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Volunteers of the Empire (1855-1898) explores the history of the Volunteer units 
that existed in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and the Philippines during the second 
half of the 19th century. These units were closely associated with the continuity of Spanish 
sovereignty, and to understandings of the empire as an extension of the Spanish Nation. 
The Volunteers have traditionally been considered the private militia of the Spanish 
colonial elite, politically conservative, and made up almost exclusively of Spaniards from 
the metropolis, the so-called peninsulares. This thesis challenges this view and explores 
the history of the Volunteers in a new light. Principally drawing on unpublished 
documents consulted in Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico (encompassing military records, 
letters, and memoirs), this thesis explores four main aspects: the reasons that motivated 
the creation of the Volunteers, the participation of colonial societies, the Volunteers’ 
relationship with the Spanish authorities, and their social and political cohesion. In a 
major revision of the existing historiography, this thesis demonstrates that both 
peninsulares and creoles participated in the Volunteers. This heterogeneity meant that the 
Volunteers’ relationship with the Spanish authorities fluctuated between loyalty and 
confrontation depending on the challenges posed to the colonial statu quo by the colonial 
policy designed in Madrid. The Volunteers were also diverse in social (there were 
peninsulares and creoles, working-class, middle-class and affluent members), and political 
terms. Conservatives, liberals, republicans, and socialists filled their ranks. The cohesive 
principle of the Volunteers resided in adherence to the idea of the Spanish Nation’s unity, 
rather than in loyalty to the imperial authorities. This thesis argues that the Volunteers 
can be held to represent the ambivalent relationship between Nation and Empire, 
something which is still poorly understood in the Spanish case despite recent advances. It 
reveals the existence of a loyalist sentiment among significant sectors of the colonial 
societies, inviting us to reconsider the political and social dimensions of the struggles for 
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There are place names mentioned in this thesis that are either rarely used today, 
have been legally changed, or are popularly used but not officially recognised. I have 
chosen to use these traditional names because they were in common use during the period 
of time covered by this thesis, and often are the only form used in primary sources. In 
some cases, they are still commonly used by Spanish speakers. This decision is not 
intended to contradict the utmost respect that I hold for the current official names of 
cities, regions or countries. Hence, I use Puerto Príncipe instead of Camagüey, Santo 
Domingo instead of Dominican Republic, Fernando Poo instead of Bioko, and Spanish 
Sahara instead of Western Sahara. In the case of Haiti, I only use Saint-Domingue when 
discussing the period before 1804, when it was given its current name. Whenever a single 
name can refer to a city and a region or a country, this is duly explained in footnotes. 
Regarding the names of persons discussed, I have always respected the original or 
traditional form, except for monarchs, which are translated into English, respecting the 
custom. Hence, Elizabeth II or Alphonse XII instead of “Isabel II” or “Alfonso XII”. 
Spanish political nomenclature has been literally translated, instead of adapted to 
the British custom. Hence, I have used deputy instead of member of parliament, minister 
instead of secretary, and president instead of prime minister. In 19th century Spain, the 
head of Government was called presidente del Consejo de Ministros (president of the 
Ministers’ Council), commonly known as presidente, or president in English. The head of 
State was either the monarch or a regent. During the First Republic (1873-1874) the 




This thesis explores the untold history of some of the people that stood by the Spanish 
Empire during the second half of the 19th century. It is a study of Spanish Loyalism in the 
colonies through the study of the Volunteers, a civilian militia that was first created in 
Cuba in 1855 and became an inherent element of Spanish imperial structure through the 
expansion of this model to Santo Domingo (1863), Puerto Rico (1864), and the Philippines 
(1896). The Volunteers became a bulwark of Spanish imperialism in the Caribbean and 
Asia, and the end of their history coincided with Spain’s withdrawal from her old empire 
in 1898.1 The Volunteers were the armed wing of the staunchest version of Spanish 
nationalism in the colonies: the integrismo, named for the defence of the integrity of a 
Spanish Nation that would encompass both the metropolitan territory and the imperial 
possessions. In a way, the Volunteers embodied this idea of Spain as an empire and a 
nation at the same time, for alongside the peninsulares (men born in metropolitan Spain), 
thousands of men born in the Spanish Antilles and the Philippines served in their ranks. 
Thus, this research is a contribution to the history shared by Spain and the nations that 
emerged from her fin-de-siècle imperial collapse. 
In this regard, this research is an innovative contribution to the historiography of 
the Spanish Empire that was left after the independence of the bulk of the old American 
empire in the 1820s.2 Spanish Loyalism in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines is an 
almost unexplored field by historians, with some brilliant exceptions. In fact, the study of 
Loyalism in the Spanish colonial context remains a fertile ground to be cultivated, though 
recently there have been thorough studies focused on the wars for independence in 
colonial Spanish America, with a great interest in the heterogeneity of Royalism, the role 
of the imperial administration, the Royalist Armies, and the effects of the Napoleonic 
invasion and the response by Spanish Liberals on both sides of the Atlantic. The studies 
by Brian R. Hamnett and Marcela Echeverri or Julio Albi de la Cuesta are perhaps the best-
known examples of this trend.3 Thanks to the advances of these pioneering works, the 
                                                 
1 The dissolution of the Volunteers in Santo Domingo came with the withdrawal of Spain by July 
1865, after a brief period of re-annexation to the old metropolis (1861-1865). 
2 For an overview on Spanish colonial historiography, see Christopher Schmidt-Nowara. “After 
‘Spain’: A Dialogue with Josep M. Fradera on Spanish Colonial Historiography”, in Antoinette 
Burton (ed.). After the Imperial Turn. Thinking with and through the Nation. Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 2003, pp. 157-169. Although this text is fourteen years old at the time of 
writing, many of its considerations still apply. 
3 Julio Albi de la Cuesta. Banderas olvidadas. El Ejército realista en América, Madrid: Instituto de 
Cooperación Iberoamericana, 1990; Marcela Echeverri. Indian and Slave Royalists in the Age of 
Revolution: Reform, Revolution, and Royalism in the Northern Andes, 1780-1825. New York: 
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study of Loyalism, for which a relatively abundant literature exists regarding the British 
case, still offers a wide range of opportunities in the case of Spain’s post-1820s empire.4  
This study is also a contribution to the wider field of Global History, which still 
today remains a largely unexploited approach for historians of Spain and Latin America, 
as pointed out by Matthew Brown.5 This research on the Volunteers engages with a series 
of issues (war, migration, slavery, and politics) that affected Spanish Loyalists from the 
Caribbean to Asia through Spain, and which also concern Global History. In this sense, 
this thesis is also informed by the approach to Global History taken by Sebastian Conrad. 
Rather than an object of study, Conrad considers Global History an approach. He stresses 
the possibilities of integration in a fluid conception of time and space. This implies how 
agents (societies, governments, armies, social, sexual or political movements, companies) 
underwent similar processes or faced similar challenges at different levels of time and 
space.6 In fact, Spanish Loyalism can be considered in a wider sense, as more concretely 
can the Volunteers, as a fertile ground for establishing connections and comparisons 
between groups of people committed to one purpose (the defence of the Spanish Empire) 
that underwent similar processes under a same imperial structure at different times 
throughout the second half of the 19th century. In Cuba, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and 
the Philippines, the Volunteers were the consequence of undergoing processes of 
migrations from Spain, nation and empire-building, and anti-colonial movements. There 
is no doubt that for those who lived through it, the history of the Volunteers was 
necessarily framed in a global context. In this sense, Conrad’s approach to Global History 
can be understood as a necessary tool for understanding the Volunteers as a phenomenon 
of integration within the Spanish imperial context. 
Volunteering is a permanent element in the history of imperial warfare. During the 
19th century, Spain itself sent volunteer battalions to Morocco and Cuba during the 1860s 
and 1870s. France conquered its African empire with volunteer soldiers (for instance, the 
                                                 
Cambridge University Press, 2016; Brian R. Hamnett. “Mexico’s Royalist Coalition: The Response to 
Revolution, 1808-1821”. Journal of Latin American Studies, 1980, vol. 12, No. 1. 
4 Thomas B. Allen. Tories: Fighting for the King in America’s First Civil War. New York: Harper 
Collins, 2010; Wallace Brown. The King’s Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American 
Loyalists Claimants. Providence: Brown University Press, 1965; John Crawford & Ian McGibbon 
(eds.). One Flag, One Queen, One Tongue. New Zealand, the British Empire and the South African 
War, 1899-1902. Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2003; Austin Gee. The British Volunteer 
Movement, 1794-1814. London: Clarendon Press, 2003; Maya Jasanoff. Liberty’s Exiles. The Loss of 
America and the Remaking of the British Empire. London: Harper Press, 2011. 
5 Matthew Brown. “The Global History of Latin America”. Journal of Global History, 2015, vol. 10, 
No. 3, pp. 365-386. 
6 Sebastian Conrad. What is Global History? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, pp. 62-114. 
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Foreign Legion), and thousands of men from Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
volunteered to fight against the Boer Republics in South Africa. But the Volunteers this 
thesis deals with were a different kind of unit. The Volunteers of the Spanish Antilles and 
the Philippines were made up of men from the metropolis and the colonies, who combined 
their regular jobs with unpaid military service and were recruited locally. Thus, they were 
different from the men that voluntarily joined the professional French Army units to 
conquer Algeria or that were organized ex professo during the Second Boer War (1899-
1902) and disbanded thereafter. 
In the British Empire, more concretely in the Cape Colony and Ireland, there were 
militias with similar characteristics to the Spanish Volunteers. In the Cape Colony, a 
Volunteer Force (1853-1910) was created to reinforce military control over the territory. 
These Volunteers were recruited from among the Cape’s British settlers and fought as 
auxiliary forces during the Zulu and Boer wars. In Ireland, the Ulster Volunteer Force (1913-
1920) was organized by Northern Irish Protestants in order to defend British rule, counter 
the projects by the British Government to grant Ireland its home rule and later the 
attempts by the Irish nationalists to put British rule to an end.7 Paradoxically, the Ulster 
Volunteers undermined the authority of the British Government by trying to impose their 
vision of Britishness in Ireland. This recalls the Volunteers’ role against the Spanish 
Government’s reformist projects for the Antilles during the 1868-1878 period, as will be 
seen in the third chapter. 
With this thesis, I aim to answer four main historiographical questions. Firstly, why 
there was a militia such as the Volunteers in the Spanish imperial context of the second 
half of the 19th century. Secondly, to what degree the colonial societies participated in the 
creation and consolidation of the Volunteers as the armed wing of Spanish Loyalism. 
Thirdly, to determine what was the relationship between the Volunteers and the colonial 
authorities in a context of decline for the Spanish Empire. Fourthly, to examine whether 
the Volunteers were a homogeneous group that represented a coherent political project.  
In a way, these questions might be summed up in one: are the Volunteers a product of the 
ambivalent relationship and interconnectedness between nation and empire in the 19th 
century Spanish context? 
                                                 
7 Robert Kee. The Green Flag. A History of Irish Nationalism. London: Penguin Books, 2000, pp. 478-
484 (first published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972). 
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There are two main reasons that enticed me to research the Volunteers to try to 
answer this question. The first one is to fill a historiographic vacuum by taking a fresh 
approach to the history of the Spanish Empire; the second is to question the veracity of a 
longstanding assumption regarding the Volunteers. 
The historical importance of the Volunteers has not raised the attention of 
historians, with just a few exceptions. This is particularly paradoxical in the Cuban case, 
for the Volunteers’ central role as an opposing force to Cuban independence has largely 
been recognised by historiography. However, only the relatively recent works by Marilú 
Uralde Cancio and María Dolores Domingo Acebrón, who focused on the formative years 
of the Volunteers and their role during the Ten Years’ War (1868-1878) respectively, can 
be counted on.8 For the Puerto Rican case, I count on the brief study by Luis González 
Cuevas, whereas no study has been written on the Volunteers in the Philippines and Santo 
Domingo.9 Prior to these studies, no monographic work was written on the Volunteers for 
more than a century. Further, the existing 19th century literature on the Volunteers is often 
closer to propaganda than to historical research, as some of the books were written by 
members of this militia with an unconcealed laudatory tone.10 
It can be understood that the reason for this historiographic vacuum is that neither 
in Spain nor in her former colonies, have historians been willing to assume the 
implications of the Volunteers’ history. Somehow the Volunteers are an uncomfortable 
episode in the shared history of Spain and the nations that emerged from the imperial 
collapse of 1898, for they represent the ambivalent relationship between empire and nation 
in the Spanish case. The frontier between both was unclear during the lifetime of the 
Volunteers, just as it was during the revolutionary processes that ended up in the 
independence of most of Spanish America in 1810-1825. In the Spanish imperial political 
culture, the American territories were considered as extensions of the nation. The 
philosopher Gustavo Bueno even considered that, in the Spanish case, the empire created 
                                                 
8 María Dolores Domingo Acebrón. Los Voluntarios y su papel contrarrevolucionario en la Guerra 
de los Diez Años en Cuba, 1868-1878. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996; Marilú Uralde Cancio. Voluntarios 
de Cuba española, 1850-1868. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2011.  
9 Luis González Cuevas ¿Defendiendo el honor? La institución de voluntarios en Puerto Rico durante 
la guerra hispanoamericana. San Juan: Ediciones Puerto, 2014. 
10 Luis Otero Pimentel. Memoria sobre los Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba. Consideraciones relativas 
a su pasado, su presente y su porvenir. Havana: La Propaganda Literaria, 1876; José Joaquín Ribó. 
Historia de los Voluntarios cubanos, 2 vols. Madrid: Imprenta y Litografía de Nicolás González, 1872-
1877; Rafael Rosado y Brincau. Bosquejo Histórico de la Institución de Voluntarios en Puerto-Rico. 
San Juan: Imp. de la Capitanía General, 1888. 
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the nation.11 The importance of interconnectedness between empire and nation has been 
pointed out by historians who work on the Spanish American wars for independence, such 
as François-Xavier Guerra, Jaime E. Rodríguez, Roberto Breña, Tomás Pérez Vejo, Antonio 
Feros or Brian Hamnett, and this thesis follows this approach.12 This thesis contributes to 
this field of study, for the persistence of the intermingled national and imperial projects 
after the 1820s remains an almost unexplored field.  The Volunteers came to embody this 
relationship as the armed wing of the ideology that advocated for the integridad nacional 
between Spain and her empire. 
Having said that, it should also be remarked upon that considering the empire as 
an extension of the nation was not a unique feature of Spanish political culture. The 
emergence of national and imperial projects in Europe during the 19th century generated 
debates on the true extension of nationhood. For instance, in Britain, advocates of “Little 
England” and “Greater Britain” debated over the true extension of Britishness, especially 
regarding the White Dominions of Canada, Australia or New Zealand.13 In the case of 
France and Portugal, some of their African colonies became part of the national territory 
over the 20th century and participated in the national political institutions. 
Although the literature in Spain on the empire lost in 1898 is abundant, it has 
generally focused on issues such as the economic relationship, slavery, and colonial policy. 
The history of Spanish nationhood in the Empire is absent, and it has only been 
approached from the institutional perspective through the integration of the colonies into 
                                                 
11 Gustavo Bueno. España frente a Europa. Barcelona: Alba Ediciones, 1999, p. 164.  
12 Roberto Breña. El imperio de las circunstancias. Las independencias hispanoamericanas y la 
revolución liberal española. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2012, pp. 21-40; Antonio Feros. Speaking of Spain. 
The evolution of race and nation in the Hispanic world. Harvard University Press: Cambridge 
(Massachusetts) & London, 2017, pp. 232-277; François-Xavier Guerra. Modernidad e 
independencias: ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispánicas. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 2000, pp. 232-238; Brian R. Hamnett. The End of Iberian Rule on the American Continent, 
1770-1830. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 72-106; Tomás Pérez Vejo. Elegía 
criolla. Una reinterpretación de las guerras de independencia hispanoamericanas. Ciudad de México: 
Tusquets Editores, 2010; Jaime E. Rodríguez O. “We are now the true Spaniards”. Sovereignty, 
Revolution, Independence, and the Emergence of the Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808-1824. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2012 (first published as Nosotros somos ahora los verdaderos españoles. 
La transición de la Nueva España de un reino de la Monarquía Española a la República Federal 
Mexicana, 2 vols. Zamora: El Colegio de Michoacán/Instituto Mora, 2009), pp. 7-33. 
13 Similar debates took place in imperial nations, such as France and Germany, but also by nations 
with no sovereign State, such as in the case of Czechs and Hungarians. Hannah Arendt. The Origins 
of Totalitarianism. Sand Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1973 (first 
published in New York: Schocken Books, 1951), pp. 222-266; Stuart Ward. “Transcending the Nation: 
A Global Imperial History?”, in Burton, After the Imperial Turn, pp. 44-56. 
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the metropolitan political system.14 In fact, the Spanish national narratives have still not 
incorporated the cases of Cuba and Puerto Rico, despite integrismo being undeniably the 
Antillean expression of Spanish nationalism.15 In a 1997 article, the US-born Spanish 
historian Enric Ucelay-Da Cal considered Cuba the birthplace of Spanish nationalism in 
the form of integrismo.16 This view has remained the exception rather than the norm, but 
there are recent works that point in the same direction. For instance, Albert García Balañá 
explored the ways in which both Spanish nationalists in Spain and Cuba explicitly 
supported imperial projects in Africa and Santo Domingo.17 In this sense, this thesis is a 
contribution to this historiographic approach which considers both Spain and the Antilles 
the core members of the Spanish national and imperial projects. 
I consider that two different one-hundred-year-long historiographical approaches 
may explain the lack of a narrative that integrates empire and nation. Firstly, the loss of 
the empire in 1898 generated a vivid debate focused on its impact on Spain’s state of 
decline, rather than on the reasons for the colonial failure.18 The intellectuals that starred 
this debate were known as Generación del 98, thus stressing the deep impact that the 
defeat of 1898 had on Spain’s conscience.19 It became a commonplace among Spanish 
                                                 
14 Inés Roldán de Montaud. La Restauración en Cuba. El fracaso de un proyecto reformista, Madrid: 
CSIC, 2000. 
15 For instance, Cuba and Puerto Rico are completely absent in the referential study on Spanish 
nationalism during the 19th century by José Álvarez Junco, Mater dolorosa: la idea de España en el 
siglo XIX. Madrid: Taurus Ediciones, 2001. Only recently the topic of Spanish nationalism in the 
Americas has been addressed, though restricted to the wars for independence in 1810-1820, Manuel 
Lucena Giraldo. “La nación imperial española y las revoluciones americanas de 1810”. Antonio 
Morales Moya, Juan Pablo Fusi & Andrés de Blas Guerrero (coord.). Historia de la nación y del 
nacionalismo o español. Madrid: Galaxia Gutenberg, 2013, pp. 217-243. 
16 Extending his argument, he argues that beyond Spanish nationalism, the replicating nationalist 
voices from the Spanish periphery (Catalonia, the Basque Country, and to some extent Galicia) owe 
much of their configuration to the struggles for and against independence that took place in Cuba 
during the second half of the 19th century. Enric Ucelay-Da Cal. “Cuba y el despertar de los 
nacionalismos en la España peninsular”. Studia Historica. Historia contemporánea, 1997, No. 15, pp. 
151-192. 
17 Albert García Balañá. “Patriotismos trasatlánticos. Raza y nación en el impacto de la Guerra de 
África en el Caribe español de 1860”. Ayer, 2017, No. 106, pp. 207-237. 
18 For an overview of the debate on Spain’s decline after 1898 see Helen Rawlings. The Debate on the 
Decline of Spain. Manchester and London: Manchester University Press, 2012, pp. 91-110.  
19 The term Generación del 98 was first coined in 1934 by the Spanish poet Pedro Salinas, and later 
spread by Pedro Laín Entralgo (1908-1991) in his La generación del noventa y ocho. Laín Entralgo 
considered that the dominant thought among the members of this Generación was the desire to 
rediscover the essence of Spain through the Castilian landscape, and to escape from imperial 
adventures for which they thought Spain was not politically, technologically and militarily 
prepared. Some of the most prominent members of this group of intellectuals were Miguel de 
Unamuno, Pío Baroja, Ramiro de Maeztu, Ángel Ganivet, Joaquín Costa, Manuel and Antonio 
Machado, Valle-Inclán, and Azorín. Pedro Laín Entralgo. La generación del noventa y ocho. Madrid: 
Diana Artes Gráficas, 1945, pp. 21-43. 
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intellectuals to consider that the imperial adventures had been a major cause of Spain’s 
decline. Consequently, Spain should focus on its inner regeneración (regeneration) and rid 
itself of any colonial burden.20 In this context, the Volunteers were a reminder that 
alongside the empire, in 1898 Spain lost part of what many in the Peninsula considered 
part of the national territory. Hence, the Volunteers might have been painful reminders of 
the defeat. Secondly, throughout a good deal of the 20th century, there was an ongoing 
debate on the essence of Spain, focused on the country’s nationhood after the loss of the 
empire, rather than in relation to the colonial past. Since Cuba and Puerto Rico were no 
longer members of the Spanish map, they have been neglected from the debate. These 
factors have made it difficult for scholars to integrate the history of the imperial territories 
lost in 1898 into the Spanish national narrative. The boundaries between nation and 
empire regarding Spain, Cuba and Puerto Rico were extremely permeable. The Volunteers, 
a militia created in the imperial territories for the defence of the Spanish Nation, is a clear 
example of this. 
In the case of Cuba and Puerto Rico, I consider that the shortage of studies on the 
Volunteers relates to the quest for nationhood of these two islands since 1898, with very 
different outcomes and many nuances. Their historiographies’ vision of their colonial past 
has generally followed the scheme of two nations struggling for their liberation against 
their colonial master, Spain. The very existence of the Volunteers is a direct challenge to 
this viewpoint. The documents held in archives largely show that thousands of Cubans 
and Puerto Ricans served in the Volunteers for the defence of the Spanish nation in the 
Antilles. David Armitage considers that “any great revolution is a civil war”, a reality which 
is often rejected by the revolutionary narrative.21 This is the pattern followed by historians 
in both the Antilles, especially in Cuba due to the history of wars for independence and 
the revolution of 1959, which differs from Puerto Rico’s colonial relation with the United 
States since 1898. The Volunteers have been largely considered simply as the peninsular 
agents on the ground of the most intransigent Spanish colonialism, and as alien to local 
society. Denying the participation of the Antillean societies in the Volunteers has been a 
strategy for building the vision of Cuba and Puerto Rico as nations struggling for their 
                                                 
20 The Regeneracionismo was a late 19th and early 20th centuries’ Spanish intellectual movement 
focused on detecting the causes of Spanish decline and proposing solutions for the modernization 
of the country. A recent overview on Regeneracionismo in Andreu Navarra Ordoño. 
Regeneracionismo. La continuidad reformista. Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 2015. 
21 David Armitage. “Every Great Revolution is a Civil War”, in Keith Michael Baker & Dan Edelstein 
(eds.). Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015, pp. 57-68. 
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freedom since the 19th century. Trying to challenge this view in the Cuban academia proves 
challenging still today. As a personal experience, an invitation to present the initial results 
of this thesis at Cuba’s National Library in September 2015, was finally cancelled for my 
“troublesome findings” about the existence of thousands of Cuban-born Volunteers. 
However, this historiographical nationalism has lately been challenged by some brave 
Cuban historians. For example, in his 2012 book on integrismo, José Abreu Cardet 
considered that “the integristas are part of our history. Many Cubans of today have an 
integrista forebear [who was] as convinced [of his cause] as his mambí [supporter of Cuban 
independence] great-grandfather”.22 This is a simple and thorough way to argue that the 
Volunteers belong to the history of Cuba just as much as the elements that fought for 
independence. The same could be said regarding Puerto Rico. 
This thesis presents novel research on the Volunteers. For the first time, it offers a 
global perspective on the phenomenon of the Volunteers. The thesis is fundamentally 
focused on the Cuban and Puerto Rican scenarios, but it also explores the short-lived 
presence of the Volunteers in the Philippines and Santo Domingo. The reason for this is 
that whereas the Volunteers had a relatively long history in Cuba (43 years) and Puerto 
Rico (34), they only existed for two years in Santo Domingo and the Philippines. Hence, 
Cuba and Puerto Rico provide a wider field in which to explore the role of the Volunteers 
as agents of the empire and nation. 
This thesis is largely built on mostly unpublished material consulted in archives 
ranging from the national to the local level in Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. The 
information generated by the Volunteer units plays an essential role, but the collection of 
primary sources that inform this study has been widened to private letters and memoirs 
from Volunteers, but also of those who challenged Spanish rule in Cuba and Puerto Rico, 
as well as newspapers and the material produced by the Spanish administration and its 
agents in the overseas and in the metropolitan territories. Most of these sources have not 
previously been consulted by historians. In building the thesis I have also relied on the 
referential historiography regarding the relationship of Spain and the colonies on issues 
such as colonial administration and politics, commercial relations, struggles for 
independence, slavery, and the labour movement, just to name the most important. 
                                                 
22 José Abreu Cardet. Apuntes sobre el integrismo en Cuba, 1868-1878. Santiago de Cuba: Editorial 
Oriente, 2012, p. 4. 
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This study is structured into five chapters. The first one offers an overview of some 
of the most characteristic features of the Volunteers: military training and duties, uniforms 
and weapons, and especially their demographic profile. Contrary to what historiography 
has traditionally claimed, that the Volunteers were a militia overwhelmingly made up of 
peninsulares, this thesis argues that there was a remarkable presence of Creoles in the 
Volunteers, especially in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Building on primary sources (Ministry of 
War and the Volunteers’ own documents) never consulted before, I conclude that in Cuba 
and Puerto Rico, the Creoles represented about half of the Volunteer force, forming the 
majority in the rural areas, whereas in the main cities the peninsulares were the dominant 
element. The information on the origin of the Volunteers in Santo Domingo and the 
Philippines is virtually non-existent, but I argue through indirect sources that most of the 
Volunteers were of peninsular extraction due to the small number of them that existed in 
both countries. 
In chapter two I analyse the creation, consolidation, and expansion of the 
Volunteers in the period 1855-1868. I argue that the Volunteers were created in 1855 to 
strengthen Spanish rule in Cuba against the movement that wanted to annex the island to 
the United States. The Volunteers were the expression of the emergence of the 
peninsulares that came to dominate the island’s politics and economy and created 
powerful communities in the island’s main cities by the mid-19th century at the expense of 
the Creole elite. Whereas businessmen were the Volunteer officers, the immigrant 
working-class filled their ranks. The consolidation of the Volunteers as a permanent 
element of the Spanish defensive system in Cuba was closely linked to their support for 
imperial adventures in Morocco and Santo Domingo in the 1860s. Once the annexationist 
threat was gone, the Volunteers’ unclear role in times of peace was redefined through an 
imperialist stance that translated into financial and logistical support for Spanish military 
efforts elsewhere. In relation to this, the Volunteers became an element associated with 
the same Spanish imperialist structures when the same model of militia created in Cuba 
in 1855 was also established in Santo Domingo (1863) and Puerto Rico (1864) for the 
defence of Spanish rule. 
Chapter three explores the role of the Volunteers during the revolutionary period 
known as Sexenio Revolucionario (1868-1874). In six years, Spain saw Queen Elizabeth II 
dethroned, a regency (1868-1871), the reign of Amadeus I (1871-1873), and the First Republic 
(1873-1874). During the Sexenio the Antilles also underwent changes and suffered lingering 
upheavals. Cuba lived its first war for independence (1868-1878), and Puerto Rico 
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experienced deep reforms such as political assimilation to the metropolis (1869) and the 
abolition of slavery (1873). I argue that the Volunteers reinforced their role as the armed 
wing of integrismo in both islands, which did not always collaborate with the Spanish 
authorities when the latter tried to alter the status quo through reformist policies. This 
was precisely the case for the Sexenio governments, which generally tried to implement 
reforms in the Antilles. During these years, the Volunteers also intensely engaged with 
Cuban society by integrating thousands of Creoles into their ranks, especially in the 
countryside. Thus, the Volunteers were a demonstration that the integrismo concerned 
peninsulares as well as Creoles, thus overcoming a certain historiographic tendency to 
associate the Spaniards with counter-revolution and Creoles with the revolution in the 
Americas.23 The heterogeneity of the Volunteers was also expressed by the class tensions 
that began to emerge during the war, expressed in the labour demands of working-class 
Volunteers against their employees in Havana. 
Chapter four examines the adaptation of Cuba’s Volunteers to the new scenario 
created during the interwar period that went from the end of the Ten Years’ War (1878) to 
the beginning of the last war for independence in 1895, and the role of their Puerto Rican 
colleagues against the local powerful autonomist movement during the 1880s. I argue that 
the legacy of the 1868-1878 war greatly determined the evolution of the Volunteers in Cuba 
and Puerto Rico. Whereas in the latter the Volunteers enjoyed a relative stability due to 
the island’s general situation, in the former the Volunteers underwent a difficult 
adaptation to peace. The assimilation of both islands to the metropolitan political system 
meant the appearance of political parties that relatively marginalized the Volunteers from 
Antillean politics. Instead of remaining a central element of Spanish politics in the 
Caribbean, the Volunteers became a repressive force when deemed necessary by the 
integristas, such as in Puerto Rico against the autonomists in 1887. However, though the 
Volunteers were associated with the integrista forces, the importance of militias tends to 
ebb away in a political party system. The Volunteers even became a force to be bargained 
with in metropolitan politics in the early 1890s, as will be seen. In Cuba, distinct problems 
originated from the legacy of the war. The devastation of the countryside during the war 
severely affected the mostly Cuban-born peasant Volunteers in the rural areas, largely 
neglected by the authorities despite plans to rebuild these with agricultural colonies. Also, 
                                                 
23 This is, for instance, the approach by the Mexican historian Romeo Flores Caballero, who 
considers the Spaniards as agents of counter-revolution in Mexico during the 18th to the 19th 
centuries. See Romeo Flores Caballero. Revolución y contrarrevolución en la Independencia de 
México, 1767-1867. Mexico City: Océano, 2009. 
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the growing influence of an organized labour movement and the influx of peninsular 
conscripts into the Volunteers complicated the relationship with the Spanish authorities, 
who would not find a clear redefinition of the Volunteers’ military role during peacetime, 
even if the fight against banditry offered a good opportunity. 
Chapter five investigates the role of the Volunteers during the wars that brought 
the Spanish Empire to its end in the Caribbean and in Asia: the Cuban war for 
independence (1895-1896), the Filipino Revolution (1896-1898), and the Spanish-American 
War (1898). I argue that the Volunteers became again an important element for the 
Spanish defensive system in the islands during these wars. In Cuba, their wide presence in 
rural areas was vital for the war that was fundamentally fought in the countryside for and 
against the protection of agricultural wealth. Often, the Volunteers were the only Spanish 
troops available in the countryside, which made them priority targets for the insurgents. 
The Volunteers also took part in the most dramatic event of the entire war for 
independence: the forced concentration of thousands of peasants that ended up in the 
death of nearly 10% of the island’s population. The chapter shows that the Volunteers’ role 
in this drama was ambivalent, for they participated as victimizers, but also as victims in a 
highly complex situation caused by the strategies of the Spanish and the Cuban rebel sides. 
The inherent association of the Volunteers with 19th century Spanish imperialism 
had another expression with the creation of the Volunteers in the Philippines in 1896 in 
the context of the Filipino Revolution (1896-1898). Even in a context so different from Cuba 
and Puerto Rico in terms of demography and socio-economic structure, the Volunteers 
appeared as a bulwark of integrismo during the final years of Spanish domination in the 
archipelago. The Cuban and Puerto Rican examples were imitated in the Asian colony, yet 
with a particularity: The Volunteers were segregated by race between units of peninsulares 
and of native Filipinos. This was the adaptation of the same model in a different context. 
Finally, in this chapter, I also explore the role of the Volunteers during the war 
against the United States that took place between April and August 1898 in Cuba, the 
Philippines, and Puerto Rico. Their military role clearly depended on the performance by 
the Spanish regular Army. Wherever these forces resisted, the Volunteers resisted. 
Wherever they collapsed, the Volunteers followed and even joined the enemy in some 
cases. I consider that desertions especially affected the Volunteers born in the overseas 
territories, who feared that after a foreseeable Spanish defeat they might suffer reprisals 
from their fellow countrymen that had supported independence.
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CHAPTER I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE VOLUNTEERS 
This chapter aims to answer two very basic questions. The first is what the Volunteers did, 
and who they were. The answer to the first question will explore issues such as their 
organization, military duties of the Volunteers, their military training, their weapons, and 
uniforms. This will offer an overview of the Volunteers’ organization, and some of the 
characteristics of their relationship with the military authorities, their esprit de corps, and 
their relations with local societies. To do this, this section will examine the reglamentos or 
regulations of the Volunteers in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and of the Philippines’ native 
companies. The archipelago’s Spanish Volunteers had their own reglamento, but I have 
not been able to consult the relevant documents.1 The Volunteers in Santo Domingo 
lacked a reglamento, but according to the existing evidence their organization was based 
on the Cuban model.2 
The second question has to do with who the Volunteers were or rather, where they 
came from. Who were the men that donned the Volunteers’ uniform in Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
Santo Domingo, and the Philippines? Were they migrants from metropolitan Spain, sons 
of the colonies, or a mixture of both? What was their racial background? These questions, 
though they may seem simple, do not have an easy answer. The basic source of information 
available for determining the backgrounds of the Volunteers—the military records—are 
fragmented and incomplete. 
Nonetheless, trying to answer this question is worth the effort, for its potential 
implications regarding the nationhood of the territories that made part of the Spanish 
Empire prior to 1898, and regarding the very concept of the Spanish Nation as well. 
According to the archives consulted, nearly half the Volunteers in Cuba were Cuban-born. 
In Puerto Rico, the presence of Creole Volunteers is proved. In Santo Domingo, the 
evidence suggests that the presence of local Volunteers was rather small. Finally, in the 
Philippines, the Volunteers were theoretically segregated between units of Europeans and 
native men. 
Analysis of the ‘national’ background of the Volunteers forces us to rethink the 
boundaries between Nation and Empire in the fin-de-siècle Spanish case. Indeed, the data 
found show us that these boundaries were blurry rather than well-defined. In other words, 
                                                 
1 The only existing copy is kept at the National Library of the Philippines, in Manila. Reglamento 
provisional de los cuerpos de Voluntarios de Filipinas. Manila: Imp. de Amigos del País, 1897. 
2 AGMM, Ministerio de la Guerra, “Organización y aprobación del uniforme del Batallón de 
Voluntarios de Santo Domingo (1863-1865)”, sig. 5664.5. 
13 
 
the idea of belonging to the Spanish nation went well beyond the limits of the Iberian 
Peninsula and reached a considerable part of the societies of Cuba and Puerto Rico. The 
presence of Cubans and Puerto Ricans in a militia of civilians committed to the defence of 
the Spanish Nation and its empire in exchange for no economic compensation is proof of 
that. Hence, our thesis is an invitation to reconsider the well-established historiography 
on the evolution of the national projects in Spain and its overseas dominions. Works of 
reference on this topic largely omit the existence of this transatlantic sense of a Spanish 
community. For instance, the idea of the Spanish Nation in the imperial territories is 
totally absent in the work by José Álvarez Junco on the evolution of the Spanish nationality 
during the 19th century. In the former Spanish territories, this vision is mirrored regarding 
the emergence of the Cuban and Puerto Rican nations. For the US-based Cuban historian 
Louis A. Pérez, Jr., by the mid-19th century, the idea of a Cuban nation had already been 
forged in opposition to Spanish rule.3 In the case of Puerto Rico, historians have often 
argued that Spanish Loyalists were almost exclusively peninsulares.4 
I argue that whereas this approach to the issue of nationality in Spain, Cuba, or 
Puerto Rico is partially valid, it does not embrace the complexity of their societies. It is 
true that by mid-19th century a strong and distinctive sense of nationality different to the 
Spanish had persuaded wide segments of the Cuban and Puerto Rican populations, and 
that the sentiment of belonging to the Spanish Nation was stronger in the Peninsula.5 
However, I argue that a sense of identification with the Spanish Nation also existed among 
wide sectors of Cuban and Puerto Rican societies. Their presence among the Volunteer 
ranks is proof thereof. Santo Domingo and the Philippines were particular cases in their 
own right. For different reasons, the Volunteers in these countries were overwhelmingly 
peninsulares. The short period of reincorporation of Santo Domingo into the Spanish 
Monarchy (1861-1865) had not allowed for the development of a sense of belonging to the 
Spanish Nation. In the Philippines, the sense of Spanish nationhood was restricted to the 
                                                 
3 Louis A. Pérez, Jr. Cuba. Between Reform & Revolution. New York & Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995 (first published in 1988), pp. 105-155. 
4 Olga Jiménez de Wagenheim. Puerto Rico. An Interpretive History from pre-Columbian Times to 
1900. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1998, pp. 137-192. 
5 Of course, this does not mean that nationalization in Spain was not contested. By the 1880s and 
1890s there were incipient nationalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country, whereas 
some historians have argued that the working-class were only weakly incorporated into the idea of 
a Spanish nation. Xosé M. Núñez Seixas. “Nación y nacionalismos en la España contemporánea”, in 
Manuel Menéndez Alzamora & Antonio Robles Eges (eds.). Pensamiento político en la España 
contemporánea. Madrid: Trotta, 2013, pp. 275-312; Manuel Tuñón de Lara. “Nacionalismos y la lucha 
de clases en la España contemporánea”. Iglesia viva: revista de pensamiento cristiano, 1981, No. 95-
96, pp. 429-446. 
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tiny community of peninsulares or of Filipinos of Spanish descent, whereas the Spanish 
culture remained alien to most of the archipelago’s population. 
 
1. What did a Volunteer do? 
According to the reglamentos, the Volunteers were created to collaborate with the regular 
forces in keeping public order and defending Spanish sovereignty. This was reflected with 
little variations in the regulations of Cuba’s (1856, 1869, 1892), and Puerto Rico’s Volunteers 
(1870, 1888). The Volunteers of Santo Domingo and the Spanish Volunteers of the 
Philippines probably functioned in a very similar way to their colleagues in the Antilles. In 
Cuba, the Volunteer units were organized into sections, companies, battalions, and 
regiments of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and Marines. Infantry always represented the bulk 
of the Volunteers. In Puerto Rico and the Philippines there were only infantry units. The 
lack of artillery or cavalry units is not mentioned in their reglamentos but was probably 
caused by the hilly orography of both countries, which recommended the use of foot 
soldiers rather than cavalry. The number of sections, companies, battalions, and regiments 
was left to the convenience of the Captain General, who decided over their creation and 
dissolution. Since 1869, the Segundo Cabo was officially appointed Subinspector General de 
Voluntarios. Only in the reglamentos of Puerto Rico (1888) and the Philippines (1897) are 
the number of units mentioned: 14 battalions and a loose company, and 30 companies 
respectively. 
The organization of the units was quite like the Army. The basic operative unit was 
the company, which was made up of a captain, 2 1st lieutenants, 2 2nd lieutenants, 5 
sergeants, 13 corporals, 1 bugle, and 80-126 volunteers. A company had 3 sections (of ca. 
25-40 men), a battalion had 6-8 companies, and a regiment had 2 battalions. Sections were 
commanded by a 2nd lieutenant or a lieutenant, companies by a captain, battalions, and 
regiments by a colonel. Coordinating all the units, the Segundo Cabo or vice-captain 
general was appointed from 1869 Subinspector General de Voluntarios. Advising the 
Subinspector General, there was a Plana Mayor General on each island, made up of 
Volunteers: a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, two majors, and five captains.6 
                                                 
6 Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba. Havana: Imprenta del Gobierno y 
Capitanía General, 1869, cap. I, art. 1-7; Novísimo Reglamento del Instituto de Voluntarios de la Isla 
de Cuba aprobado por Real Decreto de 7 de julio de 1892; Comentado y anotado con numerosas 
disposiciones, formularios y apéndices conteniendo la parte de las Ordenanzas del Ejército aplicable 
a los mismos; el Tratado 2º del Código de Justicia Militar y el Reglamento de Voluntarios de Puerto 
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All the Volunteers had to be men between the ages of 16-18 and 40-50 (depending 
on the island), and Spaniards, with the exception of the native Filipino Volunteers. This 
included all the free inhabitants of Cuba and Puerto Rico, but only a minority in the 
Philippines. They had to be economically self-sufficient, and able to afford their own 
weapon, uniform, and horse (in the case they joined a cavalry unit). Contrary to what has 
often been argued, former convicts or men of “bad reputation” were not allowed into the 
Volunteers. Active members of the Army, the Navy and the administration could only join 
the Volunteers after their retirement.7 In fact, former Army officers and sergeants who 
stayed in the colonies often joined the Volunteers with the ranks they had reached in the 
Army. 
The military preparation was quite basic. According to the reglamentos of 1856, 
1869 (Cuba), and 1870 (Puerto Rico), the only military training was provided on holiday 
days between November and January. This coincided with the zafra, or sugar harvest when 
the commercial activity of Cuba came to a halt because the island’s main export, sugar, 
was being collected. This is a reminder of the fact that people employed in commerce were 
the backbone of the Volunteers. While their shops and companies were in a state of low 
activity, the Volunteers could better combine their regular jobs with military training. This 
calendar did not fit with the activities in the countryside, which were more intense 
precisely during the months of the zafra. The influx of thousands of peasants to the 
Volunteers after 1869 resulted in the units in the countryside not following this calendar. 
Accordingly, the reglamentos of 1888 (Puerto Rico) and 1892 (Cuba) changed the military 
training calendar, leaving the decision to the Captain General. 
Military training consisted of learning the Volunteers’ reglamento, basic military 
training such as foot drills, marksmanship and taking care of weaponry. Such a basic 
military training usually produced no great fighters. In fact, the low preparation of the 
Volunteers was often denounced by the military authorities who had to count on them for 
taking part in military operations. The Volunteers were prepared enough to patrol the 
                                                 
Rico, é índices cronológico y alfabético. Havana: P. Fernández y Compañía, 1892, cap. I, art. 1-21; 
Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de la isla de Puerto Rico. San Juan. Imprenta del 
Gobierno y Capitanía General, 1870, cap. I, art. 1-6; Isla de Puerto-Rico. Reglamento para los cuerpos 
de Voluntarios de la misma, aprobado por Real Orden de 10 de julio de 1888. Puerto Rico: Imp. de la 
Capitanía General, 1888, cap. I, art. 1-6.     
7 Uralde Cancio. Voluntarios de Cuba española, pp. 73-77; Reglamento para los cuerpos de 
Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba (1869), cap. II, art. 8-20; Novísimo Reglamento del Instituto de 
Voluntarios de la Isla de Cuba (1892), cap. II, art. 22-27; Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios 
de la isla de Puerto Rico (1870), cap. II, art. 7-19; Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de 
[Puerto Rico] (1888), cap. II, art. 7-19. 
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cities, garrison military hospitals, prisons, and forts, but not to fight a war. The military 
preparation in the countryside was still irregular, but better than in the cities. After all, 
peasants were familiar with firearms for hunting and knew the terrain perfectly.8 
During peacetime, the Volunteers’ main military duties were to garrison forts, 
prisons, military hospitals, and to take part in parades alongside the Army. Apart from the 
parades, which were performed on some holidays, the rest of the duties were performed 
generally once a week. This is, every Volunteer had to be on duty at least once per week. 
During wartime, their duties in the cities were rather the same. In the countryside, 
however, the Volunteers had a direct role in military operations. 
The Volunteers were recruited and operated locally. They could not be deployed 
to serve outside their town unless they were mobilized by the Captaincy General during 
wartime. Mobilization often only affected Volunteer units in big cities and consisted of the 
forcible deployment of companies to the countryside. During the mobilization, the 
Volunteers had to abide by the same strict discipline as the regular soldiers, but also 
theoretically received a small stipend, which nevertheless was often never received.9 
Evidence suggests that the Volunteers were weak combatants when fighting alone. 
When a town was attacked by the rebels during the wars for independence in Cuba, the 
Volunteers often surrendered when they were the only defenders. This attitude might also 
be explained by the fact that, in the countryside, the Volunteers were Cuban peasants who 
feared retaliation against them, their families and their properties. In fact, if captured in 
combat, these Cuban Volunteers faced an almost certain death, for the insurgents 
considered them as traitors. However, when these troops fought alongside the regular 
Army, they often proved reliable forces, being used to perform auxiliary tasks, or even to 
hold the line alongside regular soldiers. The better preparation of the regular soldiers and 
the very presence of the Army encouraged the Volunteers to intensify their performance. 
                                                 
8 Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba. Havana: Imprenta del Gobierno y 
Capitanía General, 1856, cap. II, art. 1-2; Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de la isla de 
Cuba (1869), cap. V, art. 27-33; Novísimo Reglamento del Instituto de Voluntarios de la Isla de Cuba 
(1892), cap. VI, art. 51-58; Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de la isla de Puerto Rico (1870), 
cap. V, art. 26-32; Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de [Puerto Rico] (1888), cap. V, art. 
26-32. 
9 Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba (1856), cap. I, art. 1-8; Reglamento 
para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba (1869), cap. VI, art. 34-43; Novísimo Reglamento 
del Instituto de Voluntarios de la Isla de Cuba (1892), cap. VII, art. 60-72; Reglamento para los cuerpos 
de Voluntarios de la isla de Puerto Rico (1870), cap. VI, art. 33-42; Reglamento para los cuerpos de 
Voluntarios de [Puerto Rico] (1888), cap. VI, art. 33-42. 
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It is important to mention that the Volunteers received no salary or stipend unless 
they were mobilized. The only Volunteers to receive an allowance were the cabos furrieles 
(corporals which took care of administering the units’ funds), and the members of the 
military band, for they were often required to perform on holidays, at bullfights, or special 
events.10 In fact, they had to provide their own uniform and weapons. Often, the Volunteer 
colonels, commanders of the battalions, were affluent members who paid for the uniforms 
and weapons of their men. On other occasions, officers collected money to pay for the 
uniforms and weapons of their men. In the countryside it became a common practice that 
neighbours collected money to pay for the uniforms and weapons for the local Volunteers. 
The uniform of the Volunteers was quite similar in Cuba and Puerto Rico. It was 
made of cotton and consisted of white trousers and a blue-striped white jacket, with a 
panama hat decorated with a Spanish-flag-coloured cockade, military boots, and belting. 
There were minor differences, especially on the jacket cuffs and flaps, where they bore 
their rank insignia and the symbol of their branch (infantry, cavalry, artillery, Marines) 
and unit (battalion or company nº). 
Weaponry was not standardised, but for infantry forces it usually consisted of a 
long firearm (fundamentally Remington, but also Peabody, Minié, or Chassepot), and a 
machete. Artillery Volunteers had a short firearm (pistol or revolver), whereas cavalry 
units were armed with a long firearm (shorter than that of foot soldiers), a sabre, and more 
rarely, spears. Officers of all branches were armed with a pistol or a revolver, and a sabre. 
Weapons were bought by private companies or the Spanish Ministry of War.11 A 
particularity of the Volunteers was that they could keep their weapons at home. However, 
when they left the militia, they had to give it up to the military authorities.12 
The companies of Filipino native Volunteers, created in 1897, functioned quite 
differently. They were divided into “locals” and “mobilized”. The former had to be men of 
18-50 years, and the latter 20-40. In both cases, the Volunteers received the same stipend 
                                                 
10 Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba (1869), cap. XIII, art. 133-142; 
Novísimo Reglamento del Instituto de Voluntarios de la Isla de Cuba (1892), cap. XII, art. 155-165; 
Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de la isla de Puerto Rico (1870), cap. XIII, art. 131-138; 
Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de [Puerto Rico] (1888), cap. XIII, art. 136-146. 
11 For instance, the Ministry of War Budget for 1871-1872 included 1 million pesetas to build 
Remington rifles that were to be bought by Cuba’s Volunteers. Gaceta de Madrid, 18-04-1872, p. 172.  
12 In small towns the weapons had to be given to the closest Comandancia Militar (military 
command), in Havana and Manila to the Maestranza de Artillería (Artillery headquarters and 
factory) and to the Comandania de Artillería (Artillery headquarters) in Puerto Rico. Domingo 
Acebrón. Los Voluntarios, pp. 35-36; Ribó. Historia de los Voluntarios cubanos, p. 477; Uralde 
Cancio. Voluntarios de Cuba española, pp. 68-73.  
18 
 
as the native Filipinos serving in the Spanish Army. Since the authorities did not rely on 
the loyalty of these men, all their weapons (a Freire-Bull rifle and a bolo, or traditional 
Filipino dagger) was provided by the military authorities and kept in barracks, not at 
home. Also, all their officers had to be active members of the regular Army. The thirty 
companies created in 1897 consisted of 5 officers and 219 soldiers, who were always 
embedded into regular Army battalions. The native Volunteers were often used as 
skirmishers and pathfinders for the regular soldiers.13 
 
2. Who were the Volunteers? 
The basic source of information about the background of the Volunteers comes from the 
membership lists and the individual military records kept at Spain’s General Military 
Archives of Madrid and Segovia respectively. A thorough examination of all the thousands 
of men that served in the Volunteers in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and the 
Philippines between 1855 and 1898, would give us the exact background map of these men.  
However, these lists are incomplete and non-standardized, as they lacked a 
concrete regulation. Some companies and battalions recorded their men in detail, 
including their name, surname, birthplace, age, rank, profession, and in some case, even 
their race. Others only recorded their full name, age, and rank. And for others, the lists 
have simply been lost. There is also an additional difficulty for the researcher. Whereas 
most of Cuba’s Volunteers records have been kept at the General Military Archive in 
Madrid, the detailed membership list of their colleagues in Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, 
and the Philippines have not been kept for reasons unknown. 
Thus, the information collected for this thesis, until now unpublished in an 
academic treatise, regarding the background of the Volunteers is not complete and very 
fragmentary. Hence, this thesis has thoroughly explored indirect sources, both primary 
and secondary, such as military reports, memoirs, personal letters, and newspapers, which 
give us some hints about the Volunteers’ background. However, due to the lack of 
information regarding the records for the Volunteers in Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and 
the Philippines, the information on the Cuban scenario is far more detailed than in the 
other cases. 
                                                 
13 Reglamento de las Compañías de Voluntarios Indígenas creadas por Decreto de 16 de Octubre de 




It is impossible to establish the exact number of men that donned the uniform of 
Voluntario between the creation of this militia in 1855, and its dissolution in 1898. 
However, they certainly were tens of thousands. Five years after their creation, in 1860, 
there were already ca. 12,000 of them.14 During the Ten Years’ War, their numbers peaked 
at 80,000, dropping to 60,000 during the interwar period that preceded the war of 1895-
1898, when the Volunteers reached up to 85,000 men. 
Throughout their history of over forty years, the ranks of the Volunteers in Cuba 
reflected the society in which they had originated. Far from the traditional opinion that 
the Volunteers were fundamentally a militia of peninsulares, the ranks of these men were 
Cuban-born as much as they were metropolitan Spaniards. Writing in 1872, the New York-
based Spanish journalist and former Voluntario José Ferrer de Couto considered that out 
of the 80,000 Volunteers, over 52,000 were born in Cuba.15 Despite this datum, to establish 
the exact percentage of Cubans and peninsulares among the Volunteers is virtually 
impossible due to the reasons given in the pages above. 
Nonetheless, there seems to have been an informal spatial division between the 
urban and the rural areas of the island. Whereas the members’ lists of the companies and 
battalions in the cities tended to show a predominance of peninsulares, the men born in 
Cuba were usually countryside Volunteers for the most part. This was the result of the 
configuration of the Cuban society from the mid-19th century. Most of the migrants from 
metropolitan Spain settled in the cities and found employment in commerce, transport, 
and cigar-making. This was the bedrock of the Volunteers in urban Cuba. In the 
                                                 
14 More concretely 11,802. They were organized into ten battalions, 30 loose companies, and 51 
sections of infantry (7,278 men), and 11 squadrons, and 193 sections of cavalry (5,524 men). Cuerpos 
de Voluntarios de la Isla de Cuba. Escalafón general de señores jefes, oficiales y sargentos por el orden 
de antigüedad en 1º de enero de 1860. Havana: Imprenta del Gobierno y Capitanía General, 1860, p. 
13. 
15 José Ferrer de Couto (1820-1877) was a native of Galicia who settled in New York in 1860 after 
following a career as a soldier and journalist in Spain. He wrote extensively on the Spanish 
colonization of the Americas and in favour of slavery. He created the Spanish Government-funded 
El Cronista de Nueva York in 1863 as a platform to defend Spain’s interests in the United States. He 
was also an intelligence agent of the Spanish consulate in New York where there was an active 
Cuban nationalist exile community. By the end of 1868 he joined Havana’s Artillery Volunteer 
Battalion and fought during the first stages of the Ten Years’ War. José Ferrer de Couto. Cuba puede 
ser independiente: folleto político de actualidad. New York: Imprenta de “El Cronista”, 1872, pp. 85-
86; Daniel Fernández de Miguel. El enemigo yanqui. Las raíces conservadoras del antiamericanismo 
español. Zaragoza: Geneuve Ediciones, 2012, pp. 44-48; Otero Pimentel. Memoria sobre los 
Voluntarios, p. 71; Andrés Sánchez Padilla. Enemigos íntimos. España y los Estados Unidos antes de 
la guerra de Cuba (1865-1898). Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2016, p. 62. 
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countryside, alongside thousands of slaves and former slaves in the sugar-producing areas, 
Cuban-born free peasants—popularly known as guajiros—worked in agriculture, 
especially in the tobacco and coffee fields, which did not rely to a large extent on enslaved 
manpower. Most of the Volunteers in the countryside were guajiros. 
To establish the exact percentage of criollos and peninsulares in the Volunteers is 
impossible. Quite often, the units’ membership lists did not disclose information on the 
birthplace of their members. Fortunately, this was not always the case. A partial review of 
the Volunteer units in Havana during the Ten Years’ War, shows us that the percentage of 
peninsulares tended to be 70-90%.16 In the countryside area of Guantánamo, in eastern 
Cuba, on the contrary, the Cubans usually represented 55-95%. Areas which combined an 
important urban centre with a vast agricultural vicinity followed the same tendency.17 This 
was the case of the city of Matanzas and its hinterland. Whereas in the city the 
peninsulares represented nearly 70% of the Volunteers, in the nearby rural area the Cubans 
comprised over 55%.18 
As to the years of the war of 1895-1898, the percentages remained much the same. 
Yet still, many units did not include information on the birthplace of their members. Just 
as in the previous war, the traditional assumption was to consider that these men were 
merely migrants from metropolitan Spain. However, the study of this war by John 
Lawrence Tone highlighted that the presence of Cubans among the Volunteers was far 
from a rarity. The data consulted here point in the same direction. Considering that the 
member lists do not always provide the information, I have resorted to the lethal casualties 
list published by the Spanish Ministry of War during the conflict. After having checked 
the complete list of 60,000 entrances, it was found that almost 1,800 Volunteers died 
during the war, of whom ca. 44% were Cuban-born.19 
                                                 
16 The data are taken from surveys of AGMM, Ultramar, Capitanía General de Cuba, Subinspección 
General de Voluntarios, cajas 3526-3530. 
17 The data are taken from surveys of AGMM, Ultramar, Capitanía General de Cuba, Subinspección 
General de Voluntarios, cajas 3658-3660. 
18 The data are taken from Benito González del Tánago. Estadística de los Voluntarios existentes en 
31 de julio de 1869 en Matanzas, Cabezas, Ceiba-Mocha, Corral-Nuevo, Canasí, Guanábana, Sabanilla 
del Encomendador, Bolondrón, Unión de Reyes, Madruga, Güira de Macuriges y Alacranes, con 
expresión de las clases, nombres y apellidos, edad, pueblos y provincias de donde son naturales. 
Havana: Imprenta La Intrépida, 1869. 
19 The data are taken from the Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra, published by the Ministry 
of War between 22nd March 1896 and 7th June 1900. These lists cover the entirety of the war, between 
February 1895 and December 1898. 
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Regarding race, the Volunteers reflected the Cuban population’s composition and 
hierarchization. During the second half of the 19th century, Cuba was a white-dominated 
diverse society. So were the Volunteers. Since the conquest and colonization of the 
Americas, the Spaniards had established a system of castas giving different legal status to 
people of European, indigenous American, and African descent. The Spaniards (whites) 
were the privileged group that held political, social, and economic power in the colonial 
societies of Spanish America. They were followed by the free yet subservient indios, and 
the unfree Africans, who only gradually were granted the means to achieve personal 
liberty. The social boundaries between the castas were less rigid than the legal statuses, 
and over the centuries sexual intercourse between the different groups produced growing 
numbers of mestizos, mulattoes, and zambos. The castas legal system was abolished by 
the Cádiz Constitution (1812), but the social-hierarchic dynamics established by three 
centuries of colonial practices outlived its legal abolition.20 Hence, during the 19th century, 
Cuba was a society in which whites had the upper hand. Black Cubans were only gradually 
granted freedom until slavery was finally abolished in 1886. Of course, the very definition 
of “white” and “black” was often problematic in a diverse colonial society such as Cuba’s. 
The “racial” distinction could have been clearer when referring to peninsulares or people 
born in Africa. Regarding families with a long presence in Cuba, the concept of “white” 
and “black” often depended on the phenotype and social status, and perception, rather 
than on the actual ethnic background. 
In quantitative terms, whites and blacks were the bulk of Cuba’s population. In 
1846, whites made up 47.4% and blacks 52.6 respectively. In 1899 the balance had shifted 
to 66.1% white and 32.2 black. This “whitening” process was the result of a conscious policy 
aimed at increasing the number of whites on the island. This was achieved through the 
massive arrival of Spanish immigrants during the 19th century. Apart from whites and 
blacks, there was also a minority of Chinese ‘coolies’, which reached a peak of 3.3% in 1877, 
and a tiny community of Taínos, the island’s original inhabitants, at the eastern tip of 
Cuba, near the towns of Baracoa and Guantánamo.21 
Among whites, there were also hierarchies. The population of Spanish descent was 
made up of criollos, or Creoles (born in the Americas) and peninsulares (born in 
                                                 
20 Feros. Speaking of Spain, pp. 189-231; David Sartorius. Ever Faithful. Race, Loyalty, and the Ends of 
Empire in Spanish Cuba. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013, pp. 21-51. 
21 The information on the demographic percentages is taken from Joan Casanovas. Bread, or Bullets! 
Urban Labor and Spanish Colonialism in Cuba, 1850-1898. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 
1998, p. 54, table 10. 
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metropolitan Spain). The privileged position of the former began to be contested by the 
massive arrival of the latter from the 1830s. During the second half of the 19th century, 
peninsulares gradually came to dominate administration, commerce, and politics in Cuba, 
despite never reaching more than 10% of the population. The Spanish authorities 
considered the peninsulares a key element for controlling Cuba, as the criollos’ loyalty to 
Spain was considered doubtful. The paramount role of Creoles in the independence of 
Spanish America was in the back of the minds of colonial governors throughout the 
century. The creation of the Volunteers must be understood in relation to this social 
hierarchy, for its very inception was aimed at arming the peninsulares and marginalizing 
the criollos from the military system. However, as will be seen throughout the thesis, 
matters proved to be much more complex as there was also a strong Spanish criollo 
Loyalism. 
To establish the percentage of whites and blacks/mulattoes in the Volunteers is 
impossible, for the documentation produced by the units only rarely disclosed information 
about the racial background of their members. However, all the evidence suggests that the 
Volunteers were predominantly white. The first organizers of the Volunteers in 1855 were 
mostly wealthy peninsulares linked to commercial activity, who recruited their employees, 
often peninsulares as well. But after the start of the Ten Years’ War in 1868, a wave of 
criollos joined the Volunteers, especially in the countryside, as Spanish rule was seriously 
threatened. Thus, at least since 1868, the bedrock of the Voluntarios was the immigrant 
community of peninsulares and white Cuban peasants. 
The presence of black and mulatto Volunteers is also well documented. This is 
consistent with the argument of David Sartorius, who considers that until 1898 there was 
a minority of Cubans of African descent who considered that they could be granted more 
civil rights under the Spanish rule.22 A Batallón de Voluntarios movilizados de color was 
created in 1869, and there were units of “coloured” Volunteers throughout the wars fought 
between 1868 and 1898.23 The number of black Volunteers in some units was quite relevant. 
Out of the hundreds of Volunteers member lists consulted, only one disclosed their racial 
background. In 1876, the Volunteers infantry section of Cuartón del Indio (a small village 
                                                 
22 Sartorius. Ever Faithful, pp. 187-216. 
23 For instance, the black civil rights activist Rodolfo de Lagardère created on 24th April 1898 the 
Voluntarios de Color and the Batallón Urbano de Color de La Habana. AGMM, Ultramar, Capitanía 
General de Cuba, Subinspección General de Voluntarios, caja 4690; Gil Gelpí y Ferro. Historia de la 
revolución y guerra de Cuba. Havana: Tipografía de la Gaceta Oficial, 1887, p. 161; Sartorius. Ever 
Faithful, pp. 214-215. 
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near the town of Guantánamo) reported that a third of its members were of African 
descent. In the nearby village of Palma de San Juan, evidence was even found of an African-
born Volunteer (from “Guinea”), probably a former slave.24 
 
2.2. Puerto Rico 
Unlike in the Cuban case, the member lists of the Volunteer units in Puerto Rico have not 
been kept. Understandably, this is an unsurmountable barrier that impedes the offering 
of any precise data on the presence of peninsulares and Puerto Ricans in the smaller of the 
Spanish Antilles. Thus, I have resorted to secondary references that nonetheless tell us a 
story similar to the Cuban scenario. 
As in Cuba, though in smaller numbers, thousands of men donned the Volunteers’ 
uniform in Puerto Rico since their creation in 1864 and their dissolution after the 
occupation of the island by the United States in 1898. By 1884 there were 4,700 Volunteers 
on the island.25 By 1890, the estimates ranged between 5,000 and 6,000 members.26 Thanks 
to a thorough publication that includes the name and rank of the Volunteers—though not 
the birthplace—it is known that by 1896, there were exactly 7,135 Volunteers in Puerto 
Rico.27 At the time of the US declaration of war on Spain in April 1898, their numbers 
peaked at 7,930.28 
As for the Cuban case, the historiography has tended to consider Puerto Rico’s 
Volunteers as little less than the ‘militia of the peninsular merchants’.29 However, primary 
and secondary sources reveal that both Puerto Ricans and peninsulares joined the 
Voluntarios. Their very creator, José Ramón Fernández, marquis of La Esperanza, was a 
Puerto Rican landowner and sugar producer who relied on the powerful community of 
                                                 
24 Out of 87 men, of whom 85 were Cuban-born, 6 were pardos (Mulatto), and 22 morenos (Black). 
AGMM, Ultramar, Capitanía General de Cuba, Subinspección General de Voluntarios, caja 301. 
25 Ejército de Puerto-Rico. Estado militar de todas las armas é institutos y escalafón general de los 
jefes, oficiales, sargentos 1º de Infantería en 1º de enero de 1884. Puerto-Rico: Imprenta y Litografía de 
la Capitanía General, 1884, p. 7.  
26 See, for instance, the 1889-1890 debate on the right to vote for the Volunteers in Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes, 22-04-1890, p. 4493. 
27 Provincia de Puerto Rico. Instituto de Voluntarios de la Isla de Puerto Rico. Estado militar y 
escalafón general de los Sres. Jefes, oficiales, médicos, capellanes, músicos mayores, sanitarios en 
activo, supernumerarios, honorarios y exentos de servicio en 1º de marzo de 1896. San Juan: Est. Tip. 
de Francisco J. Marxuach, 1896, p. 15.  
28 Ángel Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la Guerra Hispano-Americana en Puerto Rico. Madrid: Sucesores 
de Rivadeneyra, 1922, p. 450. 
29 Astrid Cubano Iguina. El hilo en el laberinto. Claves de la lucha política en Puerto Rico (siglo XIX). 
San Juan: Ediciones Huracán, 1990, p. 61. 
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peninsulares that controlled commerce in San Juan—the island’s capital—for the 
organization of the first Volunteer battalion in 1864.30 Over the years, more Volunteer 
companies and battalions were created throughout the island, incorporating Puerto 
Ricans as well as peninsulares. In 1888 a fifth of the Volunteer officers was born in Puerto 
Rico.31 As for the rank-and-file Voluntarios, the presence of natives of the island was 
probably much higher. The Puerto Rican Spanish Army officer Ángel Rivero Méndez 
acknowledged the presence of many of his fellow countrymen in the Volunteers’ militia.32 
Other indirect sources seem to point in the same direction. For instance, in the 
Autumn of 1895 the military commander of Ponce, the island’s second most important 
city, reported to the captain general in San Juan that most of the Volunteers in his area 
were employed as coffee-pickers, a job usually conducted by Puerto Rican peasants of 
Spanish or mixed Taíno-Spanish descent, popularly known as jíbaros.33 Thus, though 
lacking precise numbers, the presence of Puerto Ricans among the Volunteers can be 
inferred. Besides, the existence of these jíbaro Volunteers in the countryside indicates that 
the spatial distribution seen for Cuba’s Volunteers (peninsulares in the cities, Creoles in 
the rural areas) was also valid for the Puerto Rican case. 
As to the racial composition of the Volunteers in Puerto Rico, no reference was 
found to the presence of men of African descent in their ranks, unlike in the Cuban case. 
This is rather surprising, for non-Whites represented ca. 40% of the island’s population by 
the end of the 19th century.34 Despite the limited sources, it might be suggested that this 
                                                 
30 AHN, Ultramar, 5457, exp. 23. José Ramón Fernández y Martínez (1808-1883) was born in San 
Juan to a Spanish Navy officer and a Puerto Rican mother. He was a sugar and rum producer, 
owning ca. 200 slaves and several haciendas, most notably ‘La Esperanza’ (Manatí), becoming 
Puerto Rico’s first sugar producer. He contributed economically to the African War (1859-1860), 
promoted the creation of the San Juan 1st Volunteer Battalion in December 1864, and founded the 
Conservative Liberal Party (Unconditional Spanish Party since 1880) in 1870. He was appointed 
Marquis of La Esperanza (1869) and was granted the Cruz de Isabel la Católica (1871). AHN, 
Ultramar, 5457, exp. 23; Alejandro Ynfiesta. El marqués de la Esperanza, jefe del partido español de 
Puerto-Rico. San Juan: Tipografía de González, 1875; Reece B. Bothwell. Orígenes y desarrollo de los 
partidos políticos en Puerto Rico. San Juan: Editorial Edil, 1987, pp. 4. 
31 Rosado y Brincau. Bosquejo Histórico, pp. 235-312. 
32 Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la Guerra, pp. 449-455.  
33 The Taínos were the inhabitants of Puerto Rico (which they called Borikén) at the arrival of the 
Spaniards in the early 16th century. AGMM, Documentación de Puerto Rico, sig. 5202.20; Fernando 
Picó. “Genealogía del sudor: la procedencia de algunos jornaleros agrícolas del café en el Puerto 
Rico del siglo XIX”. Iberoamericana. América Latina, España, Portugal: Ensayos sobre letras, historia 
y sociedad. Notas. Reseñas iberoamericanas, 1997, vol. 21, No. 67-68, pp. 20-28. 
34 According to the census of 1887, out of a total population of 798,565 inhabitants, Whites 
numbered 474,933 (59.5%), Mulattoes 246,647 (30.9%), and Blacks 76,985 (9.6%). Luis A. Figueroa. 
Sugar, Slavery, and Freedom in Nineteenth-Century Puerto Rico. Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2005, p. 48.  
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was caused by the early identification of the Puerto Rican autonomists and nationalists 
with the cause of abolitionism, thus decreasing considerably the rate of support among 
the Puerto Ricans of African descent.35 In opposition, the Volunteers were considered the 
armed wing of the landowning class that defended slavery until its abolition in 1873.36  
  
2.3. Santo Domingo 
The existence of the Volunteers in Santo Domingo was brief (1863-1865) and completely 
linked to the reincorporation of the Spanish-speaking part of La Hispaniola into the 
Spanish Crown (1861-1865). The records of the Volunteers there are scarce and fragmented. 
Again, no record of their members is to be found in the Spanish Military General Archive, 
where all military records are theoretically preserved. 
I have only been able to document two companies of Volunteers, in the cities of 
Santo Domingo and Santiago de los Caballeros.37 Hence, the Dominican Volunteers would 
have probably numbered around two hundred men. Since no list of members exists, no 
precise data can be established on their numbers nor on their origin. However, I argue 
that they were a mixture of Spanish officers and Dominican rank-and-file, due to the 
scarce Spanish migration to the country and the existence of a pro-Spanish community 
among Dominican merchants in the capital city. 
The only members’ list found refers to the 22 officers of the Volunteer company 
created in the city of Santo Domingo. All of them were Spanish officials, former soldiers, 
and businessmen recently arrived in Santo Domingo, apart from a few members of the 
Dominican Pou family, owners of the main trading company in Santo Domingo.38 This 
very document also states that most of the rank-and-file Volunteers had been recruited 
                                                 
35 Ileana Rodríguez-Silva. “Abolition, Race, and the Politics of Gratitude in Late Nineteenth-Century 
Puerto Rico”. Hispanic American Historical Review, 2013, vol. 4, No. 93, pp. 621-657. 
36 Christopher Schmidt-Nowara. Empire and Antislavery. Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, 1833-1874. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999, pp. 144-153.  
37 The only information found is that the Ministry of War rewarded 12 of them in June 1864 for their 
gallantry during combats in August and September 1863. The decorations were Cruces de María 
Isabel Luisa awarded to one sergeant, one corporal, and ten soldiers. AGMM, Ministerio de la 
Guerra, sig. 5665.23. 
38 The members of the Pou family were Juan Pou, Salvador Pou, and José Mana Pou. AGMM, 
Ministerio de la Guerra, “Organización y aprobación del uniforme del Batallón de Voluntarios de 
Santo Domingo (1863-1865)”, sig. 5664.5. 
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from among commercial employees, which was restricted to Dominican citizens until the 
annexation to Spain in 1861.39 
Thus, it can be considered that the composition of the Volunteers in Santo 
Domingo was a direct consequence of the weak popular support among Dominicans for 
the reinstated Spanish rule. At least among the officers of the Volunteers, only a group of 
local merchants donned the uniform, whereas most of their comrades-in-arms were 
Spaniards that had recently arrived with the Spanish state apparatus. 
    
2.4. Philippines 
The existence of the Volunteers in the Philippines was brief and exclusively related to the 
Filipino Revolution (1896-1898). This militia was created in September 1896 at the very 
beginning of the uprising and was dismantled in August 1898 when the Spaniards 
capitulated to the new ruler of the archipelago: The United States.  
In terms of composition, the Volunteers in Asia’s only Spanish colony presents a 
unique case in comparison to their colleagues in the Caribbean. In the Philippines, the 
Volunteers were a militia segregated between Spaniards (either peninsulares or Filipino-
born, created in September 1896) and indígenas, or pre-Hispanic ethnicities of the 
archipelago (created in October 1897). I consider that this ethnic division was a 
consequence of the demographic context of the Philippines in the context of the Spanish 
Empire. By the late 19th century, the Filipino archipelago was a territory ruled by a tiny 
minority of Spaniards and populated by an overwhelming majority of natives with a weak 
integration into the Spanish culture. Although most Filipinos had adopted Catholicism by 
the end of the 19th century (with the exception of important Muslim populations in the 
southern sub-archipelagos of Mindanao and Sulu), only a minority was able to speak 
Spanish.40 It was estimated that by 1876 the whole archipelago had a population of ca. 6.2 
million people, of which little less than 20,000 were of Spanish origin.41 Thus, it is 
                                                 
39 José Serulle Ramia & Jacqueline Boin. “Evolución económica de la República Dominicana, 1844-
1930”, in Frank Moya Pons. Historia de la República Dominicana. Madrid: CSIC/Academia 
Dominicana de la Historia / Ediciones Doce Calles, 2010, p. 160. 
40 Antonio Quilis. “La trayectoria de la lengua española en Filipinas”. El lejano oriente español: 
Filipinas (siglo XIX): actas. Seville: Cátedra “General Castaños”, 1997, pp. 751-768.  
41 J. Jimeno Agius. Población y comercio de las Islas Filipinas. Madrid: Est. tip. de El Correo, 1884, p. 
14. On migration of Spaniards to Manila in the 19th century see Xavier Huetz de Lemps. “La faible 
émigration des espagnols vers les Philippines : vastes projets et maigres réalisations des dernières 
années de la colonisation espagnole, 1881-1898”, in María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso (ed.). Las 
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considered that the lack of a strong community of Spanish descent, and the weak 
integration of most Filipinos into the Spanish culture (among other things, most were 
unable to speak Spanish) unlike in Cuba and Puerto Rico, was the cause of the segregation 
of the Volunteers between Spaniards and native Filipinos. Doubts about Filipinos’ loyalty 
to Spain might have also caused the segregation of Volunteer units. 
The lack of membership records makes estimating the number of Volunteers a 
difficult task. However, a pamphlet published in 1903 considered that the companies of 
peninsular Volunteers summed up to 5,000 men throughout the Philippines.42 Although 
there were units of this kind created in several cities, the only relatively complete records 
that can still be consulted belong to the Manila Volunteers. By late July 1898, shortly after 
the US siege of the city, there were slightly over 2,000 Volunteers in the capital of the 
Philippines.43 As to the Voluntarios indígenas, it is known that shortly after their creation 
in October 1897 there were 6,000 of them distributed into thirty companies, although 
these numbers diminished due to the desertion of many of their ranks to the rebel cause.44 
Thus, it is considered that the Volunteers in the Philippines, both Spaniards and natives, 










                                                 
relaciones internacionales en el Pacífico (siglos XVIII-XX): colonización, descolonización y encuentro 
cultural. Madrid: CSIC, 1997, pp. 201-214.   
42 Elías Martínez Nubla. Los voluntarios de Ultramar. El Libro Azul. Apuntes para la Historia. 
Madrid: Imprenta del Fomento Naval, 1903, p. 5.  
43 AGMM, Documentación de Filipinas, sig. 5342.65; sig. 5342.71; sig. 5342.67; sig. 5342.66.  
44 Reglamento de las Compañías de Voluntarios Indígenas, p. 12.  
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Table 1. Number of Volunteers (1850s – 1890s) 
 Cuba45 Puerto Rico46 Santo Domingo Philippines47 
1850s 23,686 (1856) - - - 









1870s 80,000 (1872) ca. 4,500 - - 
1880s 66,000 (1889) 4,700 (1884) - - 
1890s 70,000 (1895) 
90,000 (1897) 
7,930 (1898) - 5,000 (1898) 
Spaniards 
6,000 (1898) Natives 
 
3. Conclusions 
The results of this chapter bring us to consider that some of the traditional views on the 
Volunteers need to be reviewed in depth. Far from being a militia of peninsulares, the 
makeup of the Volunteers was the result of the societies where they had been created. The 
role of peninsulares was certainly important, but there was also a remarkable presence of 
criollos, especially in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Volunteers of Santo Domingo and the 
Philippines were the exception. In these cases, their short-lived experience and their 
demographic background made the Volunteers a conjunctural rather than a well-
grounded phenomenon. 
For their part, the long history of the Volunteers in Cuba and Puerto Rico produced 
a pattern which can be considered distinctive of this militia of unpaid men-at-arms. In 
both cases, both Creoles and peninsulares joined their ranks. However, these two elements 
seem not to have been evenly distributed throughout both islands. Whereas the Volunteer 
                                                 
45 The figures are taken from Otero Pimentel. Memoria sobre los Voluntarios, p. 10 (1855); Cuerpos 
de Voluntarios de la Isla de Cuba, p. 13 (1860); Eugenio Vandama y Calderón. Colección de artículos 
sobre el Instituto de Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba. Havana: Imprenta Militar, 1897, p. 48 (1868); Luis 
Navarro. Las guerras de España en Cuba. Madrid: Ediciones Encuentro, 1998, p. 28 (1869); Otero 
Pimentel. Memoria sobre los Voluntarios, p. 71 (1872); Tesifonte Gallego y García. Cuba por fuera 
(apuntes del natural). Havana: La Propaganda Literaria, 1890, p. 229 (1889); A+B, Apuntes en defensa 
del honor del Ejército, Madrid, Est. Tipográfico de Ricardo Fe, 1898, p. 39 (1895); Arturo Amblard. 
Notas coloniales. Madrid: Ambrosio Pérez y Compañía, 1904, p. 163. 
46 The figures for Puerto Rico are taken from González Cuevas. ¿Defendiendo el honor?, pp. 59-64 
(1864); Ejército de Puerto-Rico (1884), p. 7 (1884); Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la Guerra, p. 450. 
(1898). 
47 The figure for the Philippines is taken from Martínez Nubla. Los voluntarios de Ultramar, p. 5. 
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units in the cities remained largely in the hands of the peninsulares, in the rural areas the 
Creoles made up most of the Voluntarios. 
This spatial distribution implies another consequence. In the cities, the Volunteers 
were largely employed in the commercial, industrial or transport sectors, which began to 
be dominated by peninsulares from the mid-19th century, due to the wave of migrants 
coming from metropolitan Spain. For their part, the Volunteers in the countryside seem 
to have been mostly employed in the agricultural sector as free workers in the sugar, 
tobacco and coffee industries. 
In terms of race, the Volunteers were non-segregated militias, though 
predominantly white. The exception was the case of the Philippines. Unlike the Antilles, 
in the archipelago, most of the population was alien to Spanish culture, and people of 
Spanish descent represented only a tiny minority. Thus, potential Volunteers had to be 
Spaniards, born either in metropolitan Spain or in Ultramar.48 In Cuba, however, the 
presence of Cuban Volunteers of African descent is well documented, though it is difficult 
to establish their percentage due to the scarcity of sources documenting the racial 
background of these men. 
                                                 
48 This was reflected in the reglamentos of the Volunteers in Cuba (1856, 1869 and 1892), and Puerto 
Rico (1870, 1888). 
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CHAPTER II. CREATION, CONSOLIDATION, AND EXPANSION (1855-1868) 
This chapter addresses three basic yet fundamental questions regarding the history of the 
Volunteers. The first deals with the reasons for the creation of a militia such as the 
Volunteers in Cuba in 1855. The second deals with the ways in which the Volunteers became 
consolidated as a permanent element of the Spanish defensive system. Closely related to 
this question, the third explores the expansion of this type of militia from Cuba to Puerto 
Rico and Santo Domingo in the context of Spanish military interventions in the Caribbean 
during the 1860s. 
This thesis argues that the Volunteers were created to strengthen the Spanish 
military system in a context in which the possession of the island of Cuba was coveted by 
powerful groups in the United States, in collaboration with some elements of the Cuban 
economic elite. The creation of the Volunteers is also analysed as a manifestation of the 
Spanish authorities’ surreptitious will to replace the Cuban elite in the island’s defensive 
system and rely instead on the powerful group of peninsulares. Thus, its creation arose as 
one of the indirect effects of the marginalisation of Cuba from the Spanish national system 
that began with the exclusion of the Cuban representatives from the Spanish Congress of 
Deputies in 1836.1 
Whereas Cuba was de jure a Spanish province, it was de facto ruled as a colony. This 
very contradiction, by which Cubans could be implicitly, yet not explicitly, expelled from 
power, allowed thousands of them to find a way to integrate into the new militia. Thus, the 
Volunteers came to represent a strong loyalist community in Cuba, certainly dominated by 
peninsulares, but in which Cubans had their say as well. The presence of these Cuban 
loyalists in the militia reinforced the wish of the Spanish authorities to marginalize the 
Creoles from the defence of the island. 
The consolidation of the Volunteers in Cuba is also considered to be intimately 
linked to the imperial structure of Spain. Firstly, the Volunteers became a permanent 
element of the Spanish defensive system in Cuba within a wider set of military reforms 
carried out by the Captaincy General to make the defence of Cuba more affordable and with 
a greater degree of participation by the local society. Secondly, another factor influencing 
consolidation was the series of adventures undertaken by Spain under the presidency of 
                                                 
1 From 1834 to 1923, and since 1978 the Spanish Parliament is formed by the Congress of Deputies 
(lower house) and the Senate (upper house). 
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Leopoldo O’Donnell (1858-1863), who had an important support in Cuba after having been 
its captain general between 1841 and 1846.2 The war against Morocco (1859-1860), and the 
reincorporation of Santo Domingo (1861-1865) generated an enthusiastic popular support 
at home that was echoed in the overseas territories. In Cuba, the Volunteers actively 
supported Spain’s colonial campaigns. This support served two main causes: on the one 
hand, it strengthened the idea of Cuba as an integral member of the Spanish Nation; on the 
other, it allowed the Loyalists to gain momentum before the authorities, in a context in 
which the status quo was being contested by sectors of the Cuban elite pushing for profound 
changes regarding the relationship between the island and metropolitan Spain. In this 
context of political dispute and military adventures in the Caribbean, the Volunteers came 
to be regarded by the Spanish authorities as a loyal militia that could temporarily replace 
the military personnel deployed to the warzones. This double aspect of the support towards 
Spain´s expansionist ventures, explains the implementation of Cuba´s Volunteer model in 
Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo. 
 
1. The Annexationist Backgrounds 
The creation of the Volunteers took place in Havana on 12th February 1855, the result of a 
decree by Cuba’s Captain General José Gutiérrez de la Concha (1854-1859).3 He wanted to 
engage the civilians in the defence of the Spanish sovereignty in Cuba when it was at risk. 
And in February 1855 it was. On the 6th of that very month, a conspiracy by the Cuban Creole 
elite aimed at annexing the island to the US was uncovered. Thus, the Volunteers were 
created to strengthen the defences of the island alongside the Army and the Navy in the 
face of such a threat. 
 
                                                 
2 Leopoldo O’Donnell y Jorís (1809-1867) was one of the leading political and military figures of 19th 
century Spain. He was president of the Spanish Government on three occasions (1856, 1858-1863, 
and 1865-1866), and minister of Foreign Affairs, Navy, Overseas, and War offices in different 
governments between 1854 and 1866. He took part in Liberal and Conservative conspirations before 
1854, when he created the Liberal Union party, attempting to merge the moderate wings of both 
political traditions. As a military man, he took part in the First Carlist War (1833-1840) and the 
African War (1859-1860). A recent biography by F. Martínez Gallego. Leopoldo O’Donnell. Biografía 
breve. Madrid: Ediciones 19, 2017. An analysis on the supports gathered by Leopoldo O’Donnell in 
Cuba in Carmen García García. “Relaciones y vínculos de poder de un general isabelino: O’Donnell 
y los antecedentes de la Unión Liberal”. Ayer, 2017, No. 105, pp. 51-75. 
3 Gaceta de La Habana, 12-02-1855. 
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1.1. Changing Tide in Cuba 
Between the 1820s and the 1860s Cuba underwent an intense process of re-hispanization 
that especially affected the urban landscape of the island and its political and economic 
structures.4 The Cuban elite created by the sugar-based economic boom of the late 18th 
century began to be replaced by an emerging elite of peninsulares and some associated 
Cuban lineages. In the lower strata of society, the arrival of migrants from metropolitan 
Spain also changed the urban labour landscape, as the peninsulares began to take over jobs 
that traditionally employed free Cubans of African descent. 
The creation of a Cuban elite, which the Cuban historian Manuel Moreno Fraginals 
called sacarocracia (or ‘sugar aristocracy’), was associated with the boom of the sugar-
producing industry in Cuba, mostly due to the collapse of sugar production in the French 
colony of Saint-Domingue after the slaves’ Haitian Revolution (1791-1804).5 Cuba replaced 
Saint-Domingue as the world’s main sugar producer, thus creating a powerful elite on the 
Spanish island.6 The Haitian Revolution meant an opportunity for Cuba and an admonition 
of the dangers associated with slavery at the same time. It had allowed Cuba to become a 
major sugar producer but had also shown the perils of an uncontrolled slave population.7 
However, the Spanish rule could potentially solve both problems. Spain allowed the slave 
trade even after legally abolishing it in 1820, provided the military presence to keep the 
slaves under control, and ended its monopoly on the Cuban economy in 1818, allowing a 
flourishing trade with the United States.8 These are the main reasons why the elites of Cuba 
                                                 
4 Manuel Moreno Fraginals. Cuba/España, España/Cuba. Historia común. Barcelona: Crítica, 1995, 
pp. 220-231; Pérez, Jr. Cuba. Between Reform & Revolution, pp. 70-103. 
5 Julio Le Riverend. Historia económica de Cuba. Barcelona: Ariel, 1972, 147-157; Manuel Moreno 
Fraginals. El ingenio. Complejo económico social cubano del azúcar. Barcelona: Crítica, 2001 (first 
published in Havana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1964, 3 vols.), pp. 27-86; Cuba/España, pp. 145-
156.  
6 Manuel Barcia. “’Un coloso sobre la arena’: definiendo el camino hacia la plantación esclavista en 
Cuba, 1792-1825”. Revista de Indias, 2011, vol. LXXI, No. 251, pp. 53-76.  
7 Ada Ferrer. “Noticias de Haití en Cuba”. Revista de Indias, 2003, vol. LXIII, No. 229, pp. 675-694; 
Freedom’s Mirror. Cuba and Haiti in the Age of Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014, pp. 189-235; Carrie Gibson. “’There is no doubt that we are under threat by the Negroes of 
Santo Domingo’: the spectre of Haiti in the Spanish Caribbean in the 1820s”, in Matthew Brown & 
Gabriel Paquette (eds.). Connections after Colonialism. Europe and Latin America in the 1820s. 
Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2013, pp. 223-235. 
8 Christopher Schmidt-Nowara. “Bartolomé de las Casas and the Slave Trade to Cuba circa 1820s”, 
in Brown & Paquette. Connections after Colonialism, pp. 236-249. For the activities of the illegal 
slave trade merchants see Martín Rodrigo y Alharilla. “Spanish Merchants and the Slave Trade: 
From Legality to Illegality, 1814-1870”, in Josep M. Fradera & Christopher Schmidt-Nowara (eds.). 




and Puerto Rico remained loyal to the Spanish Crown during the wars for independence in 
Spanish America (ca. 1810-1825).9 
However, in a process thoroughly studied by José G. Cayuela and Ángel Bahamonde, 
the privileged position of this landowning Creole elite began to be seriously challenged 
from the 1830s by the emergence of a new elite of merchants, mostly peninsulares, but also 
Cuban-born and Spanish American Loyalists.10 Because of their support for the integrity of 
the Spanish Nation, which included Cuba, this elite came to be known as integrista.11 
The loss of the continental Spanish empire by 1825 had driven thousands of 
peninsulares and American Loyalists out of the continent and into Cuba, and Puerto Rico 
to a lesser extent.12 This influx was strengthened by a continuous migration from 
metropolitan Spain to Cuba, which mostly settled in the cities and found employment in 
the commercial sector, but also in a series of relatively skilled jobs such as coachman, 
stevedore, bricklayer, and cigar maker. As shown by Joan Casanovas, the arrival of this 
migration meant that the labour force of Havana, Matanzas, and other major cities 
comprised a working sector dominated by peninsulares, having displaced the free Cubans 
of African descent.13 
Thanks to their links with metropolitan Spain and the continuous arrival of new 
members, the peninsulares came to dominate commerce in Cuba by the second third of the 
19th century. They distributed the Cuban exports and controlled the imports. More 
importantly, since Cuba lacked a modern banking system, these merchants often became 
moneylenders to the Creole landowners. The abusive interest rates and the high costs of 
modernizing and increasing sugar production, often ended up in the sugar mills being 
seized by these merchants, thus expanding their interests into the sugar industry. The 
                                                 
9 Hugh Thomas. Cuba. La lucha por la libertad. Barcelona: Debolsillo, 2011 (first published as Cuba. 
The Pursuit of Freedom. London: Pan Macmillan, 1971), pp. 93-110. 
10 This does not mean, however, that there was the neat division between Cuban landowners and 
peninsular merchants for which Cuban historiography has tended to argue. There were also 
peninsular landowners and Cuban merchants whose political loyalties were not always defined by 
their birthplace. See Martín Rodrigo y Alharilla. “Hacendados versus comerciantes. Negocios y 
práctica política en el integrismo cubano”, in Francisco Morales Padrón (coord.). III Coloquio de 
Historia Canario-Americana; VIII Congreso Internacional de Historia de América (AEA), 1998. Las 
Palmas de Gran Canaria: Cabildo de Gran Canaria, 2000, pp. 647-663.    
11 Ángel Bahamonde & José G. Cayuela. Hacer las Américas. Las elites coloniales en el siglo XIX. 
Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992, pp. 15-52. 
12 Pérez, Jr. Cuba. Between Reform & Revolution, pp. 95-96. 
13 Casanovas. Bread, or Bullets!, pp. 15-42; Rosario Márquez Macías. “La Habana en el siglo XIX. Una 
visión a través de la emigración”. Ubi Sunt? Revista de Historia, 2008, No. 23, pp. 13-21. 
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humble social background of these men 
was compensated by their upward social 
mobility through marriage with women 
of well-to-do Cuban families, who 
became their economic and political 
allies. This was the case, for instance, of 
the Basque Julián Zulueta (whom can be 
seen donning the uniform of Volunteer 
colonel in image 1), the biggest 
slaveowner and sugar producer of mid-
19th century Cuba.14 It was also the case of 
José Eugenio Moré, a New Granadian 
(present day Colombia) who settled with 
his family in Cuba in 1820 after being 
expelled by the revolutionary 
government following the independence 
of his native land.15 
Their economic ascendancy also translated into political predominance during the 
administration of Captain General Miguel Tacón (1834-1838). Tacón, politically considered 
                                                 
14 Julián de Zulueta y Amondo (1814-1878) settled in Havana in 1832 to work for his uncle, whose 
businesses he inherited. He became Cuba’s biggest slaveowner and illicit slave trader, and one of 
the most important landowners by the 1860s. He also entered politics. He was Havana’s mayor 
(1864-1876), and was appointed life senator in 1877, although he never took the oath. His 
commitment to the defence of Cuba was longstanding. In 1837 he joined the Batallón de Voluntarios 
Distinguidos del Comercio, and in 1850 he organized the Batallón de Buenos Vecinos. He joined 
Havana’s 2nd Battalion in 1866 as its colonel. He was bestowed the positions of marquis of Álava and 
viscount of Casablanca (1875) for his services to Spain. AGMS, leg. Z-267; AS, ES.28079.HIS-0009-
09. A biography in Eduardo Marrero Cruz. Julián de Zulueta y Amondo: promotor del capitalismo en 
Cuba. Havana: Unión, 2006. 
15 José Eugenio Moré de la Bastida (1807-1890) was born in Santa Marta (Viceroyalty of New 
Granada, today in Colombia) to Royalist parents, and settled in Santiago de Cuba in 1820 after the 
independence of Gran Colombia. He began his business career as a merchant, later buying several 
sugar mills and promoting the construction of the railway Cruces-Sagua la Grande (Las Villas). On 
13th February 1855 he was appointed captain of the 1st Havana Volunteer Battalion’s 8th Company 
and was promoted to colonel—the highest rank possible within the Volunteers—on 14th February 
1873. He was granted the Gran Cruz de Isabel la Católica (1876) and was made Count of Casa Moré 
(1879). He was also president of the Círculo de Hacendados (1879). See Villa. Álbum biográfico, pp. 
14-18; Gaceta de Madrid, No. 105, 15-04-1879; La Ilustración española y americana, 15-11-1890, p. 291; 
AHN, Ultramar, 4740, exp. 67; Leida Fernández Prieto. Espacio de poder, ciencia y cultura en Cuba: 
el Círculo de Hacendados, 1878-1917. Madrid: CSIC/Universidad de Sevilla/Diputación de Sevilla, 
2008, p. 54; Ángel Bahamonde & José G. Cayuela. “La creación de nobleza en Cuba durante el siglo 
XIX”. Historia Social, 1991, No. 11, pp. 56-82.  
Image 1. Julián de Zulueta was a leading member of Cuba’s 
integrista elite and one of the organizers of the 
Volunteers in 1855. Ribó, Historia de los Voluntarios 
Cubanos, vol. I, p. 254. 
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a Liberal, felt a deep distrust towards the Creoles due to his experiences during the wars for 
independence in New Grenada. Contrary to his predecessors, Tacón relied on the new elite 
for political and economic advice, excluding the old Cuban elite from the spheres of power.16 
This exclusion from power was aggravated by the establishment of a Liberal regime in Spain 
in the 1830s. Due to the incompatibility between institutional slavery in the Antilles and a 
Liberal system in metropolitan Spain—where slavery had been abolished in 1811—the 
metropolitan Liberals decided to exclude Cuba and Puerto Rico from the Spanish laws. 
Thus, in 1836 the elected representatives of Cuba and Puerto Rico were not allowed to take 
a seat in the Spanish Congress.17 Only a year later, the new Constitution declared that both 
islands should be ruled by ‘special laws’ (that nevertheless were never passed). The legal 
corpus of the Antilles remained the set of laws known as Leyes de Indias (mostly untouched 
since 1680), and the ultima ratio represented by the Captains General, who had been 
granted discretionary powers by the Crown in 1825.18 Thus, Cuba and Puerto Rico, although 
de jure members of the Spanish Nation, were de facto excluded from it as participants. 
According to José Antonio Piqueras Arenas, this exclusion was not perceived as 
particularly negative by the different elites in Cuba. In fact, the elite of peninsulares and 
their Cuban allies preferred the Captains General to keep their power, whereas the old 
Cuban elite trusted that this exclusion might mean an open door to a sort of autonomy and 
the guarantee of the survival of slavery.19 However, the promised ‘special laws’ were not even 
discussed in Madrid, whereas the exclusion of the old Cuban elite from the spheres of power 
was only aggravated during the administration of Tacón’s successors. The administration 
was further not particularly open to the Cubans, as most of the officials on the island were 
peninsulares. In 1844, a visitor from the United States considered that “The native of Cuba 
                                                 
16 Thomas. Cuba, pp. 130-133; María José Vilar. “Un cartagenero para Ultramar: Miguel Tacón y el 
modelo autoritario de la transición del Antiguo Régimen al liberalismo en Cuba (1834-1838)”. Anales 
de Historia Contemporánea, 2000, No. 16, pp. 239-278. 
17 Josep M. Fradera. Gobernar colonias. Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 1999, pp. 71-93; “Include and 
Rule: The Limits of Colonial Policy, 1810-1837”, in Brown & Paquette. Connections after Colonialism, 
pp. 64-86; La Nación Imperial. Derechos, representación y ciudadanía en los imperios de Gran 
Bretaña, Francia, España y Estados Unidos (1750-1918), vol. I. Barcelona: Edhasa, 2015, pp. 751-848. 
18 M.ª Paz Alonso Romero. Cuba en la España liberal (1837-1898). Madrid: Centro de Estudios 
Políticos y Constitucionales, 2002, pp. 17-22; Javier Alvarado Planas. La Administración Colonial 
española en el siglo XIX. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2013, pp. 13-40; 
Josep M. Fradera. Colonias para después de un imperio. Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2005, pp. 
220-252. 
19 José A. Piqueras Arenas. Sociedad civil y poder en Cuba. Colonia y poscolonia. Madrid: Siglo XXI 
de España Editores, 2005, pp. 80-92. For an overview of the relationship between Cuba’s captains 
general and the local and metropolitan elites see José G. Cayuela Fernández. “Los capitanes 
generales de Cuba: élites coloniales y élites metropolitanas (1823-1898). Historia contemporánea, 
1996, No. 13-14, pp. 197-222. 
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[…] sees himself almost entirely excluded from all offices under government, the army, and 
the church, and regards with no favourable eye those who are thus sent to mend their 
fortunes at his expense”.20 It almost seemed that there was “no place for Cubans in Cuba”.21 
The keystone that maintained the Spanish regime in Cuba was slavery. Nonetheless, 
even its survival seemed precarious due to the mounting pressure from Britain to abolish 
the slave trade. After the abolition of slavery in its empire in 1833, Britain actively repressed 
the illicit slave trade between Africa and the Americas, which could have put the Cuban 
sugar industry in danger.22 In fact, the British consular agents in Havana actively promoted 
the abolitionist ideal, and apparently conspired towards a general slave revolt in 1843-1844.23 
Although the uprising never took place, the fear that Spain might not be able to resist the 
British pressure to end the slave trade was real and well-grounded. For instance, in 1845 the 
Spanish Congress passed a law aimed at repressing the slave trade, after intense British 
pressure. However, the Spanish authorities in Havana continued to tolerate the arrival of 
enslaved Africans, thus perpetuating tensions with the British Government.24    
Being excluded from power, and fearing that slavery might come to its end, the old 
Cuban elite began to look for alternatives that could guarantee both slavery and political 
participation outside the Spanish Monarchy. The most evident example of the combination 
of Liberal principles and the existence of slavery was to be found in the neighbouring 
United States. Thus, the efforts of the Cuban elite, who felt excluded from power, to try to 




                                                 
20 John George F. Wurdermann. Notes on Cuba. Boston: James Munroe and Company, 1844, pp. 196-
199, quoted in Louis A. Pérez, Jr. (ed.). Slaves, Sugar, & Colonial Society. Travel accounts of Cuba, 
1801-1899. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1992, p. 228. 
21 Pérez, Jr. Cuba. Between Reform & Revolution, p. 98. 
22 For the British role in the end of slavery in Cuba see David Murray. Odious Commerce. Britain, 
Spain and the Abolition of the Slave Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 72-91. 
23 This conspiracy is known as “The conspiracy of the ladder”, named after a torture method used 
against the slaves that had allegedly taken part in it, Michele Reid-Vázquez. The Year of the Lash. 
Free People of Color in Cuba and the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic World. Athens and London: The 
University of Georgia Press, 2011, pp. 42-67; Murray. Odious Commerce, pp. 133-180. 
24 Franklin W. Knight. Slave Society in Cuba during the nineteenth century. Madison: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1970, pp. 137-153. 
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1.2. The Annexationist Momentum 
The annexationist project can be understood as a desperate attempt to perpetuate slavery 
in a context of retreat for the “peculiar institution” in the Americas.25 Elsewhere in the 
Caribbean region, slavery was abolished in the colonies of Britain (1833) and France (1848), 
Colombia (1851) and Venezuela (1854). By the 1850s, slavery in the Americas only existed in 
the Spanish territories of Cuba and Puerto Rico, Brazil, the Dutch colonies, and the United 
States.26 The plan to annex Cuba to the US to protect slavery went against the dominant 
abolitionist tendency in an attempt to reverse the fate of an institution that already seemed 
doomed by the mid-19th century. 
The idea of annexing the island to its northern neighbour might seem logical in the 
context of the territorial expansion of the United States. After all, the US had acquired 
Louisiana from France (1803), Florida from Spain (1819), and had just annexed the northern 
half of Mexico (1848) and was expanding continuously westwards to the Pacific Ocean.27 As 
for Cuba, the US interest was almost as old as its independence, for Cuba had been the key 
to the Caribbean due to its geographical location since the Spanish conquest in the 16th 
century. In 1809, President Thomas Jefferson summed up this interest in the island by 
stating that Cuba “can gravitate only towards the North American Union which by the same 
law of nature cannot cast her off its bosom”.28 
However, to secure slavery through its annexation to the United States was rather 
unlikely. In fact, the very existence of slavery had proven an unsolvable problem that 
confronted the northern and southern US states throughout the country’s process of 
territorial expansion. Every new land acquisition by the Union opened intense debate about 
the status of slavery in the new US territory. During the 1850s North and South were only 
able to reach a series of feeble compromises, establishing a fragile equilibrium that proved 
                                                 
25 This was a way to refer to slavery popularized in the 1830s by the US statesman and political 
theorist John C. Calhoun (1782-1850), a staunch defender of slavery and the US states’ right to secede 
from the Union. See William W. Freehling. The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.  
26 Jeremy Black. Slavery. A New Global History. London: Constable & Robinson, 2011, pp. 192-229. 
27 For the US expansion at the expense of the Spanish-speaking countries of the Americas see 
Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez. La expansión territorial de los Estados Unidos a expensas de España y de 
los países hispanoamericanos. Havana: Editorial Nacional de Cuba, 1935, pp. 182-281; Luis Martínez-
Fernández. Town Between Empires. Economy, Society, and Patterns of Political Thought in the 
Hispanic Caribbean, 1840-1878. Athens & London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994, pp. 11-57. 
28 José Ignacio Rodríguez. Estudio histórico sobre el origen, desenvolvimiento y manifestaciones 
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unsustainable when the southern states began to secede from the Union in 1860 aiming to 
protect slavery, paving the way to the Civil War (1861-1865).29 
Despite this context, the annexationist Cuban elite began to take steps towards the 
union with the United States in 1847. This very year, a group of sacarócratas led by Miguel 
de Aldama, created the Club de La Habana to coordinate the annexationist movement. It 
was indispensable to find some support in the US, where a Junta Cubana was opened in 
New York and New Orleans for that purpose. Certainly, the cause of the annexation of Cuba 
was positively received by some sectors in the US, both in the North and the South. On the 
one hand, the equilibrium between both sections of the country could be broken in favour 
of the South, should Cuba have joined the Union as a new pro-slavery state. On the other, 
for the industrious northern states, the entry of Cuba could mean a new market for their 
goods free of the high customs tariffs imposed by the Spanish Government. The 
annexationist discourse could have found fertile ground in the United States, where the 
Monroe Doctrine (“America for the Americans”) still permeated its self-perceived vision as 
the guarantor of American independence against the European colonial powers.30 So fertile 
was the ground that the Cuban annexationist lobbyists reached the US President James K. 
Polk (1845-1849), who offered to buy Cuba from Spain on behalf of the Club de La Habana 
members in 1848.31 
The firm refusal by the Spanish Government meant that the transaction was 
unfeasible, thus paving the way for a violent alternative. This was a turning point. According 
to Tom Chaffin, although the annexation still enjoyed some popular support, the US 
Government was not willing to embark on a military operation against a nation with which 
it had peaceful relations, especially when Britain and France were against a change of the 
                                                 
29 The dispute over the status of slavery in the newly-acquired territories taken from Mexico in 1848 
lead to the Compromise of 1850, which among other considerations, stated that the implementation 
of slavery was to be decided by popular vote in each new territory. The failure of this Compromise 
became evident after the Nebraska-Kansas Act (1854), when pro-slavery and abolitionist settlers 
engaged in a quasi-civil war within these two territories, known as ‘Bleeding Kansas’ (1854-1861). 
See Bruce Catton. The Civil War. Boston and New York: Mariner Books, 2004; James M. McPherson. 
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status quo in the Caribbean.32 For both countries, it was more desirable to keep Cuba under 
the control of a weak nation, rather than seeing it in the hands of the expanding United 
States. 
Nonetheless, the Cuban annexationists were determined to push their plan forward 
and continued to prepare an armed expedition against Cuba, yet in precarious conditions. 
Unable to find a US Army officer to lead the expedition, they finally contacted the former 
Spanish Army general Narciso López, a man opposed to Spain’s rule in Cuba after having 
been dismissed from a political office in 1843 by the Spanish Government.33 
Lack of support for the annexation was not only a problem in the US but especially 
in Cuba. Narciso López launched two expeditions against Cuba in May 1850 and August 1851 
but failed to raise the Cuban population against the Spanish authorities. The lack of popular 
support for the attempted uprisings made it evident that the idea of annexing the island to 
the United States had barely permeated into the Cuban population beyond the small circle 
of sacarócratas of the Club de La Habana. In fact, there were barely any Cubans in the 
expeditionary force commanded by Narciso López. Most of his mercenaries were US 
citizens and German and Hungarian veterans of the European Liberal revolutions of 1848.34 
Hence, the popular support that Narciso López and the annexationists envisioned for their 
project, was almost inexistent. The invasions of 1850 and 1851, however, did spur some sort 
of popular armed participation. They drove a few thousand Loyalists to take up arms to 
reject the plans to annex Cuba into the United States. 
 
2. A Precedent: the Milicia Voluntaria de Nobles Vecinos 
The mobilization of civilians organized into militias for the defence of Spanish sovereignty 
in the Americas was not new in the mid-19th century. Leaving aside the Milicias 
Disciplinadas (which combined conscription with volunteering), during the wars for 
                                                 
32 Ibid., pp. 44-72. 
33 Narciso López (1797-1851) was born in Venezuela and pursued a military career in the Spanish 
Army, first during the war for independence in his native land (1810-1823), and later in metropolitan 
Spain fighting in the First Carlist War that confronted Liberals and supporters of the Ancien Régime. 
In 1840 he was appointed governor of the Cuban sugar-producing town of Trinidad but was 
dismissed from office in 1843 by the captain general Leopoldo O’Donnell (1841-1846). This fact 
turned Narciso López into an enemy of Spain’s presence in Cuba. Herminio Portell Vilá. Narciso 
López y su época, vol. I. Havana: Cultural, 1930, pp. 142-154. 
34 Portell Vilá. Narciso López y su época, vol. III, pp. 483-495. 
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independence in Spanish America (1810-1825), units which bore the name of Voluntarios 
appeared in different parts of the continent. Such units have been identified in New Spain, 
Venezuela, and Peru. Although a thorough study of these units is still to be made, it has 
been found that some of their characteristics significantly resemble the Volunteer units 
created in Cuba in 1855. For instance, their members were peninsulares as well as Creoles, 
mostly employed in commerce, and fought as auxiliary forces of the Royal Army until their 
dissolution as the American territories became independent.35 
 Following a similar pattern, there had also been a project to organize such a unit in 
Havana in 1837. Due to the political crisis that opened the proclamation of the 1812 Spanish 
Constitution in Santiago de Cuba by the local governor in 1836, the Captain General Miguel 
Tacón began to recruit a militia of 1,500 men from among the most loyalist elements of 
Havana’s commercial elite: the Batallón de Voluntarios Distinguidos del Comercio. Among 
them, Julián de Zulueta, a prominent Basque merchant and landowner, who would later 
take part in the creation of the Volunteers in 1855. This new militia was only organized on 
paper, for it was given neither weapons nor uniforms as it was dissolved by mid-1837 as the 
situation in Santiago de Cuba was rapidly controlled by the Captain General. Nonetheless, 
a stark difference with the volunteer units that fought in continental America was that the 
Creoles were de facto absent from this battalion, reflecting Tacón’s deep distrust regarding 
Cubans’ loyalty to Spain.36 
Considering this background, it is hardly surprising that the Spanish authorities 
thought again about mobilizing loyal civilians when Narciso López launched his 
annexationist attacks against the island in 1850 and 1851. Although an irrelevant enterprise 
in military terms, Narciso López’s expeditions caused the birth of armed civilian Loyalism 
in Cuba, which was an important element of the island’s history during the second half of 
                                                 
35 Some of these units were the Voluntarios Distinguidos de Fernando VII in Mexico Ciy and 
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the 19th century. The annexationist attacks against Spain’s sovereignty on the island sparked 
a reaction among the integristas, who decided to rally around the Spanish authorities and 
create a militia: the milicia voluntaria de Nobles Vecinos. The creation of this militia was 
another element of the rising power of the integrista elite, whereas the old Cuban elite 
supported the failed annexationist attempts by Narciso López. 
On his first expedition, Narciso López’s men landed in the town of Cárdenas and 
ransacked it on 19th May 1850, until they were expelled by two Army battalions sent from 
Havana by Captain General Federico Roncali (1848-1850).37 Fearing that the expedition 
might get hold of some territory, and willing to declare their support to the authorities, the 
Loyalists in Havana demonstrated before the captain general asking him permission to 
create a militia in order to replace the Army units that had been sent to chase López’s men.38 
Prominent members of the integrista elite led the petition and thought of the peninsular 
migrants as the potential militiamen. The latter would fill the ranks, whereas the former 
would become the officers of the militia, as well as the providers of uniforms, weapons, and 
the funds necessary to organize it.39 
This proposal was positively received by the captain general, who created the Milicia 
Voluntaria de Nobles Vecinos on 21st May 1850.40 Four infantry battalions were created in 
Havana, commanded by members of the emerging integrista elite, such as Julián de Zulueta 
or the Cuban-born Count of San Esteban de Cañongo, whereas the ranks were mostly filled 
by the working-class peninsulares.41 The example was soon followed in other cities 
throughout Cuba, even in areas where the presence of peninsulares was weak, such as Pinar 
del Río or Manzanillo, where Cuban-born men filled the ranks. In total four infantry 
battalions plus four spare companies were created throughout the island.42 
                                                 
37 Cárdenas is a coastal town located in the Matanzas province, 150km east of Havana. For a detailed 
account of the attack on Cárdenas see Herminio Portell Vilá. Historia de Cárdenas (edición del 
centenario). Havana: Talleres Gráficos “Cuba Intelectual”, 1928, pp. 97-126. 
38 According to Jacobo de la Pezuela, as much as 13,000 integristas demonstrated before the palace 
of the Captains General, in Havana. See Jacobo de la Pezuela. Crónica de las Antillas. Madrid: Rubio, 
Grilo y Vitturi, 1871, p. 116. 
39 Portell Vilá. Narciso López y su época, vol. II, pp. 390-391. 
40 Gaceta de La Habana, 21-05-1850, p. 1. 
41 The Cuban Count of Fernandina was appointed colonel of the Nobles Vecinos. Jacinto Larrínaga 
(peninsular) was made commander of the 1st Battalion, Julián de Zulueta (peninsular) of the 2nd, the 
Count of San Esteban de Cañongo (Cuban) of the 3rd, and Manuel Izquierdo Villavicencio 
(peninsular) of the 4th. Diario de la Marina, 21-05-1850, p. 1. 
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The creation of these battalions in different cities of Cuba was a symptom that 
Loyalism in Cuba was not exclusive to the peninsulares. However, Captain General Roncali 
deeply distrusted the Cubans. In fact, shortly after the creation of the Nobles Vecinos, he 
wrote to the Ministry of War, in Madrid, asking for permission to create a militia of 30,000 
men, yet “only peninsulares, for I do not trust in handing over weapons to the natives”.43 
Explicit support for Narciso López’s attempt had been almost inexistent among the Cuban 
population. Roncali probably feared that the unrest towards Spain was more widespread 
among the Cubans. 
Arming the Cubans was not Roncali’s only concern, for he also feared the volatility 
of a militia of armed working-class peninsulares. The growing importance of the labour 
organization in Havana, fed by the constant influx of migrants from metropolitan Spain, 
could have found an influence in the ranks of the Nobles Vecinos. In case of a clash of 
interest between the authorities and the workers, the latter could direct their weapons 
against the former. Thus, despite the threat of a new annexationist attempt against Cuba 
not having disappeared, the captain general decreed the dissolution of the Nobles Vecinos 
on 24th September 1850.44 
The fact that the Nobles Vecinos was dissolved because of the captain general’s 
distrust rather than of the theoretical likeliness of a new annexationist attempt was 
confirmed in the summer of 1851. In July, two landowners and Milicias Disciplinadas’ 
officers took up arms in an uprising in central Cuba. This was followed by the landing of 
Narciso López with 600 mercenaries at Bahía Honda (60 km west to Havana) on 12th 
August.45 These Milicias Disciplinadas had been created in Cuba almost a century before, 
mostly made up of Creoles. By the mid-19th century, they were in a clear state of decay, 
deprived of a clear military role and lacking the confidence of the Spanish authorities due 
to the involvement of some of their members with anti-Spanish conspiracies.46 The 
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annexationists had clearly worked on widening their support network in Cuba, 
coordinating an uprising within the island and an expedition launched from the US.  
On this occasion, the Captain General José Gutiérrez de la Concha (1850-1852) 
reactivated the Nobles Vecinos, for the Army garrison was scant and the threat posed by a 
combined uprising needed a bigger fighting force. The Nobles Vecinos played a crucial role 
in crushing the expedition. For instance, the battalion reactivated in Pinar del Río, the area 
where Narciso López landed, collaborated alongside the regular Army in defeating the 
expeditionary force by late August 1851, in what was the first armed action of the Nobles 
Vecinos.47 On 1st September 1851, Narciso López and another ten leaders of the invasion were 
executed in Havana. 
The attitude of Gutiérrez de la Concha regarding the participation of civilians in the 
defence of Cuba differed from that of his predecessor. He had trusted the Nobles Vecinos 
for military operations. This was particularly significant, as many of the men of the Pinar 
del Río battalion were Cuban guajiros. On a public speech the day before Narciso López’s 
execution, the captain general gave a speech in which he praised the participation of the 
Nobles Vecinos in repelling the expedition, and acknowledging the role played by the Cuban 
members of the Pinar del Río battalion.48 This reflected the good relationship that existed 
between the captain general and the integrista elite. The former secured the continuity of 
the slave trade and granted the latter business opportunities, whereas the integristas offered 
the captain general their loyalty and a defensive contribution through the Nobles Vecinos.49 
In fact, Gutiérrez de la Concha aimed to make the Nobles Vecinos a permanent element of 
the Spanish defensive system in Cuba within a wider set of military reforms for the island.50 
However, the unstable political scene in metropolitan Spain had Gutiérrez de la 
Concha replaced by two Captains General who were much less willing to compromise with 
the interests of the integrista elite. The instructions of the new Spanish Government, 
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controlled by the most conservative wing of the Moderate Party, was to increase the power 
of the State against the growing power of the integrista elite.51 The new Captains General 
Valentín Cañedo (1852-1853) and José Manuel de la Pezuela (1853-1854), not only tried to 
effectively end the illicit slave trade but also to dissolve the Nobles Vecinos, for they deeply 
distrusted the existence of a militia of armed civilians that were not constrained by  military 
discipline.52 
Nonetheless, in a context where the annexationist threat was still active, the new 
Spanish authorities finally decided not to dissolve by decree the Nobles Vecinos. Instead, 
they were left to wither, not allowing for the recruitment of new members and barely letting 
them carry out military exercises. However, the experiences of 1850 and 1851 against the 
expeditions of Narciso López, had created the powerful basis of a militant integrismo that 
would reappear in 1855. 
 
3. The creation of the Volunteers and Ramón Pintó’s conspiracy 
Although it was never carried out, the plot headed by Ramón Pintó, which was uncovered 
in February 1855, was the most important plot to end Spanish rule in Cuba before the Ten 
Years’ War. Pintó’s real aim remains unclear, but after it no more plans to annex Cuba manu 
militari to the US were made. More importantly to the present concern, it marked the 
creation of the Volunteers and the definitive establishment of this armed integrista militia 
as a permanent element of the Spanish defensive system on the island. 
Ramón Pintó’s real conspiratorial goal is not clear. Whether it was to annex Cuba to 
the US or to declare the island’s independence from Spain, it is known that it had strong 
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links with annexationist elements in the US South. According to the inquiries by the 
Spanish authorities, the former governor of Mississippi, John A. Quitman (1835-1836 / 1850-
1851) was meant to command a mercenary force to invade the island. However, the plot’s 
leader, the Catalan Ramón Pintó, was a well-known Liberal and cultural promoter in 
Havana who advocated for the abolition of slavery, which was precisely the institution that 
the annexationists both in Cuba and the US southern states had been wanting to protect.53 
The only certainty about the conspiration was that it aimed to put Spain’s rule in Cuba to 
an end. And the Volunteers were created precisely to secure Spanish sovereignty in Cuba. 
On 6th February 1855, the conspiracy was uncovered in a context of great political 
tension in Cuba. Only a few months before, in October 1854, the US ambassadors to Spain, 
Britain, and France had published the Ostend Manifesto, which vowed to annex Cuba to the 
US either by an agreement with Spain or by a military intervention.54 It was a statement of 
intent rather than a well-organized plan. In fact, the US Government finally discarded the 
idea of annexing Cuba because of the northern US states’ opposition to it, for the Manifesto 
distilled a sheer pro-slavery spirit. Despite its not finally being implemented, the Manifesto 
was a signal that the annexation of Cuba still had powerful advocates in the American 
Union. The menace of an armed expedition against Cuba was taken for granted on the 
island. Only three days after uncovering the plot, the Spanish authorities announced that 
they had learned that a force of 2,500 men was ready to sail for Cuba from different points 
in the US.55 On 15th February, Cuba’s main newspaper, the Diario de la Marina, assured that 
‘no one doubts that the expedition will arrive”.56 
The expedition never arrived, since the detention of Ramón Pintó by the Spanish 
authorities thwarted the plans, but the news of the extent of the conspiracy’s network was 
no less worrying. It was estimated that a force of at least 1,400 men distributed throughout 
Cuba was ready to take up arms, backed by the Caja de Ahorro (Cuba’s first savings bank) 
and by the annexationist elite that had supported the expeditions of Narciso López.57 Thus, 
on paper, it was a powerful conspiracy with a wide network of interests involved. 
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55 Gaceta de La Habana, 9-2-1855, p. 1. 
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In this context, Captain General 
José Gutiérrez de la Concha (whom can be 
seen in image 2, p. 46) who had recently 
returned to Cuba, revived his project 
involving the civilian population in 
defence of the island. Consequently, on 
12th February 1855, he issued a decree 
creating the Volunteers. All the Spanish 
men, both peninsulares and Cuban-born, 
between the ages of 18 and 50, could 
voluntarily join the newly created militia 
to defend Spanish sovereignty and secure 
public order in Cuba.58 
Back in Cuba, the inactive ranks 
and officers of the Nobles Vecinos became 
the basis for the Volunteers. The integrista 
elite and the working-class peninsulares were the bedrock of the Volunteers, repeating the 
scheme of the Nobles Vecinos. Thus, this new militia was somehow the armed wing of the 
integristas. However, due to the magnitude of Ramón Pintó’s conspiracy, and fearing the 
invasion of several thousand mercenaries, the recruitment soon took on a bigger dimension 
than in 1850 and 1851. Companies and battalions of infantry and cavalry were created 
throughout Cuba, and it thus became a true island-wide movement. By late April 1855, the 
Volunteers reported having ca. 24,000 men-at-arms.59 Most of them were concentrated in 
the west of the island, which concentrated a majority of the island’s population and 
economic production. 
Due to their impressive numbers, the Volunteers soon became a social phenomenon 
to be reckoned with, especially considering that they outnumbered the 16,000-strong 
regular Army garrison stationed in Cuba. In case of divergence between the policies of the 
authorities and the Volunteers, the latter could also use their coercive power to push 
forward their agenda, especially in Havana where the Spanish power in Cuba resided. This 
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Image 2. Cuba’s Captain General José Gutiérrez de la 
Concha, who created the Volunteers on 12th February 




does not mean that such a heterogeneous group as the Volunteers, where industrial tycoons 
and working-class people gathered, had a common agenda. All the Volunteers, however, 
were united in their staunch support of Spanish sovereignty. Thus, the plot headed by 
Ramón Pintó was a potential threat to their presence in the island, for it aimed at ousting 
Spain from Cuba. Hence, the Volunteers intensely demanded the execution of Ramón Pintó 
and his closest collaborators.60 
Pintó’s fate was precisely the excuse used by the Volunteers to demonstrate their 
coercive capacity in front of the authorities. Perhaps due to the old friendship between the 
captain general and Pintó, the former opposed the idea of executing him, a position that 
was shared by the military court which processed the conspirators, who were acquitted in 
the first instance. This sparked mounting pressure by the Volunteers against the 
authorities. The campaign to execute Pintó was especially intense in Havana, where the 
Volunteers carried out public meetings and informal military parades where toasts for the 
death of Pintó were made. At a coffee house in Havana, the Volunteer captain Costa gave a 
speech promising his comrades that Pintó’s fate was certain, for they would do it with their 
‘own hands’ should the captain general spare Pintó.61 This was an open threat to Gutiérrez 
de la Concha’s authority and an expression of the Volunteers’ reliance on their coercive 
power. 
Aware of the Volunteers’ willingness to kill Pintó, the captain general decided to 
avoid a rebellion in Havana by taking Pintó before the courts for the second time. On this 
occasion, a new military jury sentenced Pintó to being executed. On 22nd March 1855, the 
execution of Ramón Pintó in front of the fortress of La Punta was witnessed by thousands 
of habaneros. Alongside the Army and Civil Guard troops that escorted Pintó and protected 
the area, there was a squad of Volunteers.62 These men had finally won their tour de force 
against the captain general. 
The outcome of the Ramón Pintó affair could have been interpreted as a relative 
political defeat for the captain general, as he initially opposed the execution. However, he 
understood the Volunteers were a military necessity for the defence of Spanish rule in Cuba 
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in a context where annexationist plots were still being organized in the US. To tackle these 
plots, the collaboration of the loyalist elements in Cuba was paramount. 
 
3.1. A Militia of peninsulares? 
The creation of a militia like the Volunteers was consistent with the wider plan for military 
reform envisioned by the captain general José Gutiérrez de la Concha (1854-1859). One of 
his main tasks was to reform the almost chronically short-of-funds Cuban treasury. As a 
metropolis, Spain was virtually unable to provide funds for its Antilles. The war for 
independence against France (1808-1814), the loss of the American empire, the First Carlist 
War (1833-1840) and decades of continuous political instability, had left the Spanish 
economy in a ruinous state. Hence, the Spanish Government expected Cuba not only to be 
self-sufficient but to contribute to the Spanish treasury.63 In order to alleviate the pressure 
on the island’s treasury, the captain general planned to establish in Cuba a smaller yet better 
equipped regular Army and Navy. He also envisioned a greater participation of Cuba’s 
society in the defence of the island, for this would foster loyalty towards Spain and narrow 
the gap between peninsulares and Cubans that had been forming since the days of Captain 
General Miguel Tacón (1834-1838).64 
These were precisely the core arguments of a report he sent to the Spanish Ministry 
of War on 20th June 1855. He argued that the Cuban treasury lacked the means to maintain 
an Army of 40,000 men, which was deemed necessary to successfully face a military 
invasion launched from the US. Hence, the Volunteers were a reliable substitute for the 
soldiers the State was not prepared to pay for. 
The captain general desired to address the widening gap between Cubans and 
peninsulares extant since Miguel Tacón’s government, for both had joined and were an 
integral part of the Volunteers.65 This was especially true outside Havana, where most of the 
Volunteers were peninsulares. Certainly, the men from metropolitan Spain also participated 
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in the organization of the Volunteers throughout Cuba. In Santiago de Cuba, a city where 
the peninsulares represented a relatively small community, the backbone of the Volunteers 
was represented by metropolitan Spaniards employed in commerce.66 For instance, this was 
the case of a lingerie shop owner, Facundo Bacardí, a Catalan migrant from Sitges who 
would go on to establish the rum-producing Bacardí Company in 1862.67 
The participation of Cubans had been a reality since the very inception of the 
Volunteers, despite the historiography tending to see it as a force exclusively made up of 
peninsulares.68 To join the Volunteers was not only a question of social prestige, for the 
Havana integrista elite that controlled the Cuban economy was the driving force that 
created the Volunteers. It was also a way to establish good relations with political power. For 
instance, in the city of Santa Clara, the Cuban landowner Pedro Nolasco González-Abreu 
created the local cavalry squadron after only ten days of the captain general’s decree 
establishing the Volunteers.69 Beyond being a member of the local elite, González-Abreu is 
known for being the father of Marta Abreu, a philanthropist that favoured the cause of 
Cuba’s independence during the second half of the 19th century.70 
The very existence of the Volunteers must be understood as a symptom of the 
diverse loyalties that existed in Cuba by the mid-19th century. They were created to counter 
the annexationist plans supported by part of the Cuban elite. However, the presence of both 
Cubans and peninsulares in their ranks revealed the existence of a loyalism that was by no 
means exclusive to the community of metropolitan Spaniards that had settled in Cuba. 
 
 
                                                 
66 Maritza Pérez Dionisio. “La inmigración hispana en Santiago de Cuba (1868-1898). Estudios de 
historia social y económica de América, 1996, No. 13, pp. 427-448. 
67 AGMS, leg. B-585, exp. 30. For a history of the Bacardí Company see Tom Gjelten. Bacardí and the 
Long Fight for Cuba. The Biography of a Cause. New York: Viking, 2008. 
68 Áurea Matilde Fernández Muñiz. España y Cuba 1868-1898. Revolución burguesa y relaciones 
coloniales. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1988, pp. 134-156; Uralde Cancio. Voluntarios de 
Cuba española, p. 22. 
69 BNC, CM Abreu, No. 91, 94 & 324. 
70 Marta González-Abreu y Arencibia (1845-1909) was a well-respected philanthropist from the city 
of Santa Clara. Among other enterprises, she promoted the construction of railways in Central Cuba 
and helped to fund the war for Cuban independence of 1895-1898. For a biography of Marta Abreu, 
see Josefina Toledo Benedit. Marta Abreu. La caridad como energía creadora. Havana: Editorial de 




The consolidation of the Volunteers as a permanent element of the Spanish defensive 
system in Cuba must be understood in relation to the imperial structure of Spain in the 
Caribbean. Firstly, they became a permanent element of defence in Cuba within a wider 
context of military reforms carried out by the Captain General José Gutiérrez de la Concha. 
Secondly, they consolidated their role during a context of Spanish colonial adventures in 
Africa and the Caribbean, as a pro-imperial militia. 
 
4.1. The Captain General’s Military Reforms 
Reforming the defensive system in Cuba was a priority for Captain General José Gutiérrez 
de la Concha (1854-1859). The core aims of the reform were to count on a smaller yet properly 
equipped Army, less costly to the treasury, and to foster the participation of local society in 
the defence of the island.71 The creation of the Volunteers must be understood in relation 
to this latter aspect. However, it also reflected the ascendance of integrismo in Cuba, closely 
related to the emergence of the integrista elite and the community of working-class 
peninsulares. 
Fostering the participation of Cuban society in the defence of the island was another 
basic element of the military reforms planned by Gutiérrez de la Concha. Considering that 
this meant the use of civilians for paramilitary purposes, loyalty to Spain was a cardinal 
element in the recruitment of militiamen. This did not seem a problem for the mobilization 
of free Cubans of African descent, whose participation in the army, which dated back to the 
17th century, had been banned in 1844 after an alleged slaves’ conspiracy had been thwarted 
by the authorities. Between 1854 and 1857 the captain general created the Milicias de Color.72 
The issue of loyalty seemed more troublesome regarding white Cubans. The role of criollos 
in Spanish America’s independence, and the support of part of the Cuban elite for 
annexation to the US (including the collaboration of several Milicias Disciplinadas’ officers 
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with Narciso López), only increased the Spanish authorities’ distrust towards Cubans. This 
was the reason why these militias had been left virtually to wither.73 
In this context, the Volunteers seemed a militia especially fit for the context to 
follow. Firstly, it was made up exclusively of unpaid volunteer civilians. Taking this into 
account, the recruits must have been driven by a loyalty to Spain and a sincere desire to 
serve. Cubans and peninsulares participated alike under the same regulations, and their 
financial support was to be found among the integrista elite, and thus did not represent any 
cost to the Treasury. The Milicias Disciplinadas, on the contrary, was a conscript militia 
dominated by Creoles who received a stipend from the Treasury. Conscription meant that 
Cubans who might not be supportive of Spanish rule could be recruited forcibly. As seen in 
the previous paragraph, some of these men took part in uprisings against Spain. Instead, 
the Volunteers were apparently made up of enthusiasts and represented no burden for the 
Treasury. Hence, on 24th April 1856, the Volunteers became a permanent element of the 
Spanish defensive system in Cuba. That very day, the Captaincy General approved their 
militia regulations or reglamento. In the first article of its first chapter, the raison d’être of 
the Volunteers is clearly stated: ‘the main object the Volunteer Battalions have been created 
for, and the main obligation of their members, is to maintain the order and public 
tranquillity of the towns: the armed defence of the rights of the Mother Country and our 
queen Doña Elizabeth II with one’s life if necessary’.74 
The reglamento set the basic rules for the organization and military instruction of 
the Volunteers. It stated that ‘Spaniards from both hemispheres” between 18 and 50 years 
old with “a proper behaviour” could join the militia, which was to have infantry and cavalry 
units. Contrary to the Milicias Disciplinadas, which resorted both to conscription and 
volunteering, the Volunteers were exclusively made of men who voluntarily decided to join 
the militia. This was meant to be a measure to assure the loyalty of the members, for Cubans 
discontented with Spanish rule would hardly join a unit so closely associated with the most 
radical forms of Spanish nationalism. As to the military instruction, it was rather basic, 
mostly consisting of basic weaponry training and drilling. As to the command structure, 
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the Segundo Cabo, or the captain general’s second-in-command, was instituted as general 
sub-inspector of the Volunteers. However, direct command was bestowed upon the units’ 
officers. Although vague, the reglamento of 1856 marked the consolidation of the 
Volunteers as a permanent element of the Spanish defensive system in Cuba.   
 
4.2. Supporting the Spanish Imperial Adventures 
The consolidation of the Volunteers was also possible thanks to their support in a series of 
imperial adventures carried out by Spain between the late 1850s and the mid-1860s. These 
adventures were a series of colonial campaigns promoted by the Spanish Government 
headed by Leopoldo O’Donnell (1858-1863) and his party, the Liberal Union, aimed at 
strengthening Spanish national unity and claiming Spain’s role as a colonial power.75 
Stephen Jacobson has called these campaigns “micro-military adventures”, for their discrete 
territorial ambitions and motivations mostly related to the country’s declining prestige.76 
More concretely, Cuba’s Volunteers explicitly supported the war against Morocco 
(1859-1860), and the reincorporation of Santo Domingo into the Spanish Monarchy (1861-
1865). Between the thwarted annexationist plot headed by Ramón Pintó (1855) and the 
breakout of the Ten Years’ War in 1868, the Volunteers had no clear military use as Cuba 
faced no direct threat. Thus, their support for the Spanish imperial adventures allowed the 
Volunteers to claim their loyalty to Spain, and to contribute to the country’s military effort 
to gain the favour of the authorities. 
This was especially important after the annexationist Cuban elite had abandoned 
their plans, due to the failure of Ramón Pintó’s conspiracy. Instead of trying to push forward 
its agenda of political and economic reforms outside Spain, the former annexationist elite 
tried to explore the possibility of achieving reforms within the Spanish Monarchy. Thus, 
during the terms of the Captains General Francisco Serrano (1859-1862) and Domingo 
Dulce (1862-1866), the former annexationist elite, now reformist, sought the support of the 
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Spanish authorities, which had traditionally sided by the integrista elite.77 In a context 
where the Captains Generals were the ultima ratio, and without a system of established 
political parties, lobbying was the only way to defend any political agenda before the power 
that ruled Cuba.  
In this context, to rally around the authorities and to show a firm disposition to 
collaborate in national projects was crucial to claiming a role in Cuba. The Volunteers’ 
loyalty paid off, for it was rewarded by the recognition of the authorities and helped to keep 
the units active during a period where their military use was unclear. This is an aspect 
omitted by Uralde Cancio in her book on the Volunteers before the Ten Years’ War.78 
However, the existence of a pro-imperial movement in Cuba has recently been pointed out 
by García Balañá, who considers that supporting the imperial adventures of Spain was a way 
to defend Spanish sovereignty on the island.79 In the same line, it is argued here that the 
Volunteers are a clear example of this support, which at the same time helped them to 
consolidate their role within the Spanish defensive system. 
The war against Morocco (1859-1860) proved a most successful colonial campaign. 
Essentially, this was a war about Spain’s prestige, ignited by the attack on the Spanish 
garrison of the North African enclave of Ceuta by a group of Moroccans.80 Although the 
country only gained commercial benefits and a tiny geographical expansion of its enclaves 
of Ceuta and Melilla, it sparked a wave of national enthusiasm both in metropolitan Spain 
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and her colonies.81 In the words of an Army officer, “nothing was more popular in Spain that 
the war against the Moors”.82 
In Cuba, this war also struck an imperial chord. According to La América, “each one 
of our Army’s victories is celebrated in the ever-faithful island of Cuba with demonstrations 
of immense joy”.83 The Volunteers played a prominent role in these demonstrations. Among 
other events, they organized a masquerade at Havana’s impressive Tacón theatre, and a 
raffle for the men serving in Africa.84 They also organized events that explicitly referred to 
the support to the Spanish cause and the Spanishness of Cuba. For instance, during a 
bullfight in Havana, both the arena and its surrounding streets were decorated with Spanish 
flags. Quite remarkably, the Volunteers, and not the police, kept public order during the 
bullfights.85 The setting, the event, and the participation of the Volunteers were a clear act 
of Spanish nationalist affirmation, for bullfighting was deeply “associated with Spain”.86 
Another demonstration of support for Spain’s war in Morocco was aiding the men 
fighting in Africa economically through donations. These donations were not exclusive to 
the Volunteers, not even of the integristas. Members of the Cuban elite that had flirted with 
annexationism also took part in the donations as a mean to reconcile with the Spanish 
authorities. For instance, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, a lawyer, and landowner from the 
eastern town of Bayamo donated a 4% of his income for the Spanish military effort in 
Morocco.87 A few years later, Céspedes would lead the Cuban insurgent forces that declared 
the island’s independence in 1868 that marked the beginning of the Ten Years’ War. The 
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support of the considered “Father of the Fatherland” for the imperial Spanish campaign in 
Africa has been concealed by traditional historiography.88 
For the Volunteers, which by 1860 were already 12,000 men-at-arms throughout the 
island, the donations were a transversal demonstration of loyalty to Spain, which included 
all its members regardless of their social position.89 The social and geographical 
composition of the Volunteers was reflected by the donations to the war effort in Morocco. 
Just to mention a few examples, Corporal Tomás Abreu of Santiago de Cuba, donated 4 
pesos per month during 1860 for the sustainment of a soldier fighting in Morocco. The 
Matanzas Volunteer Battalion, commanded by the Cuban-born Cosme de la Torriente, 
contributed with 5,088 pesos. The four infantry Volunteer battalions of Havana gathered 
over 37,000 pesos.90 In total, the Volunteers gave over 273,000 pesos for the war in Africa.91 
The fact that these donations came from all over the island is a good indicator of the 
existence of both an esprit de corps and the Volunteers’ commitment to Spain’s role in 
Africa, which at the same time reinforced Spanish sovereignty in the colonies as well. 
All this support for the Spanish military effort in Morocco was not followed by the 
direct participation of many Volunteers in the war. In fact, according to the records, only 36 
men left Cuba to join the Spanish Army in Morocco, of whom just a handful were 
Volunteers.92 Nevertheless, there were plans to use the Volunteers as a model militia to 
create a unit in Cuba to be dispatched to Morocco. In September 1860, the Cuban-born 
secretary of Queen Elizabeth II, Martín de Arredondo y Olea, suggested to the Ministry of 
War the creation of a Volunteer battalion of “Blacks and Mulattoes” to be sent to Africa. 
Concretely, he suggested that these men could garrison the Moroccan cities occupied by 
the Spanish troops after the war ended in April 1860. But above all, he envisioned these 
Volunteers as a “Cuban contribution to the glory of the Nation”.93 
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The project of sending Volunteers of African descent to Morocco never took place. 
However, it is relevant to the idea that inspired Arredondo’s report. For the first time, the 
Volunteers were considered as a model militia to be used for Spain in her colonial 
campaigns outside Cuba. Thus, beyond being a permanent element of the Spanish 
defensive system on the island, they were thought of for the first time as a militia that could 
play a role in its imperial dimension. The idea of sending Cuban Volunteers to fight in Africa 
also engaged with the practices of Spanish nationalism of the 1860s. In the Peninsula, units 
of Basque and Catalan volunteers were raised and sent to fight to Morocco alongside the 
regular Army, whose victories were celebrated by demonstrations of enthused popular 
nationalism.94 Thus, supporting Spain’s imperial ambitions was a way to reinforce the 
Spanish nationalist discourse in Cuba.95 
The Volunteers’ commitment to Spain and her empire was also demonstrated 
through donations that were not exclusively linked to military adventures. For instance, 
they donated 10,000 pesos for the creation of barracks for invalided soldiers in Havana, or 
ca. 28,000 for the reconstruction of Manila after the earthquake that almost destroyed it in 
June 1863.96 Showing solidarity towards the Philippines was a way to underpin the idea of 
integridad nacional between the different parts of the empire. But it was a war in the Antilles 
that would consolidate the Volunteers within the Spanish defensive system: the war in Santo 
Domingo (1863-1865), which took part in the context of the re-annexation of that country 
into the Spanish Monarchy (1861-1865). Returning to the direct rule of the old Mother 
Country was the option defended by part of the Dominican elite—represented by General 
Pedro Santana—as the solution for the chronic instability of the country and the threat of 
Haitian expansionism.97 However, the opposition to Spanish rule of other groups gathered 
around Buenaventura Báez, and the resistance of the US to the biggest change in the status 
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quo of the Caribbean since the Haitian independence of 1804, fuelled a nationalist uprising 
against Spain that ended with the withdrawal of the Spanish troops in May 1865.98 
Evidence suggests that the war in Santo Domingo was not as popular among 
Volunteers as the war against Moroccans. They probably feared that waging a war against a 
nation so close geographically and culturally to Cuba might have a negative impact on the 
island. Figthting the Dominicans could have a bad effect on Cuban reformists who now 
trusted they would gain more political and economic rights under Spain. A major factor to 
be reckoned with was the United States. Althoug the country was embroiled in the civil war, 
as the conflict went on and the North’s victory seemed more imminent, it was clear that the 
US would not tolerate the Spanish presence in Santo Domingo.99 Hence, this was another 
source of potential trouble for Spain in the Antilles. If the financial contribution can be 
taken as a measure to reckon the Volunteers’ support for this war, the fact that they donated 
less than 30,000 pesos for the Dominican campaign is quite telling (whereas they had 
contributed with ca. 275,000 for the Moroccan war).100 
Despite this, and although the outcome of the war in Santo Domingo was a setback 
for Spain’s imperial aspirations to a stronger presence in the Caribbean, the Volunteers did 
contribute to the war effort, which helped to consolidate them as a permanent element of 
the Spanish defensive system in Cuba. In fact, just as had been considered during the war 
against Morocco, there were plans to send Volunteers to fight in Santo Domingo. On April 
1864, a Volunteer officer in Havana, the Catalan Baudilio Vila, sent a report to the Spanish 
Ministry of War, while military operations were still ongoing in Santo Domingo. Vila 
suggested recruiting men from among the already existing Volunteer units to create a 600-
strong Batallón de Voluntarios del Príncipe de Asturias and send it from Cuba to Santo 
Domingo under his direct command, for he had some military experience as a former 
member of the National Militia in Barcelona.101 
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Unfortunately, although Vila’s proposal could not be traced, it can be assumed that 
a type of volunteer force was organized in Havana to be sent to Santo Domingo. At the 
National Archives of the Republic of Cuba, in Havana, there is a file named ‘organization 
of a volunteer battalion for the war in Santo Domingo’, which was unfortunately inaccessible 
at the time of conducting research in Cuba, in Autumn 2015.102 Thus, although it cannot be 
established who these volunteers organized in Havana and sent to Cuba were, it is certain 
that such a force, whatever its composition, was sent to the Dominican war, for the Spanish 
newspapers informed in November 1864 that the sending of the Volunteer battalions from 
Havana had been suspended.103 
Another way the Volunteers contributed to the military effort in Santo Domingo was 
through logistics. Due to its vicinity to La Hispaniola, Santiago de Cuba became a platform 
used to send and receive troops and goods to and from Santo Domingo.104 This role allowed 
the local Volunteers to claim their role in the Spanish defensive system. Since most of the 
local Army garrison had left for Santo Domingo, the Volunteers assumed its tasks during 
the duration of the war, as well as organized a structure of support for the men fighting in 
Santo Domingo. This included sending spirits and cigars, but more importantly, the 
transport of the sick soldiers returning from Santo Domingo to the military hospitals of 
Santiago de Cuba. This task was extremely dangerous, due to the infectious nature of the 
tropical diseases present. A group of 65 men, out of the 1,400 Santiago de Cuba Volunteers, 
was selected to carry out the transportation.105 In total, it is estimated that the Santiago de 
Cuba Volunteers transported more than 10,000 men between August 1863 and July 1865.106 
The efforts of the Volunteers were praised by the authorities and gained them the 
recognition of the Crown. Their contribution helped their consolidation as a permanent 
militia in Cuba. In fact, Captain General Domingo Dulce (1862-1866) informed the Ministry 
of War about the Santiago de Cuba Volunteers’ efforts. He advised that giving some official 
recognition to their contribution would raise their morale and would help to consolidate 
their role in Cuba. As a result, 23 of the Volunteers were awarded military decorations by 
the Crown in December 1865, seven months after the end of the war.107 After that war, the 
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Volunteers had clearly consolidated their role thanks to the recognition of the Spanish 
authorities in Havana and Madrid of their efforts during the war.  
 
5. Expansion 
The contribution of the Volunteers to the Spanish military efforts in Morocco and Santo 
Domingo helped to consolidate their role in the defensive system of Cuba, as well as serving 
as a tool to affirm Spanish sovereignty in the Caribbean. Despite plans to send Volunteers 
to Africa and Hispaniola never taking place, due to the war in Santo Domingo the model of 
the Volunteers was replicated in Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico.   
 
5.1. Santo Domingo 
The history of the Volunteers in Santo Domingo, unexplored by historiography, goes hand 
in hand with the Spanish re-annexation of the country (1861-1865), and the consequent 
arrival of Spanish merchants and civil servants to the newly occupied territory. Since Spain 
withdrew from Santo Domingo in 1821, the Dominican support for the Spanish presence 
was constrained to a tiny elite of politicians and merchants.108 Hence, the backbone of the 
Volunteers in Santo Domingo had necessarily to be the Spaniards who began to disembark 
in the country after the annexation became effective in May 1861. Spain’s weak presence in 
Santo Domingo also explains the fact that the existence of the Volunteers in this country 
was restricted to Santo Domingo city, the country’s capital. It has only been possible to track 
a Volunteer section created in Santiago de los Caballeros, the country’s second most 
important city.109  
The first proposal to create a Volunteer company came from a group of peninsular 
merchants established in the city of Santo Domingo. On 26th June 1861, they asked for the 
creation of two Volunteer companies after Dominican nationalists had attacked the town 
of Las Matas de Farfán at the Dominican-Haitian border.110 The fact that these peninsulares 
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were willing to create two companies (ca. 200 men) after an attack on a Spanish position, 
reflects the difficulties that Spain encountered in the country to impose its rule, but also 
the existence of a relatively important colony of peninsular merchants. Just as in the Cuban 
cities, these men were to be the backbone of the Volunteers in Santo Domingo. 
It is difficult to quantify the number of peninsulares in Santo Domingo by the time 
of the annexation. However, since the Dominican-Spanish treaty of 18th February 1855 
aimed to increase Spain’s presence in the country, the number and importance of the 
peninsulares had been growing.111 By 1861, they already controlled the commerce of 
mahogany and tobacco in Santo Domingo city and the surrounding area.112 Another 
important contingent of peninsulares was represented by the civil servants who were 
appointed as administrators of Santo Domingo.113 In fact, theirs was the initiative to create 
a Volunteer battalion in Santo Domingo city, after the Dominican nationalists attacked the 
country’s second most important city, Santiago de los Caballeros on 24th February 1861, and 
regular troops had to be sent from Santo Domingo city.114 On 2nd March 1863, Santo 
Domingo’s Captain General Felipe Ribero y Lemoyne (1862-1863) officially called for the 
creation of a Volunteer battalion in the capital city.115 
Just as in Havana in 1855, when the Spanish authorities thought that the arrival of 
an annexationist military expedition was imminent, the fear that the Spanish Army would 
be overcome by the insurgents was the cause of the creation of a Volunteers battalion. Thus, 
the experience of Cuba had been taken as the model for the civilian participation of the 
defence of the Spanish rule in Santo Domingo. These civilians necessarily had to be 
peninsulares, for the Dominican population generally opposed the Spanish re-annexation 
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of their country as Frank Moya Pons has shown.116 Consequently, Spanish civil servants and 
merchants formed the backbone of the Volunteers in Santo Domingo. 
Little is known of the military activity of these Volunteers. The records kept at the 
General Military Archive, in Madrid, are only related to the organization of the battalion. It 
seems likely that the Volunteers of Santo Domingo were never activated militarily outside 
of the city, where most of the military action took place. For instance, no military action of 
the Volunteers is described in one of the most detailed works on that war, written by the 
last Spanish captain general of Santo Domingo, José de la Gándara y Navarro.117 Even though 
its dissolution is not mentioned either, it appears evident that it took place when the 
Spanish troops evacuated the country between May and July 1865.      
 
5.2. Puerto Rico 
One of the effects of the war in Santo Domingo was the creation of a Volunteer battalion in 
San Juan, Puerto Rico’s capital, on 23rd December 1864, following the model of Cuba’s 
Volunteers. The idea to emulate the Cuban Volunteers was suggested by the Puerto Rican 
sugar baron José Ramón Fernández to Captain General Félix María de Messina (1863-1865). 
Fernández was the most prominent figure of the commercial elite—mostly made up of 
peninsulares—that dominated San Juan. They recruited around 500 of their employees, also 
mostly peninsulares, and gave them uniforms and weapons, creating the first Volunteer 
battalion. Following the Cuban model, the promoters of the battalion also became its first 
officers. José Ramón Fernández was appointed its colonel.118 The official reason for creating 
the Volunteers was the fact that half of Puerto Rico’s Army garrison was fighting in Santo 
Domingo. Thus, the Volunteers were supposed to replace these men during the war.119 The 
Volunteers of Puerto Rico were linked to the imperial projection of Spain from their very 
inception. The island was a fertile ground for the Spanish imperial discourse. During 
Spain’s war in Morocco (1859-1860) the very elite or merchants that would later create the 
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Volunteers coordinated alongside the Captaincy General a donation of 360,000 pesos for 
the Spanish soldiers fighting in Africa.120 
The organization of the Volunteers in Puerto Rico was also a result of the ascent of 
the elite of merchants and landowners, mostly made up of peninsulares, which dominated 
the island’s economy by the mid-19th century. Certainly, there was never a mass migration 
from Spain to Puerto Rico, but Astrid Cubano Iguina demonstrated that the tiny community 
of peninsulares came to dominate credit and commerce in Puerto Rico at the expense of the 
declining landowning Creole elite. In a way, the Volunteers represented the rising power of 
the peninsulares that controlled commerce.121 
The creation of the Volunteers also sent a powerful political message. The elite of 
peninsulares and their closest Puerto Rican allies (such as José Ramón Fernández, the 
promoter of the idea) would use their loyalty to the Spanish authorities to defend their 
privileged status within society. To a certain extent, José Ramón Fernández and his 
colleagues began to promote the idea that the Volunteers were also necessary to defend 
Spanish authority, since there were groups of criollos that might conspire against Spain. 
Due to the emergence of the merchant elite of peninsulares and the decline of the Puerto 
Rican landowners, there was certainly some discontent towards the way Spain ruled Puerto 
Rico among the propertied and educated circles. These groups had never conspired against 
Spanish sovereignty, and there was no serious plot to oust Spain by 1864. In Puerto Rico, 
there had never been an annexationist or nationalist movement aimed at severing ties with 
Spain. On this island, the main political aspiration of wide echelons of Creole society was 
to have better conditions under Spanish rule. Despite this, the elite of peninsulares 
exploited the tiniest expression of discontent with the Spanish authorities to justify the 
creation of a militia of armed Loyalists. 
Only a tiny minority of Puerto Ricans openly advocated for the independence of the 
island.122 The two leading voices of the Puerto Rican nationalist movement were the 
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physician Ramón Emeterio Betances and the landowner Segundo Ruiz Belvis.123 During the 
second half of 1864, they circulated a manifesto calling all the peninsulares living on the 
island “scum” and “thieves”. Considering that the Army garrison in Puerto Rico had sent 
almost half its personnel to Santo Domingo, the manifesto urged the islanders to start an 
uprising against Spain, for “there are no soldiers in the island […] and a jíbaro and his 
machete are worth twenty Spaniards”.124 
The reality was, however, that no one answered the call, and peace in Puerto Rico 
remained unperturbed. Nonetheless, rumours of an imminent uprising reached San Juan 
and were exaggerated by the elite of peninsulares. They even falsely accused a Puerto Rican 
officer serving in the Spanish Army, Luis Padial y Vizcarrondo, of preparing an armed 
uprising for the mere fact of having expressed publicly some disagreement with the way the 
authorities ruled the island.125 Padial was expelled from the island by the captain general 
despite the accusation being ungrounded. Nevertheless, the Volunteer battalion was 
created on 23rd December 1864.126 
Not really believing in the likelihood of an uprising, the captain general and 
peninsular merchants based in San Juan used the Betances and Belvis manifesto, and the 
rumours accusing Luis Padial of conspiring against Spain, as an excuse to tighten their 
control over the island. The peace in Puerto Rico was not threatened by any nationalist 
conspiracy. On a report sent to the Ministry of War, Captain General Félix María de Messina 
wrote that he had stopped the organization of the Volunteers for the ‘peace was secured, 
and they were not necessary’.127 
The Volunteers were left almost inactive since the Spanish troops returned from 
Santo Domingo to Puerto Rico in May 1865, after Spain had relinquished its sovereignty 
over that country.128 The only known activity of the Volunteers during the war was to send 
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3,000 pesos, shoes and clothing to the soldiers fighting on the neighbouring island.129 After 
1865 the alliance between the captain general and the elite of peninsulares that created the 
Volunteers exerted an oppressive control over Puerto Rico. Consequently, some members 
of the Puerto Rican landowning elite began to conspire against Spanish rule, which would 
crystalize into the uprising of September 1868 as will be seen in the next chapter. 
 
6. Conclusions 
As has been shown, the creation, consolidation, and expansion of the Volunteers were 
intimately related to the imperial framework of the Caribbean during the mid-19th century. 
The Volunteers were created to defend Spanish sovereignty over its oldest imperial 
possessions (Cuba and Puerto Rico). Their status was consolidated due to their 
identification with Spain’s imperial adventures of the 1860s. Also, in relation to the latter, 
the model of the Volunteers as a militia first implemented in Cuba, was exported to Santo 
Domingo and Puerto Rico. 
The creation of the Volunteers in Cuba in 1855 can only be understood in relation to 
the annexationist projects aimed at making the island another state in the American Union. 
The Volunteers were first organized to strengthen Spanish military capacity in Cuba during 
a context in which the annexationist movement organized military expeditions aimed at 
changing the island’s status quo. 
Firstly, and in relation to the previous point, the Volunteers were also the expression 
of the new system of defence envisioned by the Captain General José Gutiérrez de la Concha 
(1854-1859). Part of this new system consisted of a greater participation of the civilian 
society in the defence of the island, in the form of militias that would not represent a new 
burden to the stressed Cuban treasury. The cost of organizing the Volunteers was paid by 
the battalion’s officers, and often by the rank-and-file themselves. 
The Volunteers must also be understood as an expression of the emerging power of 
the peninsulares in mid-19th century Cuba, as well as the Cuban society’s complex relations 
to political loyalty. The authorities sought to replace the old Creole-manned militias with a 
new militia dominated by the peninsulares. In the urban areas, where the peninsulares 
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dominated, it became clear that Spanish Loyalism was not exclusive to the men born in 
metropolitan Spain. Almost since its very inception, White Cubans joined the Volunteers, 
especially in the rural areas. 
Secondly, the consolidation of the Volunteers is explained by their explicit support 
of Spain’s colonial adventures in Morocco and Santo Domingo during the 1860s. In a context 
of stability in Cuba, and of a growing influence of the Cuban reformist elite—formerly 
annexationist—in relation to the Spanish authorities, supporting the imperial projects of 
Spain through the Volunteers was an approach the integristas took to legitimise their 
position on the island. This support was expressed via donations, but also by directly 
engaging with the logistical needs of the Spanish troops returning to Cuba from the 
Dominican warfront. This behaviour justified the Volunteers’ role in the defensive system 
of the island to the authorities, both in Havana and Madrid. 
Thirdly, due to their support of Spain’s campaigns outside Cuba, the Volunteers 
became an inherent feature of the military practices of Spanish colonialism in the 
Caribbean. These forces cost almost nothing to the State, were self-funded, and had shown 
their identification with Spanish sovereignty in the Antilles. Conditioned by the briefness 
of Spain’s annexation of Santo Domingo (1861-1865), the Volunteers appeared as another 
element of the Spanish colonial structures deployed over the newly acquired possession. 
Because of the war in Santo Domingo, the Volunteers model was also implemented in 
Puerto Rico. As in Cuba in 1855, the creation of the Volunteers in Puerto Rico in 1864 was 
aimed at strengthening Spanish military control over the island during a period in which 
its defences had been weakened due to the demand for soldiers in the Dominican 
campaign. Puerto Rico’s Volunteers were first organized by a powerful elite of peninsular 
merchants, which used this militia to secure their privileged position by raising suspicions 
about the loyalty of the Puerto Rican landowning elite. Thus, both in Cuba and Puerto Rico, 
the Volunteers played a military role for the authorities and served a political purpose for 
the elite of peninsulares created around colonial commerce. 
The Volunteers were thus a force with a dual dimension, local and imperial. On the 
one hand, they represented the support of part of the local Antillean societies for the 
Spanish presence in the region. They defended Spain’s sovereignty in Cuba and Puerto Rico 
and were committed to the re-annexation of Santo Domingo. On the other hand, they 
became an inherent element of the Spanish imperial strategy in the Caribbean. The Spanish 
authorities used the Volunteers to reinforce their grip over the islands and profited from 
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their logistical and financial support during the campaigns in Morocco and Santo Domingo. 




CHAPTER III. AGAINST THE REVOLUTION (1868-1878) 
Reflecting on the assassination of eight innocent medical students, perpetrated in Havana 
on 27th November 1871 by the Volunteers, the Cuban scholar Juan Luis Martín in 1942 
considered this militia to have been 19th century Cuba’s own “Fascist party”. Martín 
considered them the equivalent of Italy’s Fasci di Combattimento, Germany’s SS, and 
Spain’s Falange. More importantly, he also described the Volunteers as the private militia 
of the Spanish slaveholding and commercial elite in Cuba, which recruited these men from 
among their employees—poorly educated peninsulares settled in Havana, who were used 
to terrorize both the Cubans and Spaniards who wanted to change the colonial status quo.1 
Leaving aside the ‘Fascist’ epithet, Martín’s brief description of the Volunteers has 
been traditionally shared by historians.2 This chapter will argue that it is only a partially 
valid interpretation in some respects for the period 1868-1878. It is, as well, an 
interpretation that is excessively Havana-centred, a common flaw in the historiography on 
Cuba, as pointed out by Moreno Fraginals (a similar view has been given regarding the 
Volunteers in Puerto Rico, though they have drawn much less attention from historians).3 
Though still predominant, this interpretation of the Volunteers has lately been 
contested, mostly by Cuban historians. This study builds on their critique. On a recent 
study on Cuban reformism, Mercedes García Rodríguez recognised that the extent of this 
militia spread well beyond the peninsular community in Havana, yet without completely 
abandoning the traditional view.4 Abreu Cardet, on his study on integrismo during the Ten 
Years’ War, has shown the important presence of Cuban Volunteers as an integral element 
to the forging of the Cuban nation as the insurgents.5 In the United States, Tone and 
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Sartorius have also argued that Spanish Loyalism in Cuba went well beyond the 
community of peninsulares.6 
Drawing from both the traditional and the revised interpretation of the Volunteers, 
this chapter argues that they were a counterrevolutionary yet highly heterogeneous 
phenomenon. They certainly opposed the potential changes streaming from the 
revolutions of 1868 in Spain and her Antilles, however by no means should they be 
considered merely a Spanish slave owners’ urban militia of peninsular workers. In fact, the 
revolutionary period opened in the Spanish Antilles in 1868 marked for the Volunteers not 
only an expansion of its model from Cuba to Puerto Rico, but also the inclusion of 
thousands of Creoles into their ranks. Whereas before 1868 the Volunteers had been a 
force basically made up of peninsulares, during the war in Cuba the Volunteers expanded 
geographically throughout the island, incorporating thousands of Cuban-born men who 
chose to defend the continuity of Spanish Cuba against other Cubans who fought for the 
creation of an independent nation. 
There were remarkable differences, particularly in Cuba, among the Volunteers 
regarding their spatial distribution. In the cities, they were indeed mostly peninsulares 
employed in commerce, the tobacco manufacturing industry, and other semi-skilled jobs. 
In the countryside, the Volunteers were predominantly Cubans working in agriculture. 
Moreover, the heterogeneity of the Volunteers was also reflected in the often-conflictive 
relationship that existed between the working-class rank-and-file Voluntarios, and their 
middle-class and affluent officers, who often happened to be their employers. This factor 
shaped the power relationship established between the working-class Volunteers, their 
officers, and the Spanish authorities, swinging from confrontation to collaboration, both 
in the Antilles and in metropolitan Spain. 
To show the counterrevolutionary and heterogeneous character of this militia, this 
chapter deals with the response of the Volunteers in Cuba and Puerto Rico to the 
challenges posed by the revolutionary process that the Spanish Empire underwent after 
1868. To do this, this chapter will offer an overview of class divisions within the Volunteers, 
for the political consequences it had. Then, it will answer three main questions. The first 
one deals with the strategies they adopted to oppose this very revolutionary process, both 
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in the Antilles and in Spain. The second one addresses the impact of the class conflict in 
shaping the Volunteers’ reaction during this period. The third one examines the military 
role played by this militia during Cuba’s Ten Years’ War. 
 
1. Class Divisions Within the Volunteers 
As seen in the previous chapters, the Volunteers were a heterogeneous force only united 
by their commitment to the continuity of Spanish rule in the Antilles. Before 1868 this was 
a militia dominated by peninsulares, but with the outbreak of the war, thousands of criollos 
joined it, as will be seen later in this chapter. However, class was the main factor that 
divided the Volunteers at the start of the war.7 Class differences also translated into 
different political cultures, views, and practices. The Volunteers were made up of men that 
belonged to upper, middle, and lower classes. As will be shown throughout this chapter, 
the different classes engaged in an intense struggle for political, social and economic 
power, all within the rubric of integrismo during the revolutionary period of 1868-1878, 
especially in Cuba. This division proved a key element in the understanding of how the 
Volunteers resisted the challenges posed by the revolutionaries in Madrid and the 
Antilles.8 In Puerto Rico, class differences among the Volunteers were not as acute. The 
absence of war and the virtual non-existence of an industry did not allow social and 
political tensions to grow as exacerbated as became the case in Cuba. Thus, in the smaller 
of the Spanish Antilles the Volunteer elite generally managed to effectively control the 
whole of the Volunteers. 
 In 1868 the Volunteers were still an urban phenomenon, both in Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. Chief officers and officers (colonels and majors) were for the most part members of 
the commercial, financial, landowning elite, as well as former Army officers and civil 
servants of the colonial administration’s highest ranks.9 They were predominantly 
peninsulares who had settled in the Antilles during the 1820s and 1830s, thriving 
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economically due to their involvement in the slave, sugar, and commercial trades. In Cuba, 
their leading figure was the Basque sugar baron, financier, and slaveowner Julián de 
Zulueta, and in Puerto Rico the criollo José Ramón Fernández, the island’s major sugar 
baron and slaveowner, both of whom were discussed in the previous chapter. Despite the 
opposition of these upper-class Volunteers to the reforms promised by the revolutionary 
government of La Gloriosa, some of them were well connected with the new regime in 
Spain. For instance, the foreign minister’s brother, Ramón López de Ayala, was captain of 
Havana’s 4th Volunteers Battalion.10 This group was also well connected to the local Cuban 
elite through marriage, as most of them were wedded to criollas that belonged to the 
island’s old elite. This was a group deeply committed to the continuity of slavery, and a 
protectionist economic policy that kept the Antilles as captive markets for Spanish goods 
they commercialized. Their opposition to the reforms promised by Madrid aimed to limit 
and restrict them as much as possible, trying to find a compromise with the Spanish 
authorities. Their views were often conveyed through the Diario de la Marina, Cuba’s most 
important newspaper of the day. This integrista elite tried to dominate the Volunteers and 
use them to push forward their agenda, but the lower echelons often escaped their control, 
as this chapter will show. 
 Beneath this group, there were the middle-class Volunteers. They were also 
predominantly peninsulares who had arrived in the Antilles in the 1840s and 1850s and 
often had also married Cuban and Puerto Rican women. Most of them were shopkeepers 
and owners of small businesses (such as bakeries, taverns or transport companies), as well 
as cigar-making company owners. A good example of these men was the Catalan José 
Gener Batet, who had migrated to Cuba in the 1840s, and after working for a few years as 
tobacco grower, established in Havana his own cigar-making company, La Escepción, 
which produced the famous Hoyo de Monterrey cigars, still much appreciated by cigar 
aficionados to this day.11 In the 1870s he was captain of Havana’s 6th Volunteer Battalion 
and was known for his radical opposition to any form of Cuban nationalism or reformism. 
In fact, the political views of these middle-class Volunteers tended to be far more 
intransigent and much more nationalistic than the upper-class Volunteers. La Voz de 
Cuba, owned by the Asturian journalist and Volunteer Gonzalo Castañón, tended to 
                                                 
10 Ribó. Historia de los Voluntarios cubanos, vol. I, p. 334. 
11 El Moro Muza, 31-03-1870, pp. 1-2. 
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represent the political views of this group.12 These men coveted the superior social, 
cultural, and economic position of the integrista and Cuban elites. During the war, they 
saw the opportunity to claim a greater share of power through violence. Politically, this 
group was highly heterogenous. There were monarchists, as well as republicans, 
conservatives, and liberals, but all were radically committed to the continuity of Spanish 
rule. It was often the case that they supported the revolution of 1868 in Spain but not the 
colonial reforms it promised, as these were often perceived as a threat to Spain’s presence 
in the Antilles. Rather than by politics, they were defined by their social position. Beyond 
opposing the political changes promised by Madrid and the insurgents, these middle-class 
Volunteers were also driven by an intense desire to ascend socially and economically. They 
considered the declining old Cuban elite as the most vulnerable enemy, for they had been 
displaced by the integrista elite from political power and were not supported by Spanish 
authorities. During much of the war, these Volunteers attacked the lives and properties of 
this Cuban upper-middle class. Repressing this class and seizing their property required 
the indispensable collaboration of the working-class Volunteers, who would provide the 
brute force and the numbers. The influence of middle-class over working-class Volunteers 
was remarkable, both as officers and employers. 
 Working-class Volunteers represented the lowest social echelons of this militia. 
They were mostly young peninsulares (usually from Galicia, Asturias, Catalonia, and the 
Canary Islands) who had recently migrated to the Antilles and were usually employed by 
middle-class Volunteers as shop assistants, store clerks, coachmen carters, cigar-makers, 
stevedores, or carters.13 They were relatively isolated from criollos, spending long hours 
“behind the counter” with their peninsular employees and tending to socialise with fellow 
countrymen. Also, due to their young age, they were generally not married, which was the 
usual way to integrate into the local society. This isolation often generated fierce anti-
Creole sentiments, which were used by middle-class Volunteers to direct their violence 
against the old Cuban reformist elite.14 They were generally poorly educated, and their 
political views often shaped by their employers and La Voz de Cuba. However, as this 
chapter will show, since the 1860s these working-class Volunteers began to develop a 
                                                 
12 J. R. Betancourt. Las dos banderas. Apuntes históricos sobre la insurrección de Cuba. Cartas al 
Excmo. Sr. Ministro de Ultramar. Soluciones para Cuba. Seville: Establecimiento Tipográfico del 
Círculo Liberal, 1870, p. 63; García Rodríguez. Con un ojo en Yara y otro en Madrid, pp. 109-117. 
13 In 1869-1870, 71.25% of peninsular Volunteers in Havana and Matanzas came from these regions. 
Manuel Moreno Fraginals & José J. Moreno Masó. Guerra, migración y muerte (El ejército español 
en Cuba como vía migratoria). Colombres: Ediciones Júcar, 1993, p. 97. 
14 Fernández Muñiz. España y Cuba, pp. 135-156. 
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greater class consciousness through their involvement in Cuba’s organized labour 
movement, which was de facto constrained to Havana. For instance, the island’s first 
labour newspaper, La Aurora, had been created in 1865 by the Asturian cigar-maker and 
Volunteer Saturnino Martínez.15        
The reason for the intransigence of the lower-class Volunteers in the big cities is 
difficult to determine. It might have been caused by their generally poor education, and 
relative isolation from Cuban society, at least during their first years on the island. As 
pointed out by Áurea Matilde Fernández, most of the Volunteers in the big cities were 
young peninsular migrants, mostly employed in the commercial sector by other 
peninsulares, who often happened to be their relatives. Their working conditions tended 
to be quite harsh, spending long hours behind the counter, and often living in the shop 
backroom, with little contact with Cubans outside of their working hours. They often came 
to see in every Cuban a suspected rebel, who would potentially thwart the peninsulares’ 
goal of making a living on the island. Thus, these young men were easy prey for the radical 
rhetoric of La Voz de Cuba, which called for the ‘extermination’ of the rebels.16 
 
2. A Triple Revolution: Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico 
In the early autumn of 1868, Spain and her colonies in the Antilles underwent three 
apparently unrelated revolutionary processes.17 In the metropolitan territory, on 17th 
September a coalition of the Progressive Party, the Liberal Union, and the Democratic 
Party, led by General Juan Prim, started a revolution against Queen Elizabeth II (1843-
1868) for her explicit support of the conservative Moderate Party.18 In less than two weeks, 
                                                 
15 Casanovas. Bread, or Bullets!, pp. 80-81. 
16 La Voz de Cuba, 30-01-1869, p. 1. 
17 Although it has not been proved, several authors have suggested that Juan Prim and Carlos 
Manuel de Céspedes, leaders of the revolutionary uprisings in metropolitan Spain and Cuba 
respectively, might have coordinated their actions. See Moreno Fraginals. Cuba/España, p. 232-233; 
García Rodríguez. Con un ojo en Yara y otro en Madrid, pp. 43-44. 
18 Juan Prim y Prats (1814-1870) was a leading figure in 19th century Spain. A veteran of the first and 
second Carlist wars, he began to be considered a military hero for his role during the war against 
Morocco (1859-1860), and the Mexican campaign (1861-1862), during which he averted a war against 
the Mexican Government of Benito Juárez. He became president (1869-1870) and War minister 
(1868-1870). He was also a representative for the Progressive Party at the Congress of Deputies (1841-
1869). In the colonial sphere, he was captain general of Puerto Rico (1847-1848). For a biography of 
Juan Prim see Emilio de Diego. Prim. Mucho más que una espada. Madrid: Editorial Actas, 2014; 
Rafael Olivar Bertrand. Prim. Madrid: Tebas, 1975. For a study on the Progressive Party see Jorge 




La Gloriosa—as this revolution came to be known—ousted both the Queen and the 
Moderates, who had dominated Spanish politics intermittently since 1843.19 The political 
period that La Gloriosa opened is known as Sexenio Revolucionario or Democrático (1868-
1874). 
The liberal regime envisioned by the men of La Gloriosa failed after six years, for 
the Democrats saw it as a starting point, whereas the Progressives and the Liberal 
Unionists thought it an accomplished goal.20 The new regime was further debilitated by 
four main issues: a profound internal division surounding the type of State desired 
(Monarchy or Republic), a chronic political instability in the Peninsula, slavery, and a 
separatist war in Cuba. Consequently, the regime born in September 1868 was extremely 
unstable. In only six years, Spain had a Regency (1868-1871), a Monarchy (1871-1873), a 
Republic (1873-1874), and twenty heads of government. Besides the war in Cuba, the 
country also underwent two civil wars: The Third Carlist War (1872-1876), and the Rebelión 
Cantonal (1873-1874), a federalist republican uprising that aimed to restructure the State 
from below.21 
At the same time, the Antilles were shaken by two revolutions aimed at ending the 
political relationship with Spain. On 23rd September 1868, Puerto Rico underwent its first 
uprising for independence, known as Grito de Lares. It did not escalate into a full-fledged 
war, as it was quickly quelled by forces loyal to the Spanish Government. In Cuba, on the 
contrary, the uprising led by Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, known as Grito de Yara (10th 
October 1868), turned into a long war that devastated the island: The Ten Years’ War. The 
traumatic experience of this war paved the ground for the abolition of slavery, and was the 
foundational moment for Cuban nationalism, according to Jorge Ibarra.22 Moreover, it also 
shaped the way in which Spanish Loyalism, with its armed wing, the Volunteers, would 
operate during the last decades of the Spanish presence in America. 
                                                 
19 The only two parentheses to the Moderate Party power were the Bienio Progresista (1854-1856) 
and the Gobierno Largo of Leopoldo O’Donnell’s Liberal Union (1858-1863). See Durán. La Unión 
Liberal y la modernización de la España isabelina; V. G. Kiernan. The Revolution of 1854 in Spanish 
History. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966. 
20 Miguel Tuñón de Lara. Estudios sobre el siglo XIX español. Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, 
1971, pp. 141-145. 
21 Raymond Carr. Spain, 1808-1975. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 305-346; Josep 
Fontana. La época del liberalismo, in Josep Fontana, Josep & Ramón Viralles (dir.). Historia de 
España, vol. VI. Barcelona and Madrid: Crítica-Marcial Pons, 2007, pp. 351-408. 
22 Jorge Ibarra. Ideología mambisa. Havana: Instituto del Libro, 1967; pp. 9-76. 
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The aim of the Antillean revolutions was clear: to sever ties with Spain. The 
revolutionary goals of La Gloriosa were more imprecise. There was only a vague consensus 
within the new ruling elite that more political and individual rights ought to be granted. 
This, of course, included the free inhabitants of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Nonetheless, the 
debates on people’s rights also alluded to the unfree inhabitants of the Antilles: ca. 400,000 
slaves in Cuba, and ca. 40,000 in Puerto Rico. These were the main issues that the Overseas 
Minister Adelardo López de Ayala pledged to address.23 Nevertheless, the vagueness of 
goals and complex issues regarding the Spanish rule in the Caribbean rendered more 
difficult the elaboration of a coherent policy. 
In the Antilles, there was only a vague consensus between integristas and 
reformistas on the need to abolish slavery, and to grant more political rights to the free 
inhabitants of Cuba and Puerto Rico, in the form of assimilation or of colonial autonomy. 
The disagreement centred on how and when to implement the reforms. The most 
reluctant regarding the rapid implementation, or even any implementation at all, were the 
integristas. For them, the political and social changes pledged by the overseas minister 
were an open door to independence and for the outright abolition of slavery, if not a slave 
revolt, as Piqueras Arenas pointed out.24 
 
3. The Volunteers as a Counterrevolutionary Force  
From the Autumn of 1868 onwards, the integristas in Cuba and Puerto Rico were engaged 
in an active counterrevolutionary effort. Cuba’s integristas opposed two revolutions 
simultaneously, La Gloriosa in Spain and the Grito de Yara at home. In the island, their 
strategy was clear: to fight any movement aimed at severing ties with Spain. As to the new 
regime established in Madrid, the position was more complex. The uneven result of the 
anti-Spanish uprisings in Cuba and Puerto Rico determined not only Madrid’s set of 
reforms for these islands but also the strategies with which the Antillean integristas tried 
                                                 
23 García Rodríguez. Con un ojo en Yara y otro en Madrid, pp. 62-64; Zaragoza. Las insurrecciones de 
Cuba, vol. II, pp. 734-736. The Overseas Ministry was created in 1863 to deal with Spain’s colonial 
policy. It was dissolved in 1899 after Spain had lost all its imperial possessions outside Africa. 
Agustín Sánchez Andrés. El Ministerio de Ultramar. Una institución liberal para el gobierno de las 
colonias, 1863-1899. La Laguna: Centro de la Cultura Popular Canaria, 2007, pp. 43-64. For López de 
Ayala as overseas minister see Casildo Rodríguez Serrano. “Adelardo López de Ayala y el Ministerio 
de Ultramar”, in Felipe Lorenzana de la Puente (coord.). España, el Atlántico y el Pacífico y otros 
estudios sobre Extremadura. Llerena: Sociedad Extremeña de Historia, 2013, pp. 237-250. 
24 Piqueras Arenas. La revolución democrática., pp. 259-269. 
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to prevent them from being implemented.25 The escalation of the Cuban uprising into a 
fully-fledged war tempered the implementation of any major reforms. How to end the 
armed conflict became grounds for a confrontation between the Spanish Government and 
integristas. The Government considered that a generous set of reforms would end the war. 
The integristas, on the contrary, considered that no reforms should be implemented until 
the rebels gave up their weapons.26 The new Constitution, passed on 6th June 1869, granted 
a temporary solution: no reforms would be implemented in Cuba and Puerto Rico until 
they sent representatives to the Spanish Parliament.27 Cuba would not elect its deputies 
and senators until the war was over, but a peaceful Puerto Rico could do so. 
In Puerto Rico, the swift quelling of the Grito de Lares introduced a different 
scenario. Local integristas could not openly oppose the implementation of reforms as there 
was no war on the island, or else this would have meant an open confrontation with the 
new government. Nonetheless, the integristas considered that these reforms should be as 
limited as possible, for they believed that the possibility of another uprising was real. In 
fact, they accused the local reformists of harbouring anti-Spanish sentiments and plans. 
Thus, the integrista strategy was to condition Government policy towards the island, 
rather than to radically oppose it. Cubano Iguina called it “conservative reformism”.28 
Though the scenarios in Cuba and Puerto Rico were quite different, the integristas 
of both islands rallied the Volunteers around the idea of the Integridad Nacional. This was 
a principle that considered Cuba and Puerto Rico members of the Spanish nation, rather 
than colonies. The advocates of Integridad Nacional wanted to keep Spain and her Antilles 
united, regardless of the political regime in Spain.29 In real terms, the agenda of the 
integrista elites in Cuba and Puerto Rico was clearly directed against the reformist 
tendencies of the Spanish revolutionary government. As will be seen, the units of 
Volunteers were instrumental in the integrista strategy against the reforms. 
                                                 
25 Ibid., pp. 295-299; Roldán de Montaud. La Restauración en Cuba, pp. 1-10. 
26 Segundo Rigal. A nuestros hermanos de la península. Havana: 1871; Roldán de Montaud. La 
Restauración en Cuba, pp. 10-25. 
27 Constitución democrática de la Nación española. Madrid: Imprenta de “El Imparcial”, 1869, título 
X, art. 108; Alonso Romero. Cuba en la España liberal, pp. 36-38. 
28 Cubano Iguina. El hilo en el laberinto, pp. 59-70. 
29 Consuelo Naranjo Orovio. “Hispanización y defensa de la integridad nacional en Cuba, 1868-
1898”. Tiempos de América: Revista de historia, cultura y territorio, 1998, No. 2, pp. 71-92. 
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3.1. Volunteer Terror in Cuba 
In the Autumn of 1868, Cuba’s integristas were caught between two revolutions, in Madrid 
and in Oriente (eastern Cuba).30 Nonetheless, the instability of the central Government 
and the scarce regular troops that Spain had in Cuba, allowed the Volunteers to achieve a 
dominant position they had never enjoyed before. Having only 8,000 regular soldiers ready 
for combat, on 17th October 1868 Captain General Francisco Lersundi (1867-1868) called 
the Volunteers to organize new companies to help him defeat the insurrection.31 Lersundi 
wanted to deploy the army’s soldiers to fight the rebels and use the Volunteers to replace 
the troops in the cities and use them to repress the laborantes, as the agents of the 
insurgency, who provided the rebels logistic aid from the cities, were known.32 The call 
was a great success, and only a month later there were more than 35,000 Volunteers at 
arms throughout Cuba.33 By April 1869, they were more than 70,000.34 This was a third of 
Cuba’s white males over 16.35 This was possible thanks to the wave of criollos that joined 
the Volunteers throughout the island. This is an aspect that will be addressed further later 
in this chapter. 
                                                 
30 The proclamation of independence in María Victoria López-Cordón. La revolución de 1868 y la I 
República. Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, 1876, pp. 114-115. Several of the rebel leaders, like 
Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, and Francisco V. Aguilera, were seriously indebted to the money-
lending company Ramírez y Oro, from Manzanillo (Oriente). AHN, Ultramar, 4417, exp. 90; 4349, 
exp. 48; 4347, exp. 63. 
31 Francisco Lersundi Hormaechea (1817-1874) was a veteran of the First Carlist War. Politically 
aligned with the Moderate Party, he was briefly president of the Council of Ministers (1853), 
minister of State (1853), War (1853, 1856, 1863-1864), and Navy (1856-1857). He was also a lifelong 
member of the Senate (1853-1868). After returning to the Peninsula in 1868, he went into self-
imposed exile in France because of his firm support for the dethroned Queen Elizabeth II.  
32 This nickname originated from an article published by the Cuban journalist Rafael María Merchán 
(1844-1905) in the Havana-based reformist newspaper El País on November 15th, 1868 entitled 
“Laboremus”, in which Merchán advocated for an independent Cuba. Eleuterio Llofriu y Sagrera. 
Historia de la insurrección y guerra de la isla de Cuba, vol. I. Madrid: Imprenta de la Galería Literaria, 
1871, p. 51. 
33 There were 14,720 army soldiers, 640 Civil Guards, 1,000 firemen, and 3,400 men from the old 
Milicias Disciplinadas, according to Vandama y Calderón. Colección de artículos, p. 48. Though with 
reserves, as data for 1868 is lacking, to these 19,760 men can be added the 11,802 Volunteers existing 
in 1860. Cuerpos de Voluntarios de la Isla de Cuba, p. 14. 
34 Navarro. Las guerras de España en Cuba, p. 28. They were organized into 351 units of infantry (41 
battalions, 162 companies, and 81 sections), cavalry (13 regiments, 38 squadrons, and 16 sections), 
and artillery (1 mounted brigade). Vandama y Calderón. Colección de artículos, p. 14. The speech of 
Lersundi to the Volunteers can be consulted in Otero Pimentel. Memoria sobre los Voluntarios, pp. 
48-49.  
35 By 1869, the white male population over 16, which made up the bulk of the Volunteers, consisted 
of 90,000 Cubans and ca. 105,000 peninsulares, according to José María García de Arboleya. Tres 
cuestiones sobre la isla de Cuba. ¿De dónde venimos? ¿Dónde estamos? ¿Adónde vamos? Havana: 
Imprenta del Tiempo, 1869, pp. 14-15. 
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The integristas perceived that it was the Volunteers who represented their 
interests, rather than the Army. The regular soldiers were commanded by a captain general 
appointed by officials in Madrid, whereas the Volunteers were controlled by local 
interests. Consequently, several local institutions contributed with money. For example, 
both the Spanish Bank of Havana and the Havana Bishopric paid for the expenses of 500 
Volunteers for three months, probably thinking that the war would soon be over.36  
Fears of a reformist captain general came true in January 1869, with the 
appointment of Domingo Dulce (Jan.-Jun- 1869) by the Spanish President Juan Prim (1869-
1870). Dulce was a Liberal who had taken part in La Gloriosa. He firmly believed that 
political representation and individual rights would convince Cuban rebels to give up the 
fight.37 One of Dulce’s first measures was to organize a meeting between the integrista and 
reformista elites, guided respectively by the landowners and slaveholders Julián de Zulueta 
(colonel of the 2nd Volunteer Battalion) and Miguel de Aldama, who had conspired to 
annex Cuba to the US in 1848.38 The aim was to build a common front against the 
insurgents , based on reforms under Spanish sovereignty. This attempt was thwarted by 
incompatible strategies. The integristas would not have reforms without peace, whereas 
the reformistas would not have peace without reforms.39 
The power of these Volunteers lay in their numbers. In Havana, a city of 210,000 
inhabitants by 1869, they were 9,000 men, the only armed men available to the 
                                                 
36 On 17th November 1868, the Banco Español de La Habana gave 45,000 pesos for the sustainment 
of 500 Volunteers for three months. By 1872 the Banco had already given 150,000 pesos for the 
Volunteers mobilized to the battlefields, according to Gil Gelpí y Ferro. Álbum histórico fotográfico 
de la guerra de Cuba desde su principio hasta el reinado de Amadeo I. Havana: Imprenta “La Antilla” 
de Cacho-Negrete, 1872, p.85-86; Inés Roldán de Montaud considers that by 1869 the Banco Español 
had already given 155,000 pesos, La banca de emisión en Cuba (1856-1898). Estudios de Historia 
Económica, No. 44. Madrid: Banco de España, 2004, p. 68. As for the church’s contribution, it 
donated ca. 32,000 pesos. AHN, Ultramar, 4390, exp. 68. For the attitude of the Catholic Church in 
Cuba during the Ten Years’ War see Rigoberto Segreo Ricardo. Iglesia y nación en Cuba (1868-1898). 
Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente, 2010, pp. 182-241. For the monetary system in Spain before 1868 
see Javier de Santiago Fernández. “Antecedentes del sistema monetario de la Peseta”. VII Jornadas 
Científicas sobre Documentación Borbónica en España, Madrid: Universidad Complutense de 
Madrid, 2013, pp. 367-388. 
37 Buxó de Abaigar. Domingo Dulce, pp. 163-189. 
38 Chaffin. Fatal Glory, pp. 11-23. Aldama’s palace currently hosts the Cuban History Institute. After 
that, Dulce granted Aldama a force of 50 armed men to protect his property, BNC, CM Ponce, No. 
445. 
39 During his first days as captain general, Domingo Dulce issued the decrees promising that Cuba 
would elect its own representatives to the Parliament in Madrid, establishing the freedoms of press 
and reunion, releasing all political prisoners, and calling for an amnesty offer for all the rebels who 
gave up in forty days counting from 12th January onwards. Olivar Bertrand. Prim, pp. 490-497.  
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authorities.40 Despite his weak position, Dulce pushed forward his reformist plans and 
issued a proclamation on 12th January declaring that the island would elect representatives 
to the Spanish Parliament, granting freedom of speech and reunion, and calling for an 
amnesty for the Cuban rebels.41 This offer to the rebels and the reformists was 
unacceptable to the radicalised middle-class and working-class Volunteers. Aware of 
Dulce’s defencelessness, by the end of January 1869, these men started a wave of violence 
in Havana with a strong symbolic message directed against Dulce as much as against their 
actual victims.  
On 22nd January, the Volunteers attacked the Villanueva theatre, during the 
performance of a Cuban nationalist-themed play, killing 1 and injuring 18. On the 24th, they 
ransacked the Café del Louvre, a meeting point for affluent young nationalist Cubans, 
usually university students. Right after attacking the Louvre, they looted the nearby 
impressive residence of Miguel de Aldama, the reformist leader, beating his black servants 
and raping one of them.42 These attacks can be considered to symbolize a clear rejection 
of Dulce’s reformism, represented by the openly nationalist play at the Villanueva theatre. 
It is also argued that the attacks might have been motivated by social resentment, 
especially against the well-to-do students of the Louvre and Aldama’s palace.   
The Volunteers’ violence evidenced that the understanding between integristas 
and reformistas envisioned by Dulce, was almost impossible. Indeed, the tension between 
peninsulares and nationalist Cubans in Havana ran high.43 Acts of violence between the 
two groups were not uncommon. A Spanish policeman even reported to Dulce that, in 
some areas of the city where they were a minority, and especially in neighbourhoods with 
a strong Afro-Cuban community, the life of the “honest men, especially the peninsulares, 
hung by a thread”.44 
                                                 
40 Carlos de Sedano y Cruzat. Cuba desde 1850 á 1873. Colección de informes, memorias, proyectos y 
antecedentes sobre el Gobierno de la Isla de Cuba, relativos al citado periodo y un apéndice con las 
Conferencias de la Junta Informativa de Ultramar, celebradas en esta capital en los años de 1866 y 
1867. Madrid: Imprenta Nacional, 1873, pp. 152-153. 
41 García Rodríguez. Con un ojo en Yara y otro en Madrid, pp. 124-136. 
42 AHN, 4933, exp. 1, No. 93 & 94. Roldán de Montaud. La Restauración en Cuba. 
43 Gabriela dalla Corte Caballero & José Luis Luzón. “Espacio criollo y espacio colonial: los 
voluntarios y la batalla de La Habana en la Guerra de los Diez Años”, in Centro de Investigaciones 
de América Latina (comp.). De súbditos del rey a ciudadanos de la nación (Actas del I Congreso 
Internacional Nueva España y las Antillas). Castellón de La Plana: Univeristat Jaume I, Servicio de 
Publicaciones, 2000, pp. 339-368. 
44 ANRC, Asuntos Políticos, leg. 58, exp. 11. 
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Dulce’s situation was extremely weak, with an ongoing war in Oriente, violence in 
Havana he was not able to control, and a lack of support from his Government. His 
complaints to Madrid against the Volunteers’ violence, were blatantly replied to by 
Adelardo López de Ayala: The Volunteers were the only force in Havana, and their officers 
had generously contributed to the Cuban treasury.45 Dulce was alone against the 
Volunteers. 
Considering his weak position, the captain general opted to try to appease the 
Volunteers by adopting a harder line against the reformists and rebels.46 In April he 
revoked the freedoms granted by the decree of 12th January and deported 250 suspected 
laborantes to the Spanish colony of Fernando Poo, in the Gulf of Guinea, escorted by two 
dozen Volunteers. The deported were mostly liberal professionals and university students, 
representing Havana’s Cuban educated middle-class who supported wider reforms for 
Cuba, but not necessarily independence. In the tense atmosphere of 1869, having shown 
discontent towards Spain’s rule on the island was a reason for the integristas to consider 
anyone an enemy of Spain.47 Another measure that attempted to control the Volunteers 
was the publication of a new reglamento (21st April 1869), which was not well received by 
the Volunteers for the wide attributions granted to the captain general. His second-in-
command, the Segundo Cabo, was to be appointed vice-inspector of Volunteers, having 
the power to create or dissolve units, as well as appointing or dismissing Volunteer 
officers.48 However, his most important gesture towards the Volunteers was the creation 
of the Consejo de Bienes Embargados on 17th April 1869, which would confiscate the 
properties of the laborantes and the rebels fighting for a free Cuba.49 The corrupt Spanish 
administration in Cuba soon made the Consejo a hotspot for abuses and generalized 
corruption. As Alfonso W. Quiroz exposed, quite often the embargoed property ended up 
in the hands of prominent integristas with enough money to bribe the Consejo’s officials.50 
The symbolism of the Consejo was strikingly powerful: it represented the transfer of 
property from Cuban reformista and independentista supporters to integrista hands. On 
                                                 
45 RAH, CCR, 9/7536, doc. 88 & 100. 
46 The repression against the Creoles has been studied by Alfonso W. Quiroz. “Integrista overkill: 
The Socioeconomic Costs of ‘Repressing’ the Separatist Insurrection in Cuba, 1868-1878”. Hispanic 
American Historical Review, 1998, No. 78, pp. 261-305. 
47 AHM-M, Ministerio de la Guerra, sig. 5602.14. 
48 Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba (1869), cap. II, art. 8-20. 
49 See Disposiciones relativas a bienes embargados e incautados a los infidentes. Havana: Almacén 
de papel y efectos de escritorio de Castro Hermanos y Compañía, 1874. 
50 Alfonso W. Quiroz. “Corrupción, burocracia colonial y veteranos separatistas en Cuba, 1868-1910”. 
Revista de Indias, 2001, vol. LXI, N. 221, pp. 91-111; RAH, CCR, 9/7536, doc. 156. 
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13th July 1869 La Voz de Cuba, a popular newspaper among the Volunteers’ most radical 
elements, expressed it blatantly: “The traitors have enough goods to pay for the hardships 
undergone by the loyal”.51 It became a symbol of the Spanish oppressive rule that the 
advocates of Cuban independence were fighting against.  
From its very inception, middle-class Volunteers took part in the Consejo. At least 
two of their men, Segundo Rigal and Mamerto Pulido, were members of the first Consejo’s 
board.52 However, rather than appease the Volunteers, it gave them a tool for rapid 
enrichment they were not willing to dispense with. In fact, the measures taken by 
Domingo Dulce against the corruption generated around the Consejo ended up 
precipitating his forcible resignation as captain general. 
In the city of Cienfuegos, the head of the Consejo local branch, the Havana-born 
Colonel González Estéfani, had been openly tolerating the illicit expropriation of 
embargoed properties by local sugar and trade barons, many of whom were Volunteer 
officers. When Captain General Dulce removed him in May 1869, these men spurred a 
coordinated action with Volunteers from other towns such as Santa Clara, Matanzas, and 
Havana. Thousands of them gathered in Havana, appearing in their uniforms before the 
captain general’s palace on 30th May, asking for Dulce’s resignation. Groups of other 
civilians and army officers supported their request. The isolation of Dulce became evident 
when the scant army force guarding the palace refused to disperse the Volunteers. 
Consequently, Dulce stepped down and left for Spain on 2nd June 1869.53 
Dulce’s resignation meant a great victory for the Volunteers. Without a shot, they 
had forced the representative of the Spanish revolution out of Cuba. After the expulsion, 
the real power in Cuba was held by the Volunteers, rather than by captains general. 
Indeed, only days after Dulce’s departure, many city councils throughout Cuba, governed 
until then by reformists, were forcibly seized by the Volunteers. For instance, in mid-June 
1869 in Cienfuegos, the Volunteers physically expelled the reformists from the city council 
and appointed their colonel, the Basque Agustín Goytisolo, a sugar baron with investments 
                                                 
51 La Voz de Cuba, 13-07-1869, p. 2.  
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in the shipping industry, as the new mayor.54 This was just an expression of the power they 
gained during Dulce’s term and after his expulsion. The Volunteers not only wanted 
influence over the Captaincy General but also at the local level, where power lay in the 
ayuntamientos or city councils. Thus, the forcible replacement of the captain general was 
followed by the violent removal of many mayors, who for the most part were Cuban 
reformists. The Volunteers’ aim was to control all centres of power in Cuba.    
Having expelled the captain general, and effectively controlling most of the city 
councils, the most radical integristas proceeded to institutionalize their power, and on 11th 
June 1869, the Casino Español de La Habana was created.55 The Casinos were spaces of 
sociability and relatively discreet political debate that developed in Spain and the 
American countries with sizeable Spanish communities.56 Officially, Havana’s Casino 
Español was a mere space of socialization for the integrista community, but soon became 
the headquarters of the integrista elite and the Volunteers, and a “parallel authority”, 
according to Manuel Espadas Burgos.57 Most of the Volunteer officers in Havana became 
members of the Casino. The members of the Casino’s board were usually chief officers and 
officers of the Havana Volunteers.58 
Due to its weakness, the Spanish Government opted to accept the integrista role, 
rather than to open a second front in Cuba. Thus, Dulce’s successors were to be accepted 
by the men of the Casino Español. Antonio Caballero de Rodas (1869-1870), the Count of 
Valmaseda (1870-1872), and Francisco Ceballos (1872-1873) were all made honorary 
Volunteers and often appeared in public donning the Volunteer uniform. Caballero de 
Rodas even chose a personal guard of Volunteers.59 This very captain general even decreed 
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in February 1870 that all the Consejo de Bienes Embargados local branches must have 
Volunteer officers among its members.60 
Having recognised such a privileged position, the Volunteers in Havana may have 
felt entitled to determine who the enemies of Spain were, and proceed accordingly. For 
instance, on 12th April 1871, they prevented Jacinto María Martínez, Bishop of Havana, from 
entering the city on his way back from Rome, falsely accusing him of connivance with the 
Cuban rebels.61 From his temporary exile in the United States, Martínez declared on 22nd 
May 1871 to The New York Herald: “The Volunteers have all the power and intervention in 
the island, and oblige the governor to do whatever they want”.62 In fact, the acting Captain 
General Buenaventura Carbó did not intervene in the affair, fearing the rage of the 9,000 
Volunteers of Havana.63 
The Volunteers were utterly committed to fight any possible negotiations between 
the Spanish Government and the insurgents. They wanted a complete defeat of their 
enemies, not a reconciliation with them. Anyone trying to break a deal between sides was 
deemed a traitor and could even be executed. This was the fate of the Cuban poet Juan 
Clemente Zenea, who was captured by the Puerto Príncipe Volunteers on New Years’ Eve 
1870, right after a meeting he had with the rebel president Carlos Manuel de Céspedes. 
According to Mercedes García Rodríguez, Zenea had been contacted as double agent by 
the Spanish Government, and was trying to break a deal between Madrid, the rebel 
government in Cuba, and its representatives in New York based on autonomy for the 
island and the disarmament of the Volunteers. This was unbearable for the Volunteers, for 
they regarded autonomy as the first step towards independence, and their disarmament 
the excuse that would allow the rebels to annihilate them. Despite showing a safe-conduct 
given by the Spanish Government, Zenea was handed over to Havana’s Volunteers, and 
was executed on 25th August 1871 in Havana.64 
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The peak of the Havana Volunteers’ 
violence took place on 27th November 1871, 
with the assassination of eight young 
University of Havana medical students.65 
Alongside 29 other classmates, they were 
falsely accused of profaning the tomb of 
Gonzalo de Castañón, editor of the 
integrista newspaper La Voz de Cuba, and 
a Volunteer himself.66 After a first trial, 
which had the students acquitted, 
members of the 5th Volunteer battalion, led 
by Captain Felipe Alonso, surrounded the 
courts and forced the judges to repeat the 
trial and to accept 9 of them as members of 
the jury. 
Lorenzo Pedro, president of the 
Casino Español and a Volunteer officer himself, published an article in the Diario de la 
Marina, calling on the Volunteers to calm down, and let the judges do their job.67 Despite 
this, the second trial went on, sentencing eight randomly selected the students to death. 
27 other students were imprisoned, and 2 were acquitted. José Gener, captain of Havana’s 
6th Volunteer Battalion, read the sentence.68 The firing squad was directed by Captain 
Ramón López de Ayala, who can be seen donning the uniform of Havana’s 4th Volunteer 
Battalion in image 3.69 Since the assassination of Gonzalo Castañón (30th January 1870), a 
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Image 3. Captain Ramón López de Ayala commanded 
the firing squad that executed the eight medical 
students in Havana on 27th November 1871. Ribó. 




true idol for the most intransigent Volunteers, his followers had been looking for 
revenge.70 This might explain the active participation of José Gener, Ramón López de 
Ayala, and Felipe Alonso, who were close friends of Castañón.71 However, the victims’ 
profile and the attitude of some Volunteers leads to the argument made here that this 
crime was also motivated by social resentment. The profile of the university students 
(middle-class educated Cubans) was the same of the theatre-goers of the Villanueva 
theatre and the customers of the Café del Louvre. Hence, whereas personal revenge might 
have been the motivation for the friends of Gonzalo Castañón, hatred towards the upper-
middle class might have fuelled the fury of working-class Volunteers.   
The anger that these working-class Volunteers might have felt towards the well-
to-do students, meant they did not even spare the life of a Volunteer’s son. One of the 
executed students, Alonso Álvarez de la Campa, was the son of a well-known peninsular 
merchant and officer of Volunteers. Right before the execution, Felipe Alonso, Castañón’s 
friend, told the young student: ‘Ah, Alonsito, not even your father’s millions will be able 
to spare you a bullet in the head!’.72 These words could be interpreted as a macabre 
statement of the brute force of these radical Volunteers directed against the influence and 
economic success of some of their comrades-in-arms. Hence, the execution of the medical 
students was a consequence of the extremism and radicalism of some Volunteers, but also 
a symbolic gesture against the dominant echelons of society. 
Far from condemning it, the most radical integrista press claimed that the 
execution of the students was a rightful act of vengeance for the profanation of Castañón’s 
tomb. On the very day of the assassination, 27th November 1871, Diario de la Marina, La 
Voz de Cuba, and La Constancia published a joint article in which they called the 
Volunteers to respect law and justice, but in which they wrote that all “Spanish hearts are 
full of anger against these dirty hyenas [the students]”.73 These radical Volunteers would 
not be deterred by the authorities or the opinions of their comrades-at-arms, which did 
not approve of such savage actions. The assassination was not gratuitous, but symbolic. 
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The students were but the scapegoat with which the lower echelons of the Volunteers, the 
most radical, showed their determination to claim their stake of power in Cuba. 
In fact, the assassination was widely condemned all over Cuba, Spain, and abroad, 
even by fellow Volunteers and integrista groups. Cuban-born Colonel Francisco de Acosta 
y Albear, a retired army officer who had raised a Volunteer battalion in 1869, strongly 
labelled the perpetrators as “social scum… which have caused more damage to the national 
cause than all the laborantes together”.74 In the Peninsula, even Barcelona’s Círculo 
Hispano-Ultramarino, the foremost representative of the colonial lobby in Spain, asked for 
the acquittal of the students still in prison, which was granted by the Crown on 9th May 
1872.75 Thus, this crime committed by a group of the Havana Volunteers was far from 
representative of the spirit of the whole militia or the integristas.  
 
3.2. Resisting Changes in Puerto Rico 
As in Cuba, the Volunteers of Puerto Rico were the armed wing of integrismo. They were 
committed to the defence of Spanish sovereignty and the status quo. Nonetheless, the 
relatively peaceful situation of Puerto Rico after the revolutionary autumn of 1868, 
conditioned the ways in which the Volunteers defended the interests of the integristas. 
Once the possibility of a war had been halted by the rapid quelling of the so-called 
Grito de Lares (23rd September 1868), the political debate in Puerto Rico focused on two 
main issues: how to assimilate the island to the Spanish political system, and how to 
abolish slavery. The integristas were against these changes, whereas their political 
opponents, the reformistas, favoured them. The many captains general appointed by the 
Spanish Government for short terms of office alternated between supporting the former 
or the latter. This was a cause of deep instability, reflected in the fact that between 1868 
and 1874 Puerto Rico had seven captains general: José Laureano Sanz (1868-1870), Gabriel 
Baldrich (1870-1871), Ramón Gómez Pulido (1871-1872), Simón de la Torre y Ormaza (1872), 
Joaquín Enrile Hernán (1872-1873), Juan Martínez Plowes (1873), and Rafael Primo de 
Rivera y Sobremonte (1873-1874). This constant change of governors was caused by 
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political instability in Spain and had a negative effect on the tense situation created in 
Puerto Rico after the Lares uprising, which sparked the reactivation of the Volunteers. 
Although the first Volunteer battalion in Puerto Rico had been created in 
December 1864, it had been almost inactive since its inception. Thus, the creation of the 
Puerto Rican Volunteers was de facto triggered by the Grito de Lares. This was an uprising 
of nearly 600 peasants commanded by landowners in the town of Lares. After declaring 
the Republic of Puerto Rico on 23rd September 1868, they arrested all the peninsular 
merchants in town, looted their shops, and proceeded to the nearby town of San Sebastián 
del Pepino, where they were subdued by a mixed force of the Army and Milicias 
Disciplinadas, a militia created in the 18th century, mostly composed of creoles.76  Knowing 
of the fate of their fellow countrymen in Lares, the peninsulares of the nearby towns of 
Arecibo, Aguadilla, and Camuy, took up arms and organized companies of Volunteers.77 
The uprising only lasted for a week, and by December 1868 all its members were either 
imprisoned or in exile.78 
The rebellion failed because it lacked popular support, and the Spanish forces acted 
swiftly.79 Nonetheless, it was a sign of a certain level of discontent against Spanish rule. 
Gervasio Luis García considered that the peasants that joined the rebellion were motivated 
by opposition to a system of forced employment known as the libreta.80 As to the 
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landowners’ participation, Cubano Iguina argued that they were drawn in by their fear of 
losing their properties to the peninsular merchants. In fact, due to the absence of banks in 
Puerto Rico, these merchants were also money-lenders when the landowners needed 
capital to cover the costs of harvesting or buying new land. Quite often, when the debts 
could not be paid back, sugar and coffee crops, but also their plantations, ended up in the 
hands of these peninsular merchants.81 
Another consequence of Lares for the Volunteers was that they gradually came to 
substitute the Disciplined Militias, which had an established record of defending Spanish 
rule on the island.82 The reason was that several of the Lares’ rebels had served in the 
Militias and that most of its members were creoles.83 The Volunteers, on the contrary, were 
perceived by the Spanish authorities as a new loyal militia dominated by peninsulares.84 
Consequently, while the Militias were not allowed to recruit new members, new units of 
Volunteers were created throughout the island.85 In spite of this, the expulsion of Domingo 
Dulce by the Havana Volunteers was an example too dangerous to be repeated, and the 
first reglamento of the Puerto Rican Volunteers (issued on 5th August 1869), was harsher 
in terms of discipline than in Cuba, assimilating them to the army and ensuring 
dependence on the military authorities.86 
This was the situation found by José Laureano Sanz (1868-1870), the captain 
general appointed by the Spanish Government to implement the reformist policy 
promised by La Gloriosa. However, he would soon side with the integristas. They did not 
constitute a political party, but a group of powerful merchants, landowners, and officials, 
mostly peninsulares. Their leader was a Puerto Rican, the island’s biggest sugar producer, 
José Ramón Fernández, appointed Marquis of La Esperanza on 5th February 1869.87 They 
opposed the assimilation of Puerto Rico into the metropolitan political system and the 
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abolition of slavery. Assimilation meant giving a voice to the reformistas through the 
election of representatives to the Spanish Parliament, and also press and assembly 
freedoms. As for the abolition of slavery, they feared that it would spur a race war, and 
would hamper the export economy, though, in fact, it had a limited importance in 
comparison to Cuba.88 Whereas in Cuba 25% of its population was enslaved by 1868 
(400,000 people), Puerto Rico had a less than 6.5% slave population (40,000 people).89  
The integristas’ opponents were the reformistas, a group of intellectuals, who 
unlike their Cuban colleagues, were decidedly abolitionists, and had never conspired 
against Spanish rule. Some of their leaders, such as José Julián Acosta or Julián 
Vizcarrondo, were well connected with liberal politicians in metropolitan Spain and had 
been instrumental in the establishment of the Spanish Abolitionist Society, as shown by 
Christopher Schmidt-Nowara.90 
The first challenge posed by political assimilation was the election of 
representatives to the Spanish Parliament for the first time since the expulsion of the 
Antillean deputies in 1837.91 Since the peninsulares were the backbone of the integristas, 
and they represented only 2% of Puerto Rico’s population, their political success depended 
on electoral manipulation, in connivance with the captains general.92 Thus, in the 
elections of 15th January 1869, the integristas won 8 of the 11 seats that Puerto Rico sent to 
the Congress of Deputies. Among them, there were the Marquis of La Esperanza and 
Colonel Juan Bautista Machicote of the San Juan Volunteer battalion.93 Although 11 
deputies in a Spanish Parliament of 352 seats could do little, the integristas would send a 
firm voice against the reforms to Madrid. 
This victory gave the integristas little influence in altering Madrid’s policy in 
Puerto Rico. Amid accusations of electoral manipulation, Captain General Sanz was 
replaced by the liberal Gabriel Baldrich (1870-1871). In just a few months, Baldrich 
established the local Diputación Provincial, employed reformists in the administration, 
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embarked on a campaign against corrupt officials, and allowed the creation of political 
parties.94 Under Baldrich’s supervision, the elections of 20th June 1870 were clean. The 
Conservative Liberal Party (integristas) suffered a severe defeat, clinging onto only 2 out 
of the 15 deputies sent to Madrid.95 
The lessons that the integristas could have taken from the election were evident. 
On the one hand, the electoral victory of 1869 had not translated into real power on the 
island. On the other, non-manipulated elections on the island meant a landslide victory 
for the Liberal Reformist Party (reformistas). Hence, to protect their agenda, the 
integristas would need to practice politics outside of parliament. If they wanted to control 
Puerto Rican politics, the captain general needed to be an ally, and Baldrich was not. They 
decided to oust him and began a campaign against him. The Eco Mercantil, the main 
integrista newspaper, bitterly criticised Baldrich for protecting the reformistas.96 At the 
same time, the Volunteers throughout the island began to parade more often, aiming to 
intimidate their opponents. This necessarily created tension, which often caused 
incidents. For instance, in the town of Ciales, the local company of Volunteers was stoned 
by a group of drunken men on 17th February 1871 after it had sworn allegiance to the new 
King of Spain, Amadeus I (1871-1873).97 
Despite Baldrich’s complaints to Madrid against the Volunteers, they continued 
their campaign of intimidation.98 The most serious incident occurred on 23rd July 1871, 
when an accidental shot by a Volunteer in San Juan sparked a massive street fight between 
the Volunteers and a group of blacks and mulattoes of the area who had shouted at them. 
The brawl ended up with the Volunteers randomly beating reformist suspects and 
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Puerto Rico, pp. 269-270.  
97 Rosado y Brincau. Bosquejo Histórico, pp. 36-37. 
98 In a letter to the Overseas Minister Víctor Balaguer on 22nd June 1871, he wrote that he was 
probably going to take ‘forceful dispositions’ after the elections’. BVB, Epistolario, sig. 7102075. 
90 
 
shouting out against the captain general. As this dangerously resembled the events of 
January 1869 in Havana, Baldrich declared a state of siege in San Juan for three days, taking 
the army to the streets, and rapidly controlling the situation. However, the Spanish 
Government wanted to avert a repetition of Dulce’s expulsion, and by September 1871 
Baldrich was replaced by Gómez Pulido.99 
Unlike what happened in Cuba after the expulsion of Dulce, Baldrich’s substitution 
did not translate into integrista control of Puerto Rico. In fact, more captains general 
committed to the reformist agenda were sent to Puerto Rico. In that scenario, the options 
for the integristas to dominate Puerto Rican politics were to promote a change of 
government in Madrid or to acquire allies against the captain general. They chose to join 
forces with the Cuban integristas, and the conservatives in metropolitan Spain (as will be 
seen in the next section) and to use the press against the captains general, often employing 
a menacing tone. For instance, on 21st January 1873, the Boletín Mercantil reminded Captain 
General Joaquín Enrile (1872-1873) that the ‘true Spaniards’ (for the integristas) would 
always be willing to use the Volunteers to make sure that Puerto Rico remained part of the 
Spanish nation, should the authorities fail to do so.100  
This thorny relationship would be particularly tense during 1873. The reason was 
the proclamation of the First Spanish Republic (11th February), and the abolition of slavery 
in Puerto Rico (22nd March). The abolition was not a surprise, as it was the logical 
consequence of the gradual transition to free labour sanctioned by the Moret Law (4th July 
1870).101 Besides, the abolition was enacted on moderate terms: the 2,000 slaveholders 
would be compensated, the ca. 30,000 freed slaves would have to work for their masters 
for a period of three years, and they would not enjoy political rights for five years.102 The 
integristas would try to thwart its full implementation.  
Lidio Cruz Monclova argued that they feared the freed slaves would take revenge 
against their former masters. Additionally, they thought that as in the postbellum US, the 
                                                 
99 AHN, Ultramar, 5113, exp. 5. 
100 Boletín Mercantil, 21-01-1873. I would like to thank the CIH-UPR for allowing me to consult the 
digitized collections of the Boletín Mercantil.  
101 Concepción Navarro Azcúe. La abolición de la esclavitud negra en la legislación española, 1870-
1887. Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica/Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana, 1987, pp. 37-
123. For a succinct overview of the abolitionist process in the Spanish Empire see José Antonio 
Piqueras Arenas. La esclavitud en las Españas. Un lazo transatlántico. Madrid: Los Libros de la 
Catarata, 2012, pp. 234-251. 
102 Díaz Soler. Historia de la esclavitud negra en Puerto Rico. San Juan: Editorial de la Universidad 
de Puerto Rico, pp. 349-371. 
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black population might be granted political rights in the future, for the benefit of the 
reformistas, who had a well-known abolitionist record.103 The integristas were also afraid 
that should their opponents become dominant in Puerto Rican politics, they would have 
the Volunteers dissolved. In January 1872 the Puerto Rican reformist representatives in the 
Spanish Congress had formally asked the government for the dissolution of the 
Volunteers.104 
The strategy followed by the integristas to thwart complete abolition, was to 
pretend that there was a serious threat to Spanish sovereignty on the island and that all 
reformistas were conspirators. For instance, on 13th February 1873, a group of Volunteers 
and Civil Guards seized the country house of Cayetano Estrella, near Camuy, alleging that 
the reformistas that regularly met there were conspiring against Spain.105 The reformistas 
were armed, and the assault ended with 12 of them being killed, several arrested, plus a 
Volunteer and a Civil Guard injured.106 
The actual purposes of the Camuy reformistas are unknown, and there were even 
rumours that the story had been manufactured by the integristas, according to Salvador 
Brau.107 Whatever the case, it was conveniently exploited by the Boletín Mercantil. It 
published several articles for a few days after the Camuy events, claiming that this proved 
‘a new Lares’ was on its way.108 The Volunteers were presented as the eternal saviours of 
the Spanish integridad nacional.109 
The Camuy affair did not represent a victory for the integristas, though. Despite 
public speeches praising their collaboration with the Civil Guard, Captain General 
Martínez Plowes did not trust them entirely. He feared that the Volunteers might have 
been exaggerating news of supposed anti-Spanish conspiracies to claim a greater influence 
and undermine his authority. After all, Martínez Plowes was a man sent by the First 
Spanish Republic, which had recently abolished slavery and given more political rights to 
Puerto Ricans. The memories of Havana’s Volunteers’ behaviour in 1869 were still too 
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fresh. In April 1873, Captain General Martínez Plowes wrote to the overseas minister that 
he was trying to keep the Volunteers under control.110 Quite cleverly, the captain general 
took a sugar-coated measure to achieve this. On 4th March 1873, he issued a decree making 
the Volunteers “reserves of the Army”. In that very decree, he praised the Volunteers for 
their loyal services to Spain but reminded them that they must abide by military discipline, 
and only the supreme authority on the island (the captain general) was to decide on the 
gravity of the rumours and threats that circulated around the island. He warned that he 
would not tolerate disturbances caused by these very rumours.111 The reglamento of 1870 
established that causing public disorder for no apparent reason could be punished with 
arrest for a few days, or expulsion from the Volunteers. However, Martínez Plowes 
reminded them that he could decide whether a Volunteer must be judged by a military 
court, and according to the army ordnances, the punishment for public disorder would be 
imprisonment.112 
So far, all the strategies adopted by the integristas had failed. Neither electoral 
participation nor the tension strategy had functioned for them. With the proclamation of 
the First Republic, their situation only worsened. In fact, the captain general appointed by 
the Republic, Rafael Primo de Rivera (1873-1874), was a well-known liberal who worked 
intensely to implement a reformist policy on the island.113 In just a few months, he decreed 
freedom of the press (30-04-1873), of public gatherings (13-05-1873), and the Municipal Law 
(25-07-1873), which sanctioned the appointment of mayors by popular election. All of this 
benefited the reformistas, for it allowed them to express the popular support they had in 
the press and at the polling stations.114 Aware that they could never beat them, the 
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integristas decided to abstain from participating in elections.115 This meant that the 
reformistas would have the monopoly of the representatives in Madrid, the Diputación 
Provincial, and the city councils.116 
Despite abstaining electorally, the integristas were determined to take back 
control. Having failed in all their strategies, they concluded that the problem lay in 
Madrid. To prompt a change of policy in Puerto Rico, it was necessary to change the regime 
in Madrid. This was a conclusion shared by the integristas in Cuba, and the conservatives 
in Spain opposed to the political situation inaugurated in La Gloriosa. Consequently, they 
decided to coordinate their efforts to change Spain’s political regime. 
 
4. The Institutional Framework of Transatlantic integrismo 
Integristas conducted their counterrevolution in the Antilles but also forged alliances with 
groups with similar interests in the transatlantic space that connected Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
Spain, and American countries where there were sizeable communities of Spanish 
migrants. The extension of political representation and profound social reforms promised 
by the Overseas Minister Adelardo López de Ayala in October 1868 were seen as a threat 
by the integristas in the Antilles. They understood that these were open doors to the 
independence of Cuba and to the abolition of slavery.117  
In metropolitan Spain, a strong opposition to the Sexenio was gradually taking 
shape around the Moderate Party that had been kicked out of power in September 1868, 
and initial supporters of the revolution disappointed with the incapacity of the new regime 
to stabilize Spain. Local industry was also opposed to the Sexenio, due to the free trade 
policy advocated by the Treasury Minister Laureano Figuerola (1868-1869). The flour 
industry in Castile, wheat in Andalusia, and most notably Catalan textiles depended on 
protectionism to keep Spain and the Antilles as captive markets for their products.118 
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Among them, there were numerous peninsulares who had settled back in Spain after 
having accumulated fortunes in the Antilles, where they still had significant interests, 
known as indianos.119 All these opposition groups in Spain began to gather around the idea 
of restoring the monarchy to Prince Alphonse, son of the queen dethroned in 1868, 
Elizabeth II. This project was also shared by the integristas in Cuba and Puerto Rico. As 
Manuel Espadas Burgos exposed, both groups coordinated efforts to end the political 
instability started in 1868 and restore the Bourbon dynasty.120 
In order to push forward this agenda, the efforts to dismantle the regimes of the 
Sexenio were being articulated across an “imperial spatiality consisting of networks”, 
following a concept taken from David Lambert and Alan Lester in their study of networks 
in the British Empire.121 To push forward their interests, alfonsinos in the Peninsula and 
integristas in the Antilles created institutions to articulate their strategy against the 
Sexenio. The Cuban integristas took the lead with the creation of the Casinos Españoles, 
shortly imitated thereafter in Puerto Rico. Later, the alfonsinos organized the Círculos 
Hispano-Ultramarinos in Spain. Both were closely related to the Volunteers. 
The most radical elements of the Volunteers, the middle and working-class 
members, also created their own mechanisms of alliances with similar groups in Spain and 
some South American countries, most notably Argentina, where Spanish migrant 
communities sympathised with their intransigent position against the insurgency. Their 
means were humbler than the integrista elite’s. Rather than establishing institutions, these 
Volunteers carried out campaigns to disseminate their political views through books and 
the press. 
  
4.1. Casinos Españoles   
The Casino Español de La Habana was created on 11th June 1869 by three peninsular 
merchants, Juan Toraya, Antonio C. Tellería, and Rufino Sainz, and a Treasury official, 
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Juan de Ariza. They were middle-class Volunteers who envisioned the Casino as a power 
centre with which to pressure the Spanish authorities and challenge the integrista elites 
dominant position. The Casino imitated the formula of other Casinos Españoles which 
already existed in other American countries, such as Mexico and Argentina.122 Purportedly, 
the aim of the Casino Español de La Habana was to “provide a meeting venue for all these 
persons [Spanish loyalists], to address privately the issues that concern the moral and 
material interests of the country [Spain], promote and collaborate with projects that 
favour and provide its members means of instruction and leisure; everything within the 
law and always helping the action of the authorities”.123 Actually, the Casino Español truly 
was the political centre for radical integristas and the headquarters of the Volunteers.124 
Soon, a network of 31 Casinos had been created throughout Cuba, being coordinated from 
Havana.125 Their members were often also Volunteers. 
The success of the Casinos, with their rapid spread throughout Cuba and their 
growing influence, was soon coveted by the integrista elite. After a period where this elite 
disputed its control with the middle-class Volunteers that created it, the Casinos finally 
came under the control of the wealthy integristas in 1872, when Julián de Zulueta was 
appointed their president. This was possible due to the removal of captain general Blas 
Villate in 1872. The elite’s representative in Madrid, Manuel Calvo, had been lobbying for 
this in Madrid since 1870. Villate was perceived as a threat by the elite. He was supported 
by a majority of the most radical Volunteers and had publicly denounced the corruption 
of the wealthiest integrista groups before the Spanish Government.126 
Once the elite controlled the Casino, rather than expelling the middle-class 
members, it opted to integrate the middle-class integristas into the lower positions of the 
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board.127 The social profile of the Casino’s directors had changed, but not their purpose. It 
became a centre of greater influence thanks to the prominent social position of its leaders. 
The Casino Español exerted a great influence on both captains general and the Spanish 
Government, as well as advising them on the Cuban situation. For instance, the Casino 
became instrumental in the appointment and removal of captains general. 
The Casino was a centre of power that could not be ignored. For instance, even 
President Juan Prim (1869-1870), politically considered a liberal, often consulted with the 
presidents of the Casino about the convenience of certain policies for Cuba.128 But the 
Casino put the interests of integrismo before any other consideration. For instance, 
Manuel Espadas Burgos argued that the men of the Casino Español might have organized 
the assassination of President Juan Prim in December 1870, for there were insistent 
rumours that he was trying to sell the island to the United States.129  
The firm position of the Casino Español as the centre of Cuban integrismo was 
maintained throughout the Sexenio Democrático and beyond. Coinciding with the visit to 
Cuba of the First Republic’s Overseas Minister Santiago Soler y Pla (1873-1874) in 
November 1873, the Casino reaffirmed its compromise to keep Cuba out of the upheaval 
that irresponsible reforms might bring. This attitude was praised by the integrista press. 
The Diario de la Marina considered the Casino the firmest stronghold of Spain in Cuba, 
whereas the staunchly integrista newspaper La Voz de Cuba considered that Cuba would 
be Spanish for as long as the Volunteers and the Casino Español existed.130 Both the 
Volunteers and the Casinos Españoles, the armed wing and political headquarters of 
integrismo respectively, were the bulwarks of Spanish Cuba against the reformist policies 
envisioned by the First Republic.131 
The initiatives of the Cuban integrismo were replicated in Puerto Rico. In 1871 a 
Casino Español was established in San Juan by the same elite that created the Volunteers 
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in 1864. Its aims and purposes were the same as the Havana Casino: staunch defence of 
the integridad nacional against the reformists in Spain and in Puerto Rico. In fact, the 
influence of the Cuban Casino over his Puerto Rican colleague was not merely theoretical. 
Juan de Ariza, one of the founders of the Havana Casino, also became a leading member 
of the Puerto Rican branch.132 Also, the relationship between the Casino and the 
Volunteers in Puerto Rico was as close as in Cuba. In fact, the founders of the Casino were 
almost the same men that had created the first Volunteer battalion in San Juan in 
December 1864, like its first president, the Marquis of La Esperanza.133 
Nonetheless, due to the weaker position of the Puerto Rican integristas in 
comparison to their Cuban colleagues, the Casino did not have as much influence over the 
Captaincy General. However, it did act as a lobby in defence of its members’ interests. For 
instance, in October 1877 it formally asked the Government to reduce the tariff applied to 
the Puerto Rican sugar entering Spain, for many sugar barons were members of the 
Casino.134 
 
4.2. Círculos Hispano-Ultramarinos 
Just as the integristas had created their own organizations in the Antilles, the groups with 
interests in the Antilles created their own version in metropolitan Spain: the Círculos 
Hispano-Ultramarinos, aimed at defending the Antillean market, financially supporting 
the Spanish soldiers and Volunteers in Cuba, and opposing the outright abolition of 
slavery.135 The creation of the Círculos was a reaction to the Moret Law (4th July 1870), 
which paved the way for the gradual abolition of slavery.136 In a way, the Círculos created 
in the Peninsula were similar to the Casinos created in the Antilles. Both were clubs, but 
the Círculos explicitly served as a platform with which to defend the colonial interests, 
lacking the educational or socialization purposes of the Casinos.  
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The first Círculo was created in Madrid in November 1870 by the Marquis of 
Manzanedo, an indiano that had made a fortune in Cuba as a slave trader. According to its 
reglamento, it was required that its members had lived in the Antilles and still maintained 
some interests there.137 Its first president was José Laureano Sanz, Puerto Rico’s former 
captain general who had been removed in January 1870 for his excesses in repressing the 
reformistas. Due to personal issues, Sanz was soon replaced by Manzanedo in 1871. The 
model of the Círculo was rapidly copied, and by the end of 1872, there were eleven of them 
in Spain.138 The most important of the Círculos was Barcelona’s (est. December 1870), due 
to the foremost importance of commercial relations with the Antilles for Catalan industry, 
mainly textiles.139 The creation of the Barcelona Círculo had been promoted by the 
Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, the main employers’ association created in 1869 to fight 
against the free trade policy of the Treasury Minister Laureano Figuerola.140 Its first 
president and vice-president were José Güell and Antonio López, respectively. Güell had 
been Spain’s most remarkable advocate for protectionism, and López the country’s most 
important shipbuilding tycoon of the 19th century.141 
Apart from the shared interests of the Casinos and the Círculos, there were 
personal connections too, which helped to establish the latter, and to keep the links with 
the former. Juan Bautista Machicote, who had been colonel of the Puerto Rican Volunteers’ 
first battalion, and co-founder of the Casino Español in San Juan, became a member of 
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Madrid’s Círculo.142 In Seville, the former Volunteer and member of Havana’s Casino 
Español, Rafael Torres-Pardo, gave a passionate speech in the local Círculo in April 1872 
defending their former comrades-at-arms from the attacks that kept coming from the 
reformist Spanish press.143 
Though the Círculos pretended not to be political beyond the defence of the 
integridad nacional, it became overwhelmingly dominated by the alfonsinos, as Eloy Arias 
Castañón showed in his study of Seville’s Círculo.144 This gave the Círculos an ideological 
cohesion around issues such as the defence of slavery or the return of the Bourbons. This 
meant the de facto exclusion of the republicans, who had historically been proposing the 
abolition of slavery.145 
The cohesion of the Círculos, therefore, was the result of the collusion between the 
integristas and the alfonsinos. This became even more evident with the creation of the 
Liga Nacional, a last attempt to tackle the abolition of slavery in Puerto Rico. Though its 
economic impact was limited, due to the relatively slight importance of enslaved labour 
for the island’s economy, the members of the Círculos feared that the measure would soon 
be extended to Cuba, where slavery was still profitable.146 The Círculo of Madrid created 
the Liga Nacional (7th February 1873) to coordinate all the Círculos and present a joint front 
against the government.147 The Liga organized demonstrations and presented thousands 
of signatures against the abolition of slavery. The end of slavery in Puerto Rico, however, 
was a strategic compromise for the government, and parliament finally passed the law 
                                                 
142 Memoria que presenta á los señores socios del Centro Hispano-Ultramarino de Madrid el 
Presidente Excmo. Sr. Marqués de Manzanedo. 20 de enero de 1873. Madrid: Imprenta de Andrés 
Orejas, 1873, p. 31; AHN, Ultramar, 5457, exp. 23. 
143 Rafael Torres-Pardo. Discurso en defensa de los Voluntarios de Cuba, leído en la Junta General del 
Círculo Hispano-Ultramarino de Sevilla y su provincia, celebrada el 14 de abril de 1872, por D. Rafael 
Torres-Pardo, socio del mismo. Seville: Imprenta de Salvador Acuña y compañía, 1872, pp. 3-8; AHN, 
Hacienda, 3147, exp. 96. 
144 Eloy Arias Castañón. “El Centro Hispano-Ultramarino de Sevilla y la Guerra de Cuba (1872-1881)”. 
Actas del II Congreso Internacional de Historia Militar, vol. III. Zaragoza: Servicio de Publicaciones 
del EME, 1988, pp. 213-229. 
145 For instance, the republican deputy Baldomero Lostau was kicked out of the first Barcelona 
Círculo’s meeting for having defended the abolition of slavery in the Antilles. La Igualdad, 02-02-
1872, pp. 2-3. Baldomero Lostau Prats (1846-1896) was elected to the Congress for the districts of 
Gracia (1871-1872) and Vilafranca del Penedés (1893-1894), ACD, Serie documentación Electoral, 62, 
No. 10 & 107, No. 8.   
146 Rebecca J. Scott. Slave emancipation in Cuba. The transition to free labor, 1860-1899. Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000 (first published in 1985), pp. 77-110. 
147 Espadas Burgos. Alfonso XII y los orígenes de la Restauración, pp. 285-288; Maluquer de Motes. 
“La burgesia catalana i l’esclavitud colonial”, pp.119-122. 
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abolishing forces labour in Puerto Rico on 22nd March 1873. Having failed to secure slavery 
in Puerto Rico, the Liga Nacional was dissolved shortly afterwards.148 
The most important outcome of the Liga Nacional was the identification of 
interests between integristas and alfonsinos. At the same time as they were defending their 
vested interests in the Antilles, the members of the Liga had been actively working for the 
return of the Bourbon dynasty to Spain. Both alfonsinos and integristas believed that a 
conservative government under the restored monarchy of Prince Alphonse would bring 
peace and stability to Spain and Cuba. In a way, the profile of the Liga Nacional members 
was the same that supported the Bourbon’s restoration to the throne on 31st December 
1874: a mixture of politicians, army officers, civil servants, and middle-class businessmen 
disappointed with the evolution of the 1868 regime, and conservatives that had never 
participated in it.149 The Liga’s president Francisco Serrano (the regent in 1868-1871), and 
the vice-president Adelardo López de Ayala (overseas minister 1869-1870) were among the 
men disappointed by the Sexenio regime’s inability to stabilize Spain. Among the 
conservative politicians that never took part in it was Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, the 
mastermind behind the proclamation of Alphonse XII, and architect of the most stable 
regime in modern Spain, the Restoration (1874-1923).150 
The convergence of interests between integristas and alfonsinos therefore gave the 
Restoration a clearly Antillean background, to paraphrase Manuel Espadas Burgos.151 After 
stabilizing Spain, the first Restoration Government, led by Cánovas del Castillo, 
                                                 
148 The Government headed by Manuel Ruiz Zorrilla (June 1872 – February 1873) not only had a 
compromise with the Puerto Rican reformistas, but also considered that it would convince the 
Cuban rebels to give up their fight. Eduardo Galván Rodríguez. La abolición de la esclavitud en 
España. debates parlamentarios, 1810-1886. Madrid: Dykinson, 2014, pp. 166-187.   
149 Melchor Fernández Almagro. Historia política de la España contemporánea, vol. I. Madrid: 
Alianza Editorial, 1968, pp. 242-247; Carr. Spain, 1808-1875, pp. 348-355; Espadas Burgos. Alfonso XII 
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150 Antonio Cánovas del Castillo (1828-1897) is one of the leading figures in Spanish modern history. 
He presided over the Spanish Government for seven different terms between 1874 and 1897 and had 
previously been Minister of the Interior (1864) and for Overseas (1865-1866). Initially involved with 
Leopoldo O’Donnell’s Liberal Union, he created the Conservative Party in 1874, with which he 
shaped the Restoration regime. Carr. Spain, 1808-1875, pp. 348-355; José Luis Comellas. Cánovas. 
Madrid: Ediciones Cid, 1965, pp. 147-212; Jesús Neira. “El régimen político de la Restauración”. 
Cánovas y la vertebración de España. Madrid: Fundación Cánovas del Castillo, 1998, pp. 35-78. Also 
see Javier Tusell Gómez & Florentino Portero. Antonio Cánovas del Castillo: el sistema político de la 
Restauración. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2007; Carlos Dardé. Cánovas y el liberalismo conservador. 
Madrid: Gota a Gota Ediciones, 2013. 
151 Espadas Burgos talked about a ‘Cuban background’, Espadas Burgos. Alfonso XII y los orígenes de 
la Restauración, pp. 271-299. 
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victoriously put an end to the Third Carlist War.152 Once the peninsula was peaceful, 
military efforts could be focused on Cuba.153 During the three years that followed Alphonse 
XII’s proclamation, Spain could send to Cuba ca. 80,000 soldiers, who in collaboration 
with roughly the same number of Volunteers, ended the war on 10th February 1878 with 
the so-called Pacto del Zanjón with the rebel army.154 
With the Conservatives of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo in power in Madrid (1874-
1881), the Spanish Government implemented a series of profound reforms in Cuba. These 
reforms were not perceived as a threat by the integristas, for they did not harm their 
interests. Cuba was assimilated to the Spanish political system, as was Puerto Rico in 1869, 
and given the right to elect representatives to the Spanish Parliament. However, the 
electoral census, more restricted than in the Peninsula, assured the predominance of the 
integrista elite, representing the biggest fortunes, by leaving them with the right to vote. 
Also, the island was divided into six provinces, each with its own Diputación Provincial, 
dominated by the integristas since their very creation. 
A major reform introduced by the Restoration was the abolition of slavery in Cuba, 
legislated by the Congress on 13th February 1880. It was a relatively smooth transition to 
free labour, for abolition did not mean immediate freedom for the slaves. A Ley del 
Patronato established a period of eight years during which the former slaves (ca. 230,000 
in 1880) were forced to work for their former owners in conditions that powerfully 
resembled unfree labour.155 De facto, slavery in Cuba had been destroyed by the Ten Years’ 
War. Thousands of slaves achieved freedom by joining the insurrection, a good deal of the 
agricultural system in eastern Cuba had been shattered, and the costs of maintaining 
enslaved workers (including feeding, security, and fears of a new rebellion), convinced the 
slaveowners to accept a such a transition towards the use of free labourers.156     
                                                 
152 For the presence of Carlismo in the Spanish Empire see Fernando J. Padilla Angulo. “El carlismo 
en Ultramar”, in Daniel Montañà & Josep Rafart (eds.). Fronteres del carlisme: del Berguedà a 
Ultramar. IV Simposi d’Història del Carlisme. Avià, 7 de maig de 2016. Avià: Centre d’Estudis d’Avià, 
2016, pp. 209-229. 
153 Josep C. Clemente. Las guerras carlistas. Madrid: Sarpe, 1986, pp. 184-197; Julio Aróstegui, Jordi 
Canal & Eduardo González Calleja. El carlismo y las guerras carlistas. Madrid: La Esfera de los 
Libros, 2003, pp. 76-85. 
154 Casanovas. Bread, or Bullets!, pp. 119-124; Navarro. Las guerras de España en Cuba, pp. 87-112; 
Otero Pimentel. Memoria sobre los Voluntarios, p. 177. 
155 The period of eight years of patronazgo ended earlier, in 1886, when there were only 25,000 
patrocinados left in Cuba. Scott. Slave Emancipation in Cuba, 127-141; Knight. Slave Society in Cuba, 
pp. 154-179; Galván Rodríguez. La abolición de la esclavitud en España, pp. 195-221.  
156 Scott. Slave Emancipation in Cuba, pp. 111-124.  
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Consequently, the integristas in the Antilles and the colonial lobbies in the 
Peninsula felt secure and protected by the Conservative government. Between 1876 and 
1881 all the Círculos Hispano-Ultramarinos were dissolved. The first was Madrid’s Círculo, 
for its members, mostly former officials of the Spanish administration in Cuba and army 
chiefs, were mainly concern with bringing a conservative regime to power, and that was 
achieved in 1875.157 The last Círculo to dissolve was Barcelona’s, for its members, basically, 
Catalan indianos with a strong interest in the Antillean economies, were clearly interested 
in securing an economic policy friendly to their interests from the government. Only a few 
months after the delicate issue of slavery had been settled, the Círculo Hispano-
Ultramarino de Barcelona dissolved in January 1881. Explaining this decision to President 
Cánovas del Castillo, the Círculo’s president, José Munné, considered that the Círculos 
were no longer necessary, since the Government was making the reforms required to boost 
the Cuban economy, and they felt their property was well protected.158 
 
4.3. Popular Counterrevolutionary Strategies 
Middle-class Volunteers also developed their own strategies to spread their views and 
forge alliances beyond the Antilles. Their lower economic and social position did not allow 
them to create institutions or to exert a determinant influence over the Spanish 
Government or the influential colonial lobbies of the Peninsula. Unlike the integrista elite, 
they lacked a coherent policy or the will to produce a regime change in Spain. In fact, in 
the articles and books they produced there was barely any explicit support for the 
monarchy as a system or for the Bourbon restoration. There was instead a constant defence 
of the integridad nacional, and often liberal and republican claims. This represents an open 
contradiction, for whereas these men often supported the liberal revolution in Spain, they 
rejected the colonial reforms envisioned by the governments in Madrid. 
The best example of this contradiction is represented by Las Glorias del Voluntario, 
published by the journalist José E. Triay in 1869 in Havana, but aimed at potential readers 
in Spain. A freemason and a republican, he praised the liberty given to the Spanish people 
by La Gloriosa and considered the Volunteers heirs of Rafael de Riego, the colonel that 
                                                 
157 El Imparcial, 21-01-1876, p. 2.  
158 Diario oficial de avisos de Madrid, 26-01-1881. 
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imposed the Cádiz Constitution over Ferdinand VII in 1820.159 At the same time, he 
defended the existing status quo and tried to convince his readers that the abolition of 
slavery, a major promise of La Gloriosa, would ruin the island. Despite this contradiction, 
the main aim of the book was to try to link the fight of the Volunteers in Cuba with the 
struggle for freedom in 1868 Spain and thus gain support for their fight among liberals and 
republicans in the Peninsula.160 
The Volunteers must have certainly been relatively popular in Spain since the 
beginning of the war. For instance, cheap Volunteer-shaped paper dolls were sold in 
Barcelona since early 1869.161 There were also popular Volunteer-themed novels in Spain 
throughout the 1870s, such as J. Álvarez Pérez’s Aventuras de tres Voluntarios, which 
narrated the adventures of three peninsular Volunteers in the Cuban war.162 Even a 
habanera song was composed in 1873 to honour the Cuban Volunteers.163 The Volunteers 
were also regularly mentioned in the popular press. All these were examples of popular 
culture which could potentially reach important audiences in the Peninsula. It could thus 
be argued that the Volunteers indeed enjoyed some degree of acceptance in the Peninsula. 
But the Volunteers also received harsh criticisms from Spain for their violent 
methods in Cuba, especially among republicans, who considered that more civil and 
political rights rather than repression would end the war in Cuba. On 17th June 1870, the 
republican Francisco Díaz Quintero declared at the Spanish Congress that he considered 
                                                 
159 Rafael de Riego lead a coup d’état in 1820 which inaugurated the so-called Trienio Liberal (1820-
1823) a period during which Spain had a liberal regime aimed at dismantling the Ancien Régime. 
Ever since, Riego has been a symbol of Spanish republicanism.  
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creating the Cuban Press Association. He passed away in Madrid during a visit to Spain in 1907. José 
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Raso, sig. 0978.   
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low-income readers, as it only costed 4 reales in Madrid, and 5 in other provinces. Aventuras de tres 
Voluntarios (guerra de Cuba). Madrid: Medina y Navarro Editores (year unspecified).  




the Volunteers a stain on Spain’s history in 
America, for having executed a priest accused of 
having blessed a rebel flag a year before.164 Díaz 
Quintero’s speech provoked an immediate reaction 
by hundreds of Volunteers and their supporters in 
Cuba, Spain, and in the Spanish migrant 
communities in the Americas.165 
The first reaction was publishing letters in 
the main newspapers vindicating the Volunteers’ 
honour and disapproving Díaz Quintero’s speech. 
The first letter was published in early July at Diario 
de la Marina by Captain José Gener, who claimed 
that “without the Volunteers, the Spanish flag 
would not wave in the Morro castle”, and that the 
Volunteers were “Spaniards willing to lose 
everything before letting the enemies of their motherland triumph”.166 Captain Gener 
became a popular character among Cuba’s integristas, even appearing in the front page of 
El Moro Muza (image 4), a satirical weeky magazine very popular among Volunteers. 
The hundreds of letters that followed were collected and published by the 
journalist and Volunteer Joaquín de Palomino at the end of 1870, aimed at showing the 
support received by the Volunteers in the Antilles and Spain.167 Concerned by public 
opinion in Spain regarding the Volunteers, in October 1870 Palomino created a newspaper 
in Madrid entitled El Voluntario de Cuba, aimed at propagating the idea that the 
Volunteers were true patriots and not criminals through articles and news on the 
Volunteers’ main military actions in Cuba. This newspaper was financially supported from 
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Image 4. José Gener started the campaign 
against the Congress member Díaz 




Havana by Suárez Martínez Vigil and other middle-class Volunteers, but it was short-lived 
due to the tiny number of subscribers and closed in January 1871.168 
Opinions disapproving of the Volunteers’ methods strongly intensified after the 
assassination of the medical students of 27th November 1871. Francisco Salmerón y Alonso 
labelled the Volunteers brutal and cowardly for their involvement in this affair at the 
Congress.169 Ventura Olavarrieta, a former Volunteer, and conservative deputy answered 
Salmerón by proclaiming his former comrades’ role as the guarantors of Spain’s presence 
in Cuba and accusing Salmerón of receiving “filibuster’s gold”, implying that he 
collaborated with the insurgents.170 This was the Volunteers’ usual response to criticisms. 
Anyone disapproving of their behaviour was considered a traitor to Spain. In November 
1872 the former Artillery Volunteer Francisco Matías Ruiz y López published Cuba y sus 
enemigos in which he accused Díaz Quintero, the republicans and abolitionists of 
defending the insurgents’ cause in Madrid, and hence of being traitors to Spain.171 
Despite the Volunteers’ efforts to counter critical voices, the echoes of the 
assassination of the medical students reached South America. On 28th December 1872 the 
Buenos Aires newspaper La República published an article by Florentino González entitled 
“Cuba y las repúblicas americanas”, which intensely disapproved of Spanish policy in 
Cuba.172 As well as supporting Cuba’s independence and calling all Hispanic American 
republics to fight for it, he called the Volunteers “mere assassins”. 
This caused outrage among the Spanish community in Buenos Aires. Enrique 
Romero Jiménez, the editor of El Correo Español, a popular newspaper among Spanish 
immigrants, encouraged his fellow countrymen to give Florentino González a due 
response. Between January and February 1873 his newspaper published dozens of letters 
                                                 
168 El Voluntario de Cuba, 18-01-1871, p. 1.  
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by Spanish migrants defending the Spanish struggle in the Antilles.173 The articles and 
letters exchanged between the Spanish El Correo Español and the pro-Cuban 
independence La República reached a crescendo. Romero even urged the Argentinian 
President Domingo Sarmiento (1868-1874) to force La República to apologize, or else he 
would “break up the social peace in Buenos Aires between the Spaniards and the Cuban 
insurgency-supporters”. 
One of the most striking letters was written by Manuel Barros, a former Volunteer 
who had settled in Buenos Aires after leaving Havana. His letter is one of the most extreme 
examples of radical integrismo found here. He rejected all the criticisms received by his 
former comrades-at-arms, writing that “I would have executed not only eight students of 
medicine but forty”. He also considered that most Cubans supported Spanish rule.174 
Romero continued with his campaign and accused Norberto Ballesteros, the head 
of the Spanish diplomatic legation in Buenos Aires of cowardice, for he was as “useless and 
ignorant as most of the diplomatic service appointed by the revolution of 1868”.175 To 
remove Norberto Ballesteros, El Correo Español collected 6,700 signatures, which were 
sent to Cuba’s Captain General Blas Villate (1870-1872), who was very popular among the 
Volunteers, so that he could present the removal proposal in the Spanish Parliament.176 
This shows that similar views and attitudes of middle and working-class peninsulares were 
shared by part of the Spanish émigré community in Argentina. They supported Spanish 
rule in Cuba, disapproved of La Gloriosa, and threatened to use violence if necessary to 
achieve their goals. A social class solidarity should also be considered, as both the radical 
Volunteers in Havana and the men that supported them in Buenos Aires were young 
working-class men. 
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The radical pro-Volunteer 
propaganda seems to have faded away after 
1873-1874 when the integrista elite came to 
control the Casinos Españoles and impose 
its power in Havana. Of course, the class and 
political divisions among the Volunteers 
continued, but the voices of the middle and 
lower strata were not allowed to propagate 
their views, apparently. The works of the 
Volunteers that were published afterwards 
reflected the views of the integrista elite, but 
also tended to praise the patriotism and 
bravery of the rank-and-file Volunteers. 
This was praised, but not given voice. This is the case, for instance, of the Volunteer José 
Joaquín Ribó’s (whose portrait can be seen in image 5, p. 106) Historia de los Voluntarios 
Cubanos, published in two volumes between 1872 and 1877, and dedicated to the Casino 
Español.177 Ribó’s approach to the Volunteers’ history attempted to keep the balance 
between the rank-and-file and the elite Volunteers, stressing the issue that united the 
Volunteers: integridad nacional.178 
The same concept can be found in Álbum de los Voluntarios, a poetry book 
published in 1874 by the Cuban-born Volunteer Fernando C. Moreno Solano. It is a 
collection of poems on the most popular issues among the Volunteers, with verses devoted 
to the rank-and-file Volunteer, the members of the Casino Español, Spain, Cuba, and the 
Integridad Nacional. Above all, it was a chant to the “Spanishness” of Cuba. The very 
metrics and thematic treatment were inspired by the romancero viejo, a collection of orally 
transmitted popular stories which are the basis of Spanish popular poetry. Moreno stresses 
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 Image 5. José Joaquín Ribó, author of Historia de los 
Voluntarios Cubanos (1872-1877). Ribó, Historia de los 




in almost every poem his condition as Volunteer and “good and proud Cuban loyal to his 
mother Spain”.179 
The campaign by the radical Volunteers to propagate their ideas had gone a long 
way. When the radical Volunteers had the upper hand in Havana (ca. 1869-1872), their 
propaganda was markedly popular and rather exalted, stressing the Volunteers’ patriotism 
and zeal in repressing whom they perceived as “enemies of Spain”. Since 1872, when the 
integrista elite took control of the Casino Español and emerged as the commanding group 
in Havana, the pro-Volunteers propaganda assumed a more conciliatory tone. It began to 
stress the idea of patriotism and Integridad Nacional avoiding extremisms. The book by 
the Army officer Luis Otero Pimentel Memoria sobre los Voluntarios (1876), or Ribó’s 
Historia de los Voluntarios cubanos second volume (1877) are good examples of this 
moderated pro-Volunteer literature.180 
The public voice of the middle-class and working-class Volunteers had been 
somehow silenced by the integrista elite. But their radicalism did not fade away. Instead, 
their views and demands were expressed by different means. 
 
5. The Volunteers and Labour Movement   
Beneath the integrista elite that controlled the Casinos Españoles and filled the Volunteer 
officer ranks, there were thousands of working-class rank-and-file Volunteers who have 
seldom been studied by scholars. If one considers that per company, there were 108 
troopers and 23 Volunteers with some degree of command, it could be argued that ca. 
65,000 of the 80,000 Volunteers in Cuba in 1872 were workers and peasants.181 It is, 
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however, difficult to know the percentage of either. Nonetheless, the number of working-
class urban Volunteers must have been high, for in Havana only, there were 19,000 
Volunteers by 1876.182 
In Havana, the professional profile of these rank-and-file Volunteers was quite 
defined: peninsular migrant, usually employed by fellow peninsulares as a shop assistant, 
stevedore, coachman, or cigarmaker.183 Above this echelon, sergeants and low-ranking 
officers (lieutenants and captains) were often lower-middle class and middle class 
peninsulares, who usually owned their own shop or small business, such as bakeries, or 
hardware stores. No consensus on the reasons why they would join the Volunteers exists. 
Manuel Espadas Burgos considered that they were driven by sincere patriotism.184 
Mercedes García Rodríguez, for her part, argued that these humble peninsulares joined 
the Volunteers in exchange for a small stipend.185 However, this stipend never existed, for 
it is not contemplated in the reglamento of 1869 and evidence of it has not been found 
here.186 Instead, there were a variety of reasons for joining the Volunteers. Although an 
identification with the idea of the integridad nacional might have convinced some young 
men to step forward, here it is considered that better employability options and social 
prestige were the most important factors for a peninsular migrant to join the Volunteers, 
an idea also shared with Uralde Cancio.187 In any case, patriotic sentiment might have been 
boosted by belonging to the Volunteers, in combination with gaining social status and 
relating to the dominant group. 
According to the testimony of some of these Volunteers, to join this militia was 
almost a natural step upon settling in Cuba. The Catalan Narciso Maciá recalled joining 
the 1st Artillery Volunteer battalion in Havana in 1873 at the age of 18 alongside his brother, 
persuaded by the owner of the shop where he was employed, a fellow Catalan, who was a 
lieutenant colonel in that unit. He recognised that donning the uniform, taking part in 
military parades, and carrying a weapon, increased his patriotism.188 The same hierarchy 
                                                 
sergeants, 2 1st caporals, 6 caporals, a bugle, and 108 troopers, Reglamento para los cuerpos de 
Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba (1869), cap. I, art 3. 
182 Otero Pimentel. Memoria sobre los Voluntarios, p. 177; Casanovas. Bread, or Bullets!, pp. 119-124. 
183 Over 90% of the Centro de Dependientes de La Habana (a shopkeepers’ trade union) members 
were peninsulares. Moreno Fraginals. Cuba/España, p. 267.  
184 Espadas Burgos. Alfonso XII y los orígenes de la Restauración, pp. 283-285. 
185 García Rodríguez. Con un ojo en Yara y otro en Madrid, p. 111. 
186 It is not contemplated in any of the reglamentos (1856,1869, 1892). The Volunteers only received 
a stipend in case they were mobilized and assimilated to the same conditions of the regular army 
troops. 
187 Uralde Cancio. Voluntarios de Cuba española, p. 60. 
188 Narciso Maciá y Doménech. Vida y obra (1855-1933). Havana, 1954, p. 11. 
110 
 
of trading companies was often reproduced in the Volunteer companies. For instance, 
Captain Antonio Ferrer y Robert of Santiago de Cuba’s 2nd Volunteer Battalion recalled 
that the overseers in his shop were sergeants in his company, and his shopkeepers were 
troopers.189 
The reproduction of these hierarchies might have given more cohesion to the 
Volunteer companies but did not avert social tensions. On the contrary, many Volunteers 
were active members of the labour movement in Cuba, especially among the 
cigarmakers.190 Indeed, belonging to the Volunteers gave these men a sense of unity, 
cohesion, solidarity, and organization inherent to the service-at-arms. The leader of the 
labour movement in Havana during the 1860s and 1870s was himself a Volunteer, 
Saturnino Martínez, an Asturian migrant employed in the Partagás tobacco factory as a 
cigarmaker. He had been promoting the creation of workers’ associations at least since 
1865 from the pages of La Aurora, Cuba’s first workers’ newspaper.191 
The social and labour situation of workers in Havana worsened with the breakout 
of the war. The living conditions created by the Ten Years’ War spurred the creation of 
labour associations. A higher tax pressure on the local industry to finance the war resulted 
in lower wages for the employees and shrinking income for the companies. This caused 
class tensions that partially explain the episodes of violence of 1869-1871 by the Volunteers, 
as already seen. Amidst this tension, both employers and employees began to organize for 
the defence of their own interests. The tobacco manufacturing industry, which employed 
ca. 30,000 people throughout Cuba, particularly felt the tax pressure caused by the war. It 
became a sector where internal tensions between employers and employees were strongly 
felt. In 1870, the cigar factory owners created the Central Guild of Havana Tobacco (Gremio 
Central de Tabaco de La Habana), which lobbied in Spain for the defence of its members’ 
interests.192 Only two years later, in 1872, their employees founded Cuba’s first trade union, 
the Cigar Selector’s Protection Society (Sociedad Protectora del Gremio de Escogedores), 
devoted to the defence of their members’ interests in Cuba.193 In a consideration shared 
here with Joan Casanovas, these working-class peninsulares who happened to be 
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Volunteers assuredly brought with them from the Peninsula the labour culture of trade 
unions that began to grow from the 1870s.194    
Another strategy was to take their labour claims from the guilds to the streets. On 
11th September 1872, the coachmen of Havana, mostly peninsulares, many of whom were 
members of the 5th Volunteer Battalion, went on a strike, seriously disturbing the traffic of 
people and goods in a city which already had 210,000 inhabitants. This action caused great 
alarm among the authorities since the Volunteers had the right to keep weapons at home 
and carry them at any time with their militia uniform, making clear their potential 
power.195 Quite rightly, Moreno Fraginals labelled the Volunteers ‘workers at arms’.196  
However, solidarity was not universal among the Volunteers. Nor were these men 
sharply divided between powerful businessmen and their workers. In between, there was 
a middle-class of shop owners and self-employed Volunteers, who usually filled the 
officers’ low ranks, from second-lieutenant to captain. The affirmative actions of the 
labour movement, such as strikes, affected their businesses as much as the company 
owners. In fact, these actions were regarded as perilous to the cohesion of the Volunteers, 
and a lack of patriotism by these middle-class Volunteers. The coachmen’s struggle was 
just an example. For instance, the Catalan José Gibert, a bakery-owning Volunteer 
lieutenant, was quite critical of the coachmen’s strike. In a letter to his family back in 
Spain, he considered that the strike was caused by the captain general’s order to regulate 
transport coach fares, and by the propaganda spread by infiltrating agents of the 
International Workers’ Association (AIT) who had come to Cuba to disseminate their 
‘terrible ideas’.197 Although no evidence has been found of the presence of AIT among the 
strikers, it was a cause of worry even among the small propertied Volunteers that their 
working-class comrades had been infiltrated by communist agents.198 
These ideological divisions meant that the Volunteer labourers defended their 
class interests separately by trade, rather than converging into a single trade union. This 
was the logical consequence of the distinct working conditions of cigarmakers, coachmen, 
bakers, and other trades. The Volunteer labourers did create mutual insurance companies 
as a common response to economic hardships and to provide some security to their 
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members, and Havana was no exception. The socially progressive ideals of the First 
Spanish Republic, proclaimed in February 1873, facilitated the creation of these 
associations. For instance, in September 1873, Captain General Cándido Pieltain approved 
the creation of La Integridad Nacional, which offered financial aid to the Volunteers and 
their relatives undergoing economic strain.199 
The creation of this insurance company leads to the argument that there was a 
distinct identity of Volunteer workers in Havana, based on their twofold condition of 
labourers and militiamen.200 The defence of their concrete labour claims might not have 
been unified for practical reasons, but the aid to the needy Volunteers was. This argument 
is also based on the fact that La Integridad Nacional was not controlled by the Casino 
Español or other regional clubs, which also had social aid schemes for their members.201 
Away from the integrista elite-controlled Casinos and regional associations, working-class 
Volunteers opted to create their own independent means of mutual help. 
 
6. The War Outside Havana: A Cuban Civil War. 
Outside Havana and other major cities, the conflict was quite different. It was a clash of 
property and the political and social future of Cuba. Ada Ferrer argued that, for the 
insurgents, it was a fight for ending Spanish rule as much as for getting rid of slavery.202 
They understood that it was necessary to destroy Cuba’s wealth to defeat Spain: from big 
sugar mills to the properties of peasants loyal to Spain. On the loyalist side, it became a 
fight for the preservation of Spanish rule and property, including slavery, an argument 
made by Abreu Cardet and agreed with here. He also argues that the very need to protect 
their properties, drew thousands of Cuban peasants to join the Volunteers outside Havana, 
with which this thesis clearly agrees.203 This was the reason that may have driven the 
majority of criollos to join the Volunteers. Evidence suggests though that there was a 
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minority of insurgents disappointed with the revolution, or who feared reprisals by the 
Spaniards, who defected from the mambís and joined the Volunteers.204 
One of the main effects of war was the influx of thousands of criollos into the 
Volunteers. In May 1870, Captain General Caballero de Rodas reported to Madrid that 
Cuban peasants were joining the Volunteers in their hundreds.205 This means that the 
Cuban population did not rally unanimously behind the idea of removing Spain from the 
island. On the contrary, it was split between those who fought for and against this. In fact, 
the Ten Years’ War can be analysed as a war for independence as much as a civil war 
between Cubans. 
Detailed study of the Volunteer battalions shows just how the Cuban population 
was split during the Ten Years’ War, contrary to what has often been claimed.206 José Ferrer 
de Couto, an integrista journalist, and former Volunteer claimed that at least 52,000 
Cubans had joined the Volunteers by 1872.207 Although it is extremely difficult to establish 
the exact numbers of the Cuban Volunteers—not all the units kept detailed records of 
their members—the surviving evidence suggests that the Cuban-born Volunteers presence 
in the rural areas was important and even dominant.208 In big towns, however, the 
Volunteers were often peninsulares. 
In the area around the city of Matanzas in western Cuba there were ca. 3,000 
Volunteers by 1869. 75% of them were peninsulares in the city, but in nearby small towns, 
such as Sabanilla del Encomendador or Corral Nuevo, the Cubans formed more than half 
the numbers.209 In the same area, the Colón’s Cavalry Volunteer Regiment (550 men), was 
mostly made up of Cubans.210 The same pattern was repeated in eastern Cuba, the centre 
of the revolutionary war. In villages, such as Cuartón del Indio and Tiguabos (around the 
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city of Guantánamo), the Cubans represented 97% and 100% respectively. In the city itself, 
the Húsares de Pando consisted of 55% of peninsulares.211 
From the starting months of the revolution, the nature of the conflict had the 
characteristics of a civil war. In that sense, the siege of the city of Holguín (Oriente), is 
quite telling. Between 17th October and 6th November 1868, the rebel forces, commanded 
by Julio Grave de Peralta, put his native city under siege.212  Only after a few days after the 
attack began, the only Spanish stronghold left was La Periquera, the house of Francisco 
Rondán, a local merchant loyal to Spain. Several hundred other Loyalists (a mix of Army 
personnel, Volunteers, and their families) took refuge in Rondán’s house and collaborated 
in its defence, commanded by the Army Colonel Francisco Camps y Feliu. Camps recalled 
a few years later that most of the people inside La Periquera were Cubans. Among them 
was Julio Grave de Peralta’s grandmother, Josefa Cardet de Martínez, who died during the 
siege.213 Only a few months later, one of these Cuban Loyalists, the journalist Antonio José 
Nápoles Fajardo, published a work on the siege of Holguín.214 Antonio José was the brother 
of Juan Cristóbal, a Cuban nationalist poet known as El Cucalambé, who had his properties 
seized by the Consejo de Bienes Embargados in 1873.215 This shows how the war often split 
Cuban families down the middle.  
The existence of these Cuban Loyalists negated the rebels’ claim that the revolution 
was a fight between Cubans and Spaniards.216 The insurgent commanders usually offered 
them either defection to the Spanish forces or death. During the campaign against 
Guantánamo (1871), another Loyalist stronghold in Oriente, the rebel general Máximo 
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Gómez issued a call to his ‘fellow countrymen of Guantánamo’ compelling them to join 
the insurgency, or else face death.217 The message was clear: the Cubans defending Spain 
to the very last would not be forgiven. This attitude by the insurgents towards the Spanish 
loyalists powerfully recalls the “War to Death” against all Spaniards proclaimed by Simón 
Bolívar in 1813.218 The difference was that whereas Bolívar promised clemency to all 
Americans and death to all peninsulares, regardless of their loyalty, the mambís would kill 
any Cuban supporting the cause of Spain. 
 
6.1. Useful Troops 
Archival resources reveal that contrary to what historiography has often claimed, the 
Volunteers played an active military role throughout the war.219 They were not only in 
garrison prisons, military hospitals, and forts but were also deployed to chase the rebel 
army in the countryside, as can be seen in image 6. The first Volunteer battalions 
organized ad hoc to fight alongside the regular Army were created on 17th November 
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1868.220 Their organizer was Francisco de Acosta y Albear, a Cuban landowner who had 
served in the Spanish Army since 1827 and decided to organize a Volunteer battalion after 
the Grito de Yara.221 
The Volunteers were crucial in averting the insurrection from spreading to western 
Cuba, and in defending the Spanish positions in eastern Cuba, where the rebels had their 
main operational base.222 
For instance, the first 
attempt to bring the war 
westwards was quelled by 
the Voluntarios 
Chapelgorris of Guamutas 
on 10th February 1869 in 
Jagüey Grande (Matanzas), 
as recorded by José Joaquín 
Ribó.223 In the east, the 
Volunteers helped the 
regular Army to keep the 
cities and major towns under Spanish control. Throughout the war, the insurgents 
attacked all the towns in Oriente, save Santiago de Cuba and Gibara, a Loyalist stronghold 
surrounded by the revolution.224 
Local Volunteers were of great use to the Spanish military commanders, due to 
their thorough knowledge of the terrain. For instance, a group of Cuban fishermen from 
La Isabela (Las Villas, in Central Cuba) formed a company of Volunteers deployed to patrol 
the coast.225 Theirs was a vital task, for the insurgents used the rocky coast of that area to 
smuggle weapons and mercenaries into rebel territory, mostly coming from the US, 
Jamaica, and Haiti.226 For instance, on 14th June 1870, the Volunteers from the coastal town 
of Maniabón, commanded by Captain Aurelio López del Campo, captured the George S. 
Upton on the beach. This was a ship sent from the US by Cuban exiles, loaded with men 
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Image 7. Captain Aurelio López del Campo commanded Maniabón’s 




and weapons for Belisario Grave de Peralta, the rebel leader in the Holguín region.227 The 
capture of the Upton became highly popular among integristas, making it to one of the 
pages of El Moro Muza (image 7). The Volunteers were also used to protect some of the 
key infrastructure in the countryside. For instance, the Volunteers from Puerto Príncipe, 
in the Camagüey region, protected the railway line that linked this city of the interior to 
the port of Nuevitas. Keeping the railway open was vital for the region’s livestock industry, 
which exported its cattle though Nuevitas’ port to other parts of Cuba.228 
 
6.2. The Decree of Mobilization 
The Volunteers’ biggest contribution in terms of men to the military effort came at a 
critical period. This was a compulsory contribution ordered by the superior military 
authority. On 10th February 1874, Captain General Joaquín Jovellar (1873-1874) decreed the 
mobilization and deployment to the warzone of 10% of the Volunteers for a period of 6 
months.229 This decree was a military need for Jovellar. The years of 1873-1874 were critical 
for Spain. The proclamation of the Republic on 11th February 1873 had only worsened the 
political instability the country had been living in since the revolution of 1868. Also, 
besides the Cuban war, there were two ongoing wars on the Peninsula: The Third Carlist 
War, and the Rebelión Cantonal. This meant that the already limited Spanish military 
resources could pay little attention to the war in Cuba.230 
On the island, the situation was extremely tense. The rebellion was not abating, 
and the capture by the Spanish Navy in October 1872 of the American ship Virginius, which 
transported 175 men, weapons and ammunition for the rebels, brought Spain and the US 
to the brink of war. The cause was that alongside four Cuban rebel leaders, 27 members of 
the ship’s crew, including US and British citizens, had been executed in Santiago de Cuba. 
To avoid war, the Spanish Government agreed to return the ship to the US authorities and 
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to pay a compensation of $80,000 for the executions.231 This was understood as a betrayal 
by the Havana Volunteers, who organized demonstrations against the Spanish 
Government for this agreement, between November and December 1873. The Volunteers 
demanded that no compensation should be given to the US or British Governments, for 
their citizens who participated in the Virginius expedition were helping to subvert Spanish 
sovereignty in Cuba. They demonstrated, donning their uniforms and producing their 
weapons, claiming that they were ready to defend the island in case the United States 
declared war on Spain.232 
These demonstrations did not escalate, as Cándido Pieltain was replaced by 
Joaquín Jovellar, a man respected by the integristas, because of the Virginius affair. He 
enjoyed a good reputation among the integristas for his honesty and known conservative 
political inclinations.233 He assured the Volunteers of his firm commitment to defend 
Spanish rule in Cuba at any cost and asked them for a demonstration of patriotism in times 
of need. The decree of 7th February was implemented with no incidents.234 It mobilized ca. 
8,000 Volunteers. Since not all of them had any military experience, Jovellar decided to 
organize auxiliary companies of Voluntarios movilizados, and embed them into regular 
army battalions.235 
The mobilization could have caused a serious disruption in the lives of the 
Volunteers. Most of them were labourers and peasants who could not afford to leave their 
jobs for half a year. The absence of them from their workplace for a prolonged period 
would have also caused a serious problem to their employers, who often happened to be 
their Volunteer officers. However, the pragmatism and flexibility of the Volunteer 
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companies provided the solution. Each battalion usually had 100-200 men who had served 
in the army, according to the Cuban-born Volunteer Colonel Francisco de Acosta y Albear. 
Quite often, the Volunteers who did not want to fulfil their military duties, paid these men 
a few pesos so that they would substitute them, even though this contravened the 
regulations.236 
Most of the Volunteers that were mobilized after 7th February 1874 were army 
veterans, and they contributed to the success of the Spanish forces. In Las Villas (central 
Cuba), 1,800 of them were deployed to cover the trocha Júcaro-Morón. This was a fortified 
line that separated western Cuba from the eastern half, aiming at isolating the rebellion in 
the eastern part.237 Although Máximo Gómez, the insurgency leading general, managed to 
cross the trocha on 6th January 1875, his plan to bring the war to western Cuba failed.238 
 
7. Conclusions 
The Volunteers were a decisive force in shaping the political limits of the revolutionary 
period opened in Spain and her Antilles in 1868 and ended in 1875 with the restoration of 
the Bourbon dynasty in Spain and Puerto Rico, and with the Peace of Zanjón in 1878 in 
Cuba. This militia, with the financial strength of its chief officers, and the impressive 
numbers of its rank-and-files, not only conditioned the intensity with which the colonial 
programme of La Gloriosa could operate in the Antilles, but also, contributed to the 
undermining of the regimes that succeeded the revolution of 1868 and the final restitution 
of the Bourbons in Spain. 
In Cuba (with less intensity in Puerto Rico) the coercive capacity of the rank-and-
file Volunteers in the big cities proved a powerful tool to repress anticolonial nationalism. 
Their ferocity also made them a threat to the authority of the Spanish Government in the 
Antilles through the captains general. This, in its turn, facilitated the emergence of an 
already existing class struggle within the Volunteers, between the wealthy officers, and the 
working-class rank-and-file members. In this regard, the existence of a war situation, 
                                                 
236 The regular military duties of the Volunteer consisted in serving as sentinels in military hospitals, 
prisons, and their own barracks. Acosta y Albear. Compendio histórico, pp. 24-26. 
237 Luis de Sequera Martínez. “Las trochas militares en las campañas de Cuba (1868-1898)”. Revista 
de Historia Militar, Año XL, No. 81, 1996, pp. 107-146. 
238 Navarro. Las guerras de España en Cuba, pp. 85-87; Evaristo Martín Contreras. Los Voluntarios 
de la Isla de Cuba. Reconocimiento de su heroísmo y vindicación a su honor. Valladolid: Imprenta, 





which occurred in Cuba but not in Puerto Rico, seems to have been a crucial factor in 
determining the level of intensity at which this double conflict (Volunteers vs. Authorities 
and Officers vs. Rank-and-Files) was expressed. Other factors were the lack of a powerful 
industry in Puerto Rico that demanded a strong working class and weak immigration from 
Spain. Hence, in a peaceful situation, and lacking a strong community of working-class 
peninsulares, the Volunteers of Puerto Rico showed a much lower profile than their 
colleagues in Cuba.  
The war factor also shaped the military role of the Volunteers and evidenced the 
existence of a powerful Creole Loyalism in the case of Cuba, and a passive acceptance of 
Spanish sovereignty in Puerto Rico. In areas little or unaffected by the war, such as western 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Volunteers comprised basically a militia of peninsulares used 
by the military authorities to exert a coercive role, but in the areas directly affected by the 
war, the Volunteers had a profile dominated by the Creole element and were directly 
involved in the military operations. 
The degree of control of the Spanish authorities over the Volunteers greatly 
depended on the identification of projects between the Integristas in the Antilles and the 
metropolitan Government. This is how the urban Volunteers operated. When this 
identification was weak, in other words caused by plans to implement deep political 
reforms or abolish slavery, the Volunteers acted as a rebellious force. When the 
identification was evident, such as after the end of the Federal Republic in January 1874, 
the Volunteers acted as a strong force loyal to the Government. The attitude of the 
Volunteers in the rural areas was generally loyal to the authorities. Far from the political 
and labour disputes of the main cities, the Volunteers of the countryside supported much 
of the war effort of the militia, acting as an auxiliary force to the regular Army. 
Linked to this, the fluid movement of ideas and people between Madrid, Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, and even Argentina, around the Volunteers, lead to the consideration here of 
this militia as the representation of a conservative colonial and national project for Spain 




CHAPTER IV. ADAPTING TO PEACE (1878-1895) 
This chapter addresses the question of how the Volunteers adapted to the new context 
introduced in Cuba and Puerto Rico after the peace of 1878, and the strategies they 
followed to try to remain a central element of the Spanish defensive system. This is a 
question that remains completely unexplored by historiography regarding the Cuban case 
and to a large extent neglected as to Puerto Rico.1 Following the general approach of the 
thesis, this chapter explores the strategies adopted by the Volunteers in both Cuba and 
Puerto Rico, in relation to the events in Spain. In this sense, this chapter also contributes 
by offering an integrated view of the Spanish Antilles, for Cuba and Puerto Rico have 
traditionally been studied separately. 
Regarding the interwar period, historians have also tended to focus on the growing 
discontent towards Spanish rule. For instance, Louis A. Pérez, Jr. has considered this 
period as a mere lapse between two wars, a “fateful interlude”, due to the persistence and 
the reorganization of the independentist movement both in Cuba and in exile.2 Cubano 
Iguina viewed the same period in Puerto Rico through the lens of the rising of a powerful 
autonomist movement, as an expression of growing disaffection towards Spain.3 Inés 
Roldán de Montaud centred the focus on Spain’s failure to properly assimilate both islands 
into the political system of the Restoration.4 Throughout the interwar period there 
certainly was a growing disaffection in the Antilles towards Spain, which proved unwilling 
to truly incorporate Cuba and Puerto Rico into the metropolitan political system and 
unable to cope with its worsening economic situation. This chapter instead focuses on the 
untold story of the strategies adopted by the Volunteers to resist the anti-colonial trend 
and to adapt to the new political situation brought about by by the failed assimilationist 
attempt by Spain. These are the main historiographic contributions of this chapter. 
The argument will be presented that due to the end of the war in Cuba in 1878 and 
the implementation of party politics in Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Volunteers lost the 
momentum they had enjoyed during wartime. In Cuba, the absence of armed conflict 
made the military role of the 80,000-strong Volunteers at least unclear, and the role of 
Puerto Rico’s Volunteers as deterrents of nationalist conspiracies at least unnecessary. 
                                                 
1 González Cuevas. ¿Defendiendo el honor?, pp. 69-82; Rosado y Brincau. Bosquejo Histórico, pp. 63-
151. 
2 Pérez, Jr. Cuba Between Empires, pp. 3-39.  
3 Cubano Iguina. El hilo en el laberinto, pp. 85-150.  
4 Roldán de Montaud. La Restauración en Cuba, pp. 113-572.  
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Also, the newly created political parties replaced the Volunteers at the centre of integrista 
political power. Clausewitz famously wrote that “war is politics by other means”. During 
wartime, armed forces are the main political actors. During peacetime, political forces are 
the main actors. 
The legacy of the revolutionary period of 1868-1878 greatly shaped the strategies 
followed by the Volunteers in Cuba and Puerto Rico, as well as their outcomes. The Ten 
Years’ War devastated Cuba’s countryside and severely damaged the economic power of 
the integrista elite. This had two major consequences for the Volunteers. First, it caused a 
major disruption in the living conditions of the thousands of peasant Volunteers. Second, 
the decline of the integrista elite translated into the colonial authorities assuming the 
initiative regarding the militia, and the re-emergence of social tensions among the 
Volunteers. The strategies followed by the Volunteers to find a new role in Cuba were 
mostly designed by the Spanish authorities: military-agricultural colonies, fighting against 
banditry, allowing Spanish conscripts to fulfil their military service in their ranks, and 
using the Volunteers as an electoral force. The social tensions that re-emerged were mostly 
caused by the economic crisis that persisted during much of the interwar period and the 
growing participation of Volunteers in the labour movement. 
The Volunteers in Puerto Rico underwent a different process. Since the island had 
not suffered a war, the power of the integristas remained intact. In fact, the end of the 
revolutionary experiments of the period 1868-1874 after the establishment of the 
Restoration in 1875, affirmed the control of the integristas over local power and their 
influence over the captaincy general. Their economic power was also mostly untouched, 
remaining in control of most of the sugar industry and monopolizing commerce thanks to 
the network of peninsular merchants. But this power was challenged by a growing 
autonomist movement, economically sustained by a thriving coffee industry, and fuelled 
by discontent regarding the paramountcy of integristas in Puerto Rican politics and the 
economy. This challenge had the Volunteers back at the centre of the fight for power. To 
cope with the ascendancy of autonomists, and amidst rumours of plans to start an uprising 
against the peninsulares (duly exploited by the integrista press) the integristas, in alliance 
with the captains general, resorted to the Volunteers to impose their power. Accordingly, 
they reclaimed their role as integrismo’s armed wing. 
This chapter draws on mostly unpublished primary sources collected at archives 
and libraries in Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Additionally, for the historiographical 
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support, it has relied on the most relevant works on topics such as agricultural colonies, 
politics in the Spanish Antilles, and banditry in Cuba.5 This chapter’s structure is divided 
into three main sections. The first one deals with Volunteer involvement in a project aimed 
at reconstructing the countryside in Cuba: the military-agricultural colonies. These 
colonies were the authorities’ response to an extended preoccupation with recuperating 
Cuba’s agriculture.6 This was an endeavour in which the military and civilian authorities 
nevertheless had divergent aims. Whereas the former aimed at creating peasant 
communities loyal to Spain, the latter sought to dominate the rebuilding of the 
agricultural system. The focus will be on the impact these diverse projects had on the 
Volunteer involvement in the military-agricultural colonies. This section, related to the 
unrest in the Cuban countryside, will also briefly explore the Volunteers’ participation in 
the short-lived war for independence known as the Little War (1879-1880).7 The second 
part analyses the impact that the political assimilation of Cuba and Puerto Rico into the 
metropolitan system had on the Volunteers, and how they came to be used for electoral 
purposes by the Spanish Government and the Antillean political parties.8 The third and 
                                                 
5 Among others, for agricultural projects, Consuelo Naranjo Orovio, “Trabajo libre e inmigración 
española en Cuba, 1880-1930”, Revista de Indias, No. 195-196, 1992, pp. 749-794; “Hispanización y 
defensa de la integridad nacional”, pp. 71-92 was consulted. For politics in Cuba and Puerto Rico, 
Roldán de Montaud. La Restauración en Cuba; Portela Miguélez. Redes de poder en Cuba. Also 
Enrique Pérez Cisneros. El reformismo español en Cuba. Madrid: Editorial Verbum, 2002; and 
Alonso Romero. Cuba en la España liberal. For the fight against banditry, Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Lords 
of the Mountain: Social Banditry and Peasant Protest in Cuba, 1878-1918, Pittsburgh, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1989; Manuel de Paz Sánchez, José Fernández Fernández & Nelson López Novegil. 
El bandolerismo en Cuba (1800-1933). Presencia canaria y protesta rural, vol. I. Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife: Centro de la Cultura Popular Canaria, 1994; Imilcy Balboa Navarro. La protesta rural en 
Cuba: resistencia cotidiana, bandolerismo y revolución (1878-1902). Madrid: CSIC, 2003. 
6 Naranjo Orovio. “Trabajo libre e inmigración española en Cuba”, pp. 749-794; Balboa Navarro. 
“Tierras y brazos. Inmigración, colonización y fuerza de trabajo. Cuba, 1878-1898”. Illes i Imperis, 
2002, No. 6, pp. 67-76; “Asentar para dominar. Salamanca y la colonización militar. Cuba, 1889-
1890”. Tiempos de América, 2001, No. 8, pp. 29-46; “Colonización e inmigración. Dos realidades 
enfrentadas en la Cuba de fin de siglo”, in Francisco Morales Padrón (coord.), III Coloquio de 
Historia Canario-Americana, VIII Congreso Internacional de Historia de América (AEA) (1998). Las 
Palmas de Gran Canaria: Cabildo de Gran Canaria, 2000, pp. 452-470; “Tierras y brazos. 
Inmigración, colonización y fuerza de trabajo. Cuba, 1878-1898”. Illes i Imperis, 2002, No. 6, pp. 67-
76; “La inmigración como forma de presión política: Polavieja, los hacendados y la colonización por 
la vía militar: Cuba, 1878-1892”. Illes i Imperis, 2004, No. 7, pp. 135-156. 
7 The term ‘Little War’ (Guerra Chiquita) was used since the late 19th century. The Cuban journalist 
Herminio Leyva y Aguilera published a collection of articles on that war entitled El movimiento 
insurreccional de 1879 en la provincia de Santiago de Cuba. (La Guerra Chiquita). Havana: Imprenta 
y Papelería “La Universal”, 1893. Francisco Pérez Guzmán & Rodolfo Sarracino. La Guerra Chiquita: 
una experiencia necesaria. Havana: Editorial Letras Cubanas, 1982, pp. 178-254; Baldovín Ruiz. Cuba, 
pp. 251-259.  
8 For the historiographic support, Roldán de Montaud. La Restauración en Cuba; Portela Miguélez. 
Redes de poder en Cuba was used. Also consulted were Pérez Cisneros. El reformismo español en 
Cuba; and Alonso Romero. Cuba en la España liberal; Cubano Iguina. El hilo en el laberinto, pp. 77-
150; “Puerto Rico”, in José Varela Ortega (dir.). El poder de la influencia. Geografía del caciquismo en 
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last section explores the debates and possible solutions aiming to give the Volunteers a 
clear military role in Cuba in times of peace.9 
 
1. Reconstructing Cuba 
Between 1877 and 1895, when the last war for independence broke out, there were plans to 
reconstruct Cuba’s countryside, as it had been mostly devastated during the Ten Years’ 
War.10 Within Cuba, the only agents with the capacity to embark on such a project were 
the landowners and the colonial authorities.11 However, their projects were not 
compatible: whereas the former aimed to attract a cheap labour force and expand sugar 
production, the latter prioritised the creation of loyalist rural communities over 
agricultural revitalization.12 
The landowners planned a controlled colonization of the land that would increase 
their agricultural properties. For instance, José Eugenio Moré, Count of Casa Moré and co-
founder of the Volunteers in 1855, submitted a project in 1879 proposing the import of 
30,000 Chinese indentured servants and 10,000 peninsulares paid for using the island’s 
budget.13 The Havana Volunteers’ Colonel Francisco F. Ibáñez, Count of Casa Ibáñez, a 
peninsular merchant, and landowner, asked for the creation of 50 sugar mills throughout 
the island which would be manned by 1,000 families brought in from metropolitan Spain.14 
                                                 
España (1875-1923). Madrid: Marcial Pons/Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2001, pp. 
541-557; Bothwell. Orígenes y desarrollo, pp. 1-49. 
9  For Cuban banditry, texts relied on include Pérez, Jr., Lords of the Mountain; “Vagrants, Beggars, 
and Bandits: Social Origins of Cuban Separatism, 1878-1895”, The American Historical Review, vol. 
90, No. 5, 1985, pp. 1092-1121; Paz Sánchez, Fernández Fernández & López Novegil. El bandolerismo 
en Cuba, vol. I; Balboa Navarro. La protesta rural en Cuba; “Libertos, vagos y bandoleros: la 
reglamentación del trabajo tras la abolición de la esclavitud (Cuba, 1886-1895). Relaciones: Estudios 
de historia y sociedad, 2011, vol. 32, No. 127, pp. 87-116; “Entre lo real y lo imaginario: el bandolerismo 
rural en Cuba en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX”. Contrastes: Revista de historia moderna, 2001-
2003, No. 12, pp. 43-62. 
10 Out of 100 sugar mills in Oriente in 1868, there were only 39 left in 1880. In Puerto Príncipe, in 
central Cuba, the 100 sugar mills of 1868 had been reduced to 1 in 1880. Le Riverend. Historia 
económica de Cuba, p. 453-458; Pérez, Jr. Cuba. Between Reform & Revolution, pp. 129-136. 
11 Naranjo Orovio. “Trabajo libre e inmigración española en Cuba”, pp. 749-794. 
12 Balboa Navarro. “Colonización e inmigración”, pp. 452-470.  
13 AHN, Ultramar, 278, exps. 2 & 3; Cuerpos de Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba, p. 35; Naranjo Orovio. 
“Hispanización y defensa de la integridad nacional”, p. 77.  
14 AHN, Ultramar, 340, exp. 15.; Francisco Feliciano Ibáñez, Observaciones sobre la utilidad y 
conveniencia del establecimiento en esta isla de Grandes Ingenios Centrales para salvar nuestra 
agricultura é industria azucarera por el aumento de producción y disminución de gastos y bases para 
la formación de una Compañía para la fácil realización de este objeto. Havana: Imprenta y Lit. 
Obispo, 1880, p. 27; Consuelo Naranjo Orovio & Armando García González. Racismo e inmigración 
en Cuba en el siglo XIX. Aranjuez: Ediciones Doce Calles/FIM, 1996, pp. 175-178; César Aenlle. De 
todo un poco. Havana: Imprenta Mercantil de los Herederos de Spencer, 1889, pp. 31-35. Previously, 
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In this respect, the Volunteer officers that adhered to this goal shared the view of their 
colleagues of the Círculo de Hacendados, an association aimed at representing, defending, 
and protecting the interests of the island’s landowning elite, both peninsular and Cuban.15 
Before these plans, the first project to establish military agricultural colonies was 
sanctioned shortly before the end of the war. The Royal Decree of 28th October 1877 
promoted the creation of colonies, settled in order of preference by army veterans and 
Volunteers who had been demobilized from military operations, civilian loyalists who had 
lost their property due to the war, and former rebels who had asked for pardon.16 With the 
explicit purpose of ‘averting another rebellion in Cuba’, these colonies were meant to mix 
all these elements rather than establishing separate settlements. These colonies were to 
consolidate the pacification of Oriente, where groups of rebels that had rejected the 
Zanjón pact, for it granted neither independence nor the abolition of slavery, only laid 
down their weapons by May 1879 after being defeated by the Spanish troops.17 
The Volunteers in the countryside were considered ideal material for the colonies, 
for they were mostly peasants and Cubans, thus an integral part of the rural society. For 
instance, in Cuartón del Indio (Guantánamo), 85 out of the 87 local Volunteers were 
Cuban peasants.18 However, the man appointed as governor of Oriente after the war, Field 
Marshall Camilo García de Polavieja (1879-1881) saw these men as a potential source of 
trouble.19 Shortly before assuming the governorship, he reported to Captain General 
Ramón Blanco (1879-1881) that wide areas of rural Cuba were under a ‘latent state of 
                                                 
in 1871, Ibáñez had presented another project to import agricultural workers from Annam (current 
Vietnam), AHN, Ultramar, 94, exp. 23. 
15 Fernández Prieto. Espacio de poder, pp. 55-78. 
16 Gaceta de Madrid, 28-10-1877, No. 501, p. 303.  
17 Most famously, the mulatto Antonio Maceo, one of the main rebel military commanders during 
the war, publicly rejected the pact in the Protesta de los Mangos de Baraguá (15th March 1878). 
Ibarra. Ideología mambisa, pp. 105-126; José Mármol. Antonio Maceo Grajales. El Titán de Bronce. 
Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1998, pp. 59-72; Pérez Guzmán & Sarracino. La Guerra Chiquita, pp. 
59-71.  
18 AGMM, Ultramar, Cuerpo de Voluntarios, caja 3557, “Cuartón del Indio”. In the nearby village of 
Tiguabos, all the 36 Volunteers were Cuban-born and peasants. See AGMM, Ultramar, Cuerpo de 
Voluntarios, caja 3557, “Tiguabos”. 
19 Camilo García de Polavieja (1838-1914) was a leading military figure in Spain’s 19th and early 20th 
centuries with a long career in the colonies. A veteran of the African War (1859-1860), the Ten Years’ 
War, the Thirst Carlist War, and the Little War (1879-1880), he was appointed captain general of 
Cuba (1890-1892) and the Philippines (1896-1897). He also briefly served as War minister (1899) and 
became Chief of Staff of the Army (1904-1906). After 1898 he unsuccessfully tried to start a political 
career with the support of the Catalan bourgeoisie. See Alfredo López Serrano. El general Polavieja 
y su actividad política y militar. Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2001. 
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insurgency’.20 Polavieja considered this state to exist because the ‘weapons of the 
Volunteers in the countryside have not been collected properly, and God knows where 
they might end up’.21 
Although these Volunteers had proved mostly loyal to Spain, there had been some 
desertions during the war, especially in the areas most dominated by the rebellion in 
Oriente.22 In fact, some of the insurgent leaders had previously been Volunteer officers 
themselves, such as Francisco Vicente Aguilera and Calixto García.23 Nonetheless, 
Polavieja not only distrusted the Creole Volunteers but the whole Cuban population. 
Despite the decisive contribution of Cuban loyalists to the Spanish victory in 1878, 
Polavieja argued that all the Blacks and Mulattoes, plus half the Whites, supported the 
idea of a Cuba free of Spanish rule.24 Consequently, Polavieja sought to neutralize as much 
of the threat as possible. 
 
1.1. The Volunteers and the Little War (1879-1880) 
Polavieja’s distrust as to the fate of post-Zanjón Cuba proved right, and in August 1879 a 
new war for independence, known as the Guerra Chiquita, broke out in Oriente. It was 
based on the rejection of the Zanjón agreement and was organized by the Cuban 
nationalist exiled community in New York and waged by rebel veterans of the previous 
war. The swift and firm reaction of the troops under Polavieja, forced the capitulation of 
the rebel leader, Calixto García, in September 1880.25 
                                                 
20 At the time of writing the letter, Polavieja was governor of Puerto Príncipe (1878-1879). Letter to 
Captain General Ramón Blanco Erenas (1879-1881), 4th June 1879, AGI, Diversos, Leg. 9B, No. 155. 
Ramón Blanco y Erenas (1833-1906) was a veteran of the Dominican War (1863-1865) and the Third 
Carlist War. He was appointed captain general of Cuba (1879-1881, and 1897-1898), and the 
Philippines (1893-1896). Francisco López Casimiro. “Ramón Blanco Erenas, capitán general de Cuba 
y la masonería”. Boletín de la Real Academia de Extremadura de las Letras y las Ares, 2009, t. 17, pp. 
109-122.  
21 The letter, written on 4th July 1879, is reproduced in Camilo García de Polavieja. Relación 
documentada de mi política en Cuba. Lo que vi, lo que hice, lo que anuncié. Madrid: Imprenta de 
Emilio Minuesa, 1898, pp. 43-48. 
22 For instance, several dozens of Volunteers defected to the rebel Jiguaní Regiment. See ANRC, 
Donativos y Remisiones, leg. 474, exp. 10., and leg. 477, exp. 40. 
23 Francisco Vicente Aguilera (1821-1877), was captain of the Bayamo (Oriente) company of 
Volunteers in 1860. See Cuerpos de Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba, p. 34. Calixto García was second 
lieutenant (alférez) in the local section of Volunteers in Ojo de Agua (Oriente) before 1868. Abreu 
Cardet. Apuntes sobre el integrismo, p. 48, note 137. 
24 ANRC, Donativos y Remisiones, leg. 474, exp. 10; id., leg. 477, exp. 40. 
25 Baldovín Ruiz. Cuba, pp. 251-259; Enrique Collazo. Desde Yara hasta el Zanjón. Apuntaciones 
históricas. Havana: Tipografía de “La Lucha”, 1893, pp. 139-156; José Luis Prieto Benavent. “La Guerra 
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This new war reinforced Polavieja’s distrust towards the Cubans, including the 
Volunteers, who suffered neglect by the Spanish authorities in the rural areas. They were 
mostly left alone by the regular army throughout the war. This meant that in many small 
towns, a section of Volunteers (30-50 men), poorly armed and barely militarily trained, 
had to face a force of 200-500 insurgents. Consequently, these Volunteers felt undervalued 
by the Spanish authorities. The mostly peninsular urban Volunteers were still trusted for 
the protection of key infrastructure in the cities, though they saw little military action.26 
Some of their well-connected officers did still become highly valuable sources of 
information and influence. For instance, the Catalan Cástulo Ferrer Torralba, colonel of 
Santiago de Cuba’s 2nd Volunteer Battalion, a coffee producer and railway investor, 
provided Polavieja with accurate information on the whereabouts of the rebel forces and 
convinced several affluent young Creoles not to join the rebellion.27 
Yet in the countryside, the situation was starkly different. Polavieja relied on 
regular Army soldiers rather than on Volunteers to crush the rebels. He approached the 
war as a conflict of manoeuvre and not position. This means that army columns chased 
the rebels while the Volunteers were left alone to defend the small towns.28 The Volunteers 
were in a general state of dismay, distrusted by the authorities they owed obedience to, 
and harassed by the rebels who threatened their lives unless they joined the insurgency. 
They felt rather abandoned by the authorities. The result was the biggest desertion in their 
history when between 9th and 13th September 1879 over 1,200 Volunteers joined the rebels 
                                                 
Larga y las consecuencias de la Paz del Zanjón”, in Manuel Moreno Fraginals (coord.). Cien años de 
historia de Cuba (1898-1998). Madrid: Editorial Verbum, 2000, pp. 11-34; Pérez Guzmán & Sarracino. 
La Guerra Chiquita, pp. 178-254. 
26 For instance, Captain Antonio Ferrer Robert of Santiago de Cuba’s 2nd Battalion’s 3rd Company 
kept a diary through most of the war in which not a single military action is reported beyond the 
kidnapping of the Corporal Evaristo Caballero y Silveira on the hacienda owned by Orestes 
Ylisastigui near Daiquirí beach, near Santiago de Cuba. See AHMS, Fons Josep Carbonell i Gener, 
“Companyia de Voluntaris de Santiago”. 
27 Cástulo Ferrer y Torralba (1833-1913), a native of Sitges (Catalonia), settled in Santiago de Cuba in 
1846, and returned to Spain in 1898. Due to his involvement with the Volunteers and loyalist politics 
in Cuba he was awarded military decorations several times by the Spanish Government. Jou i 
Andreu. Els sitgetans a Amèrica, pp. 290-291. The correspondence between Ferrer and Polavieja can 
be found at AGI, Archivo de Camilo García de Polavieja y del Castillo, Diversos, 9B, R. 1, D.57. Due 
to his services, Polavieja proposed Cástulo Ferrer to receive the Gran Cruz del Mérito Militar blanca 
and the Gran Cruz de Isabel la Católica to the Ministry of the Overseas on 18th August 1880, AHN, 
Ultramar, 4786, exp. 9. 
28 Throughout the war, more than 28,000 fresh troops arrived from metropolitan Spain. Navarro. 
Las guerras de España en Cuba, pp. 115-128. 
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in Oriente. For instance, on the 9th ca. 800 Volunteers from El Arpón defected to the rebels. 
Only four days later, 400 Volunteers from Mayarí followed the same path.29 
According to Francisco Pérez Guzmán and Rodolfo Sarracino, this desertion was 
caused by discontent towards the Spanish authorities rather than by sincere support for 
independence.30 This coincides with the appreciation of Polavieja, who had found that the 
Volunteers resented some of the privileges granted to the capitulated rebels after Zanjón, 
such as tax exemptions and land allotments.31 Thus, the attempt to appease the rebellion 
in Cuba by rewarding the former rebels and neglecting the loyalists backfired. In fact, this 
could be regarded as the logical reaction of men that had put their lives at stake for being 
loyal to Spain during the war in Oriente, Cuba’s rebel stronghold. In fact, the desertion 
was a clear signal that the policy of attracting the rebels on equal or even better terms than 
the Loyalists had failed. A possible way to readdress the loyalty of the Volunteers in the 
countryside would, therefore, be to engage them in the creation of agricultural-military 
colonies. 
 
1.2. The Volunteers and the Military-Agricultural Colonies 
The military colonies, which according to Consuelo Naranjo Orovio aimed to “turn rebel 
Cuba Spanish”, commenced with weak foundations.32 Despite Polavieja’s reluctance, the 
project went on and five colonies were created in Oriente during his term (1879-1881), 
added to one he had created as governor of Puerto Príncipe (1878-1879).33 Both the total 
numbers and the participation of the Volunteers were rather modest though. Six years 
after being created, the colonies only hosted 61 Volunteers plus their families, out of 364 
men with their families. Similarly, these Volunteers were mostly Cubans of African 
descent.34 In the colony of Jibacoa (near Manzanillo, Oriente) 37 out of the 144 settlers 
were Volunteers. At least 35 of them were Cubans, of whom 28 were black.35 The massive 
                                                 
29 El Arpón was a small village north of Santiago de Cuba, whereas Mayarí is located nearby the city 
of Holguín. Both towns belonged to the province of Santiago de Cuba. See Pérez Guzmán & 
Sarracino. La Guerra Chiquita, pp. 201-202; Navarro. Las guerras de España en Cuba, pp. 123-125. 
30 Pérez Guzmán & Sarracino. La Guerra Chiquita, pp. 203-204. 
31 This assessment can be found in the letters that Polavieja sent to the Overseas Minister Salvador 
Albacete (1879) during November and December 1879. See BNC, CM Guerra, No. 10. 
32 Naranjo Orovio. “Hispanización y defensa de la integridad nacional”, pp. 71-91.  
33 Balboa Navarro. “La inmigración como forma de presión política”, pp. 133-155. 
34 Jibacoa, Zarzal, El Congo, Calicito, Vega Botada, and Guantánamo. Out of the 364 settlers, 356 
were Cuban, and 239 Black. Balboa Navarro. “Tierras y brazos”, pp. 69-70. 
35 In the settlement, there were 144 Cubans, and 2 peninsulares. By race, 9 Whites, and 139 Blacks. 
Ibid., p. 69. 
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presence of African-descended peasants here not only indicates the main racial 
background of the rural population in eastern Cuba but also the racial diversity of the 
Volunteers in this part of the island.36 
Such slow progress was due to an inefficient bureaucracy, and informal land 
ownership in Oriente.37 The reglamento that established the organization of the colonies 
(1877) had two institutions involved in the process: the Inspección de Montes, and the 
Juntas de Socorro. The former was part of the national administration and had to 
demarcate the land allotments to be granted. The latter depended on city councils, 
organized land distribution, and in some cases, were controlled by Volunteers officers.38 
For instance, in Manzanillo (Oriente), the branch was presided over by Lieutenant Juan 
de Meza.39 However, by 1881, four years after the Royal Decree on the military colonies, 
the delimitation of land in Manzanillo had still not been completed.  
By the mid-1880s, Polavieja’s colonies were considered a failure. Despite the efforts 
of a special commission created in Madrid in 1881 to reactivate the colonization, its 
projects were never implemented due to weak confidence in the military settlements by 
the authorities on the ground.40 Gradually, the colonies began to fade away, and the 
landowners’ enterprise of importing a cheap workforce from metropolitan Spain began to 
take the lead.41 
Despite the relative failure of the agricultural colonies thus far, the Volunteers 
would play a central role in the attempt to revive these colonies envisioned by Captain 
General Manuel Salamanca y Negrete (1889-1890), a role that has not been noted by the 
                                                 
36 In 1860, Blacks (both free and enslaved) represented 85% of the rural population in eastern Cuba. 
See Sartorius. Ever Faithful, pp. 98-127. For the racial composition of Oriente’s population see Javier 
Laviña. “Santiago de Cuba, 1860: esclavitud, color y población”, Boletín de la Asociación de Geógrafos 
Españoles, 1992-1993, No. 15-16, pp. 17-32. 
37 This was a permanent complain by Polavieja. For instance, see García de Polavieja. Relación 
documentada, p. 17; ANRC, Gobierno General, leg. 46, exp. 1959, and leg. 48, exps. 2137 & 2138. 
38 Because city councils had generally been handed back to Cubans after 1878, Polavieja distrusted 
their alleged loyalty to the Spanish authorities. Gaceta de Madrid, No. 536, p. 622, 2nd December 
1877; García de Polavieja. Relación documentada, p. 50. 
39 ANRC, Gobierno General, leg. 39, exps. 1634, 1636 & leg. 46, exp. 1956. 
40 The members were: President, Lieutenant General and MP Manuel Fernández Cassola; Members 
of the Board: Senator León Crespo de la Serna, Field Marshall and MP Manuel Armiñán y Gutiérrez; 
ídem Antonio Dabán y Ramírez de Arellano, Colonel and MP Bernardo Portuondo y Barceló, MPs 
Julio Apezteguía, Rafael Ruiz Martínez, José Ramón Bethencourt, Francisco Cañamaque, José 
Ferreras, Field Marshall José Velasco y Postigo, Brigadiers Andrés López de Vega, and Rafael 
Hernández de Alba. Secretary: José Álvarez Pérez (administrative director of the Overseas 
Ministry), AGMM, Ultramar, caja 3078, “Establecimiento de Colonias Militares en Ultramar, 1883”. 
41 Naranjo Orovio. “Hispanización y defensa de la integridad nacional”, pp. 749-794; Balboa 
Navarro. “Colonización e inmigración”, pp. 452-470. 
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existing literature. Salamanca believed that better organization might make these colonies 
a success. He advocated less reliance on the regular army, due to the high costs, and more 
on the local elements of defence, most notably the Volunteers.42 He proposed a plan of 
colonization aimed at combining the immigration of peninsulares with the creation of 
loyalist communities.43 Firstly, Salamanca resorted to metropolitan migrants to settle the 
new colonies.44 Secondly, all the male settlers between the ages of 18 and 50, were to join 
the Volunteers.45 
The lingering problem of an inefficient and slow bureaucracy, nonetheless, 
impeded Salamanca’s colonies. Despite having created seven settlements hosting 887 
people in just over a year, the mismanagement of the authorities had them in a complete 
state of neglect.46 So much so, that most of Salamanca’s settlers ended up abandoning the 
colonies and finding jobs in Havana or as cheap labourers in the sugar mills.47 After almost 
twenty years of attempts, the military colonies had clearly failed. Although other Captains 
General like Polavieja (1890-1892), and Alejandro Rodríguez Arias (1892-1893) tried to 
retrieve the project, the military settlements had been a failure due to the authorities’ 
mismanagement. The Volunteers and their families, alongside the other settlers, were not 
provided with the seeds, farm implements, and proper housing promised by the 
authorities, causing many of them to abandon the colonies and settle in the cities, where 
there were more work opportunities.48 
 
2. The Volunteers and New Politics 
The creation of political parties in the Antilles—in 1869 in Puerto Rico, and 1878 in Cuba— 
meant the displacement of the Volunteers from the centre of politics. Whereas during 
wartime they had been at the nucleus of loyalist power in the Caribbean, during peacetime 
                                                 
42 AHN, Ultramar, 247, exp. 7. 
43 Balboa Navarro. “Asentar para dominar”, pp. 29-46. See also the report sent by M. Salamanca to 
the Overseas Ministry on 20th August 1889, AHN, Ultramar, Sección Fomento, leg. 247, No. 7. 
44 Despite Cuba becoming a less attractive destination due to an economic crisis and potential 
political instability, which were eroding the Spanish imperial projection, between 1886 and 1890, 
over 97,000 peninsulares still migrated to the island. See García Balañá, “’The Empire is no longer a 
social unit”, pp. 92-103. Besides the 97,000 migrants, more than 27,000 soldiers were stationed in 
Cuba, a part of whom tended to settle in the island after having finished their military service. 
Moreno Fraginals & Moreno Masó. Guerra, migración y muerte, p. 121. 
45 Balboa Navarro. “Asentar para dominar”, p. 33. 
46 Ibid., p. 44.  
47 AHN, Ultramar, leg 174, 13. 
48 García de Polavieja. Relación documentada, p. 324; AFAM, leg. 489, carpeta 8, Alejandro 
Rodríguez Arias a Antonio Maura, 20-06-1893. 
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they became just another, although still important, element. Besides, their close 
relationship with the most conservative sectors opposed to the reforms complicated their 
relationship with other actors in Antillean politics that represented wider echelons of the 
local society. 
Roldán de Montaud and Cubano Iguina have respectively studied the 
implementation in Cuba and Puerto Rico of the political system established in Spain since 
1875, known as the Restoration.49 Whereas in metropolitan Spain the two dominant parties 
were the Conservative and the Liberal, in the Antilles the political arena was disputed 
between the forces that demanded wider reforms and autonomy and those who opted for 
limited political and social reforms, stressing loyalty to Spain.50 Both forces shared a 
consensus on the need for basic economic reforms and the continuity of Spanish 
sovereignty. Their main difference laid in which element they accentuated. The forces that 
demanded outright independence, which were virtually non-existent in Puerto Rico but 
considerable in Cuba, operated outside the system—most notably from exile in the United 
States—as they were not legally allowed in Spain and the Antilles.51 
The first political stance was represented by the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party 
(1870), and the Autonomist Liberal Party (1878) in Cuba.52 They mostly attracted Creole 
professional liberals and some landowners.53 Antillean Conservatism was represented by 
                                                 
49 Alonso Romero. Cuba en la España liberal, pp. 46-205; Roldán de Montaud. La Restauración en 
Cuba; also see Pérez Cisneros. El reformismo español en Cuba, pp. 46-151; For Puerto Rico, see 
Cubano Iguina. “Puerto Rico”, pp. 541-558; González Vales, “The Challenge to Colonialism”, pp. 108-
125; Scarano. Puerto Rico. Cinco siglos de Historia, pp. 513-546; Luis Mattei Filardi. En las tinieblas 
del colonialismo. “Cien metros” de historia puertorriqueña. San Juan: Ediciones Nóema, 2015 (first 
published in 2014), pp. 79-96. 
50 Alonso Romero. Cuba en la España liberal, pp. 46-51; Fernando Bayón Toro, Elecciones y partidos 
políticos de Puerto Rico (1809-1976), Madrid, Instituto de Cultura Hispánica de Madrid, 1977; 
Bothwell. Orígenes y desarrollo, pp. 1-49; José A. Piqueras Arenas. Sociedad civil y poder en Cuba. 
Colonia y poscolonia. Madrid: Siglo XXI, pp. 157-164; Roldán de Montaud. La Restauración en Cuba, 
pp. 121-155. 
51 The referential study on Cuban nationalism in the US is still Gerald Poyo. With All, and for the 
Good of All: The Emergence of Popular Nationalism in the Cuban Communities of the United States, 
1848-1898. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1989. Also see Paul Estrade. “El papel de la 
emigración patriótica en las Guerras de Independencia de Cuba (1868-1898). Tebeto: Anuario del 
Archivo Histórico Insular de Fuerteventura, No. 11, 1998, pp. 83-102.  
52 The Autonomist Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Autonomista) was first created in 1878 as the 
Liberal Party (Partido Liberal) but adopted its new name in 1881 when it openly embraced the 
autonomist ideal. The Puerto Rico Autonomist Party (Partido Autonomista Puertorriqueño) was 
created in 1870 as the Reformist Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Reformista) but was renamed in 1887 
when it officially adopted autonomy as its main political goal. 
53 On the Cuban Liberal Party (later ‘Autonomist Liberal Party’) see Marta Bizcarrondo & Antonio 
Elorza. Cuba/España. El dilema autonomista, 1878-1898. Madrid: Editorial Colibrí, 2001, pp. 121-198; 
Marta Bizcarrondo. “El autonomismo cubano. Las ideas y los hechos (1878-1898)”. Historia 
Contemporánea, 1999, No. 19, pp. 69-94; Luis Miguel García Mora. “La fuerza de la palabra. El 
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the Unconditional Spanish Party (1870) in Puerto Rico and the Constitutional Union (1878) 
in Cuba. Both were fundamentally supported by the well-to-do businessmen (tobacco 
producers, sugar barons, landowners, merchants), administration officials, and army 
officers. Although both had Creole clientele embedded in these sectors, most of the 
members herein were peninsulares, according to historiography.54 
The Constitutional Union and the Unconditional Spanish Party, whose followers 
were known as incondicionales, grew out of the same social sectors as had the Volunteers 
decades earlier.55 Often, their leaders were or had been Volunteer officers.56 José Eugenio 
Moré, leader of the Cuban Constitutional Union (1878-1890), was also Havana’s 1st 
Volunteer Battalion’s colonel, having joined the militia in 1855.57 In Puerto Rico, José 
Ramón Fernández, marquis of La Esperanza, leader of the incondicionales (1871-1880), had 
created the local Volunteers in 1864. 
                                                 
autonomismo en Cuba en el último tercio del siglo XIX”. Revista de Indias, 2001, vol. LXI, No. 223, 
pp. 715-748. For the Puerto Rican Reformist Liberal Party (later ‘Puerto Rican Autonomist Party) 
see Astrid Cubano Iguina. “El autonomismo en Puerto Rico, 1887-1898: notas para la definición de 
un modelo de política radical”, in Consuelo Naranjo Orovio, Miguel A. Puig-Samper & Luis Miguel 
García Mora (eds.). La nación soñada, Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas ante el 98: actas del Congreso 
Internacional celebrado en Aranjuez del 2 al 28 de abril de 1995. Madrid: Ediciones Doce Calles, 1996, 
pp. 405-416; “Política radical y autonomismo en Puerto Rico: conflictos de intereses en la formación 
del Partido Autonomista Portorriqueño (1887)”. Anuario de estudios americanos, 1994, vol. 51, No. 
2, pp. 155-173.  
54 On the Cuban Constitutional Union, see Inés Roldán de Montaud. La Unión Constitucional y la 
política colonial de España en Cuba (1868-1898). Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1991, 
PhD Thesis 91/296; Portela Miguélez. Redes de poder en Cuba. On the Puerto Rican Conservative 
Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Conservador) created in 1870 and renamed ‘Unconditional Spanish 
Party’ (Partido Incondicional Español) in 1880 there is no recent bibliography. However, some 
information can be consulted in Cubano Iguina, Puerto Rico, pp. 541-558; Bothwell. Orígenes y 
desarrollo, pp. 1-49; Bayón Toro. Elecciones y partidos políticos de Puerto Rico, pp. 190-212; José 
Julián Acosta. Los partidos políticos. Artículos publicados en “El Progreso”. San Juan: Imprenta y 
Librería de Sancérrit, 1875; Francisco Mariano Quiñones. Historia de los partidos reformista y 
conservador de Puerto-Rico. Mayagüez: Tipografía Comercial, 1889, pp. 22-23. 
55 There were, however, some identified exceptions. For instance, José Suárez García (1849-1888) 
who had migrated to Cuba from Asturias, was a captain of Volunteers in the town of Güines 
(Havana) during the Ten Years’ War. He created the autonomist committee in Güines and became 
its secretary. He also contributed to establishing the autonomist newspaper La Unión. His funeral 
was a demonstration of popular mourning, being attended by both his autonomist and Volunteer 
colleagues. Raimundo Cabrera. Cuba and the Cubans. Philadelphia: The Levytype Company, 1896, 
p. 366.   
56 The leaders of the Constitutional Union were the Colombian-born José Eugenio Moré (1878-
1890), the peninsular Vicente Galarza (1890-1892), and the Cuban-born Julio de Apezteguía (1892-
1898). Portela Miguélez. Redes de poder en Cuba. The Puerto Rican José Ramón Fernández was the 
leader of the Unconditional Spanish Party (1871-1880), succeeded by the Basque Pablo Ubarri (1880-
1894), after whom the party remained with no clear leader. Bothwell. Orígenes y desarrollo, pp. 4-
40. 
57 Villa. Álbum biográfico, pp. 14-18. 
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In the Antilles, much more markedly than in metropolitan Spain, politics remained 
a patrician activity.58 The electoral census was even more restricted than in the peninsula, 
and most of the population, including the rank-and-file Volunteers, was excluded from 
participating in politics.59 According to the electoral law of 1878, the electoral census was 
based on tax contributions. In the Antilles, it especially considered urban taxes over rural 
contributions. This benefited the mostly urban community of peninsulares, who tended to 
vote for conservatives.60 For instance, in the city of Güines (Havana province), there were 
500 peninsulares among a population of 13,000, yet they represented 90% of the electoral 
census.61 The Volunteers took part in politics as an element of Antillean conservatism to 
be used against autonomists. According to María José Portela Miguélez, alongside political 
parties, they became one more element of power for the integristas, alongside the Casinos 
Españoles, publications such as Diario de la Marina in Cuba, or the Boletín Mercantil de 
Puerto-Rico. The identification of the Volunteers with the Antillean conservatives 
complicated their future with regards to politics both at the local and national level, 
especially because of their involvement repressing the autonomist movement. The 
Volunteers were used by the Constitutional Union in Cienfuegos (Cuba) to violently 
disband an autonomist meeting in October 1886.62 In Puerto Rico, the incondicionales 
actively supported the Compontes, a repressive wave that Captain General Romualdo 
Palacios (1887) launched against the autonomists in the summer of 1887.63 Both in Cuba 
                                                 
58 The patrician nature of Spanish politics, common in 19th century Europe, was thoroughly studied 
by José Varela Ortega. Los amigos políticos: partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración 
(1875-1900). Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001 (first published by Alianza Editorial, 1977). Also see Neira. 
“El régimen político de la Restauración”, pp. 35-73.  
59 For instance, in 1889, the electoral census in metropolitan Spain included 20.92% of males over 
25 (the only group eligible to vote), in Cuba 3.82%, and in Puerto Rico 0.52%, see S. Andrés. La 
reforma electoral en nuestras Antillas. Madrid: Imprenta de la “Revista de España”, 1889, p. 23. 
60 The Royal Decree of 9th June 1878 established that Cuba and Puerto Rico should adopt the 
electoral law of 20th July 1877, with the difference that the tax contribution which enabled the vote 
to males over 25 years old, was 125 pesetas in the Antilles, instead of 25 as in metropolitan Spain. 
This resulted in the Constitutional Union and the Unconditional Spanish Party winning all the 
elections in Cuba and Puerto Rico until 1898, when male universal suffrage was established. See 
Inés Roldán de Montaud. “Política y elecciones en Cuba durante la Restauración”. Revista de 
Estudios Políticos, 1999, No. 104, pp. 245-287. 
61 Cabrera. Cuba and the Cubans, p. 192.  
62 David Sartorius. Ever Faithful, pp. 157-186. 
63 Bizcarrondo & Elorza. Cuba/España, pp. 154-197; Portela Miguélez. Redes de poder en Cuba, pp. 
169-197; Sartorius. Ever Faithful, pp. 177-186. Lieutenant General Romualdo Palacios y González 
(1827-1908) was appointed general governor and captain general of Puerto Rico on 17th January 1887. 
He took part in the African War (1859-1860) and was appointed Segundo Cabo (vice-captain 
general) of Cuba by the Spanish Republic on 4th September 1873. Only a month later was appointed 
captain general of Valencia. He was awarded the Gran Cruz de San Fernando (1883)—the highest 
Spanish military decoration—and the Gran Cruz de Carlos III (1899). In 1899, being director of the 
Civil Guard, he retired from active service. Politically, he was considered a radical democrat for his 
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and Puerto Rico, the Volunteers continue to be the armed wing of integrismo even after 
the emergence of party politics.  
 
2.1. Repressing the Autonomists: the Puerto Rican “compontes” 
The compontes were a series of arrests and tortures carried out against Puerto Rican 
autonomists between August and September 1887. Captain General Romualdo Palacios 
ordered this repression and relied on the Volunteers and the Civil Guard to conduct it 
physically.64 According to Antonio S. Pedreira, the compontes aimed to crush the Puerto 
Rican reformists who for the first time had openly embraced the autonomist ideal in the 
Ponce assembly of May 1887.65 The “compontes” were certainly a demonstration by the 
Captaincy General and the integristas that they would not tolerate the emergence of a 
political movement that questioned the status quo.  
The affair started on 21st August 1887, when the Puerto Rican Policarpo Echevarría, 
incondicional mayor of Juana Díaz and Volunteer captain, published an article in Boletín 
Mercantil claiming he had discovered several anti-Spanish organizations throughout the 
island that planned to kill all the peninsulares in Puerto Rico.66 He wanted all the 
                                                 
early involvement as a conspirator in the Progressive Party against Queen Elizabeth II (1843-1868), 
and his active participation in La Gloriosa of September 1868. See Gaceta de Madrid, No. 247, 04-
09-1873, p. 1597; No. 327, 23-11-1883, p. 571; No. 17, 17-01-1887, p. 157; No. 40, 09-02-1899, p. 506; Juan 
Mañé Flaquer. La revolución de 1868 juzgada por sus autores. Barcelona: Imprenta de Jaime Jepús, 
Editor, 1876, p. 143; Antonio Pirala. Historia contemporánea. Anales desde 1843 hasta la conclusión 
de la última guerra civil, vol. III. Madrid: Imprenta y Fundición de Manuel Tello, 1876, p. 90. 
64 AHN, Ultramar, 5143, exps. 15-19. 
65 The Reformist Liberal Party (1870) decided to abandon reformism and adopt autonomism in the 
Ponce assembly of 7th-9th May 1887. See Lidio Cruz Monclova. Historia del año de 1887. Río Piedras: 
Ed. Universitaria, 1958, pp. 157-197; Astrid Cubano Iguina. “Política radical y autonomismo en 
Puerto Rico: conflictos de interés en la formación del Partido Autonomista Portorriqueño (1887)”. 
Anuario de estudios americanos, 1994, vol. 51, No. 2, pp. 155-173; Antonio S. Pedreira. El año terrible 
del 87. Sus antecedentes y sus consecuencias. San Juan: Biblioteca de Escritores Puertorriqueños, 
1937, pp. 26-40. 
66 The Boletín Mercantil published the first article on 21st August 1887, claiming that a secret 
organization called Los Mojados, supported by the autonomists, was plotting to kill all the 
peninsulares in the town of Juana Díaz. See Boletín Mercantil, 21-08-1887; Pedreira. El año terrible 
del 87, p. 43. Among the integrista press that made a similar accusation were La Bandera Española, 
and La Integridad Nacional, see Gómez & Sendras y Burín. La isla de Puerto-Rico, p. 168. Policarpo 
Echevarría joined the Spanish administration in Puerto Rico in 1850, becoming Juana Díaz’s mayor 
in 1868. He was considered one of the most intransigent members of the Unconditional Spanish 
Party, and a close friend to its leader, Pablo Ubarri. In 1888, he was captain of the 10th Volunteer 
Battalion’s 2nd Company, stationed in Juana Díaz. He created the company back on 28th February 
1872. AHN, Ultramar, 5117, exp. 30; Rosado y Brincau. Bosquejo Histórico, p. 42; Ejército de Puerto-
Rico. Estado militar de todas las armas e institutos y Escalafón General de todos los Jefes y Oficiales 
de Infantería. Puerto-Rico: Imprenta de la Capitanía General, 1888, p. 71. 
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peninsulares to rally with the Unconditional Party, thus alienating from autonomism a 
small but powerful sector of Puerto Rico’s society. Though the real existence of these 
organizations was doubtful at the very least, the tension between autonomistas and 
integristas was palpable, precisely for the integrista attempt to crush the autonomist 
movement. 
It seems, indeed, that there was growing yet still minor support for autonomism 
among peninsulares. This was precisely what Echevarría wanted to stop with his article. 
For instance, a former Volunteer, the Asturian journalist Francisco Cepeda, director of 
Revista de Puerto Rico, an autonomist journal, had called the Volunteers “social scum” in 
November 1886, shortly after the attendants at a Volunteer’s funeral were stoned in the 
city of Ponce by a group allegedly close to the autonomists.67 There were certainly Puerto 
Ricans among the Volunteers, but they were often associated with peninsulares because of 
the prominent role played by this group in the militia. Rather than a conflict between 
peninsulares and criollos, the power conflict in 1880s’ Puerto Rico was between integristas 
and autonomistas. 
Following Echevarría’s article, and a report by the Civil Guard captain of Juana 
Díaz, which theoretically confirmed the existence of a conspiracy to kill all peninsulares, 
Captain General Palacios issued a communication on 5th September 1888 warning that he 
would not tolerate the “political ideas that promote these criminal acts”. He meant 
autonomism. Palacios used the Civil Guard and the Volunteers to detain hundreds of 
autonomists, torture them, and block any communication between the island and the 
Peninsula.68 What followed was a wave of support by the incondicionales from all over 
                                                 
67 Francisco Cepeda, a native of Asturias, was a republican journalist who had directed several 
publications in the Peninsula, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. In 1872, he was Volunteer of Sagua La 
Grande’s 1st Battalion, in Cuba, and owner of the newspaper El Sagua. Later, he defended autonomy 
for the island as director of La Revista Económica de las Antillas (1877-1882), until he was deported 
by the authorities in June 1882. He propagated the same ideas during his Madrid period in La Revista 
de las Antillas (1882-1886), until he settled in Puerto Rico in 1886, where he created the Revista de 
Puerto Rico, and joined the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party from its very creation in May 1886. 
During the compontes, Cepeda was imprisoned in Ponce and tortured, and forced to retract the 
articles in which he denounced the Civil Guard for torturing the autonomists. Condemned to prison 
for ‘crimes against the Fatherland’, he was finally acquitted by Puerto Rico’s Court on 2nd June 1888. 
Gómez & Sendras y Burín. La isla de Puerto-Rico, pp. 142-143; Ribó. Historia de los Voluntarios 
cubanos, vol. I, p. 286; Quiñones. Apuntes para la historia de Puerto Rico. Mayagüez: Tipografía 
Comercial Aduana, 1888, pp. 52-53; Revista de Puerto Rico, 6-11-1886; Rosado y Brincau. Bosquejo 
Histórico, pp. 122-129. 
68 On 30th August 1887, a Civil Guard lieutenant colonel sent a report to Captain General Palacios 
assuring that he had arrested in Juana Díaz Cristiano Aponte, Cleto Mangual and fifty other Puerto 
Ricans belonging to Los Secos, supposedly another anti-Spanish society which was preparing the 
massacre of all the local peninsulares and the proclamation of the Republic of Puerto Rico. At first, 
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Puerto Rico. It is difficult to know whether the incondicionales truly believed there was a 
conspiracy, but the fact is the compontes seemed to have been popular among the 
integristas. Without exception, all the Volunteer units and local committees of the 
Unconditional Party sent telegrams to Palacios supporting his actions.69 The messages 
praising Palacios for the compontes shows that integristas were well established all over 
the island and that the compontes enjoyed some degree of popular support. The 
incondicionales might have enjoyed more popular support than has been often admitted 
by historiography, which has tended to see them as a phenomenon centred in San Juan 
and closely controlled by captains general, as pointed out by Cubano Iguina.70 
There was, of course, also a powerful movement against the compontes. The 
autonomists felt outraged and waged a campaign against the repression. The Revista de 
Puerto Rico was the only publication that denounced the compontes within the island, 
causing the detention of Francisco Cepeda. Denouncing the repression outside Puerto 
Rico was more difficult, as Palacios had cut all communications with the Peninsula, but 
thanks to a young autonomist who managed to escape to Spain and spread the word, the 
compontes were first denounced in the Spanish Congress on 12th October 1887 by the 
Puerto Rican Julio Vizcarrondo, causing Romualdo Palacios’ removal in early January 
1888.71 This was a severe blow for the integristas. Their bid for crushing autonomism with 
brutal repression had failed, as the Spanish Government was not willing to tolerate such 
action. Madrid feared that autonomists might want to retaliate, reinforcing the discontent 
                                                 
Judge José García de Lara, from the Puerto Rican Audience, acquitted all the detainees, but he was 
quickly replaced by García de Paredes, a well-known local integrista that accused them of plotting 
against Spain. Cruz Monclova. Historia del año de 1887, pp. 199-345; Pedreira. El año terrible del 87, 
pp. 44-45; Francisco Mariano Quiñones. Apuntes para la historia de Puerto Rico, pp. 65-80; Revista 
de Puerto Rico, 21st and 22nd June 1887. 
69 AGPR, Asuntos Políticos y Civiles, “Felicitaciones de varios pueblos de los comités del Partido 
Incondicionalmente Español por los sucesos de Juana Díaz y Ponce, 1887”; Manifestaciones del 
elemento español de Puerto-Rico con motivo de los sucesos de Juana Díaz. Puerto Rico: 1887. 
70 Bothwell. Orígenes y desarrollo, pp. 19-20; Cubano Iguina. “Puerto Rico”, pp. 541-558; Bolívar 
Pagán. Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños, 1898-1956, vol. I. San Juan: Librería 
Campos, 1959, pp. 8-15. 
71 Julio Vizcarrondo Coronado (1829-1889) was a Puerto Rican abolitionist and politician who had 
been instrumental in the creation of the Spanish Abolitionist Society in 1864. A member of the 
Puerto Rican Reformist Liberal Party (later Autonomist), on the elections of 4th April 1886 he was 
elected representative for the city of Ponce in the Congress in Madrid in 1886-1889. See Schmidt-
Nowara. Empire, and Antislavery, pp.100-125; ACD, Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes, Serie 
Documentación Electoral, 103, No. 6. The young autonomist who told Vizcarrondo about the 
compontes was Juan Bautista Arrillaga Roqué, who in 1910 wrote his memoirs: Memorias de antaño. 
Ponce: Tip. Baldorioty, 1910, pp. 16-17 & 154-155. 
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towards Spain that might end up in their resorting to violence as a means to achieve their 
objectives. 
These fears were well-grounded. The detainees were duly freed by December 1887, 
but the compontes had exacerbated the tension between incondicionales and 
autonomistas. Autonomist groups retaliated during the Spring of 1888 against the Mayor 
Policarpo Echevarría and several other incondicionales involved in the repression, by 
burning his home and attacking his properties.72 The autonomists also began a boycott 
campaign against the integrista-owned commercial houses, which happened to belong 
mostly to peninsulares, which lasted intermittently until the US invasion of July 1898.73  
Far from crushing the autonomist movement, the compontes widened the gap 
between incondicionales and autonomistas that had existed since the beginning of an 
articulated political life in Puerto Rico in 1869 when the island was assimilated to the 
Spanish political system and made difficult any potential political transaction. The 
Volunteers had played a central role in this affair. They collaborated with the authorities 
in the repression and showed their explicit support for such a measure. During peacetime, 
violence backfired. Rather than reinforcing Spanish rule and the integristas’ privileged 
position, the compontes strengthened the autonomist movement and undermined the 
economic position of the staunchest supporters of Spain’s presence in Puerto Rico.  
 
2.2. The Volunteers and the Right to Vote 
From their inception, the Volunteers had become a powerful symbol with contradictory 
political readings. For the forces supporting the status quo (Spanish Government, 
integrista elite), they were the “bedrock of Spanish nationality” in the Antilles, despite the 
excesses that they committed.74 The forces that aimed to change the system from within 
(reformists, autonomists), considered the Volunteers the embodiment of Spanish rule’s 
                                                 
72 Puerto-Rico por dentro. Cartas abiertas, por XXX. Julio y agosto de 1888, con la sentencia dictada 
por la Audiencia de Puerto-Rico en 2 de junio de 1888. Madrid: Imprenta de José Gil y Navarro, 1888, 
p. 24; Cruz Monclova. Historia de Puerto Rico, t. III, vol. I, pp. 204-205 & 273. 
73 Fernando Picó. 1898. La guerra después de la guerra. San Juan: Ediciones Huracán, 2013 (first 
published in 1987), pp. 36-39.  
74 On 26th February 1869, the Overseas Minister Adelardo López de Ayala (1868-1869) replied to 
Cuba’s Captain General Domingo Dulce that despite the Volunteers’ violent excesses, committed 
against the reformistas in Havana, they were a necessary force to sustain Spanish rule in Cuba. See 
RAH, CCR, 9/7536, doc. 88 & 100. 
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dark side: repression and abuse. Puerto Rican Reformist representatives in the Congress 
formally requested their disarmament in 1871.75 
The Restoration regime assimilated the Antilles into the metropolitan political 
system after 1878. Whilst still granting more restricted rights to their inhabitants, this 
reinforced the ambivalence of the Volunteers’ position. A good example included the 
debates on the electoral reform project for the Antilles presented in 1889 by the Overseas 
Minister Manuel Becerra (1888-1890), aimed at increasing the Antillean electoral census, 
which gave the right to vote to the Volunteers in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The project was 
first presented before the Congress of Deputies on 15th February 1889, and the clause 
including the Volunteers’ vote on 15th June 1889. However, it was not discussed until 2nd 
April 1890. Although it was passed by the Congress, it was rejected by the Senate after the 
fall of the Liberal cabinet to which Becerra belonged in July 1890.76 
The proposals were particularly offensive for the Cuban and Puerto Rican 
autonomists. The Volunteers, as the armed wing of integrismo, represented the political 
movement that had long opposed major reforms in the Antilles, including male universal 
suffrage, which had been a historic complaint of the autonomists. Becerra’s project meant 
nothing less than giving the Volunteers the right they had long stood against. The project 
also came at a time when the Congress was discussing the universal male suffrage law for 
the Peninsula, which was finally passed on 26th June 1890.77 This was one of the main 
achievements of the long Liberal Cabinet presided by Práxedes Mateo Sagasta (1885-
1890).78 However, it was not extended to the Antilles until 1898, as the authorities feared 
                                                 
75 In December 1871, the Puerto Rican reformist representatives in the Congress of Deputies 
presented a project asking for the disarmament of the Volunteers in Puerto Rico. In the words of 
Julio E. Blanco, leader of the proposal, the Volunteers were an ‘unnecessary force’ and were made 
up of ‘social scum’, ACD, Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes, 22-01-1872, p. 34. For the Cuban reformists’ 
similar petitions during the Ten Years’ War see García Rodríguez. Con un ojo en Yara y otro en 
Madrid, pp. 336-342.  
76 Manuel Becerra y Bermúdez (1820-1896) was a liberal politician that had actively participated in 
the revolutionary movements of 1854-1856 and 1868-1874. After the return of the Bourbons in 
December 1874, he joined the Liberal Party lead by Práxedes Mateo Sagasta. He was Minister of the 
Overseas (1869-1870, 1888-1890, and 1894) and Public Works departments (1872-1873). Luis Estévez 
y Romero. Desde el Zanjón hasta Baire. Datos para la historia política de Cuba. Havana: “La 
Propaganda Literaria”, 1899, pp. 651-655; Roldán de Montaud. “Política y elecciones en Cuba”, pp. 
245-287. 
77 The complete legislative material on the 26th June 1890’s electoral reform in Domingo Vivanco y 
Argüelles. La reforma electoral. Ley electoral para diputados á Cortes en la península de 26 de junio 
de 1890 aplicable á las elecciones de concejales y de diputados provinciales, precedida de un Índice de 
sus títulos y capítulos y seguida de un Repertorio alfabético con notas y observaciones. Madrid: 
Imprenta de los Hijos de J. A. García, 1890.  
78 Práxedes Mateo Sagasta y Escolar (1825-1903) was a leading character of Spanish modern history. 
Alongside Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, Sagasta was the main political figure of the Restoration. 
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that it would translate into landslide victories for the autonomists.79 Becerra’s project did 
not tend towards universal male suffrage, but rather to the increase of the electoral census 
in favour of the Antillean conservative parties. Reflecting a few years later, the Cuban 
author Luis de Estévez y Romero considered that Manuel Becerra had well deserved to be 
considered a ‘recalcitrant enemy of the Cubans for his Volunteers’ vote project.’80 
To secure the integrista vote, Becerra’s project gave the right to vote to practically 
all civil servants, retired Army and Navy officers, mercantile society members (whom as 
seen earlier were the bedrock of the urban Volunteers), and most controversially, it 
wanted to give the right to vote to the Volunteers too, although not on equal terms. In 
Puerto Rico, all the Volunteers with more than six years of service would become voters 
regardless of rank. In Cuba, only officers with the same length of service, or decorated 
rank-and-file members, would be eligible to vote.81 
                                                 
He presided over the Spanish Government on seven occasions between 1871 and 1902. Initially 
associated with radical Liberalism during the Sexenio Revolucionario (1868-1874), he accepted the 
monarchic restoration of Alphonse XII in 1874, and created the Liberal Party in 1880, which 
alternated power with the Conservatives until the coup of Miguel Primo de Rivera in 1923. A 
relatively recent biography in José Luis Ollero Vallés. Sagasta. De conspirador a gobernante. Madrid: 
Marcial Pons, 2006. 
79 This was the reason the project presented by Becerra’s predecessor, Víctor Balaguer (1886-1888) 
was rejected. It would have given the right to vote to wider layers of Antillean society deemed pro-
autonomist. The project was presented on 15th June 1887 to the Congress but was never discussed 
due to the conservatives’ opposition. The proportion between voters and adult male population 
was: in metropolitan Spain 1/21, in Cuba 1/51, and in Puerto Rico 1/250. Roldán de Montaud. La 
Restauración en Cuba, pp. 370-373; Víctor Balaguer. Memoria que precede á los dos volúmenes de 
documentos que publica el Excmo. Sr. D. Víctor Balaguer acerca de su gestión en el Ministerio de 
Ultramar durante el desempeño de su cargo como ministro del ramo desde 11 de octubre de 1886 hasta 
14 de junio de 1888. Madrid: Imprenta y Fundición de Manuel Tello, 1888, pp. 33-34; S. Andrés. La 
reforma electoral, p. 11. Víctor Balaguer y Cirera (1824-1901) was a Catalan historian, writer, and 
politician who served as overseas minister (1871, and 1886-1888), Public Works (1872), always in 
Liberal cabinets. He was a member of the Congress representing the Catalan district of Vilanova i 
La Geltrú (1869-1884), and Havana (1884-1886). ACD, Serie Documental Electoral, 60, No. 8. 
80 Luis Estévez y Romero (1849-1909) was a Cuban lawyer, and sugar producer, husband to the 
philanthropist Marta Abreu (1846-1909), daughter to the Volunteer Major Pedro Nolasco Abreu 
who was seen in the first chapter. After the end of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba, Luis Estévez was 
appointed secretary of justice by the US military government (January-June 1900), presided over 
the conservative Cuban National Party and became vice-president of the first government of the 
Republic of Cuba (1902-1905). After leaving the cabinet, he retired to Paris where he committed 
suicide shortly after the death of his wife. Estévez y Romero. Desde el Zanjón hasta Baire, p. 535. For 
a biography, see M. García Carófalo y Mesa. Marta Abreu Arencibia y el Dr. Luis Estévez y Romero. 
Estudio biográfico. Havana: Imprenta y Librería “La Moderna Poesía”, 1925.  
81 Becerra’s proposal planned to grant the right to vote to all the civil servants with a salary over 100 
pesos, tax payers who contributed with a minimum of 8 pesos (tax on rural property) or 12 (for 
urban property), all the army and navy officers both active and retired, all the mercantile 
companies’ members, and all the Volunteers. ACD, Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes, Appendix No. 
6, 15-06-1889; Roldán de Montaud. La Restauración en Cuba, pp. 414-419; Estévez y Romero. Desde 
el Zanjón hasta Baire, pp. 362-368.  
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This discrimination even within the Volunteers was explained by the strong 
perceived loyalism and whiteness of the 5,000 Puerto Rican Volunteers in comparison to 
their 66,000 Cuban colleagues, who had social, racial, and class divisions within them as 
seen in the previous chapter.82 This was pointed out by the opponents of the project, such 
as the autonomist deputies for Puerto Rico Rafael María de Labra, and José Celis Aguilera. 
They denounced it as a blatant attempt at discriminating against the autonomists, for 
whereas ‘all of the Puerto Rican Volunteers are conservatives, in Cuba, there are notable 
pockets of liberal Volunteers in Las Villas and Oriente’.83 In fact, since the creation of the 
Unconditional Party in 1870, it was an unwritten rule that only the incondicionales could 
join the Volunteers in Puerto Rico.84 Overall, Labra and the other autonomist deputies 
rejected the project for the huge impact it would have had on the Puerto Rican electoral 
census. Labra reckoned that its approval would give the right to vote to 5,000 Volunteers 
over a census of 24,000. In Cuba, the impact would have been ever greater, for the 
Volunteers with the right to vote might have gone up to 40,000 for a census of 98,500 
voters in the whole island.85 
Though it is impossible to establish the actual potential support the autonomists 
enjoyed among the Volunteers, due to the small number noted in the electoral census in 
the Antilles (3.82% of the population in Cuba, and 0.52% in Puerto Rico), the same 
argument was used by the advocates of the project.86 General Luis Manuel de Pando, a 
Constitutional Union deputy for Santiago de Cuba, considered that the Volunteers had 
rendered great services to Spain. He observed that the very existence of these liberal 
Volunteers was proof that the project was not partisan.87 Pando, however, omitted the fact 
                                                 
82 AGMM, Documentación de Puerto Rico, sig. 5195.1; Gallego y García. Cuba por fuera, p. 229. 
83 Rafael María de Labra y Cadrana (1840-1918) was a Cuban-born autonomist politician who 
extensively wrote on Spanish colonial affairs. He entered the Congress of Deputies in 1871, where 
he represented Puerto Rican and Cuban constituencies between 1872 and 1899. In the legislature 
1886-1890 he represented Sabana Grande (Puerto Rico). ACD, Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes, No. 
140, 17th April 1890, p. 4312. See Catherine Davies & Sarah Sánchez. “Rafael María de Labra and La 
Revista Hispano-Americana 1864-1867: Revolutionary Liberalism and Colonial Reform”. Bulletin of 
Spanish Studies: Hispanic Studies and Researches on Spain, Portugal and Latin America, 2010, No. 
87 (7), pp. 915-938. José de Celis Aguilera (1826-1898) was a Puerto Rican politician who had 
participated in the Lares uprising in September 1868. Later, he rejected independentism and 
defended a total political assimilation with metropolitan Spain as leader of the Puerto Rican Liberal 
Reformist Party (1883-1887). He represented Puerto Rico twice in the Congress: San Juan district 
(1873-1874) and Vega Baja (1887-1890). ACD, Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes, 21-04-1890, pp. 4434-
4439; ACD, Serie Documentación Electoral: 103, No. 6. 
84 Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la Guerra, p. 450. 
85 ACD, Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes, 22-04-1890, p. 4493. 
86 Andrés. La reforma electoral, p. 23. 
87 Luis Manuel de Pando y Sánchez (1844-1927) was a soldier that took part in the Ten Years’ War, 
and the Cuban War (1895-1898). He was appointed Governor of Pinar del Río (1877-1878), and 
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that these rank-and-file liberal Volunteers would only be granted the right to vote in cases 
where they had been awarded military decorations. 
After two months of debate, the project was passed by the Congress of Deputies in 
Madrid on 5th May 1890 but was rejected in the Senate by early July as the Liberal cabinet 
of President Sagasta fell due to the controversial involvement of the president’s wife in the 
construction of a railway in Cuba.88 The new Conservative cabinet (1890-1892), led by 
Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, was not willing to push forward a Liberal minister’s project 
and dismissed it. The Volunteer reaction to the project’s failure was of complete calmness, 
even though some of their officers claimed to consider their right to vote to be 
unnegotiable.89  
In the Antilles, the Volunteers made no effort to stand for their right to vote. In 
any case, it remained as a lingering issue in Spanish politics, ready to be used by 
Conservatives and Liberals rather than by the Volunteers themselves. It would be Antonio 
Maura, the new overseas minister (1892-1894) under the Liberal cabinet headed by Sagasta 
(1892-1895), who would definitely bury the Volunteers’ vote project.90 Maura was a 
politician committed to implementing a wide set of reforms in the colonies, aimed at 
giving more political rights to their inhabitants but keeping them under Spanish 
sovereignty.91 
                                                 
Santiago de Cuba (1881-1885). During the legislature 1886-1890 he was representing Santiago de 
Cuba.  ACD, Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes, 18-04-1890, p. 4362. 
88 Fernández Almagro. Historia de la España contemporánea, vol. II, pp. 123-127; Javier Rubio. 
“Cánovas ante el gran reto antillano”, in Emilio de Diego García et al. Cánovas y la vertebración de 
España. Madrid: Fundación Cánovas del Castillo, 1999, pp. 199-232. 
89 For instance, on 29th May 1890 El Correo Militar published an article by the Volunteer Colonel 
Eugenio Vandama y Calderón, who considered that the right to vote was a well-deserved reward 
for the many ‘generous and continuous services rendered by the Volunteers to the motherland’. El 
Correo Militar, 29-05-1890, p. 1. 
90 Antonio Maura was a major political figure in Spain’s modern history. A member of the Liberal 
(1881-1902) and the Conservative (1902-1925) parties, he presided over the Spanish Government for 
five terms between 1903 and 1922. Apart from Overseas (1892-1894), he also took charge of Justice 
(1894-1895) and Interior Departments (1902-1903). See Antonio Pérez Delgado. Maura. Madrid: 
Ediciones Tebas, 1974; Francisco J. Romero Salvadó. “Antonio Maura: From Messiah to Fireman”, 
in Alejandro Quiroga & Miguel Ángel del Arco (eds.). Right-Wing Spain in the Civil War Era: Soldiers 
of God and Apostles of the Fatherland, 1914-1945. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012, pp. 1-26. 
91 These reforms have attracted considerable attention from historians, often being considered as 
Spain’s last chance to prevent a new war for independence in Cuba, and henceforth the 
disintegration of the Spanish Empire. See James Durnerin. Maura et Cuba. Politique coloniale d’un 
ministre liberal. Besançon: Annales Littéraires de l’Université de Besançon/Les Belles Lettres, 1978; 
Emilio de Diego García, “¿La última oportunidad política en las Antillas?”, in Emilio de Diego García 
(dir.). 1895, la guerra en Cuba y la España de la Restauración. Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1996, 
pp. 99-118; Pérez Cisneros. El reformismo español en Cuba, pp. 116-128; Fernando Maura. “Autonomía 
para Cuba: el proyecto Maura (1893)”. Razón española: Revista bimestral de pensamiento, 2014, No. 
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Within this reformist mindset, Antonio Maura wanted to impede any potential 
political manipulation of the Volunteers. For instance, the new electoral reform project 
presented on 28th December 1892 did not feature the privileged vote for the Volunteers, 
although of course, their members could still vote should they meet the general requisites 
to be a voter.92 Another measure was the prohibition of the Volunteers holding public 
offices in the city councils, thus consciously breaking a link with local political power that 
had been common since the Ten Years’ War.93 A gesture towards the Volunteers was the 
inclusion of their most veteran colonel into the Consejo de Administración, an advisory 
council for the Captains General.94 Like Becerra’s before him, Maura’s project also 
excluded the majority of common Volunteers from active political participation.  
To sum up, the direct link between the Volunteers and politics that had 
predominated since the Ten Years’ War and was reinforced with the implementation of 
the Restoration Monarchy in the Antilles, was seriously threatened by the end of the 
interwar period (1878-1895). They were deprived of local political power, and it had 
become clear that the Government was unwilling to make them a privileged electoral 
group. The Constitutional Union was fiercely opposed, even warning Maura that the effect 
of this on the Volunteers might endanger Spanish rule in areas where Cuban nationalists 
were in a majority.95 As a sign of protest, the Constitutional Union committee in Santiago 
de Cuba resigned in toto in August 1893.96 
Yet despite rumours that the Volunteers were preparing violent demonstrations 
against the authorities, there was no movement among the Volunteers, who had generally 
                                                 
184, pp. 169-184; Javier Tusell Gómez. “Maura: una propuesta para la solución del problema de 
Cuba”, in José Ramón Cervera Pery et al. La presencia militar española en Cuba (1865-1905). Madrid: 
Ministerio de Defensa / Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 1995, pp. 111-124.  
92 Only in Cuba, the electoral census went from 21,265 to 50,511, Roldán de Montaud. “Política y 
elecciones en Cuba, p. 275; Pérez Cisneros. El reformismo español en Cuba, p. 120; AHN, Ultramar, 
4944, leg. 19; Gaceta de Madrid, 28-12-1892. 
93 Ramón Barrios, governor of the Western Region and Havana Province, stated that due to this 
measure he had had to replace several mayors, among them Santiago de los Baños’, who had hold 
the office since 1869 and was the local Volunteer battalion’s colonel. See AFAM, leg. 358-1, carpeta 
5, Ramón Barrios a Antonio Maura, 28-02-1893. 
94 The Consejo de Administración members were to be the captain general, the archbishop of 
Santiago de Cuba, the Commander of the Navy in Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Segundo Cabo, and 
the provincial deputies that had been re-elected, Pérez Cisneros. El reformismo español en Cuba, 
pp. 123-124. 
95 Román Martínez, head of the Constitutional Union in Santiago de Cuba, told Maura that the 
effects of his reforms had ‘deeply affected the Volunteers’, and that the consequences could be 
‘deplorable’, AFAM, leg. 166, No. 10, letter from Román Martínez to Antonio Maura, 12-11-1893. 
96 El Noticiero Balear, 17-08-1893, p. 3. 
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accepted Maura’s reforms.97 The dissociation between the Constitutional Union’s claims, 
and the Volunteers’ attitudes, seemed to indicate a considerable distance that had opened 
between the Volunteers and the integrista political elite. It does not mean that the 
Volunteers had necessarily accepted Maura’s thesis, but rather that they shied away from 
open confrontation with reformists and autonomists. Besides, the conditions of the right 
to vote discussed under Minister Becerra’s project neglected numerous echelons of 
Volunteers: all the non-decorated rank-and-file members with less than six years of 
service. Also, the right to vote might have been less a concern for the thousands of peasant 
Volunteers, mostly Cubans, who are considered here to have been more affected by the 
neglected condition of the countryside than by political manoeuvring in Havana and 
Madrid.  
 
3. An Unclear Military Role 
After having played a central role in the Antilles during the Ten Years’ War, the Volunteers 
had to redefine their role in the Spanish imperial context in times of peace. After the Pact 
of Zanjón, the Volunteers were faced with the pre-1868 situation, where only their 
involvement in supporting the imperial adventures in Morocco (1859-1860) and Santo 
Domingo (1861-1865) had legitimized their existence. The war in Cuba had also legitimized 
the Volunteers in Puerto Rico as a deterrent force to secure Spanish rule and prevent the 
any eventual uprisings spreading on the island. Consequently, after 1878, because they 
lacked a clear military role, service in the Volunteers became less appealing, their raison 
d’être at least dubious, and their morale low. 
The ways in which the Volunteers both in Cuba and Puerto Rico attempted to 
redress their decline were similar, though with different outcomes. A good example of this 
divergence was the impact of the military service law of 11th July 1885, which allowed the 
conscripts to serve their duty in the Volunteers instead of the regular Army or the Navy. 
The impact of this measure on each island reflected the differing situations of the 
Volunteers in Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
 
 
                                                 




3.1. The Challenges of Peace 
After the pact of Zanjón in Cuba, there was an excess of men-at-arms. The solution to 
reduce the number of regular Army soldiers was relatively easy: their units could be 
merged or dissolved, and the soldiers shipped back to the Peninsula.98 The 85,000 
Volunteers, however, presented a problem.99 Whereas the units created during the war 
could be dissolved, their members could be neither stripped of their Volunteer uniform 
nor shipped somewhere else, for these men were civilians not subjected to military laws 
during peacetime.100 
The victorious colonial state attempted to square this circle. Throughout 1878 
several units of Volunteers were dissolved, and the officers that had been mobilized were 
offered the possibility of joining the regular army or being recommended for appointments 
in the island’s administration, by the Royal Decree of 7th November.101 Joining the army 
could mean being sent to the Peninsula or to other Spanish colonies, however, so this 
measure scarcely appealed to men who had generally settled at a young age in Cuba, had 
a regular job, and often had started a family in the Antilles.102 
In Puerto Rico, the Volunteers were affected by low morale due to the absence of 
a concrete military purpose, and insignificant membership in comparison to Cuba. By 1884 
there were only ca. 4,700 Volunteers on the island, for a population of 810,000.103 Without 
a clear military threat, service in the Volunteers, which meant having to combine a regular 
job with unpaid military service, had become unappealing. Attempting to redress the 
situation, the Basque Pablo Ubarri, colonel of the San Juan’s 1st Battalion and leader of the 
                                                 
98 Whereas in 1878 the Army had 75,000 men in Cuba, by 1880 the numbers had been cut to 30,000. 
The whole process of the Army restructuring in Cuba has been studied by Andrés Mas Chao. 
Evolución de la infantería en el reinado de Alfonso XII. Madrid: Servicio de Publicaciones del EME, 
1989, pp. 158-181. 
99 Otero Pimentel. Memoria sobre los Voluntarios, p. 177. 
100 The loss of the Volunteer status was only contemplated for those members who had violated the 
militia’s rules. Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba (1869), art. 64, p. 22. 
101 Mas Chao. Evolución de la infantería, pp. 165-166; Gaceta de Madrid, 8-11-1878, No. 512, t. IV, p. 
373. 
102 For instance, in 1877 58% of the men of the Tiguabo’s Infantry Volunteers Section were married, 
AGMM, Ultramar, Capitanía General de Cuba Subinspección General de Voluntarios, caja 3057, 
“Sección de Voluntarios de Tiguabos”. 
103 In comparison, by 1877 Cuba there were ca. 85,000 Volunteers for a population of ca. 1,435,000 
inhabitants. This means that the ratio of Volunteers/inhabitants was 1/16 in Cuba, and 1/172 in 
Puerto Rico. Figueroa. Sugar, Slavery, and Freedom, p. 48, table 2.1; Fe Iglesias. “El censo cubano de 




incondicionales, suggested to Captain General Eulogio Despujols (1879-1881) a symbolic 
measure: rewarding all the local Volunteers with a medal to foster their social status.104  
The Medalla a la Constancia (Medal to Constancy) was consequently approved, 
and given to several thousand men representing all the island’s Volunteer units in a public 
ceremony in front of El Morro, the iconic fortress that has protected San Juan’s bay since 
the 16th century, on 11th March 1881.105 According to the integrista newspaper Boletín 
Mercantil, the ceremony was an enthusiastic demonstration of loyalism and a proof of the 
Volunteers’ good shape.106 However, it did not attract new recruits. In December 1884, 
Captain General Luis Dabán (1884-1887) urged the officers to recruit more men and to 
improve military preparations, which had been generally neglected. A good example was 
Ponce’s battalion, which was not dissolved, merely due to the bad image this would have 
presented of integrismo in a city with a powerful autonomist movement.107 
Because the Volunteers were the armed wing of the incondicionales, and hence a 
force that could be used against the autonomists, Captain General Dabán closely 
collaborated with Pablo Ubarri, leader of the Unconditional Party, in the revitalization of 
the Volunteers.108 A means to increase the Volunteers’ popularity was to recount their 
history. The Army officer Rafael Rosado y Brincau was commissioned by the Captaincy 
General to write his Bosquejo histórico de la Institución de Voluntarios en Puerto Rico, 
published in 1888. This book offered a laudatory version of the Volunteers and insisted on 
its key role in keeping Puerto Rico Spanish.109 
                                                 
104 Pablo Ubarri Capetillo (1824-1894) was a native of Santurce (Basque Country) who settled at a 
young age in Puerto Rico. He was associated with the merchant community that first organized the 
Volunteers on the island in 1864 and became the 1st Battalion’s colonel in 1874. In 1880, he succeeded 
the Puerto Rican José Ramón Fernández, marquis of La Esperanza, as leader of the Unconditional 
Spanish Party. Also, he was president of the Diputación Provincial, the Casino Español de Puerto 
Rico, and member of the Banco Español de la Isla de Puerto Rico. Due to his services to Spain, he 
received the Condado de San José de Santurce in 1880, among several other decorations. During the 
1880s and until his death his business interests mostly focused on the trams and railways, which he 
introduced in Puerto Rico. Jesús Martín Ramos. “Bosquejo histórico-biográfico de Pablo Ubarri y 
Capetillo, Conde de San José de Santurce”, in Octavio Ruiz-Manjón Cabeza & María Alicia Langa 
Laorga (eds.). Los significados del 98: la sociedad española en la génesis del siglo XX. Madrid: 
Biblioteca Nueva, 1999, pp. 201-212. 
105 The medal had been created by a Royal Decree in 27th August 1880. AHN, Ultramar, 5114, exp. 12; 
Rosado y Brincau. Bosquejo Histórico, pp. 71-83; González Cuevas. ¿Defendiendo el honor?, pp. 72-
77. 
106 Boletín Mercantil, 24-03-1881. 
107 AGMM, Documentación de Puerto Rico, sig. 5179.24, 5199.2, 5202.2; Rosado y Brincau. Bosquejo 
Histórico, pp. 95-105. 
108 Rosado y Brincau. Bosquejo Histórico, pp. 125-151. 
109 Ibid., pp. 153-161.  
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Yet, the most important task in revitalizing the Volunteers was their 
reorganization. Twenty years after the creation of Puerto Rico’s first Volunteer battalion 
in San Juan in 1864, there were now eight battalions for each of the island’s military 
regions.110 The vague Volunteer reglamento of 1869 and their lack of a concrete purpose 
had shaped a militia with serious deficiencies in terms of uniformity, the state of their 
weaponry, military training, and membership.111 Willing to improve their situation, 
Captain General Dabán created a committee in November 1886 including army officers 
and representatives of the Volunteers to study plausible solutions.112 
Within a year, the committee wrote a new reglamento that was submitted to the 
Ministry of War in Madrid and sanctioned by a Royal Decree on 10th July 1888. The eight 
battalions were turned into fourteen, with similar numbers, clear norms as to the 
possession of weapons, which usually was afforded by the Volunteers themselves, and 
military training.113 The number of Volunteers increased by 20%, from 4,412 men in 1884 
to 5,328 in 1888, at least enough for an island that had no serious external threat and 
already had a regular Army garrison aided by the Civil Guard.114 
The reglamento of 1888 ensured a much more organized, coordinated, and fit force 
of Volunteers in Puerto Rico, and increased its members by almost 1,000 men. It remained 
in force practically untouched until the dissolution of the militia in 1898 at the end of 
                                                 
110 The battalions’ organization dated back to 20th October 1874 and was as follows: 1st in San Juan, 
2nd in Bayamón, 3rd in Arecibo, 4th in Aguadilla, 5th in Mayagüez, 6th in Ponce, 7th in Guayama, and 
8th in Humacao. Their numbers oscillated from 8th Humacao’s 355 men, to 5th Mayagüez 856. 
González Cuevas. ¿Defendiendo el honor?, p. 71; Ejército de Puerto-Rico. Estado militar… (1884), p. 
7. 
111 In 1886, the 1st Battalion, in San Juan, still had 497 12mm Chassepot rifles with their bayonets, 
bought to Italy in 1870. However, these rifles had no ammunition, for its production had ceased in 
1875, after it had been the basic rifle of the French soldier during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-
1871). AGMM, Documentación de Puerto Rico, sig. 5193.3; Roger Ford. The World’s Great Rifles. 
London: Brown Books, 1998, p. 23. 
112 The committee was presided over by Juan Contreras y Martínez (Segundo Cabo, or Captaincy 
General second-in-command), Colonel Juan Álvarez Arenas (Staff Chief), Colonel Fernando 
Alameda Liancourt (Engineers deputy inspector), Colonel Luis López Ballesteros (infantry), Major 
Eduardo Valera y Vicente (artillery), Lieutenant Colonel Pablo Ubarri (1st Volunteer Battalion), 
Lieutenant Colonel Bernardo Pérez Méndez (2nd Battalion), Lieutenant Colonel Manuel González 
Fernández (3rd Battalion), Lieutenant Colonel Ulpiano Valdés (8th Battalion), and the Secretary 
Lieutenant Colonel Juan de Zbikowski y Tello (infantry), Rosado y Brincau. Bosquejo Histórico, pp. 
130-131. 
113 The new battalions’ organization was: 1st San Juan, 2nd Bayamón, 3rd Río Piedras; 4th Arecibo, 5th 
Aguadilla, 6th Mayagüez, 7th Maricao, 8th Sábana Grande, 9th Ponce, 10th Coamo, 11th Guayama, 12th 
Hato Grande, 13th Humacao, 14th ‘Tiradores de la Altura’ in Utuado, plus an independent company 
in the island of Vieques. Isla de Puerto-Rico. Reglamento para los cuerpos de Voluntarios (1888); 
Rosado y Brincau. Bosquejo Histórico, pp. 143-151. 
114 Ejército de Puerto-Rico (1884 and 1888). 
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Spanish rule in Puerto Rico. Undoubtedly, other factors helped the new reglamento to 
become a success. Firstly, their modest numbers (ca. 5,000 men) and the size of Puerto 
Rico (3,515 sq. miles, in comparison to Cuba’s 42,426 sq. miles) made the fulfilment of 
orders of joint manoeuvres easier in logistical terms. Secondly, a clear leadership purpose 
which coincided with the leader of the incondicionales.115 Pablo Ubarri Capetillo was the 
mastermind behind the whole process of reorganization of Puerto Rico’s Volunteers, 
which he saw as inextricably united to his Unconditional Spanish Party.116 Thirdly, due to 
the smaller scale of sugar and tobacco production, and the small workforce needed by 
coffee farms, Puerto Rico had no proletariat as such by the end of the 19th century.117 This 
meant that, lacking an organized labour movement, the cohesion of the Volunteers was 
not hampered by internal disputes between labourers and employers and between 
troopers and officers. In Cuba, however, the situation was rather different. 
 
3.2. Less Motivated Recruits: The Military Service Law of 1885 
The military service law of 11th July 1885 introduced a change that could theoretically 
benefit the Volunteers: it allowed the peninsulares that had been serving in the Volunteers 
for at least one year to fulfil their military service in their units instead of joining the army 
or the navy, where the service lasted for four years.118 The service period in the Volunteers 
was longer (six years), but it would be spent at home, and it would not be as intense 
militarily as in the Army or the Navy. 
According to Fernando Puell de la Villa, military service became increasingly more 
unpleasant for young Spanish men during the second half of the 19th century, due to the 
                                                 
115 José Ramón Fernández y Martínez, Marquis of La Esperanza (1870-1880), and Pablo Ubarri 
Capetillo, Count of San José de Santurce (1880-1894), Cubano Iguina. “Puerto Rico”, pp. 541-557. 
116 Rosado y Brincau. Bosquejo Histórico, pp. 235-239; AHN, Ultramar, 5100, exp. 12, 13, 19, 34; 322, 
exp. 4, 5; 428, exp. 48-52, 54.  
117 Before the US invasion, the labour movement in Puerto Rico consisted basically of recreational 
and mutual societies, such as the Círculo de Recreo y Beneficencia (San Juan, 1872), or the Sociedad 
Amigos del Bien Público (San Juan, 1873). Also, it was close to autonomism rather than to the 
socialist or anarchist trends that did not enter the island until the first decade of the 20th century. 
The first labour organization, the Federación Regional de los Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, was 
created in October 1898, under the first US military government. Gervasio L. García & A. G. 
Quintero Rivera. Desafío y solidaridad. Breve historia del movimiento obrero puertorriqueño. San 
Juan: Ediciones Huracán, 1982, pp. 13-34. For the role of coffee in developing Puerto Rico’s 
agricultural industry see Laird W. Bergad. Coffee and the Growth of Agrarian Capitalism in 
Nineteenth Century Puerto Rico. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. 
118 Gaceta de Madrid, 13-07-1885, No. 194, additional article No. 3, p. 123. This only affected 
peninsulares, for Creoles were not subjected to compulsory military service.  
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harsh conditions conscripts had to face in campaigns such as the Santo Domingo War, or 
the Ten Years’ War, where more than 80,000 Spanish soldiers had died.119In order to avoid 
the hardships of military service, thousands of young Spaniards migrated to other areas of 
Hispanic America or French Algeria instead of settling in Cuba or Puerto Rico, where they 
were still required to do military service. García Balañá has concluded that this was a sign 
of the decline of Spanish imperial culture, for young peninsulares preferred to settle 
outside Spanish national territory rather than serve in the army or the navy.120 
The law of 1885 successfully reversed the migration ratio to Cuba.121 The impact of 
this measure, however, was barely noticeable in Puerto Rico, for its poor economic 
development had never attracted great waves of peninsulares.122 Consequently, no more 
than a dozen new Volunteers benefited from the 1885 law in the Puerto Rican battalions.123 
In Cuba, however, the law had rather different consequences. Existing evidence shows that 
these incomers had a negative impact on the moral and martial spirit of the Volunteers. 
In a letter to his uncle back in Sitges dated in October 1885, Jaime Cañameras y Ferrer, a 
young rank-and-file member of Santiago de Cuba’s 1st Volunteer Battalion, considered that 
many of his young peninsular colleagues were joining the Volunteers ‘for the sole purpose 
of avoiding military service in the regular army, and lacked the motivation necessary to 
fulfil their duties effectively.124 
                                                 
119 Fernando Puell de la Villa. El soldado desconocido. De la leva a la “mili” (1700-2012). Madrid: 
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120 Between 1882 and 1885 106,813 Spaniards had migrated to Hispanic America, but less than half 
this number (47,886) had settled in Cuba. In French Algeria, there were 114,320 Spaniards in 1881, 
which went up to 157,560 in 1889. AHN, Ultramar, 120, exp. 5; García Balañá. “’The Empire is no 
longer a social unit”, pp. 92-103; Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz. “La emigración española a América en 
medio milenio: pautas sociales”. Historia Social, 2002, No. 42, pp. 40-57; Moreno Fraginals & 
Moreno Masó (1993), p. 121; Eloy Martín Corrales. “La emigración española en Argelia”. Awraq: 
Estudios sobre el mundo árabe e islámico contemporáneo, 2012, No. 5-6, pp. 47-63. 
121 89,868 peninsulares migrated to Cuba in 1886-1890, for 60,817 in 1881-1885. Moreno Fraginals & 
Moreno Masó. Guerra, migración y muerte, p. 121. 
122 In fact, they were never more than a tiny minority. According to the integrista peninsular 
journalist José Pérez Morís, in 1860 there were only 13,104 peninsulares for a population of 600,233 
(2,2%), whereas in 1899, right after the end of Spanish rule, they were only 7,690 for a total census 
of 953,243 (0.8%). See Cubano Iguina. El hilo en el laberinto, table 1, p. 156, taken from US War 
Department, Report on the Census of Puerto Rico, 1899, Washington D.C., Government Printing 
Press, 1900, pp. 34, 43, 62, 94; Pérez Morís & Cueto y González Quijano. Historia de la insurrección 
de Lares, p. 223. For a brief overview of Puerto Rico’s economy at the end of the 19th century, see 
Ángel G. Quintero Rivera. “Background to the Emergence of Imperialist Capitalism”, in Adalberto 
López & James Petras (eds.). Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans: Studies in History and Society. New 
York, London, Sydney, Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1974, pp. 87-117. 
123 In 1886, only 9 out of the 806 members of the 1st Battalion, stationed in San Juan, were conscripts 
benefiting from the 11th July 1885 law. See AGMM, Documentación de Puerto Rico, sig. 5193.3. 
124 I thank Lluís Riudor Gorgas for letting me consult the private correspondence of his great-
grandfather Antonio Ferrer Robert. 
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One of the consequences of the influx of conscripts into the Volunteers was the 
increase in social protests in the cities with a strong presence of peninsulares, especially 
Havana. The young men reinforced the populist nature of the urban Volunteers, bringing 
forms of social protest to Cuba. These young peninsulares also brought ideas of socialism 
and (to a less extent) anarchism, which further radicalized and politized the Cuban labour 
movement.125 For instance, one of these young peninsulares was the Basque Ramiro de 
Maeztu, who would later be known as a leading figure of Spanish conservative thought 
but arrived in Cuba as a socialist.126 Shortly after having settled in Havana, where he 
worked as a shop assistant, he joined the Volunteers in 1893 and became involved in the 
city’s thriving labour movement.127 In a time of deep economic crisis in Cuba, with no less 
than 20,000 unemployed people in Havana (out of ca. 250,000 inhabitants in the late 
1880s), labour demands were often mixed with demonstrations against the endemic 
corruption of the colonial administration.128 
The mixture of integrismo, anti-corruption and social demands reinforced the 
“plebeian nationalist” character of the Volunteers.129 In fact, their allegiance to the Spanish 
                                                 
125 Casanovas. Bread, or Bullets!, pp. 203-221; Frank Fernández. El anarquismo en Cuba. Madrid: 
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Deputies for the monarchic Renovación Española party (1933-1936). Due to his conservative ideology 
and opposition to the Second Republic, he was assassinated by republican militiamen in Madrid in 
October 1936, during the Spanish Civil War. For a biography see Pedro Carlos González Cuevas. 
Maeztu. Biografía de un nacionalista español. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003. 
127 Maeztu joined the Batallón de Voluntarios de Chapelgorris del Cerro in May 1893. This battalion 
was mostly made up of Basque immigrants. By April 1895, once the war had broken out, he was still 
a member of the company but was apparently on leave in Spain. AGMS, leg. M-147. 
128 Jean-Philippe Luis. “Les employés : une horde prédatrice ?”, in Jean-Philippe, Luis (ed.). L’État 
dans ses colonies. Les administrateurs de l’empire espagnol au XIXe siècle. Madrid: Casa de 
Velázquez, 2015, pp. 227-252. Corruption in the Spanish imperial administration was widespread, 
not only in Cuba. For instance, see Xavier Huetz de Lemps. “Un cas colonial de corruption 
systémique : les Philippines à la fin du XIXe Siècle”. Illes i Imperis, 2014, No. 16, pp. 135-146.   
129 According to Andreu Miralles, a combination of populism and nationalism had been the bedrock 
of the middle-class and proletarian Spanish democrats and republicans’ reaction against the abuses 
of the Moderate Party Governments during the 1840s. Xavier Andreu Miralles. “El pueblo y sus 
opresores: populismo y nacionalismo en la cultura política del radicalismo democrático, 1844-1848”. 
Historia y política: ideas, procesos y movimientos sociales, 2011, No. 25, pp. 65-91. Philip G. Nord has 
noted similar tendencies in the Paris shopkeepers’ political culture during the 19th century. Philip 
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Nation was used to legitimize their demonstrations against those who they perceived as 
elitist, corrupt, colonial civil servants, who undermined Spain’s rule in Cuba and damaged 
the interest of working-class Volunteers. This combination of nationalism with social 
demands was not unique to Cuba, of course. For instance, a similar example can be found 
in the Boulangist movement in France (1885-1889), whose supporters considered the Third 
Republic an elitist, corrupt and anti-national regime.130 Havana’s working-class Volunteers 
had very similar thoughts on the colonial authorities in Cuba.  
Strong social unrest erupted between 23rd and 27th August 1887, when ca. 5,000 
young workers, mostly young peninsular Volunteers who were probably benefiting from 
the 1885 law, demonstrated in central Havana for four days demanding the removal of 
acting Captain General Sabas Marín (1887-1889) for his blatant connivance with corrupt 
officials. The demonstrators requested the arrival of Manuel Salamanca, who had already 
been appointed as the new captain general but was being stalled in the Peninsula by the 
Government for having declared to a Spanish newspaper that he was going to eradicate 
corruption in Cuba.131 Since the Volunteers retained the right to bear arms at home, the 
authorities were extremely wary of provoking their anger, for the situation could easily 
evolve, for example, into something similar to the expulsion of Captain General Domingo 
Dulce by the Volunteers in June 1869. Finally, the situation was defused thanks to the use 
of regular cavalry to ward off the demonstrators, and the collaboration of the Volunteer 
officers in assuaging the anger of their subordinates.132 
This event was understood as a clear demonstration that corruption in Cuba was 
being tolerated by the Spanish Government and promoted by members of the integrista 
elite.133 It showed a growing capacity for social unrest within the Volunteers, partially due 
to the influx of new peninsular recruits, and the discrepancy between the rank-and-file 
                                                 
G. Nord. The Politics of Resentment. Shopkeeper Protest in Nineteenth-Century Paris. New 
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130 Michel Winock. Histoire de l’extrême droite en France. Paris: Seuil, 1994, pp. 51-82.  
131 El Resumen, 6-8-1887; Casanovas. Bread, or Bullets!, p. 183. Francisco Moreno. El país del chocolate 
(la inmoralidad en Cuba). Madrid: Imp. de F. García Herrero, 1887, p. 5. Corruption, of course, was 
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132 ANRC, Asuntos Políticos, leg. 105, exp. 4; Casanovas. Bread, or Bullets!, pp. 183-185. 
133 This precisely was the denunciation of the peninsular journalist Francisco Moreno: El país del 
chocolate, pp. 14-39.  
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and their officers (who were often involved in corruption cases at the time).134 In 1890, 
Captain General Manuel Salamanca declared that ‘all the Volunteers in here [Havana] and 
in the provinces, are absolutely with me’, and that his true enemies were the members of 
the integrista elite.135 Quiroz considered that this visible corruption discouraged many 
Cubans from continued loyalty to Spain.136 Agreeing on this point, it should be added that 
corruption was also eroding the loyalty of the Volunteers towards the authorities. 
Undoubtedly, the influx of conscripts and corruption altered the cohesion of the 
Volunteers and their relationship with the authorities. In 1898 Polavieja recalled that when 
he assumed the Captaincy General of Cuba in August 1890, he had not seen in the 
Volunteers ‘the good spirit they used to have. Peace had undermined their enthusiasm, 
and politics had them divided; within their troopers, there were already socialists and 
anarchists, and because of these, separatists too.’137 
Polavieja’s suspicions might have been exaggerated, but there were indeed 
Volunteers who were actively participating in Socialist and Anarchist platforms, as has 
been pointed out by Joan Casanovas and Frank Fernández.138 Nonetheless, less politicised 
labour associations of cigar makers and shopkeepers remained the centre of the 
peninsulares’ labour movement in Havana.139 As seen in the previous chapter, the 
Volunteers in Havana had already been engaged in labour demands during the Ten Years’ 
War. Upon this foundation, the combination of administrative crises, corruption during 
the interwar period, and repression of any labour movement expression under Polavieja 
meant that now they welcomed socialist and even anarchist ideals. 
A chance for Polavieja to implement his methods occurred shortly after his arrival 
in Cuba. On 11th October 1890, the coachmen of Havana went on strike and were soon 
joined by tram and cab drivers, cigar makers, bakers and other trades dominated by 
                                                 
134 AGMM, Subinspección General de Voluntarios, caja 2997, 2998. 
135 Among others, Salamanca explicitly mentioned men such as José Eugenio Moré and Leopoldo de 
Carvajal, Marquis of Pinar del Río, both Volunteer officers and members of the Constitutional 
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137 García de Polavieja. Relación documentada, pp. 76-77. 
138 Joan Casanovas reports on a peninsular Volunteer, Eduardo González Bobés, who gave a speech 
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peninsulares, demanding better salaries, lighter regulations, and fewer taxes.140 In short, 
Havana was facing the likely prospect of a general strike. 
Coachmen were a particularly mobilized group of workers, mostly made up of 
young peninsulares, many of whom were Volunteers.141 In his reports to the Overseas 
Minister Antonio María Fabié (1890-1891), Polavieja explicitly blamed the conscripts that 
were undertaking their military service with the Volunteers as the instigators and 
organizers of the strike.142 He also noted that the use of other Volunteers to quell them 
was no option, for he was unsure of their loyalty. This could have terrible consequences 
for public order, since ‘every Volunteer has a rifle and 70 cartridges at home’. Polavieja 
insisted on the necessity of placing the conscripts of the 1885 law into regular army 
battalions, as he considered them a destabilizing element for the Volunteers. As this was 
rejected by the Ministry of War, Polavieja opted to use regular soldiers to replace the 
strikers and threatened the Volunteer officers with revoking their privileges in case they 
were not able to convince their subordinates to give up. The strike was eventually called 
off after four days.143 
Again, the Volunteers had shown that they retained their capacity to mobilize 
different trades and coerce the authorities. Polavieja, who now believed that ‘in Cuba, 
everything conspires against Spain’, distrusted the Volunteers in the cities just as much as 
he had distrusted their colleagues in the countryside when he was appointed as governor 
of Oriente back in 1879.144 Polavieja did not suggest the suppression of the Volunteers, 
however but rather coincided with some voices within the Volunteers that demanded a 
complete reorganization of the militia. He probably preferred to reorganize the Volunteers 
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rather than to suppress them because of the limited presence of the regular army in Cuba. 
In 1889, there were only 22,517 regular soldiers against more than 60,000 Volunteers.145  
 
3.3. Cuba’s Volunteer reglamento of 1892 
The need to reorganize the Volunteers in Cuba seems to have been widely recognised by 
the early 1890s. There was not a consensus on how to do it though. The Volunteers not 
only had the problem of what role to play in the military system. There were also serious 
problems of a lack of military discipline. The Volunteer Captain Alejandro Menéndez 
Acebal, a former Army officer, considered that the relaxation of military spirit was one of 
the main problems the Volunteers faced. To contribute to remedying this, he wrote in 1890 
a Cartilla del Voluntario, an informative booklet in which he stressed the importance of 
knowing the ordnances, respecting the officers, and fulfilling their military duties 
properly.146 
In a similar tone, the Volunteer officer Eugenio Vandama y Calderón argued in 
1890 that the Volunteers had become a source of chaos: veterans and motivated patriots 
were sharing service with unmotivated young conscripts, the urban Volunteers still 
fulfilled their duties of protecting key infrastructures, but in the countryside, they had no 
real purpose.147 He also noted that too many oficiales supernumerarios were enjoying the 
privileges of the uniform without having to perform any service.148 Vandama advocated for 
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154 
 
a different role for the Volunteers. He envisioned them being turned into a reserve of the 
regular army made up of only Spanish conscripts, both peninsulares, and Cubans of all 
races between the ages of 18 and 40. Vandama wished to make the Volunteers a regular 
Army in all but in name, in the guise of a colonial militia, similar to some of the units that 
major empires had in their colonies, such as Britain and France.149 For instance, the British 
settlers in the Cape Colony created the semi-professional Volunteer Force in 1853, which 
took part in the colonial campaigns in South Africa throughout the second half of the 19th 
century.150 Since the conquest of Algeria that began in 1830, France maintained an Armée 
d’Afrique made up of segregated units of European and Muslim soldiers, such as the 
Chasseurs d’Afrique or the Tiralleurs Algériens respectively.151 
The Spanish authorities in Cuba also shared the concern that the Volunteers ought 
to be reorganized, though in the other direction. For this purpose, a commission created 
by Captain General Polavieja made up of Volunteers and Army officers, elaborated a new 
reglamento to replace the norm of 1869, which was finally sanctioned on 7th July 1892.152 
Vandama’s project to make the Volunteers the army’s colonial reserve did not materialize. 
The reglamento of 1892 made the Volunteers neither the reserve army nor established a 
recruitment of conscripts. The Filipino-born War Minister Marcelo Azcárraga Palmero 
(1890-1892), considered that the creation in Cuba of an army reserve that did not exist in 
Spain could have thorny political implications, in the sense that the island was taking a 
different path from the Peninsula. Besides, Polavieja feared that conscripting Cubans 
would mean incorporating into the Volunteers thousands of separatists and giving them 
military training.153 However, the new reglamento gave the Volunteers a more defined 
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organization, and clarified several aspects regarding promotions, punishments, and duties 
that facilitated the coordination within the units and among them. The reglamento of 1892 
attempted to tackle the problems in the esprit de corps and military capacity originating 
in the influx of young peninsular conscripts according to the law of 1885, and the growing 
class tensions among the Volunteers caused by the labour movement.  
 
3.4. Bandits and the Road to a New War 
By the early 1890s the Volunteers in Havana were increasingly becoming more involved 
with the labour movement and participating in expressions of social unrest, but their 
colleagues in the countryside had long been facing an endemic phenomenon that ran in 
parallel with the devastation of the Cuban countryside after 1878: banditry. This is an 
aspect of Cuban history about which literature is abundant and can be understood as the 
popular response to the destruction of rural Cuba during the Ten Years’ War and its 
subsequent crisis.154 Beyond a popular characterization conforming to Eric Hobsbawm’s 
‘social bandit’ thesis, Cuban banditry was also politically motivated, for many of its actors 
openly supported independence.155 Banditry was primarily a phenomenon that affected 
western Cuba, as its richer sugar plantations were a more attractive prey for bandits, 
although works by Louis A. Pérez, Jr. and Imilcy Balboa Navarro demonstrate that it 
reached Oriente too, and persisted until the 1930s.156 However, for Polavieja, these bandits 
only used their support for Cuban independence as a screen to legitimize their crimes.157 
This might well have been the case, but the truth is that there were many links 
between banditry in Cuba and the nationalist émigré community in the US, principally 
located in New York and Florida. The 1890s were years of intense work for this community 
in its efforts to make Cuba independent. In 1890 they commissioned Antonio Maceo, a 
veteran commander of the Ten Years’ War to visit Cuba and try to start a new uprising.158 
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And in 1892 the leader of the Cuban exile community in the US, José Martí, created the 
Cuban Revolutionary Party in Florida.159 Banditry was another way to propagate the 
independentist ideal in Cuba. The Cuban exile community financially aided some of the 
most important bandits in Cuba, such as Manuel García, who claimed he was waging an 
economic war against Spanish colonialism.160 
But banditry was not at all that popular in the countryside. It affected small land-
proprietors who had historically collaborated with the authorities in suppressing social 
unrest in the countryside.161 The collaboration of Volunteer guajiros in chasing bandits can 
be traced back to the 1850s.162 The Volunteers were perfect for the task of operating in the 
countryside against irregular forces, because they knew the terrain and belonged to the 
local communities.163 
Banditry had been affecting the Cuban countryside since the end of the war. 
However, the authorities did not address it as something more than a problem of public 
order until the arrival of Polavieja to Cuba’s Captaincy General (1890-1892), who declared 
a state of war in five of the six Cuban provinces in September 1890.164 Polavieja created a 
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sophisticated anti-banditry organism: the Gabinete Particular (1890-1893).165 It was an 
autonomous organism that coordinated the efforts of the army, Civil Guard, and 
Volunteers.166 It also bribed bandits and their protectors, such as the former mambí general 
Julio Sanguily, who collaborated with Polavieja while publicly opposing Spanish rule.167 
The Volunteers protected infrastructure from bandits and took part in joint patrols 
with the Civil Guard and the army, which conducted most of the operations.168 This 
participation was not always well organized. Often, town mayors asked the Volunteers to 
establish permanent patrols, but since these men had to combine their service with regular 
jobs, the situation often became unsustainable. When the mayor of Tapaste (Havana 
province) asked the local Volunteer section to patrol the area for ten hours a day, the 
Lieutenant Gerónimo Rodríguez answered that though “donning the uniform and 
defending the Nation is an honour for the Volunteers […] but my men are poor peasants 
and shopkeepers, who have to work hard every day to maintain themselves and their 
families. Hence, it would be extremely difficult for them to keep this service for much 
longer”.169 
According to the documentary evidence, the Volunteers generally rendered good 
services. However, Polavieja distrusted some of their commanders in the rural areas, for 
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he considered that they were conniving with the bandits and supported a free Cuba as 
well.170 The existing evidence seems to contradict his suspicions, for there is only one case 
reported but with no political connections. Eustasio Méndez Rey, commander of the 
Volunteers in Las Vueltas (Havana province), took part in the kidnapping and 
assassination of a landowner with the sole purpose of extorting the family.171 Any 
connection with separatism seems unlikely, for some thousand Havana Volunteers, who 
had historically been the backbone of integrismo in Cuba, demonstrated in the capital 
asking for the commuting of the death penalty, which was nonetheless enforced on 2nd 
September 1891.172 
Banditry continued even after the outbreak of a new war in February 1895. 
Polavieja’s successor in the Captaincy General, Emilio Calleja, dissolved the Gabinete 
Particular in October 1893, to convey a false image of calmness in Cuba. Banditry was part 
of a state of latent insurgency in the countryside. The most notorious of the bandits, 
Manuel García, the self-entitled ‘general of Cuba’s western department’ and ‘King of the 
Cuban Fields’, who even rhetorically declared war on Spain in April 1891, continued to 
pillage the rural areas in western Cuba while claiming that he was fighting for national 
liberation.173 He was shot and killed by a Spanish column in Ceiba Mocha (Matanzas 
province) on the 24th February 1895, the day the last war for Cuban independence truly 
started.174 With the death of the most famous of the Cuban bandits, the fight against 
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The interwar period of 1878-1895 studied in this chapter was a time of continuities and 
discontinuities for the Volunteers. Some tendencies that had begun during the Ten Years’ 
War were accentuated, whereas others were profoundly changed by the war.  
The nature of the Volunteers as the armed wing of the Cuban and Puerto Rican 
integristas, which was firmly established during the war, continued after the peace of 1878 
due to their close relationship with the Antillean conservatives of the Constitutional Union 
and the Spanish Unconditional Party. However, the very implementation of a political 
party system and the absence of a military situation displaced the Volunteers from the 
central role they had played in 1868-1878. During the war, the most hard-line integrismo 
had found in the Volunteers a means with which to express their opposition to separatism 
and to shape Spanish politics in Cuba and Puerto Rico. After wars, political parties 
replaced the armed forces in the political struggle. Integrismo fundamentally channelled 
its agenda through the political parties and their representatives in Madrid. The 
Volunteers became just one of the Antillean conservatives’ political tools, a resort to older 
ways of doing things. 
The Volunteers’ internal cohesion was also severely damaged, especially in Cuba 
by the existence of a strong labour movement. The voice of the lower echelons of the urban 
Volunteers became ever stronger throughout this period. The influx of young peninsulares, 
with their subsequent introduction of socialism and anarchism to the island, combined 
with a dire economic crisis, radicalized the message and objectives of the working-class 
Volunteers that participated in the Cuban labour movement. The lack of developed 
industry in Puerto Rico and a miniscule number of young peninsulares that arrived there 
averted this process and maintained the cohesion of the Volunteers. 
The major disruption caused by the Ten Years’ War was the devastation of the 
agricultural and social fabric of Cuba’s countryside. The deficient response of the 
authorities to rural communities’ problems created profound unrest among the peasant 
Volunteers. This was expressed through defection in the Little War and could not be 
assuaged by the military-agricultural colonies. Nevertheless, the loyal collaboration of the 
rural Volunteers in crushing a genuine expression of popular country unrest, namely 
banditry, was an indicator of the surprising resilience of loyalism among Cuban Volunteers 
in this period. 
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During the interwar period (1878-1895), the Volunteers struggled to find their role 
in the defensive system of the Spanish Caribbean after the traumatic experience of the war 
of 1868-1878. Nevertheless, they remained a part of this system. Due to the assimilation of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico into the Spanish political system, with the creation of political 
parties, the Volunteers lost a good deal of the influence they had enjoyed during the war. 
The conflict’s legacy of social unrest and economic crisis also contributed to the relative 
decay of the Volunteers. They managed to survive these huge challenges however and to 
adapt to the new situation. Their resilience is a good proof of the strength of integrismo 
during the interwar period, even while the Spanish Empire was under threat from many 
sides in the Americas.
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CHAPTER V. THE VOLUNTEERS AND THE END OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE 
(1895-1898) 
Between 1895 and 1898, Spain faced anticolonial wars in Cuba (1895-1898), the Philippines 
(1896-1898), and Puerto Rico (1898), which ended up with the military intervention of the 
United States in April 1898, and the termination of the old Spanish Empire. After this war, 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines fell under the American aegis, the United States 
emerged as a new colonial power and Spain lost its empire, entering a political, military 
and national crisis of known as the Desastre del 98 (or Disaster of ’98).1 These events have 
attracted much attention from scholars, for obvious nationalist and post-imperial reasons.  
The Volunteers played a crucial role in this process, which is not well understood 
by historiography. Thousands of them fought in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, 
both against the anticolonial armies and the United States’ invading forces. In the 
Philippines, they fundamentally contributed to the defence of Manila, against which most 
of the military operations were directed. In Cuba, they defended the cities, the key 
infrastructure (railroads, harbours, etc.), and agricultural property which was the main 
target of the rebels. They defended the sugar mills and tobacco farms, whereas the regular 
army carried out most of the military operations. In Puerto Rico, where war only arrived 
with the US troops, the Volunteers were a key element in assisting the regular army in 
preparing for war against the new imperial power. 
This chapter is a history of the Volunteers during the colonial wars that ended the 
Spanish Empire. It argues that despite the weakening of Spanish rule at the end of the 19th 
century, the Volunteers were the symbol of a relatively strong Loyalism, which persisted 
even when State control was weak. Indeed, it is understood that the central military role 
played by the Volunteers during the wars was a sign of the State’s weakness. Spain sent ca. 
230,000 men to Cuba and the Philippines during the war and faced no more than 30,000 
irregular fighters in each colony, where the Spanish Army was held in check for more than 
three years until the US intervention determined the result of the war.2 
By exploring this uncharted period of the Volunteers’ history, this chapter is an 
innovative contribution to the historiography on the demise of the Spanish Empire. It 
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offers the history of the most militant Spanish Loyalism—by focusing on the Volunteers—
during the last years of the 19th century from a transnational perspective. In this respect, it 
offers an inclusive history of the last years of the Spanish Empire following the global 
approach of Carlos Serrano, or of Josep Maria Fradera and Schmidt-Nowara on other topics 
and periods.3 Traditionally, the historiography has addressed these wars as separate 
conflicts, giving an overwhelming importance to the war in Cuba and the conflict of 1898 
against the United States.4 There is a vast literature in this mode, mostly from US 
historians.5 Using the Global History approach, the Volunteers are used here to 
understand these conflicts as one interconnected war on several fronts. 
This chapter has used a vast amount of unpublished material found in archival 
research in Madrid, Havana, Santiago de Cuba, San Juan de Puerto Rico, as well as some 
local archives in Spain. This chapter relies fundamentally on documents produced by the 
Volunteers, but has also used abundant documentation such as memoirs, personal letters, 
and newspapers produced by other key actors in the Spanish military and administrations, 
and by the anti-colonial elements who fought against the Volunteers. 
With this framework in mind, approaching the wars as one conflict, and focusing 
on the strength of Loyalism, and the weakness of the State, this chapter has been 
structured into four sections. 
The first of these topics is the military role played by the Volunteers as a defensive 
element, particularly in the Cuban and Filipino warzones. Their participation in the war is 
often neglected by the historiography, despite the Volunteers representing almost a third 
of all Spanish forces in Cuba. Only relatively recently, Tone briefly pointed out the 
importance of the Cuban loyalists that fought on the Spanish side.6 In the case of the 
Volunteers in the Philippines, this is an entirely new literature on the Spanish-American 
War. Thus, this section has been built almost entirely on primary sources and 
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contemporary accounts of the war. In the case of Puerto Rico, mostly primary sources were 
used in constructing the main contribution of the chapter: the effect the Cuban war had 
on the Volunteers before the US invasion of July 1898. For their role during the Spanish-
American War, the recent study by González Cuevas was consulted, as well as the classic 
on that very war by Ángel Rivero Méndez, who gave some detailed information about the 
Volunteers.7 
The second section deals with the Volunteers as targets of the Cuban 
revolutionaries, because of their being composed of small units sparsely distributed 
throughout the territory. The Volunteers guarded the small towns and rural property the 
rebels sought to destroy. They also had the weapons and even the men that the mambís 
desperately needed. This section has mostly relied on the studies on the Cuban war, 
memoirs by both Spanish and mambí soldiers, and by the documents generated by the 
Volunteer units themselves, found in the General Military Archive in Madrid, and in the 
National Archives in Havana. 
The third section assesses the most controversial episode of these wars, the 
relocation of Cuban peasants into concentration camps ordered by Captain General 
Valeriano Weyler in 1896 that lasted until March 1898. It was the worst chapter of the war, 
with more than 150,000 people killed, or 10% of the population of Cuba. Despite the 
immense proportion of the tragedy, until recently there had only been a few accounts, all 
produced by Cuban historians, which had bestowed upon the Spanish forces the entire 
responsibility for such a high death toll. However, more recently, the studies by Tone, and 
especially by Andreas Stucki, have profoundly reshaped our understanding of the tragedy.8 
They have shown that, although with a different kind of involvement, both the Spanish 
and insurgent forces were responsible for the tragedy that took the life of one in ten 
Cubans. In that line, it will be seen that the Volunteers were both perpetrators and victims 
of the concentrations. 
Finally, this chapter deals with the Volunteers’ role in the Spanish strategy during 
the war against the United States (April-August 1898) in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines. By using the existing literature and primary accounts by Volunteers, the main 
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military operations and the Volunteers’ behaviour are identified and analysed in the course 
of this conflict that brought the old Spanish empire to an end. 
 
1. The Volunteers and the Imperial Defensive System  
Spain undertook a huge military effort between 1895 and 1898. Indeed, since the onset of 
the war in Cuba in February 1895, and the US declaration of war in April 1898, Spain sent 
ca. 200,000 soldiers to Cuba, and ca. 26,000 to the Philippines. These 226,000 men were 
supplemented by thousands of Volunteers that fought in Cuba (ca. 85,000), Puerto Rico 
(ca. 8,000), and the Philippines (ca. 5,000).9 This section will focus on the role played by 
these ca. 98,000 men-at-arms. First, a brief overview is given of their role during the first 
stages of the war in Cuba. This will be examined in further sections, followed by their 
participation in the Philippines and Puerto Rico until the invasion of the US forces in May 
and July 1898, respectively. 
 
1.1. Cuba 
On 24th February 1895, a new war of independence began in Cuba with the ‘Cry of Baire’, a 
small town in Oriente, replicated in uprisings throughout the island. This new rebellion 
had been organized under the leadership of two veterans of the Ten Years’ War, Máximo 
Gómez and Antonio Maceo, and the political guidance of José Martí, the intellectual that 
created the Cuban Revolutionary Party in 1892 whilst in exile in the US. This new attempt 
at the liberation of Cuba was built on a profound disaffection against Spain growing among 
the Cuban population. The failure of both the low-tariff agreement between Spain and the 
US (1891-1894) and the ill-fated reformist plan advocated by the Overseas Minister Antonio 
Maura (1892-1894) had convinced wide sectors of the Cuban population that a better 
political and economic situation was unattainable under Spain’s rule.10 
The initial reaction by the Spanish authorities was not to give too much importance 
to the uprising, as the insurgent movement in western Cuba was rapidly quelled. Captain 
General Emilio Calleja (1893-1895) had been well aware of the war preparations since 
                                                 
9 For a complete account of the expeditions sent from metropolitan Spain see Baldovín Ruiz. Cuba, 
pp. 423-471. 
10 Elorza & Hernández Sandoica. La Guerra de Cuba, pp. 161-179; Louis A. Pérez, Jr. Cuba Between 
Empires, 1878-1902. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983, pp. 3-38; José Antonio Piqueras 
Arenas. Cuba, emporio y colonia. La disputa de un mercado interferido. Madrid: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 2003, pp. 303-308.  
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October 1894.11 This inaction allowed the insurgency to spread in Oriente’s countryside, as 
the Spanish regular Army remained within the cities.12 From the very beginning of the war, 
the mambís, or rebel troops, began to recruit men and to harass the only Loyalist forces 
that stood against them in rural areas: the Volunteers. The day after the start of the war, 
the Volunteers from El Caney, only 10km from Santiago de Cuba, defended the town from 
attacking forces.13 By February 1895, the Volunteers in Cuba were still an impressive force 
of ca. 60,000 members distributed throughout the island.14 
The lack of regular military presence in the countryside, though, necessarily 
weakened the forces that stood loyal to Spain. After all, the Volunteers in Oriente’s 
countryside were peasants-at-arms, with poor military training, located in a region where 
insurgency against Spain had historical support. Fearing the reprisal of the mambís and 
not expecting any assistance from the regular troops, units of Volunteers opted not to 
directly confront the insurgency. The rebels were not particularly well armed or 
disciplined but enjoyed great mobility (they were often cavalry troops) and could attack 
by surprise. Often, groups of 200-300 rebels attacked villages defended by a section of 
Volunteers, which consisted of ca. 30 men. For instance, when a group of 500 rebels was 
approaching the town of Veguitas, Captain Cayetano de la Maza of the local Volunteer 
company found that none of his men responded to his call to gather and organize the 
defence of the town. After asking for instructions from the military commander of nearby 
Manzanillo, the only answer he received was to “act following your instinct and 
patriotism”. De la Maza decided to disable all the weapons and ammunitions he held so 
that the insurgents could not use them.15 This event is quite telling of the state of 
                                                 
11 As early as 7th October 1894, Captain General Emilio Calleja (1893-1895) had warned the Overseas 
Minister Antonio Maura (1892-1894), that he had received information regarding plans for a new 
uprising that Máximo Gómez was organizing from Santo Domingo. General José Lachambre, 
governor of the Santiago de Cuba Province, had also informed the captain general that veterans of 
the Ten Years’ War, such as the Sartorius brothers and Guillermón Moncada, were recruiting people 
in Oriente for a new war. The captain general, however, decided not to arrest them as they had not 
violated the law yet. AGP, Sección Reinados, Fondo Alfonso XIII, caja 12.1832, exp. 15-A: “Telegramas 
entre el Gobernador General de Cuba y el ministro de Ultramar”, 07-10-1894, 23-02-1895, and 24-
02-1895. 
12 For an overview of the war in eastern Cuba see José Abreu Cardet & Juan José Tartaglia Redondo. 
“La Guerra del 1895 en el Oriente de Cuba”. Rafael Sánchez Mantero (coord.). En torno al “98”: 
España en el tránsito del siglo XIX y XX: actas del IV Congreso de la Asociación de Historia 
Contemporánea. Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, Servicio de Publicaciones, 2000, pp. 435-448. 
13 ANRC, Donativos y Remisiones, leg. 418, exp. 63. 
14 Eugenio Antonio Flores. La guerra de Cuba (apuntes para la Historia). Madrid: Tipografía de los 
Hijos de M. G. Hernández, 1895, p. 333. 
15 The attack took place in early March. The rebel leaders Esteban Tamayo and Bartolomé Masó 
commanded the mambí force, which operated between the towns of Yara and Veguitas, near the 
coastal town of Manzanillo. After Captain Cayetano de la Maza had destroyed 150 Remington rifles 
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bewilderment of the Spanish authorities in the areas directly threatened by the insurgency. 
Faced with a clear act of insubordination by the Volunteers, the authorities did not know 
how to react and only relied on the common sense of their men-on-the-ground. 
The Cuban situation looked unsustainable from Spain, where mounting pressure 
for a firm military reaction caused the fall of the Liberal cabinet headed by Práxedes Mateo 
Sagasta (1892-1895). In March 1895, the Conservatives of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo 
assumed power.16 The man chosen as the new captain general was Arsenio Martínez de 
Campos (1895-1896), in the hope that he would pacify the island for the second time, 
repeating the occasion he had guided the Spanish troops to victory in 1878.17 
 
1.2. Puerto Rico  
Puerto Rico was not directly involved in the war in Cuba until the US invasion in July 1898, 
but it was affected from its beginning. The island contributed to the war effort by sending 
to Cuba several battalions of the local garrison, as well as supplies to the fighting troops 
and mobilizing the Volunteers to patrol the coast.18 Despite the relatively peaceful 
situation in Puerto Rico, the fear of an uprising on the island had the Captain General 
Antonio Dabán (1892-1895) taking preventive measures.19 
In effect, Cuban nationalist rhetoric had always included the liberation of Puerto 
Rico. In the original manifesto of José Martí’s Cuban Revolutionary Party, it was stated 
that the aim of the party was to “achieve […] Cuba’s total independence, as well as 
promoting and helping Puerto Rico’s”.20 This idea was echoed by some exiled Puerto Rican 
intellectuals, most notably Eugenio María de Hostos, and Ramón Emeterio Betances, the 
foremost promoter of the island’s independence since the 1860s.21 During the war, a few 
                                                 
and 10 ammunition boxes, only the humanitarian intervention of Esteban Tamayo prevented his 
men from shooting him. El Eco de Sitges, 24-03-1895. 
16 Fernández Almagro. Historia política de la España contemporánea, vol. II, pp. 237-243.  
17 During his first term as captain general of Cuba, Arsenio Martínez de Campos (1878-1879) reached 
the Peace of Zanjón (10th February 1878) that ended the Ten Years’ War.  
18 The battalions were all infantry: Colón No. 23, Valladolid No. 21, Alfonso XIII, No. 24, Patria No. 
25, and the Puerto Rico Provisional Battalion No. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. AGMM, Documentación de Puerto 
Rico, 5170.1. 
19 Antonio Dabán y Ramírez de Arellano (1844-1902) was a soldier politically considered close to the 
Liberal Party. He represented Santiago de Cuba (1879-1881) and Tafalla (1886-1887) at the Spanish 
Congress and was Director of Security (1886-1887) under the Liberal cabinet headed by Práxedes 
Mateo Sagasta (1885-1890).   
20 José Martí. Obras completas, vol. I. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1975, p. 259.  
21 Paul Estrade. “La nación antillana: sueño y afán de ‘El Antillano’ (Betances)”, in Naranjo Orovio, 
Puig-Samper & García Mora (eds.). La Nación Soñada, pp. 23-36; M.ª Dolores González-Ripoll 
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hundred Puerto Ricans joined the Cuban rebel army, and a ‘Puerto Rican Section of the 
Cuban Revolutionary Party’ was created in New York by Julio J. Henna.22  
Nonetheless, the independence of Puerto Rico was always the dream of a minority, 
and no serious attempt was made to rebel against Spain. This, of course, did not preclude 
the existence of social and political discontent. Cubano Iguina studied the social and 
political tensions caused by the Spanish colonial system on the island, which usually 
benefited the propertied class of landowners and merchants. This class was often 
represented by peninsulares and Puerto Rican members of the Unconditional Spanish 
Party, and often also Volunteers. Nevertheless, she concluded that loyalty to Spain was 
predominant among Puerto Ricans, although acknowledging a growing disaffection 
among the rural population.23 
This disaffection was especially strong in the southwest of the island, with its 
capital in Ponce. The detection of a Cuban revolutionary agent in that city in June 1895 set 
the alarms ringing in the Captaincy General.24 From that moment, the documents 
generated by the Spanish authorities reveal a genuine desire to isolate Puerto Rico as much 
as possible from the Cuban revolutionary influence. Indeed, they feared that the existing 
tensions could explode into open rebellion against Spain were the insurgents to gain a 
stable presence on the island. 
To impede the presence of Cuban revolutionary agents, it was vital to seal the coast 
from unwanted arrivals of men, weapons, or ideas. For that purpose, beyond tight control 
of the maritime traffic coming in and out Puerto Rico, the Volunteers were mobilized to 
patrol the coast, alongside the Army and the Civil Guard.25 The Volunteers already made 
up a significant element of the Spanish forces in Puerto Rico: for 8,200 regular soldiers, 
there were 7,135 Volunteers.26 A great advantage of the Volunteers in comparison to the 
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22 Negroni. Historia militar de Puerto Rico, pp. 305-306. 
23 Cubano Iguina. El hilo en el laberinto, pp. 145-150. 
24 The Military Commander of Ponce Julio Soto Villanueva reported to Captain General Antonio 
Dabán that he had received a letter from a Spanish agent in New York, informing of the presence 
of a Cuban revolutionary agent in that Puerto Rican city. AGMM, Documentación de Puerto Rico, 
5145.38. 
25 AGMM, Documentación de Puerto Rico, 5202.3. The men of the battalions that were mobilized, 
the 2nd, 8th, 9th, and 10th, covered the area of Bayamón, Sabana Grande, Ponce, and Coamo, thus 
most of the Southwest and part of the North coasts. AGMM, Documentación de Puerto Rico, 5201.4. 
26 Provincia de Puerto Rico. Instituto de Voluntarios, p. 15; Luis González Vales. “La campaña de 
Puerto Rico. Consideraciones histórico-militares”, in El Ejército y la Armada en 1898: Cuba, Puerto 
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regular soldiers was their even presence throughout the island. The army, on the contrary, 
was only present in the cities of San Juan, Ponce, and Mayagüez, plus a few nearby towns.27 
Also, the Volunteers were the men who were most familiar with the Puerto Rican 
geography and society, as their ranks were generally made up of Puerto Rican peasants or 
peninsulares long established on the island.28 Captain General Antonio Dabán decreed 
their mobilization on 13th September 1895.29 
To be mobilized away from home for a few days, however, posed a problem for 
these men, who depended on their daily work. Mobilization implied a small allowance, 
but it rarely arrived. The impression was that the military authorities had a widespread 
contempt for the rural Volunteers, if not of open distrust for the Puerto Ricans’ loyalty to 
Spain. A Spanish staff officer wrote after the war that ‘the abyss between Creoles and 
peninsulares in the island was as deep as in Cuba, even among the Army officers’.30 This 
perception is quite symptomatic of the treatment that the Puerto Rican Volunteers could 
expect from some members of the military authorities on the island. 
Throughout the Autumn of 1895, Julio Soto Villanueva, Military Commander of 
Ponce, reported to the Captaincy General the problems their men were suffering. The rainy 
season had blocked many roads, thus leaving some of them isolated in remote areas. More 
importantly, the stipend that was granted to the mobilized Volunteers, due since 
September, only began to arrive by mid-December 1895. This, in its turn, made finding 
Volunteers for service at the coast rather difficult, especially during the coffee harvest, for 
many of them were employed in the coffee industry.31 
The defensive military role of the Volunteers in Puerto Rico remained practically 
unaltered until the US invasion on 25th July 1898. However, groups of exiled Puerto Ricans, 
aided by their Cuban colleagues, continued to plot.32 Their main problem was the lack of 
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32 On 20th October 1896, the Spanish minister in Caracas (Venezuela) reported to Sabas Marín, 
captain general of Puerto Rico, confidential information about the plot for an invasion of the island, 
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popular support for a rebellion against Spain. This was the main reason that a short-lived 
uprising, known as Intentona de Yauco, failed. Between 24th and 26th March 1897, two gangs 
of a few dozen men each took up arms in Yauco, a town in southwest Puerto Rico, which 
were swiftly quelled by the Civil Guard and the local Volunteers.33 This town was the centre 
of a thriving coffee-producing industry, mostly controlled by Corsican migrants who 
identified only weakly with Spain.34 The mastermind of the failed insurrection was a 
Puerto Rican landowner of Corsican ancestry, Antonio Mattei Lluveras. He had recruited 
Cuban and Dominican agents to organize the armed rebellion but could not convince 
more than one hundred Puerto Ricans to join the effort. The fact that the local Volunteers 
helped the Civil Guard to quell the rebellion, was a symptom that an open rebellion against 
Spain was still an unlikely outcome in Puerto Rico. 
 
1.3. Philippines 
As previously in Cuba (1855) and Puerto Rico (1864), the Philippines’ Volunteers were 
created to counter an armed struggle against Spanish rule. Only eight days after the Cry 
of Balintawak (23rd August 1896), which started the Filipino Revolution against Spain, the 
first two ‘Loyal Volunteer’ battalions were created in Manila by captain general Ramón 
Blanco. The promoters of the idea were the community of peninsulares and Filipinos of 
Spanish descent organized around Manila’s Casino Español, and the Spanish clergy, led by 
the archbishop of Manila, Fr. Bernardino Nozaleda.35 They imported to the archipelago 
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the model of Volunteers already existing in Cuba and Puerto Rico.36 Their creation was 
meant to mitigate the weak Spanish presence in the colony, despite it dating back to the 
16th century.37 For centuries, the Philippines had been administered de facto by the Spanish 
Catholic religious orders, rather than by the Crown officials.38 Only after the opening of 
the Suez Canal in 1869, which shortened the trip to Manila from six months to one, Spain 
began to increase its presence in the archipelago.39 This presence was also boosted by the 
real possibility of losing these territories to another colonial power. Indeed, in 1885 
Germany threatened to occupy the Caroline Islands, an archipelago in the Pacific Ocean 
that was governed from Manila, which had been under theoretical Spanish control since 
the 17th century.40 Although the threat finally did not materialize, the so-called crisis of the 
Carolines sparked a wave of interest in Spain regarding the country’s colonial presence in 
Asia and Oceania. This wave also reached the Spanish Antilles. For instance, Havana’s 
Casino Español started a fundraising effort among its members—many of whom were 
Volunteers—aimed at contributing to the military expansion of Spain in the islands 
recently coveted by the German Empire.41 Another expression of this renewed interest in 
Spain’s Asian colony was the General Exhibition of the Philippines Islands held in 1887 in 
Madrid, which aimed to attract capital for the development of the archipelago.42 
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Despite this increased interest in the Philippines, effective Spanish rule was 
virtually constrained to Manila and a few outposts distributed throughout the archipelago, 
thus leaving vast areas outside of Spanish control. The Philippines were still populated by 
dozens of different ethnicities, scarcely hispanized, mostly Catholic though with 
important pockets of Muslims in the archipelagos of Mindanao and Joló, who rejected the 
Spanish presence until the early 1890s when a series of military campaigns quelled the 
resistance.43 In Luzón, the biggest and most important island, where Manila is located, the 
dominant ethnicity were the Tagalog, who became the bedrock of the nationalist 
movement.44 However, unlike in Cuba, Filipino nationalism was still incipient at the end 
of the 19th century.45 The archipelago was a set of thousands of islands where a sense of a 
united anti-Spanish and anti-colonial nationalism could hardly have taken ground.46 This 
was the main reason a force such as the Volunteers had not been necessary before 1896 in 
the Philippines, for Spanish rule was weak but mostly uncontested, save for some 
sporadically anticolonial outbursts.47 
In this context, the Spanish Empire in the Philippines depended on the 
collaboration of the local Filipino and religious elites. The clash between the local power 
and the Spanish clergy shaped the ways in which the Filipino nationalists sought to 
overcome their subservient relation with Spain.48 The most prominent of them, known as 
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the Ilustrados, educated in the Philippines and in Europe, attempted to forge a sense of 
Filipino nationality, create a political culture based on the European State model, and 
prepare the archipelago for a peaceful transition towards independence.49 
The most notorious of the ilustrados was José Rizal (1861-1896), who created in 1892 
the Liga Filipina, a clandestine organization aimed at structuring a peaceful political 
movement for the emancipation of the Philippines.50 However, the purely colonial regime 
that existed in the archipelago, which denied the Filipinos political rights that had been 
granted to Cubans and Puerto Ricans, eventually convinced many Filipinos of the 
impossibility of getting any reform under Spanish rule. After the colonial authorities 
closed the Liga Filipina in 1893, some of its members, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, created the 
Katipunan, a secret organization with which to prepare an armed uprising against Spain.51 
Thanks to the network of Filipino freemasonry in the archipelago, intensely implicated in 
the emancipation of the colony, the Katipunan began to grow in the provinces around the 
city of Manila from its headquarters in the city of Cavite, the seat of the Spanish fleet in 
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the Philippine and South China Seas.52 Since the paramountcy of the Catholic Church in 
the Philippines was a major source of discontent among Filipino nationalists, it is hardly 
surprising that local masonry acted as a vehicle for propagating the idea of ending colonial 
rule. Masonry also allowed for a network of secret lodges, which were to duly prepare the 
insurrection against Spain.53 
This was the context when the insurrection began in August 1896. To cover an 
archipelago of 7,000 islands and more than 7 million inhabitants, Captain General Ramón 
Blanco (1893-1896) only had 18,000 men at his disposal.54 Manila, the main target of the 
insurgents (ca. 20,000 men), had a garrison of just 1,500 regular soldiers, of whom 1,000 
were native Filipinos.55 The high percentage of native soldiers was a source of alarm for 
their leaders rather than of confidence, for the memories of the Cavite mutiny in 1872 were 
still fresh among the Spanish community. In that year, a group of Filipino soldiers in the 
Spanish Army, in connivance with native priests, attempted to raise the native population 
against the Spanish community.56 Although the mutiny was rapidly quelled, it was a 
serious admonition of the precarious position of the Spaniards in the Philippines. 
At a months’ distance in time from Spain, arming the peninsulares in Manila and 
creating units of Volunteers likely seemed a sensible measure to reinforce the city’s 
defences. Indeed, the Casino Español did insistently request the captain general to approve 
the creation of Volunteers.57 Nonetheless, Blanco was very reluctant to hand them 
weapons, for he feared they could end up being used against him, probably keeping in 
mind the fate of Captain General Dulce in Havana in 1869, according to the contemporary 
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Spanish journalist Rafael Guerrero.58 Indeed, the relationship between Ramón Blanco and 
the Manila peninsulares was far from good. Even the Archbishop Bernardino Nozaleda 
(1889-1898), surreptitiously accused the captain general of being a freemason, and of 
collaborating with the katipuneros that wanted to overthrow Spanish rule.59 
Finally, perhaps wanting to rebuff these accusations, Ramón Blanco created two 
battalions on 31st August 1896 known as Leales Voluntarios (Loyal Volunteers), a company 
of which was taken a collective photograph shortly after its creation (image 8).60 The 
military records consulted at the Spanish National Archives show that most of these men 
were either merchants, officials or retired army personnel.61 They were directly interested 
in the continuity of Spanish rule and in some cases had military training. These Volunteers 
were used to protect some key infrastructure (military hospitals, jails, fortresses, roads, 
and telegraph lines), quite in the same way as their colleagues were doing in Cuba, as well 
as patrolling Manila Bay. Apparently, their performance was satisfactory, and by 
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59 Díaz-Trechuelo. Filipinas, p. 322. 
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Image 8. Manila’s Loyal Volunteers, 1896. Photo: G. Slernberg. AGMM, F.09200. 
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November 1896 two more units were created: the Guerrilla de San Rafael, and the Guerrilla 
del Casino Español.62 The ca. 1,500 Volunteers were deployed to reinforce the military 
presence in the outskirts of Manila, to provide a liaison between the Malacañang Palace 
(the seat of the Captaincy General) and the Cavite Arsenal, and to chase the insurgents 
from Manila Bay.63 The success of the Loyal Volunteers was soon known in other parts of 
the archipelago. According to the documentation kept at the General Military Archive in 
Madrid, despite the weak presence of peninsulares outside Manila, new units were created 
in towns like Iloilo or Mindoro, and in the countryside, often including loyal native 
Filipinos.64 The model was also extended to the recently-conquered islands of Mindanao 
and Joló, to keep the local Muslim population in order.65 
Nevertheless, the situation in Manila was still desperate. The provinces 
surrounding the city had mostly fallen into the hands of the rebels, who had agents within 
the city walls, and reinforcements were unlikely to arrive from Spain in the short term.66 
An army officer recalled that the peninsulares lived in a permanent state of fear, constantly 
carrying pistols.67 Consequently, the situation of the captain general began to look fragile. 
Despite dozens of executions, he was unable to quell the rebellion and to control the area 
around Manila. Lacking the support of the Spanish Government and the Manila 
peninsulares, Blanco was replaced by Polavieja on 13th December 1896.68 
The peninsulares of Manila, including the Volunteers, hoped that Polavieja would 
be implacable with the rebels, and pressed him to carry on with the legal process against 
José Rizal, who had been falsely accused of being involved in the Katipunan armed 
struggle.69 Polavieja, who had previously been Cuba’s captain general (1890-1892), was well 
aware of the potential perils posed by a militia like the Volunteers.70 According to the 
                                                 
62 Blanco. Memoria que dirige al Senado, p. 33. 
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Manila-based Spanish journalist W. E. Retana, the Volunteers spread the word that should 
Polavieja impede Rizal’s execution, they would send him back to Spain and kill Rizal 
themselves.71 Finally, Polavieja decided to offer them a scapegoat in José Rizal, who was 
executed on 30th December 1896 in Manila, with a notable presence of the Volunteers in 
the military parade that preceded the execution.72 
Despite the many differences between the Philippines and the Antilles, the Manila 
Volunteers had shown an attitude notably resembling their colleagues in Havana. They 
were a necessary defensive tool for captains general, but a threat as well. In political terms, 
their opposition to any movement deemed to undermine Spanish rule was just as radical 
as it had been in Havana. Their role in the process and execution of José Rizal powerfully 
recalls the assassination of the medical students in Havana in November 1871. In both 
cases, they sacrificed a scapegoat to assuage their anger against the elements they regarded 
as enemies of Spain. In Manila, as in Havana, the Volunteers had the capacity to condition 
the policy of the authorities regarding the repression of the movements aiming to alter the 
colonial status quo. 
It is remarkable to note the many similarities between the Volunteers in the 
Philippines and their colleagues in the Caribbean, especially considering the completely 
different context of the Asian colony in terms of society or economy. As in Cuba and Puerto 
Rico, the Manila Volunteers were the armed wing of Spanish integrismo. Also, in terms of 
organization, the Casino Español functioned as the dynamizing centre of the Volunteers, 
as well as a social centre for the peninsulares capable of exerting a certain political pressure 
on the Spanish authorities. The composition of the Volunteers in Manila, Havana, and San 
Juan was similar. An elite of businessmen and high-ranking officials filled the officer ranks, 
whereas the rank-and-file were mostly recruited from among the working-class 
peninsulares, often related to the former via employment. In both scenarios, in Asia and 
the Caribbean, the Volunteers were an auxiliary force as well as a threat to the Spanish 




                                                 
71 Retana. Vida y escritos del Dr. José Rizal, p. 447. 
72 Ibid., p. 430; La Voz Española, 30-12-1896. 
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2. The Volunteers as a Target for the Insurgency 
Due to their historical presence throughout Cuba, the Volunteers were a permanent target 
for the insurgency. In the cities, where most of the Volunteers were peninsulares, the 
agents of rebellion tried to exploit any frictions between these men and the authorities. 
The laborantes wanted not to attract the Volunteers to the insurgency, but to create 
conflict between these men and the Captaincy General. Memories of the events of 1869 
were only a reminder that Volunteers were staunchly committed to the integridad 
nacional, not always to colonial authorities. In the countryside, where the Cuban element 
predominated, the mambís permanently targeted the Volunteers. The Volunteers had 
more units scattered throughout the Cuban countryside than the army, thus becoming the 
first defence against the insurgents’ main strategy: to destroy the island’s economic 
infrastructures. Quite famously, the second-in-command rebel leader Antonio Maceo 
declared that “to annihilate Cuba, is to defeat the enemy”.73 The strategy of the mambís 
was to conduct a guerrilla warfare aimed at making it clear that Spain was no longer 
capable of controlling the violence and making the island unprofitable for the metropolis. 
The insurgents avoided direct clashes with the regular army, harassed the population loyal 
to Spain, and destroyed property.74 The military leader of the insurgency, Máximo Gómez, 
summed it up: ‘it is necessary to destroy Cuba to make it free’.75   
The numerous Volunteer units scattered throughout the countryside were priority 
targets for the rebels. In many small towns, the Volunteers were often the only defenders 
and generally were barely militarily trained. For instance, in Sagua de Tánamo, a town in 
Oriente, the town’s 75 Volunteers organized a permanent force of 50 men plus a reserve 
of 25. Most of these men were peasants who depended on their neighbours’ charity to 
survive since their military duties barely allowed them to work.76 The mambís were fully 
devoted to waging war, Volunteer peasants had to combine their regular jobs with the 
armed defence of their towns, lives, and properties. The insurgents deemed that their 
weapons and ammunitions could be taken easily. Besides, the rebels considered that since 
there were thousands of Cubans serving in the Volunteers, they could be induced or forced 
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to join the insurgency. It must be considered that for most Volunteer peasants, Cuba was 
the only land they knew. Unlike the peninsulares, they generally had no family in Spain 
they could go back to. All their family and goods were in Cuba. Also, if captured in combat, 
Cubans loyal to Spain were generally assassinated by the mambís, who considered these 
men traitors. However, they could be pardoned if they joined the insurgency. Therefore, 
the presence of regular troops in small towns was so vital for the military performance of 
the Volunteers. Fighting alongside an Army battalion meant that the chances of resisting 
the attack were much higher. Instead, for a company (120-150 men) or even a section (30-
50) of Volunteers, having to resist a mambí force (usually 400-500 men) on its own, defeat 
was much more likely. Thus, the stronger was the presence of the army, the better the 
military performance of the Volunteers against the insurgents. 
From the outset of the war in Cuba, the mambís tried to exploit any possible 
conflict between the Volunteers and the authorities. This is hardly surprising, for a certain 
tension between the Volunteers and those Captains General prone to implementing 
reforms in the island had always been evident. Martínez de Campos was a man associated 
with reformist policy, for he ended the Ten Years’ War in 1878 with a compromise with the 
rebels based on political and social reforms. The events of June 1869 against Captain 
General Domingo Dulce, the killing of the medical students in November 1871, and the 
strikes against Captain General Polavieja in October 1890 as seen in previous chapters were 
regular reminders of the delicate equilibrium that existed between the Volunteers and the 
military authorities. 
The weakness of the Spanish military presence at the beginning of the war 
provided the insurgents a chance to try to break that equilibrium. On 19th May 1895, having 
only 15,000 regular soldiers–half of whom were sick, Captain General Arsenio Martínez de 
Campos decreed that the conscripts called in 1892-1894 who were serving in the 
Volunteers, now had to join the regular army.77 This had a negative effect on young men 
that had joined the Volunteers precisely to avoid military service in the army. Seeking to 
exploit the discontent, rebel agents in Havana rapidly circulated a text accusing Martínez 
de Campos of abusing the Volunteers and calling them to take up arms against Spain. 
The chances of luring the Havana Volunteers, mostly peninsulares, to join the 
rebellion were virtually non-existent. They had always been the most genuine 
representation of the most radical form of integrismo that utterly opposed the 
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independence of Cuba. They might have acted against the authorities in the past, but never 
against the idea of a Spanish Cuba. Thus, the pamphlet circulated by the laborantes in 
Havana was rather clumsy propaganda. It was rapidly contested on 24th May 1895 by the 
captain general. In a personal message directed to the Volunteers, he reminded them of 
their services to Spain and stressed the necessity of their standing together in times of 
peril.78 There is no evidence of any Havana Volunteer defecting to the insurgency during 
the war. However, the authorities were not willing to allow the circulation of mambí 
propaganda among the Volunteers. 
However, there were signs that the Volunteers’ morale could have been better. Not 
many men were joining the militia. The conservative Diario de la Marina, Havana’s most 
widely circulated newspaper, issued an article in late June 1895 calling for more men to 
join the Volunteers. Quite verbosely, the newspaper called on the young Spaniards to 
imitate the deeds of the French that rallied to defend the Revolution in 1789, the Union 
volunteers of the US Civil War, and the fellow countrymen that took up arms against the 
French Army in Madrid on 2nd May 1808.79 However, it seems that the morale of the 
Volunteers could not be lifted by an article. The captain general accepted a negotiation of 
the terms of the mobilization decreed on 19th May to encourage enlistment. Instead of 
being incorporated into regular army units, as was initially planned, the mobilization 
would consist of drafting ca. 150 Volunteers and deploying them to reinforce the sugar 
mills’ garrisons located within the province of Havana.80 They probably feared the voluble 
nature of the Volunteers. Again, the Volunteers had imposed their will on the superior 
authorities. 
In the countryside, where the army presence was scant and the percentage of 
Cubans in the Volunteers higher, evidence shows that the insurgents had infiltrated the 
Volunteers before the uprising. Ricardo Batrell Oviedo, a young Black Cuban rebel, 
recalled after the war that a Volunteer smuggled weapons to the rebels in Sabanilla del 
Encomendador (Matanzas) when they first launched their insurrection in March 1895.81 
Whether these weapons were handed to the rebels voluntarily or by force is difficult to 
tell. A rather scarce army presence and the harassment of the rebel forces could bring 
many Cubans to collaborate, or at least, not to join the Volunteers. Infiltration of the 
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mambís into the Spanish forces is a topic worthy of further research, as it remains an 
unexplored field. 
This situation was only worsened by Arsenio Martínez de Campos’ strategy of 
distributing the troops throughout Cuba’s geographical area, to defend the island’s 
infrastructures and to gain the landowners’ support.82 Under Martínez de Campos, the 
Spanish troops became weak everywhere, and strong nowhere. It resulted in poorly-
defended sugar mills and railroads and small towns left alone, where the only defence was 
now the Cuban Volunteers, who were often badly fed and ill-trained. In the sugar-
producing area of Matanzas, sugar mills were defended by garrisons of 15-20 Volunteers 
who usually had to defend their position against bands of 50-100 mambises. The military 
training of the Volunteers, who it must be remembered had to combine their regular jobs 
with unpaid military duties, was not always suitable in facing these situations. Also, 
because the insurgents were in control of wide areas of the countryside, it was often 
difficult to supply the garrisons with food and munitions, forcing the Volunteers to seek 
food in the areas around the sugar mills.83 The failure of the use of Volunteers to defend 
the agricultural property soon became evident, as the insurgency began to occupy wider 
areas of the countryside, where loyalty to Spain became a difficult position to take. In fact, 
it often occurred that the peninsulares living in the countryside were assassinated for the 
mere fact of being born in metropolitan Spain.84  In a letter to President Antonio Cánovas 
del Castillo, in July 1895, Martínez de Campos confessed that ‘the few Spaniards that there 
are on the island, only dare to call themselves as such in the cities’, and that ‘there are only 
a few men that still want to join the Volunteers in the countryside’.85 
These words seem to have accurately depicted the situation, which was precisely 
the result of Martínez de Campos’ policy. The vulnerability of the Spanish presence in the 
countryside allowed the insurgency to consolidate the rebellion in Oriente, and to begin 
the most daring military action of the entire war: the Invasión de Occidente, or invasion of 
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western Cuba.86 This action, led by Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo, swept across Cuba 
from east to west, between October 1895 and January 1896.87 Although the rebels took no 
major city during the campaign, their biggest success was to bring the war to western 
Cuba, the centre of Spanish power on the island, where Havana and most of the 
agricultural production was located. The Invasión also revealed the Spanish inability to 
defend the countryside. Indeed, despite the rebel invaders trying to avoid direct 
confrontation with the Spanish troops as much as possible and conquering no important 
town, they made their presence felt by burning cane fields and sugar mills, blowing up 
railways, cutting telegraph lines, and looting towns, which were often defended by Cuban 
Volunteers.88 
Small towns were particularly attractive for the insurgents, for the weak defence 
posed by Volunteers, the scarce presence of regular troops, and the possibility of looting 
shops and houses in their search for weapons, clothing, food, women, and recruits. The 
response of the Volunteers, and the entire civilian population, often depended on the 
support of the regular army and was determined by the fact that they could expect no 
mercy from the rebels in the event of being caught in combat. As Tone wrote in detail, the 
rebels felt a deep hatred for the Cuban Volunteers, regarding them as traitors to the cause 
of a free Cuba.89 Unless they joined the rebel forces, the Cuban Volunteers could expect to 
be killed by their fellow countrymen if captured.90 Simply possessing travel documents 
issued by the Spanish authorities could lead to loyalist Cubans being killed by the 
insurgents.91 
Consequently, in the absence of regular troops, they often surrendered to the 
mambís. For instance, on 6th January 1896, four companies of the Volunteers of the 
Santiago de los Baños Volunteer Battalion, the town’s only defenders, surrendered to the 
men of Antonio Maceo and gave up ca. 500 rifles plus ammunition. Quite tellingly, the 
Volunteers decided not to resist the attack after the pleas of their fellow townsfolk, who 
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yelled at them that to resist would mean having the town burnt down by the rebels.92 By 
giving up their weapons, they had also probably avoided death. This might cause one to 
reconsider the supposed popular support for the invasion sustained by Cuban chroniclers 
of the time and since. The war was imposed by the insurgency upon the inhabitants of 
western Cuba. Refusing to fight the invaders did not necessarily mean support for an 
independent Cuba. For instance, none of the Volunteers in San Antonio de los Baños 
decided to join the rebel ranks.93 
When the Volunteers fought alongside the Army, their performance was sharply 
different. On 5th and 6th February 1896, the Volunteers from Candelaria (Pinar del Río 
province), alongside 50 regular soldiers, resisted a 30-hour attack by Antonio Maceo’s 
men. Some of the Volunteers were Basque, but most were Cuban, many of whom were 
Black and Mulatto, who donned the typical Basque beret of their comrades-at-arms. Their 
combative attitude had Maceo, a mulatto, yelling to his men to cut the throat of the Black 
Volunteers should they capture the town. This menace possibly intensified the defence, 
which was labelled as ‘heroic’ by the mambí chronicler José Miró Argenter.94 Despite 
having taken the outer defences, and burnt several houses, the rebels withdrew after 
realising the impossibility of taking the town. Candelaria was an example of the good 
fighting skills of the Volunteers fighting alongside army units. It was also a demonstration 
of the divisions in the Cuban society during the war, for Cubans had fought on both sides 
in Candelaria. 
The cases of San Antonio de los Baños and Candelaria are just two examples of the 
type of war that was fought in Cuba during Martínez Campos’ term, and the Invasión de 
Occidente. This was a guerrilla war, in which the Spanish Army poorly defended the 
countryside, often leaving it to the sole protection of the Volunteers. The Volunteers alone 
could hardly repeal the rebels’ thrust, whereas the support of the Army often resulted in a 
successful defence.  
The overall military situation in Cuba, however, was not going well for Spain. The 
cities remained under Spanish control, but the countryside was largely a domain of Cuba 
Libre. The letter to Cánovas del Castillo had shown that Arsenio Martínez de Campo lacked 
the courage to conduct a harsher type of war, which would require concentrating peasants, 
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deemed necessary to win the war. Either voluntarily or forcibly, rural populations provided 
information and logistics to the rebels. In any guerrilla war, the collaboration of the rural 
inhabitants proves vital for the insurgency. For that task, Martínez de Campos 
recommended Valeriano Weyler, a soldier with vast military experience in the colonies. 
He had fought in Santo Domingo, in Cuba, and had been captain general of the Philippines 
(1888-1891).95 Also, the rebel forces inflicted upon the Spanish Army two humiliating 
defeats at Peralejo (14th July 1895) and Mal Tiempo (15th December 1895) on its way to 
western Cuba.96 
The second half of 1895 showed the Spanish forces’ incapacity to tackle the 
invading rebel forces, bringing panic to the supporters of a Spanish Cuba, and rendering 
the continuity of Martínez de Campos untenable. In Havana, rumours of a coup against 
Martínez de Campos began to circulate by late 1895. By January 1896 sabre rattling in the 
Volunteer battalions in Havana became dangerously persistent.97 The opposition to the 
captain general in Havana was shared in Madrid, especially in the conservative circles and 
the government. Eventually, the decision to wage a more brutal war was taken in Madrid, 
and on 10th February 1896, Valeriano Weyler assumed the Captaincy General of Cuba. 
 
3. The Volunteers and the Peasants’ Concentration 
The arrival of Valeriano Weyler to Cuba meant a dramatic change in the type of war waged 
in Cuba. A veteran soldier, experienced in colonial warfare, he advocated for hasher 
methods to fight the insurgency.98 His strategy rested on two pillars. First, he advocated 
concentrating the dispersed army units into relatively large columns (ca. 200 men) to 
chase the rebel forces, thus leaving the defence of the countryside to the Volunteers 
(including Volunteers who had been mobilized from the cities) and other irregular units.99 
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Second, the relocation of the entire peasant population into fortified areas, aimed at 
depriving the enemy of the logistical support it often found among the rural communities, 
either voluntarily or forcibly.100 
This section will focus on the Volunteers’ role during the relocation of the rural 
inhabitants, for this was undoubtedly the most controversial measure conducted during 
the war. The Volunteers certainly took part in it as auxiliary forces to the regular army 
units that conducted the eviction of the peasants to fortified areas and towns. It consisted 
of the concentration of ca. 400,000 peasants, of whom between 155,000 and 170,000 
perished due to starvation and maladies, according to Jordi Maluquer de Motes.101 This 
meant that ca. 10% of the Cuban population died because of the concentration, which 
earned Weyler the nickname of ‘butcher’, given by the pro-Cuban independence press in 
the United States.102 Formally, the concentrations lasted from February 1896 to March 
1898, when Weyler’s successor, Ramón Blanco, decreed their formal end.103  
The existing literature on how it was carried out, scarce in comparison to the 
impact of the concentration, has tended to focus exclusively on the responsibility of the 
Spanish authorities for the tragedy. This is, for instance, the approach by Francisco Pérez 
Guzmán and Rafael Izquierdo Canosa.104 The latter argued that the goal of the 
concentration was to ‘exterminate the Cuban population’.105 However, the more recent 
study by Stucki shows that the concentration had a much more complex reality, in which 
both the Spanish and the Cuban rebel forces had their share of responsibility for the 
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tragedy of having one in ten Cubans killed. Stucki considers events beyond the formal 
concentration decreed by Weyler.106 In fact, it was a twofold process. On the one hand, 
there was a forcible concentration conducted during Weyler’s term (February 1896 – 
October 1897). On the other, there was an ongoing flow of refugees towards the cities, 
fleeing from the hardships of the war and the harassment from the rebel forces. There was 
also an internal migration of peasants towards the insurgency-controlled areas fleeing 
from the Spanish repression and their policy of forced concentration.107 
The focus here will be on the Volunteers’ participation in the movement of refugees 
towards the Spanish-controlled areas. They acted as auxiliary forces to the regular army 
units that conducted the eviction of the peasant communities toward fortified areas and 
towns. According to Francisco Pérez Guzmán, abuses of men, women, and children were 
frequent.108 The Volunteers’ share of responsibility in the tragedy is undeniable. Some 
Volunteers were also victims of the war, who used the concentrations as a possibility to 
escape from the harassment of the mambís. 
One of the provinces most deeply affected by the horrors of the war was Pinar del 
Río, in the westernmost part of Cuba. This province consisted mostly of small towns, and 
its economy heavily depended on the tobacco-growing industry, traditionally manned by 
Cuban peasants of Canary Islander descent.109 During the war, it was devastated. From 
when the troops of Antonio Maceo invaded the province in January 1896, until the death 
of the rebel leader in December of that very year, Pinar del Río was the centre of constant 
military action between Spanish troops and insurgent forces that burnt down or ransacked 
most of the towns.110 
Despite having far more men than the rebels, the Spanish forces were unable to 
expel the rebels from Pinar del Río. More than 16,000 Spanish regular soldiers were 
incapable of defeating the 4,000 mambís, cavalry forces commanded by Antonio Maceo. 
Their high mobility and skilful management of attacks by surprise allowed them to destroy 
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farms and ransack towns throughout 1896.111 As in eastern Cuba, the Spanish forces were 
widely disseminated throughout the territory, and the rebels only attacked a town when 
they outnumbered the defenders. One estimate was that there were 12,000 Volunteers in 
the province, remaining trapped in an enclosed warzone and stuck in their hometowns.112 
Faced with this situation, Valeriano Weyler decided to enclose the rebel troops within the 
province with the construction of the Mariel-Majana trocha, a military line that isolated 
the province from the rest of the island, seeking to ‘cleanse’ the area of rebel forces.113 
Part of Weyler’s strategy was to concentrate the peasants, which in Pinar del Río 
formally began on 21st October 1896. By the end of 1897, out of a population of more than 
225,000 inhabitants, at least 35,000 had been reconcentrados.114 It is difficult to establish 
how many had been forcibly concentrated, and how many had taken shelter in the 
Spanish-controlled areas. However, it is evident that for some one hundred loyalists, being 
concentrated was a chance to protect their lives.115 This was the case for the reconcentrados 
in the fortified town of Dimas, a small town on the northern coast of Pinar del Río. 
Thanks to the discovery of an unpublished report by Lino Galán, military 
commander of Dimas, it can now be stated that a few hundred loyalists had been 
concentrated in that town, whereas most of the peasants had either joined or assisted the 
mambís.116 According to Galán, the mass defection had been caused by the fear of an 
imminent rebel victory, rather than a sincere support for an independent Cuba. Thus, this 
was a way to avoid retaliation. Therefore, confidence in the Spanish forces’ real chances to  
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Image 9. The Volunteers of Dimas in front of the Tejar fort. This picture was taken on 18th July 1896, and first 
published by the Havana-based magazine La Caricatura on 30th July 1896. Photo: Gómez Carrera. AGMM, F. 
05953. 
quell the insurgency was low. Consequently, only a minority of refuge-seekers settled in 
Spanish-controlled areas. 
According to the report, most of Dimas’ refugees were Cuban Volunteers and 
guerrilleros with their families.117 They were people who particularly identified with the 
Spanish cause, who believed they would face certain death if caught by the rebels. Even 
before the concentration decree of October 1896, the loyalists that had taken refuge in 
Dimas probably chose this location because it had some regular troops and a gunboat 
protecting the area. Since mid-1896, Dimas began to attract more loyalists from the nearby 
towns of Mantua, Remates, Bajas, and Guane. These men and their families contributed 
to their own alimentation and defence since their arrival. They not only ploughed the crop 
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zones established around the town but also surrounded the town with a barbed-wire fence 
and built several forts, one of which can be seen in image 9. 
The existence of a place like Dimas was a challenge to the insurgency’s political 
project. Throughout the report, Lino Galán informs of several attacks by the mambís, most 
especially on the outer forts and the crops. It is most probable that the rebel forces, which 
often ran out of food, pillaged the crops to feed their ranks. Stucki’s analysis suggests that 
these attacks were also aimed at depriving Cuban loyalists the means to survive and their 
shelter, such as their crops and fortified towns, which had to be defended by the 
reconcentrados themselves.118 
This means that close to no support was received by the Spanish authorities, 
beyond the scant presence of regular troops. The reconcentrados had to provide their own 
food and defence. Nonetheless, it seems that Dimas was a success, and it kept attracting 
more loyalists. In the report, Lino Galán confessed that “due to the arrival of new people, 
we cannot fit them into the town”. Thus, new crop areas and fortified settlements were 
built around the original area of Dimas, most notably in Tumbas de Estorino. Another 
reason to consider it a success was the absence of food requests, as it seems that Dimas 
and the other settlements had become self-sufficient. One of them, Bartolo, had even 
appointed a mayor, and its authorities seriously evaluated the construction of a telegraphic 
line to connect all the settlements around Dimas.119 The settlement consolidated, and even 
after the formal end of the concentration (30th March 1898), the town continued to exist 
to this day. 
Dimas is an example of the complexity of the tragedy suffered by the Cuban 
population during the period of reconcentración. Its dramatic death toll (ca. 10% of Cuba’s 
population killed) is undeniable, considering all the documentary evidence. The abuses 
inflicted upon the population during the forcible relocation by the Spanish authorities 
undoubtedly contributed to the ca. 170,000 people killed. However, the history of Dimas 
challenges the traditional view of the concentration, for it reveals evidence of the share of 
responsibility attributable to the insurgent, who caused a wave of internal migrants in 
different directions, and a reminder that, in many aspects, the war for independence can 
be understood as a Cuban civil war. 
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The reconcentración nearly emptied the Cuban countryside of peasants and 
Spanish forces, concentrating both in towns and military positions. Meanwhile, the 
insurgency controlled vast areas of rural Cuba, although the destruction of Cuba’s 
agricultural system had seriously affected the combative capacity of the mambís.120 
Throughout most of 1897, the war entered a less intense period, in which the shortage of 
food and casualties caused by illnesses were the major problems for both sides. The 
insurgents kept control of the countryside, and the Spanish forces remained entrenched 
in the cities, which were barely attacked by the mambises. In a situation of stalemate, the 
military operations were halted. This can also be observed in the Volunteer units’ military 
records, which barely record any important actions during 1897 beyond irregular attacks 
on their position by small enemy parties. The only military action of some relevance was 
the falling of Victoria de Las Tunas on 14th August 1897 to the insurgents, which became 
the sole city taken by the mambís throughout the war.121 By the end of that year, however, 
the urban colleagues of the Volunteers entered a period of agitation against the Spanish 
authorities, due to major changes in the political and military conduct of the war.       
 
4. Opposing the Reforms 
Although the removal of peasants had almost brought the war to a halt, its devastating 
costs on human lives and rural property were fuelling public opinion in the United States 
against Weyler and the continuity of Spain in Cuba. Weyler’s methods paved the road for 
the war between the United States and Spain, as argued by Philip S. Foner, David Trask, 
and Tone.122 The press, most notably the New York Journal and the World, owned by the 
magnates William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer respectively, started a 
sensationalist campaign against Spain’s presence in Cuba.123 This permeated to the US 
public, which voted in as president the Republican William McKinley (1897-1901), who was 
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a firm advocate of intervention in Cuba.124 The new administration was full of rhetoric 
against Spain, and for the expansion of the United States. The Vice-Secretary of the Navy, 
Theodore Roosevelt, the Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and the Admiral Alfred T. Mahan 
were among the staunchest advocates for the creation of a US empire at the expense of a 
weak rival like Spain.125 In fact, since the early 1890s the US Navy Department had been 
planning an imperial expansion which included not only Cuba but also Puerto Rico and 
the Philippines as parts of a chain that would allow the US to dominate the seas from the 
Caribbean to the South China Sea through an already projected Panama Canal.126 
In September 1897, the new administration posed Spain an ultimatum: unless 
Madrid ended the reconcentración, granted Cuba political autonomy, and ended the war, 
the United States would intervene.127 This, of course, meant the military invasion of Cuba. 
Throughout 1897, the Republican-controlled Congress openly debated events in Cuba, and 
the possibility of recognising the belligerent status of the insurgents was seriously 
contemplated.128 
In Spain, although these demands were formally rejected, Antonio Cánovas del 
Castillo’s Conservative cabinet (1895-1897) was aware that not meeting at least some of 
them would probably lead to a war against the United States. Thus, the Spanish Congress 
began to debate a set of reforms presented by the Government in February 1897.129 This 
project was thwarted by the assassination of President Cánovas by an Italian anarchist on 
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8th August 1897.130 Knowing that the Conservative Party had no leader strong enough to 
replace Cánovas, the Regent Queen Maria Christina (1885-1902) called the Liberal Práxedes 
Mateo Sagasta to assume the presidency in October 1897.131 
The coming to power of the Liberal president profoundly changed Spanish policy 
in the Antilles. Contrary to Cánovas del Castillo, who relied on a military solution for Cuba, 
Sagasta believed that the war should have a political solution, which necessarily meant 
meeting some of the US’s demands: ending the concentrations and granting political 
autonomy. The man chosen to bring the new policy to Cuba was Captain General Ramón 
Blanco y Erenas (1897-1898).132 Only weeks after his arrival in Cuba as captain general, 
Blanco allowed the reconcentrados to return to their villages if they were in areas 
controlled by the Spanish troops (13th November 1897), and the Government granted Cuba 
and Puerto Rico a generous political autonomy (25th November 1897).133 The inclusion of 
Puerto Rico responded to the agreement the metropolitan Liberal Party and the Puerto 
Rican Autonomist Party had reached in 1896, consisting of political support in exchange 
for autonomy in case the metropolitan Liberals came to power.134 
Although these measures were deemed necessary by the Government to secure 
peace in Cuba and to avoid war against the United States, the Antillean integristas saw 
                                                 
130 Antonio Cánovas del Castillo (1828-1897) was shot by Michele Angiolillo at the Santa Águeda spa 
in Cestona (Basque Country). Angiolillo, a London-based Italian anarchist, decided to assassinate 
Cánovas del Castillo in retaliation for the Proceso de Montjuich. This was a trial which sanctioned 
the execution in April 1897 of 5 Anarchists and the imprisonment of another 19. They had been 
accused of perpetrating a bomb attack that killed 12 and injured 35 on 7th June 1896 in Barcelona. 
On his way from London to the Basque Country, Angiolillo made contact in Paris with Ramón 
Emeterio Betances, the representative of the Cuban insurgents in France, who gave him some 
financial aid. I am deeply grateful to Francisco J. Romero Salvadó for this information, which will 
appear in his forthcoming book ¿Quién mató a Eduardo Dato? Comedia política, tragedia social. 
Granada: Comares, 2019. Also see Ángel Herrerín López. “1893: año clave del terrorismo en la España 
de la Restauración”. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie V, Historia Contemporánea. 2008, t. 20, pp. 71-
91; Demetrio Ramos. “El antillanismo extremista: Betances y los ‘velos’ que cubrieron la muerte de 
Cánovas”, in De Diego García & Ramos. Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas, pp. 73-110; Tone. War and 
Genocide, pp. 232-233. For the Proceso de Montjuich see Antoni Dalmau i Ribalta. El procès de 
Montjuïc. Barcelona a finals del segle XIX. Barcelona: Base/Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2010.  
131 Fernández Almagro. Historia de la España contemporánea, vol. II, pp. 7-23. 
132 Ramón Blanco y Erenas, Marquis of Peña Plata, had already been Cuba’s captain general (1879-
1881), and had recently been the captain general of the Philippines (1893-1896). 
133 José Trías Monge, chief justice of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico (1974-1985) considered in 
1997 that the autonomy granted by Spain in 1897 “was much greater in several aspects than what 
the United States has been willing to concede up to the present”. Puerto Rico. The Trials of the 
Oldest Colony in the World. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997, p. 13. 
134 As a part of the agreement, the Autonomist Party became the Puerto Rican branch of the Liberal 
Party, with this losing its status as an independent party. This caused the secession of the ‘Orthodox 
Autonomists’, led by José Celso Barbosa, who rejected an absorption by a Monarchical metropolitan 
political party. Bothwell. Orígenes y desarrollo, pp. 30-32. 
192 
 
them as a concession to the ‘Yankees’ and the autonomists, who had traditionally been 
considered as treacherous. However, the fact that Cuba was undergoing a war, and Puerto 
Rico was not, determined the intensity with which the integristas opposed both autonomy 
and the dismantling of the practice of reconcentración. 
In Puerto Rico, the Volunteers took no action against autonomy. This was partly 
caused by the split of the Unconditional Party over its very implementation. Considering 
the close links between the incondicionales and the Volunteers, the party division also 
resulted in the political division of the Volunteers. Initially, the Unconditional Party’s 
rejection of autonomy had caused the split in November 1897 of the Unconditional Party 
of the Progressive Left, which openly accepted autonomy.135 It was led by Vicente Balbás 
Capó, a Puerto Rican journalist, former incondicional deputy, and Volunteer major.136 This 
new party aspired to participate in autonomist politics. The fact that the autonomy regime 
had been negotiated between the Spanish liberals and the Puerto Rican autonomists 
without the participation of the incondicionales, meant that rejecting autonomy might 
lead them to complete isolation. Thus, the Unconditional Progressive Left Party accepted 
the new political situation and aspired to avoid political marginalization by becoming an 
active participant in the new regime.137 Only in order to stop the defections to the new 
party, Pedro Arzuaga, leader of the Unconditional Spanish Party since September 1897, 
imposed the acceptance of autonomy by early-December 1897.138 Hence, despite their 
initial reluctance and a split, incondicionales accepted the new political regime for the 
island while seeking to become an interlocutor of the Liberal Party in the Peninsula. Under 
these circumstances, the Volunteers followed the path taken by the integrista political 
leaders and took no action against autonomy. 
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In Cuba, however, the war had made these political compromises much harder to 
achieve. The local integrista party, the Constitutional Union, had always rejected 
autonomy, and it was confident in the possibilities it had to reverse the situation. During 
the days of Weyler in Havana and Cánovas del Castillo in Madrid, the constitucionales had 
been the privileged political actors in Cuba. The strategy of an uncompromising, harsh 
war against the insurgency had been supported by the most intransigent elements of the 
integristas.139 The new policy of the Liberals and Ramón Blanco was thus a major setback 
to their aspirations. As for the Cuban Autonomist Party, it had never been as popular as 
its Puerto Rican counterpart and was rather marginalized by Weyler for he distrusted the 
party’s real commitment to the Spanish cause.140 The integristas, including the Volunteers, 
were not willing to tolerate the coming to power of a new regime in which the autonomists 
held power.  
The Cuban American historian Louis A. Pérez, Jr. labelled the integrista opposition 
to autonomy in Cuba as the “rebellion of the loyal”.141 Historiography has traditionally 
considered that the integristas’ rejection of autonomy was one of the reasons for its failure, 
alongside the Cuban insurgency’s rejection of any agreement with the Spanish 
Government that was not based on the island’s independence.142 Although it falls outside 
the remit of this thesis, it is considered here that the very concept of the failure of 
autonomy in Cuba should be revised. Between the decree of autonomy of 25th November 
1897 and the US declaration of war against Spain on 25th April 1898, the number of mambís 
giving up arms and accepting autonomy would grow despite the death threats from rebel 
leaders Máximo Gómez and Calixto García.143 Also, evidence has been found that relevant 
members of the Cuban insurgent government, the so-called República en Armas, did try 
to negotiate a peace agreement with the Spanish authorities on the basis of autonomy.144 
Although most of the mambí commanders fiercely condemned the mere possibility of 
negotiation, the evidence is that hundreds of insurgents, alongside their families, began 
to surrender to the Spanish authorities. Just around Manzanillo, in March 1898, more than 
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170 people quit the insurgency and accepted autonomy within the Spanish Monarchy.145 
Even some high-ranking officers gave up their fight, such as the mambí brigadier Juan 
Masó Parra who capitulated alongside 120 of his men in January 1898.146 Thus, here it is 
considered that it was the US military invasion, and not the integrista or the mambí 
opposition to it, that was the real cause of the failure of Cuban autonomy. Some authors 
have argued that even the mambí leaders’ rejection of autonomy was promoted by the US 
Government, which was eagerly interested in its failure.147 A consolidated autonomy in 
Cuba would have meant the continuity of Spanish rule. 
Even though US intervention is argued here to be the main cause of the failure of 
the autonomist project, it is true that the integristas mobilized against autonomy from its 
very inception. The Volunteers were often used to show discontent against the authorities. 
This was a purely urban reaction, related to the traditionally unruly nature of the urban 
Volunteers. This mobilization was directed against autonomy, press freedom and the 
measures taken by Captain General Ramón Blanco to assuage the appalling living 
conditions of the reconcentrados.148 
Although the war was fought in the countryside, the situation in the cities was 
critical too. The arrival of thousands of reconcentrados, coupled with food shortages, 
spread the idea that the victory of the insurgency might be likely. In this context, 
                                                 
145 Manzanillo’s military commander, Lieutenant Colonel Luis Otero Pimentel, reported that 
between 7th March and 6th April 1898 72 mambises, 62 women, and 108 children quit the insurgency 
and accepted Spanish sovereignty. AHPSC, Gobierno Provincial, leg. 743, exp. 25. Apart from his 
military career, Luis Otero Pimentel (1834-1920) also developed a writing career in Cuba, including 
Memoria sobre los Voluntarios de la isla de Cuba (1876). 
146 Juan Masó Parra was not the only officer. Accompanying him there were the lieutenant colonels 
Augusto Feria, and José del Carmen Hernández, the majors Feliciano Quesada, Saturnino León, and 
Victoriano Gómez, the captain Santiago Carrera, five lieutenants, and 110 soldiers. The surrender 
took place on 20th January in Sancti Spíritus (province of Santa Clara). All these men took their 
weapons and ammunition with them to the Spanish authorities. During the act of accepting 
Spanish sovereignty, they hailed the regent Queen Marie Christine, Spanish Cuba, and autonomy. 
After this act, Juan Masó Parra joined the Spanish Army as colonel and organized a brigade named 
Cuba española. AHPSC, Gobierno Provincial, leg. 743, exp. 37; La Unión Constitucional, 26-04-1898. 
All the details of the capitulation in Enrique Ubieta. Efemérides de la Revolución Cubana, vol. I. 
Havana: La Moderna Poesía, 1911, pp. 129-130. 
147 Agustín Sánchez Andrés. “Entre la espada y la pared. El régimen autonómico cubano, 1897-1898”. 
Revista Mexicana del Caribe, 2003, Año/Vol. VIII, No. 16, pp. 7-41. 
148 The US consul in Matanzas reported to his colleague, the general-consul in Havana, John 
Fitzhugh Lee, that Adolfo Porset, former governor of Matanzas province, was holding meetings 
with government officials, the army, Civil Guard, Volunteers, and local leaders of the integrista 
Constitutional Union party to plot against the captain general, and organize attacks against foreign 
consulates and nationals—basically US citizens—and to create a state of instability in Matanzas. 
The information was confirmed by a report send on 6th December 1897 by the governor of Matanzas 
to the captain general, AGMM, Ultramar, Capitanía General de Cuba, caja 5791, exp. 40. 
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autonomy was interpreted by the most radical elements of integrismo as a signal of 
weakness, hence a step towards the defeat of Spain. Anger at the captain general became 
evident as early as Christmas Eve 1897. Amidst the celebration of that holiday in Havana’s 
Parque Central, groups of young men, among them several Volunteers, began to shout 
“Long Live, Spain! Long Live Weyler! Long Live the Volunteers! Down with autonomy!” in 
front of the headquarters of Diario de la Marina, for it had accepted the new autonomous 
regime.149 Just as during the Ten Years’ War, the republicans in the Peninsula were 
generally very critical of the Volunteers’ demonstration of radical patriotism against the 
authorities. La Iberia, a Madrid-based republican newspaper, considered this 
demonstration “a bothersome protest by a monopoly that will soon go; this is the last 
convulsion of the agiotistas [usurers] that do not want to lose their power”.150 
The most serious incident occurred on 12th January 1898, in Havana. On that day, 
about a hundred integristas, including Volunteers and army officers, took to the streets 
shouting, ‘Long Live Weyler’ and ‘Death to autonomy’. After having broken windows and 
doors on their way, the group ended up ransacking the premises of El Reconcentrado and 
La Discusión, two newspapers that openly criticised the integristas for their opposition to 
the measures taken by the captain general and threatened to loot the headquarters of the 
Diario de la Marina.151 
The involvement of the Volunteers in these events seems to have been evident, and 
the objective of ousting Captain General Ramón Blanco cannot be discarded as the real 
motivation for the violent demonstration. The Havana-based peninsular lawyer Arturo 
Amblard recalled that only two of the Volunteer chiefs were at the captaincy general’s 
palace during the riots. The rest only came when the Segundo Cabo, or second-in-
command after Ramón Blanco, called for them, for it became all too evident that their 
involvement in the riots could have easily ended up with the toppling of the captain 
general. However, not all of the Volunteers approved of these demonstrations, which only 
undermined the authority of Spanish power. The Volunteers were certainly committed to 
the continuity of Spanish sovereignty in the Antilles, but some of them considered that 
attacking the captain general was not the best way to secure it. This was particularly the 
                                                 
149 The demonstrators initially refused to leave the area, as requested by the police. The protest was 
finally disolved after the mounted unit of the batallón de Orden Público charged against the rioters, 
sabers in hand. La Lucha, 25-12-1897, p. 2. 
150 La Iberia, 28-12-1897. 
151 On 11th January 1898 El Reconcentrado published an article entitled “Fuga de granujas” (“Flight of 
the Rascals”), in which some well-known integristas were accused of making money out of the 
reconcentrados disgrace; El Reconcentrado, 11-01-1898, p. 1; Tone. War and Genocide, p. 240.  
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case with the middle and upper-middle class Volunteers, who considered that Blanco’s 
projects must at least been given a chance. There were even some Volunteer officers who 
supported autonomy.152 It is quite telling that the colonel of the Volunteer cavalry 
regiment, whose members tended to be more affluent than the infantry units, obliged his 
colleagues to collaborate and order their men to call off the demonstration.153 The loyalty 
of this regiment was not shared by most of their colleagues but certainly shows that the 
Volunteers were not a homogeneous group which univocally rejected autonomy. 
The most radical elements of the Havana Volunteers were plotting to oust Ramón 
Blanco because of his plan to dismantle Weyler’s policy of harsh measures against the 
rebels and the autonomists. Unlike their Puerto Rican colleagues, the Cuban integristas, 
especially in Havana, were not willing to accept the new political situation. They feared 
that the establishment of autonomy was a step towards independence and that it would 
be interpreted by the mambises as a sign of Spain’s weakness, not generosity. The 
integristas also considered that autonomy was not enough to calm the United States’ 
desire to intervene in Cuba. In a situation that recalled the context of 1869, the integristas 
felt trapped between autonomy, the insurgents, and the likely possibility of a US invasion. 
The Volunteers violent reaction to this was an expression of panic. This was the 
interpretation of an anonymous Cuban nationalist agent in Havana who witnessed the 
demonstration in January 1898. He considered that although the demonstrations had been 
‘impressive’, the integristas feared that the United States would go to war against Spain 
and that consequently Spain would be ousted from Cuba.154 
These fears were well grounded, for a war between Spain and the United States 
because of Cuba was becoming increasingly likely. In both countries, the press sustained 
an inflammatory campaign calling for a military clash, although it is not clear whether the 
administrations were committed to avoiding or provoking conflict.155 John L. Offner 
considered that the war was an unwelcome yet unavoidable conflict for both 
                                                 
152 Ricardo Calderón y Pontisi was alderman at Havana’s City Council for the Autonomist Party and 
lieutenant colonel of Havana’s 5th Volunteers Battalion. He resigned on the 12th January after some 
of his men invaded the Palace of the Captains General’s courtyard and remonstrated against Blanco. 
Calderón. Cabrera. Cuba and the Cubans, p. 192; Weyler. Mi mando en Cuba, vol. V, p. 535. 
153 The only officers were the colonels of the 5th Battalion and the Cavalry Volunteer Regiment. 
Amblard. Notas coloniales, pp. 291-292.   
154 The letter was sent from Havana on 8th February 1898 by ‘No. 12’ to ‘Fiacre’, two pseudonyms 
whose real names are ignored, BNC, CM Lufriu, No. 49.  
155 Sara Núñez de Prado Clavell. “La prensa y la opinión pública española en torno al ‘desastre’”, in 
Fusi & Niño Rodríguez (coord.). Antes del desastre, pp. 453-464; Rosario Sevilla Soler. “¿’Opinión 
pública’ frente a ‘opinión publicada’? 1898: la cuestión cubana”. Revista de Indias, 1998, vol. LVIII, 
No. 212, pp. 255-276. 
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Governments. Serrano argued that, since the war was deemed inevitable, the Spanish 
Government was convinced that possession of Cuba was now unsustainable and agreed to 
give up the island after a short but honourable conflict with the United States, rather than 
being defeated by the irregular insurgent Cuban forces.156 
Whatever the case, which is not the object of this study, the United States found 
its casus belli with the explosion of the USS Maine at Havana harbour on 15th February 
1898. This ship, which was sent by late January to Cuba’s capital allegedly to protect the 
lives and properties of the US nationals on the island, was blown up either by accident or 
following an inside job, killing more than 300 members of her crew.157 The US press, most 
notably, Hearst’s Journal and Pulitzer’s Globe, hurried to falsely accuse Spain of having had 
a direct hand in the explosion, henceforth asking for a military intervention to expel the 
country from Cuba.158 
The reaction in the United States to the explosion of USS Maine vastly increased 
the anti-US feelings which already existed among the integristas in Cuba. An agent of the 
revolution based in Havana informed a colleague in New York that groups of Volunteers 
rejoiced in Havana after it blew up because of the loss of American lives.159 The integrista 
press began a campaign criticising the United States, accusing its government of using the 
case of the reconcentrados and USS Maine as mere pretexts to conquer the island. An 
article published in the Havana-based newspaper Los Voluntarios considered that the only 
concern of McKinley and the Cuban exiles in the US was the expulsion of Spain, not the 
welfare of the Cuban people.160  
                                                 
156 Offner. An Unwanted War, pp. 127-159; Serrano. Final del imperio, pp. 32-37.  
157 The debate on the real cause of the explosion remains unsolved. However, a technical analysis of 
the explosion by the US Navy Admiral Rickover in 1976 demonstrated that it was not caused from 
the outside, but rather from the inside of the ship, thus practically discarding the case for a Spanish 
hand. H. G. Rickover. How the battleship Maine was destroyed. Washington D.C.: Naval History 
Division/Department of the Navy, 1976, pp. 75-91. The Spanish journalist Agustín Remesal offered 
a complete revision of the different theories: El enigma del Maine. 1898. El suceso que provocó la 
Guerra de Cuba. ¿Accidente o sabotaje? Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, 1998, pp. 181-223. 
158 Thomas. The War Lovers, pp. 209-229. 
159 The letter was sent on 19th February 1898 by “El Monje”, brother to the mambí officer Raoul 
Arango, to an unknown female agent of the revolution based in New York. BNC, CM Arango, No. 
59. 
160 Los Voluntarios, 27-03-1898, p. 2. Los Voluntarios was a newspaper created in 1895 in Havana to 
defend the interest of the Volunteers. It was closed shortly after the armistice between Spain and 
the US in August 1898. In 1898 its director was Mario Lacorte, one of the early promoters of cycling 
in Cuba, member of Havana’s Sport Club and director of the magazine El Ciclista. El Deporte 
Velocipédico, 24-06-1896, p. 4. 
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In any case, Captain General Ramón Blanco tried to avoid US military intervention 
in Cuba by meeting the most important demand of McKinley’s Government: that Spain 
put the war against the insurgents to an end. Blanco decreed a unilateral ceasefire on 10th 
April, which was nonetheless disregarded by the insurgents as they had not been consulted 
and had never accepted any proposal of the kind. Despite this gesture by Spain towards 
the demands posed by the US Government, after intense diplomatic activity throughout 
March and most of April, the US Congress declared war on Spain on 25th April 1898, even 
though military operations had already begun on the 20th April with the US Navy blockade 
of Cuba.161 
 
5. War Against the United States 
The performance of the Volunteers during the war between Spain and the United States 
was diverse, ranging from effective fighting to desertion, not always to the enemy, but 
certainly away from the frontline. This was the case in the Cuban, Puerto Rican, and 
Filipino scenarios, and was directly related to the performance of the regular army and the 
ability of the Spanish authorities to handle the situation. 
 
5.1. Cuba 
At the start of the war against the US, the Volunteers in Cuba were still an impressive force 
of ca. 90,000 men that collaborated with the regular Army (115,000 men) in the defensive 
preparations against the expected US invasion.162 As early as 20th April 1898, Captain 
General Ramón Blanco decreed the mobilization of the Volunteers in order to create new 
companies to be embedded into the regular infantry battalions.163 In Havana, where the 
situation of the troops was already desperate due to the lack of ammunition and food 
                                                 
161 Trask. The War with Spain, pp. 30-59; Julián Companys Monclús. De la explosión del Maine a la 
ruptura de relaciones diplomáticas entre Estados Unidos y España (1898). Lérida: Estudi General de 
Lleida, 1989, pp. 46-126. 
162 Arturo Amblard considered that by late-1897 there were 90,214 Volunteers distributed 
throughout Cuba as follows: 28,616 in Havana province (20,124 in the capital), 12,163 in Pinar del 
Río, 11,316 in Matanzas, 20,682 in Santa Clara, 1,867 in Camagüey, and 9,889 in Oriente. See Notas 
coloniales, p. 163. More recently, María Magdalena Fernández-Peña Bernaldo de Quirós considered 
that there were 86,000 Volunteers in Cuba. See La oligarquía indiana, Asturias-Cuba: opinión 
pública y propaganda (1898-1899). Ph.D. Thesis. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2014, 
p. 161. 
163 The embedding of the mobilized Volunteers into the regular Army was a regular practice, for it 
was considered that their military performance could be improved under the command of army 
officers. ANRC, Asuntos Políticos, leg. 240, exp. 21.   
199 
 
caused by the US Navy blockade, new units of Volunteers were created.164 Retired Navy 
personnel and the strong community of Catalan migrants, for instance, created their own 
Volunteer companies.165 Throughout the island, the Volunteers were a key element in the 
defensive strategy organized by the military authorities, as in many towns they were the 
majority if not the sole Spanish garrison. From east to west, Cuba’s Volunteers contributed 
to the Juntas de Defensa with financial aid and their physical work by digging trenches and 
building forts.166 Thus, during the spring of 1898, whereas the regular troops were generally 
gathered around the most important cities, the defence of small towns still depended on 
the Volunteers. In the cities, their role was generally constrained to upholding public 
order. For instance, in Santiago de Cuba, they were supposed to defend official buildings 
in case of alarm.167  
However, the real test of the Volunteers’ commitment to the defence of the island 
took place in Santiago de Cuba, where the fate of the war was sealed. The campaign to 
take the city began on 26th June with the landing of the US invading force and ended on 
                                                 
164 According to the Army General Luis María de Pando, the armoury of Havana had only 2,000 
rifles, which were meant to supply 26,000 troops in the province of Havana, and 14,000 in Pinar del 
Río. Also, the armoury could only count on 20 rounds of ammunition per Remington rifle, which 
was the weapon used by the Volunteers. Luis M. de Pando. Documento presentado al Senado por el 
Excmo. Sr. Senador D. Luis M. de Pando en 22 de octubre de 1898. Madrid: Imprenta y Fundición de 
los Hijos de J. A. García, 1899, p. 16. For the situation in Havana during the US Navy blockade see 
María del Carmen Barcia Zequeira. “El 98 en La Habana: Sociedad y vida cotidiana”. Revista de 
Indias, 1998, vol. LVIII, No. 212, pp. 85-99.   
165 The Batallón de Voluntarios Marineros was created on 22nd May 1898. Its colonel was the Navy 
officer Enrique Freixes and it was made up of six companies of 150 men each. It was dissolved on 
29th August 1898, two weeks after the war’s end. AGMM, Ultramar, Capitanía General de Cuba, caja 
4690, “Voluntarios Marineros General Blanco”. The Compañía de Voluntarios Catalanes was created 
on 31st May 1898 and consisted of a captain, two lieutenants, plus 72 men. AGMM, Ultramar, 
Capitanía General de Cuba, caja 4690, Voluntarios de La Habana. Voluntarios Catalanes. 
166 For instance, in Artemisa (Pinar del Río province), whilst the soldiers of the Batallón de Vergara 
defended the town, the Volunteers from Guanajay’s 6th Company, the Artemisa Volunteers, and a 
section of Havana’s 6th Volunteer Battalion built the forts and the trenches. There was also a new 
system of contributions. Whereas the propertied classes had to pay higher taxes to afford the 
defensive system, the unpropertied ones had to contribute with their physical work. AGMM, 
Ultramar, Capitanía General de Cuba, caja 3223. In Gibara (Oriente), the local Volunteers and the 
Casino Español closely collaborated with the Military Commander to organize the town’s defences. 
For instance, the Junta de Defensa of Gibara was created by Carlos Moreno, the local Military 
Commander, at the Casino Español on 30th April 1898. It was presided over by himself, and among 
the members there were the harbour captain, the mayor, the local priest, the judge, and the 
Volunteer Colonels Antonio Fernández, Casimiro de la Torre, Cándido de Leyva, José H. Beola, José 
A. Garrido, Rufino Vega, Juan Camps, José Almarza, Francisco Fránquiz, and Atanasio G. Riancho. 
That very day, the local Casino Español collected 9,000 pesos for the war effort, and issued a call 
exhorting all men capable of bearing arms to join the Volunteers. AGMM, Ultramar, Capitanía 
General de Cuba, caja 3691; Suplemento a la Legalidad, 30-04-1898. 
167 On 15th May 1898 the city’s Governor José Toral ordered the Volunteers to protect the seats of the 




14th July 1898 with the 
surrender of the 
Spanish troops at 
Santiago de Cuba. The 
main military 
operations consisted of 
the battle for the outer 
forts of Santiago 
located in El Caney and 
San Juan Hill (1st July), 
and the naval battle of 
the bay of Santiago (3rd 
July), where the Spanish fleet under the command of Admiral Pascual Cervera was sunk 
by the US fleet led by Rear Admiral William T. Sampson.168 It is estimated that a 45,000-
strong US invading force faced ca. 15,000 Spanish defenders, including roughly 2,000 
Volunteers from Santiago 2nd and 1st battalion, whose chiefs and officers can be seen in 
image 10.169 The US troops counted on the aid of ca. 3,000 mambises on the ground, 
commanded by Calixto García, with combat experience gained from three years of 
fighting. However, these men were prevented from taking direct action and were relegated 
to a mere auxiliary force of the American troops in this conflict by Major General Shafter, 
commander of the US Army expedition.170 
Volunteers took part in all the military operations, but their performance was 
generally considered weak and unreliable by the army officers. For instance, the Spanish 
                                                 
168 Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete (1839-1909) was a veteran Navy officer who had participated 
in colonial campaigns in Africa, the Philippines, and Cuba. He had also been Minister of the Navy 
during the Liberal cabinet headed by Práxedes Mateo Sagasta in 1892-1893, and member of the 
Senate in three different terms between 1893 and 1909. For a biography of Admiral Cervera see 
Ángel Luis Cervera Fantoni. El desastre del 98 y el fin del imperio español. Visión inédita del 
Almirante Cervera. Madrid: Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, 2016. Rear Admiral William Thomas 
Sampson (1840-1902) was a veteran of the US Civil War and prior to the Spanish-American war had 
held several appointments at the Naval Academy and the Naval Department. 
169 For the Santiago de Cuba campaign see Baldovín Ruiz. Cuba, pp. 533-550; Elorza & Hernández 
Sandoica. La Guerra de Cuba, 417-451; Foner. The Spanish-Cuban-American War, vol. II, 388-405; 
Musicant. Empire by Default, pp. 352-515; O’Toole. The Spanish War, pp. 254-352; Trask. The War 
with Spain, pp. 194-335. 
170 William Rufus Shafter (1835-1906) was a veteran of the American Civil War and the Indian Wars. 
Before being appointed chief of the expedition against Cuba, he was commander of the Department 
of California. Enrique Collazo. Los americanos en Cuba. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1972 
(first published by Imprenta y Papelería C. Martínez y Cía., 1905, 2 vols.), pp. 219-236; Pérez, Jr. Cuba 
Between Empires, pp. 211-228.  
Image 10. Chief and officers of Santiago de Cuba’s 1st Volunteer Battalion. La 
Ilustración ibérica, 29-08-1896, p. 554. 
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Army officer Severo Gómez Núñez wrote that the Volunteers deserted whenever they had 
the chance and abandoned Santiago de Cuba when the Governor José Toral allowed 
civilians to leave the city (4th July 1898), when combat against the American besiegers 
intensified. Gómez Núñez argued that the Volunteers removed their uniforms and 
abandoned the city disguised as civilians. In times of war, the Volunteers were considered 
soldiers, so a permit granted on 4th July to leave the town did not include the Volunteers.171 
The evidence contradicts Gómez Núñez because not all the Volunteers left Santiago. 
When the Governor Linares allowed the evacuation of the civilians, the Catalan Volunteer 
Jaume Sans recalled that most of his comrades-at-arms left for the countryside with their 
families disguised among the civilians, alongside most of the town’s 25,000 inhabitants, 
but a few hundreds of his comrades-at-arms remained in the city. According to Sans, by 
the 6th of July, there were less than 1,000 civilians in Santiago, plus 13,000 starving and 
short-of-ammunition defenders, including around 500 Volunteers.172 Their low morale was 
not dramatically different from the regular soldiers’. Their military efficiency and their 
commitment to the defence of the city only faded away over subsequent days, when it 
became clear that the men defending Santiago de Cuba had no chance of lifting the siege.173 
In the battles at El Caney and San Juan Hill, in which ca. 1,000 Spanish troops 
(including regular soldiers and Volunteers) faced a 15,000-strong force, the Volunteers put 
in an outstanding performance, in line with the combat spirit of the regular troops.174 No 
desertion was recorded, and 40 Volunteers died while covering the retreat of the regular 
troops, and their wounded and dead, from the fort of Canosa in San Juan Hill.175 However, 
as the days passed by, the shortages of food, weapons, and ammunition became graver, 
and the morale of the defenders grew weaker. The US attackers met with fierce resistance 
and were as much affected by dysentery as the defenders, but the situation within the city 
                                                 
171 Severo Gómez Núñez was an artillery major at the time of the Cuban war and director of the 
Havana-based military newspaper Diario del Ejército. Severo Gómez Núñez. La Guerra Hispano-
Americana. Santiago de Cuba. Madrid: Imprenta del Cuerpo de Artillería, 1901, p. 61.  
172 David Jou i Andreu. El 98 vist pels sitgetans. Memòries de Jaume Sans sobre el setge americà a 
Santiago de Cuba. Sitges: Ajuntament de Sitges, 1999, pp. 57-58.  
173 For the morale of the Spanish soldiers during the colonial wars, see Manuel Montero García. “La 
moral militar de los soldados españoles durante las guerras coloniales, 1895-1898”. Revista de 
Historia Militar, Año LXI, 2017, No. 121, pp. 199-233.  
174 Collazo. Los americanos en Cuba, pp. 155-218; Musicant. Empire by Default, pp. 390-431; Trask. 
The War with Spain, pp. 225-256. 
175 Ironically, this action was recorded by Severo Gómez Núñez, who in the same book has accused 
all the Volunteers of leaving Santiago de Cuba before the final attack by the US troops. See La 
Guerra Hispano-Americana. Santiago de Cuba, p. 145-147. 
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was desperate, especially after Major General Shafter, commander of the US troops, 
announced the bombardment of the city within 24 hours on 4th July. 
To avoid unnecessary bloodshed, and following orders from the Spanish 
Government, the city surrendered on 14th July, on the condition that the insurgents were 
not granted access to the city. José Toral and the defenders that remained within Santiago 
feared reprisals from the men they had fought for more than three years. Calixto García, 
the leader of the mambís surrounding Santiago staunchly opposed this request, the 
strongest military presence of the US Army enforced it and prevented the rebels from 
entering Santiago when it was given up by the Spanish forces on 17th July 1898. Thus, 
ironically the men that had purportedly landed in Cuba to aid the Cuban nationalists in 
achieving their independence, ended up protecting the lives and properties of the Spanish 
loyalists. This was received as a relief especially by the Volunteers, who unlike the army 
soldiers, had their families and jobs well established in Santiago de Cuba. After the 
occupation, confraternization between the Volunteers and army soldiers and American 
troops was prevalent in the city, whereas the mambises were still camped outside Santiago 
de Cuba.176     
 
5.2. Puerto Rico 
The performance of the Volunteers in Puerto Rico was like that of their Cuban colleagues, 
although the war on this island lasted just three weeks and lacked any major military 
action. The Volunteers participated in the preparations for conflict as soon as the US 
declared war on Spain. On paper, they were ready to resist the invasion alongside the 
Army. There were 7,331 Volunteers alongside ca. 8,000 regular soldiers.177 In San Juan, the 
Puerto Rican Vicente Balbás Capó created the Batallón de Tiradores de Altura, made up of 
well-known incondicionales of the capital city and Volunteer veterans.178 Throughout the 
island, new sections and companies were created, despite the lack of resources in some 
areas. For instance, a force of Voluntarios Macheteros was created in early May, made up 
                                                 
176 Pérez, Jr. Cuba Between Empires, pp. 212-217.   
177 Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la Guerra, p.  449-455. 
178 This battalion was created on 23rd April 1898, two days before the declaration of war. AGMM, 
Documentación de Puerto Rico, 5195.1; Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la Guerra, p. 86.  
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of jíbaros (Puerto Rican peasants) solely armed with machetes, and several mounted 
Volunteer guerrillas, as we can see in image 11 (p. 202).179 
 
Image 11. Mounted Volunteer guerrilla in Yauco (Puerto Rico), commanded by Lieutenant Rafael 
Colorado. Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la guerra, p. 193.  
A positive consequence for the Volunteers was that, due to the peril of a US 
invasion, they came to be regarded as a genuine defence force, gaining prestige. The Puerto 
Rican Army officer Ángel Rivero Méndez recalled that many autonomists, both Puerto 
Rican and peninsulares, that had previously held a negative conception of the Volunteers, 
began to join the militia.180 From the declaration of war (25th April 1898), the autonomist 
press began a campaign attacking the US for wanting to sever the centuries-old ties 
between Puerto Rico and Spain. On 13th May 1898, Luis Muñoz Rivera, Chief of the 
Autonomist Cabinet (1898) and leader of the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party (1887-1898) 
published an article entitled “Long Live Spain!” in his newspaper La Democracia, in which 
he called all Puerto Ricans to gather around the Spanish flag and defend their nationality 
against the “Yankee aggressor”.181 The autonomists stood for wider political rights for 
                                                 
179 The first company of the Voluntarios Macheteros de Puerto Rico was created in the town of Juncos 
(25th April). Other companies were created in San Juan (4th May) and Maunabo (12th May). AGMM, 
Documentación de Puerto Rico, sig. 5146.33.     
180 Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la Guerra, p. 450. 
181 Luis Muñoz Rivera (1859-1916) was a Puerto Rican journalist, poet, politician, and a major figure 
of autonomism. Despite his defence of Spanish sovereignty during the war, he collaborated with 
the US authorities in Puerto Rico after 1898, becoming a member of the Puerto Rican House of 
Representatives (1906-1910) and Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico in front of the US Congress 
(1911-1916). Throughout the US occupation, Muñoz Rivera defended a wide autonomy for Puerto 
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Puerto Rico, but within Spain. This was constantly reinforced in the autonomist press 
throughout the war against the United States, whose intervention threatened to put 
Spanish sovereignty to an end. This might explain why, by July, there were already over 
9,000 members of the Volunteers.182  
The land invasion by US troops arrived on 25th July 1898, but the first action of the 
war in Puerto Rico was the bombardment of San Juan on 12th May. The attack killed five 
people, and it had a tremendous psychological effect, for Puerto Rico had not suffered an 
attack since the failed British invasion of 1797. During the bombardment, the Volunteers 
efficiently protected La Fortaleza, the seat of the Captaincy General, and defended some 
key areas.183 Though the aim of the US fleet was to test the defences of San Juan, the 
bombardment provided a good opportunity for the Volunteers to demonstrate their 
military capacity and reliability for the campaign to come. 
When the invading force commanded by the general Nelson A. Miles landed on 
25th July 1898 in Guánica, the entire Spanish defence force quickly collapsed, including the 
Volunteers.184 The location for the invasion was strategic because this area of southwest 
Puerto Rico was where anti-Spanish feeling was most widespread.185 The invaders found 
“there was great disaffection toward the Spanish cause among the citizens and the 
volunteers”.186 Indeed, there was a contagious wave of desertions among the Volunteers in 
the wake of Miles’ incursion. Some cases were particularly surprising, including rank-and-
file Volunteers and men who held political office for the Unconditional Spanish Party. For 
instance, oral histories suggest that Florencio Santiago, incondicional mayor of Coamo and 
colonel of Volunteers, had breakfast at his house with the Spanish commander Rafael 
                                                 
Rico as a necessary step towards independence. For a biography of Muñoz Rivera, see Mack 
Reynolds. Puerto Rican Patriot: The Life of Luis Muñoz Rivera. New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1969. La Democracia, 13-05-1898, p. 2. 
182 Larrea y Lisa. El desastre nacional, p. 73. 
183 AGMM, Documentación de Puerto Rico, sig. 5171.13. 
184 Nelson A. Miles (1839-1925) was a veteran of the US Civil War and the Indian Wars and was the 
last Commanding General of the United States Army (1895-1903). For a biography, see Peter R. De 
Montravel. A Hero to His Fighting Men, Nelson A. Miles, 1839-1925. Kent: The Kent State University 
Press, 1998.  
185 Francisco A. Scarano argued that this area received non-Spanish migrants during the first half of 
the 19th century, whose links with Spain were generally weak. Also, this region of Puerto Rico heavily 
depended on sugar exports, much more dependent on the US than on the Spanish market. Sugar 
and Slavery in Puerto Rico Plantation Economy of Ponce, 1800-1850. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1984, pp. 79-102. 
186 Fitzhugh Lee, Theodore Roosevelt & Joseph Wheeler. Cuba’s Struggle against Spain with the 
causes of American intervention and a full account of the Spanish-American War: including final 
peace negotiations. New York: American Historical Press, 1899, p. 556. 
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Martínez Illescas, and lunch with US Army Captain Anderson.187 Ángel Rivero Méndez 
argued that the weak Volunteers response to the invasion was caused by decisions taken 
by the military authorities in San Juan. For example, the very day of the invasion (25th July), 
all the young conscripts (ca. 500) serving in the Volunteers were ordered to leave the 
militia and join regular army battalions. A day later, the army troops from the southwest 
began to evacuate their positions towards San Juan, and the Volunteers were ordered to 
gather in the seats of the military districts, leaving numerous towns entirely unprotected. 
Consequently, fearing that their families and properties could fall prey to reprisals from 
either the US troops or bandits, many of these Volunteers refused to leave their towns and 
deserted.188 As a result, the Captaincy General decided to destroy their weapons and to 
dismantle most of the Volunteer units scattered throughout the island.189 
The weak performance of the Volunteers was also observed during the only 
military clash of the Puerto Rican campaign, the battle of Aibonito (9th – 13th August 1898). 
After having withdrawn from the southwest, the Spanish regular troops gathered in 
Aibonito, in the mountainous interior, to stop the US column on its way to San Juan, the 
capital. The only Volunteers that stood alongside Spanish forces were roughly a third of 
Ponce’s 9th Battalion, whereas the rest had mostly defected or even begun to collaborate 
with the US forces as scouts.190 The battle was still undecided when the armistice of 12th 
August between Spain and the US was declared. 
Faced with desertions and abandonment of military duties, some Spanish Army 
officers accused the Puerto Rican Volunteers of having been treacherous and cowards. 
Francisco Larrea y Lisa considered that these men had not ‘fulfilled their duty’.191 Shortly 
after the war, the Army Major Julio Cervera Baviera wrote that the Puerto Rican Volunteers 
had only been a source of trouble and disturbance during the war, for they ‘had never been 
                                                 
187 I would like to give thanks for this information to Lindy Usera Fernández, great-grand-daughter 
of Florencio Santiago, who told me this in Puerto Rico in December 2015. According to the 
literature, this may well be possible. The lunch took place on 9th August 1898, right before the start 
of the battle for the Asomante pass, midway between Guánica and the island’s capital, San Juan. 
This information was also collected by Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la Guerra, p. 241-242. 
188 Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la Guerra, pp. 449-455.  
189 For instance, this was ordered to Colonel Puig of the Yauco Volunteers on 26th July 1898. Yauco 
had seen a thwarted anti-Spanish uprising in 1897, and the authorities probably distrusted the local 
Volunteers. Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la Guerra, p. 203. 
190 AGMM, Documentación de Puerto Rico, sig. 5175.14 & 5173.23; Larrea y Lisa. El desastre nacional, 
pp. 195-212; Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la Guerra, pp. 427-439.  
191 Larrea y Lisa. El desastre nacional, p. 73. 
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relied upon for the defence’ of the island.192 The Puerto Rican officer in the Spanish Army 
Ángel Rivero Méndez considered these opinions as a mere pretext to charge the Puerto 
Ricans with the responsibility for the military defeat.193 
In fact, just as in Cuba, the performance of the Volunteers in Puerto Rico was 
closely related to the efficiency and support of the regular army. Only two days after the 
invasion on 25th July 1898, the army garrison in Ponce and the nearby towns evacuated the 
area to gather in central Puerto Rico. Thus, the defence of the towns was left to the 
Volunteers. It should be considered that these men barely had military training, were 
unpaid, and were trapped between a US force of 30,000 men and the disaffection of part 
of the people they were supposed to defend. Thus, it is hardly surprising that they tended 
to give up their weapons as the American soldiers advanced. 
Puerto Rican historiography has tended to explain this behaviour in terms of 
political disaffection towards Spain.194 This is a valid yet a partial explanation. Regarding 
the Volunteers, their performance should be linked directly to the army’s behaviour. The 
Spanish defensive system in Puerto Rico rapidly collapsed after the American invasion. 
Thus, a militia of barely trained civilians-at-arms could have hardly stood against an 
impressive advancing force of 30,000 men. 
Fear of reprisals by the anti-Spanish Puerto Ricans also explains the attitude of the 
Volunteers towards the invading force. After the evacuation of the Spanish soldiers, the 
American troops became their new protectors, as studied by the late Puerto Rican 
historian Fernando Picó.195 For instance, on 29th July 1898, only two days after the 
occupation of the town of Yauco, the American soldiers prevented the local Volunteers 
from being lynched by their fellow townspeople.196 In Ciales, the shop owned by the 
                                                 
192 Julio Cervera Baviera (1854-1927) was a prominent military man in 19th century Spain. Before the 
Spanish-American War, he took part in campaigns to increase Spain’s influence in Morocco and 
Spanish Sahara in the 1880s. Because of his explorations he wrote Expedición al interior de 
Marruecos (1884) and Geografía militar de Marruecos (1884). He was also a radio and wireless 
telegraphy pioneer in Spain. Julio Cervera Baviera. La defensa militar de Puerto-Rico. San Juan: 
Imprenta de la Capitanía General, 1898, pp. 8-9; VVAA. Julio Cervera y la telegrafía sin hilos. Madrid: 
Ministerio de Defensa y Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, 2015. 
193 Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la Guerra, p. 452 & 473. 
194 María de los Ángeles Castro Arroyo. “’¿A qué pelear si los de Madrid no quieren?’ Una versión 
criolla de la guerra del 98 en Puerto Rico”. Revista de Indias, 1997, vol. LVII, No. 211, pp. 657-694; 
Gervasio Luis García. “El 98 sin héroes ni traidores”, in Ivonne Acosta Lespier. El 98. Debates y 
análisis sobre el centenario en las Tertulias Sabatinas. San Juan: Editorial LEA, 1999, pp. 133-162. 
195 Picó. 1898. La guerra después de la guerra, pp. 145-160.  
196 Rivero Méndez. Crónica de la Guerra, p. 217.   
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brothers Sariego, who were former Volunteers, was attacked on 29th September.197 In 
Coamo, the former Volunteer Florencio Santiago was confirmed as mayor by the US Army 
General Ernst, who issued a decree prohibiting any reprisals against the Volunteers or 
incondicionales, or any known supporter of Spain, as long as they respected the new 
situation.198 Hence, fear of reprisals from their fellow countrymen might also explain the 
scarce resistance posed by the Volunteers in front of the United States invading forces. 
From the perspective of the US invading force, the collaboration of Spanish 
loyalists was also vital for ruling a recently conquered territory. Most of the mayors, civil 
servants, policemen, merchants and company owners were incondicionales, and often 
peninsulares. The success of US occupation greatly depended upon these men, at least 
initially, when the Americans had no governing structure on the island.199 Ironically, they 
ended up being protected by the very people they were meant to fight.    
 
5.3. Philippines 
The role played by the Volunteers in the archipelago during the war between Spain and 
the United States was more discrete in comparison with their counterparts in Cuba and 
Puerto Rico. They lacked the numerical force to impose any political agenda on the 
Spanish authorities. Hence, the Volunteers shared the fate of the rest of the Spanish forces. 
However, the Volunteers were an inspiration to the Captain General Fernando Primo de 
Rivera (1897-1898), who created the native Volunteers to try to attract native Filipinos to 
the Spanish cause at the end of 1897, when military operations were halted by a truce in 
the archipelago. This segregated native militia was a unique case in the history of the 
Volunteers in the wider Spanish imperial context. It was the result of the deep ethnic 
differences that existed between the Philippines and the Spanish Caribbean. This 
represented a rather late project to engage the local population with the defence of the 
Spanish Philippines that was thwarted by US intervention. 
The native Volunteers were created at a time when peace seemed close in the 
Philippines. Their creation was part of the Spanish strategy envisioned to end the war. 
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1 (sumario 420 de 1898); Fernando Picó Al filo del poder. Subalternos y dominantes en Puerto Rico, 
1739-1910. Río Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1993, pp. 161-171. 
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Captain General Fernando Primo de Rivera (1897-1898) had been working to change the 
conduct of the war since his arrival to Manila in April 1897.200 He wanted to increase the 
participation of native Filipinos in the Spanish military control of the archipelago. In a 
report sent to the Spanish Government in October 1897, Primo de Rivera wrote that he 
wanted to “conquer the country with the country”. Primo de Rivera also considered the 
native Volunteers a solution to save resources for the Treasury, as it was much cheaper to 
organize them than to prepare regular army units in the Peninsula and send them to the 
Philippines.201 This meant using Filipino men to control their own land. The native 
Volunteers were the keystone of this strategy. 
Primo de Rivera tested his strategy by allowing the creation of native Volunteer 
units throughout the Philippines from his arrival in Manila in April 1897.202 These troops 
seemed to be loyal auxiliaries to the regular Army, and on 29th October 1897, he formally 
instituted them by publishing the Reglamento de Voluntarios Indígenas.203 Although Primo 
de Rivera did not explicitly mention it, the Cuban and Puerto Rican cases were a clear 
inspiration for the Filipino Volunteers, according to the reglamento. The organization was 
almost identical. The idea was to integrate men that could influence their communities 
into the Spanish defensive system groups, while at the same time avoiding the costly 
organization and expedition of battalions made up of Spanish conscripts in the 
Peninsula.204 However, in order to train these new units and to keep them under control, 
the native Volunteers were attached to regular army battalions as auxiliary companies.205 
Thus, between the end of 1897 and the US intervention started in May 1898, the native 
                                                 
200 Fernando Primo de Rivera (1831-1921) was a veteran of the Third Carlist War. He had already 
served as captain general of the Philippines in 1880-1883. His second term lasted from 23rd April 
1897 to 11th April 1898. He was also war minister on three occasions under Conservative cabinets 
(1874-1875, 1907-1909, and 1917). 
201 The report was sent directly to President Práxedes Mateo Sagasta on 13th October 1897. Among 
other reasons, Primo de Rivera also considered that to create a force of 20,000 native Volunteers 
would only cost 600,000 pesos, which was the cost of sending several regular Army battalions to 
the archipelago from Spain. AGMM, Documentación de Filipinas., sig. 5324.42. For the relation 
between the use of native troops and lower military costs in the colonial context, see V. G. Kiernan. 
European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815-1960. London: Leicester University Press/Fontana 
Paperbacks, 1982, pp. 138-141. 
202 Fernando Primo de Rivera y Sobremonte. Memoria dirigida al Senado por el Capitán General D. 
Fernando Primo de Rivera y Sobremonte acerca de su gestión en Filipinas. Madrid: Imprenta y 
Litografía del Depósito de la Guerra, 1898, pp. 111-118. 
203 The document was presented on 16th October 1897 and approved on the 29th. AGMM, 
Documentación de Filipinas, sig. 5322.44.    
204 AGMM, Capitanía General de Filipinas, caja 5306, “Minuta del capitán general al ministro de la 
Guerra”, 07-11-1897. 
205 The complete list of the native Volunteers and the Army battalions they were attached to in 
AGMM, Capitanía General de Filipinas, caja 5306 & 5308. 
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Volunteers generally remained loyal to Spain in a situation in which the revolution was 
latent, but not extinguished. 
Primo de Rivera’s strategy seemed to be working by the end of 1897. After intense 
negotiations with delegates of the Filipino rebel commanders, both parties signed the Pact 
of Biak-na-Bato (14th December 1897).206 The leader of the revolution Emilio Aguinaldo 
agreed to stop the armed struggle in exchange for a generous sum of money and exile in 
Hong Kong.207 The US declaration of war against Spain, however, completely altered the 
situation. Since March 1898 the US consuls in Hong Kong and Singapore began to 
negotiate with Emilio Aguinaldo the recommencement of the revolution, and on 1st May 
1898, the US fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet under 
the command of Admiral Montojo at Manila Bay. 
The native Volunteers were deeply affected by the Spanish defeat at Manila Bay. It 
was a major blow to the Spanish military reputation in the Philippines, followed by the 
resumption of the revolution as a part of the US strategy to dominate the archipelago.208 
Most of the native Volunteers deserted to the insurgency, thus shattering the Spanish 
strategy of “conquering the country with the country”. Only a minority of them, most 
notably the Macabebes commanded by the mestizo Eugenio Blanco, joined the remaining 
Spanish troops on their way to Manila, which was already completely isolated from the 
rest of the archipelago by 7th June 1898, when the siege of the city by the Filipino and US 
troops began. 
The loyalty of some the native troops in the Spanish forces was doubtful at the very 
least, except for the Civil Guard. José Toral, a peninsular Volunteer who lived through the 
siege of Manila, recalled that the Carabineros (a police force of around 400 in charge of 
fighting smuggling) was “undermined by separatism”.209 This shows that the anti-colonial 
sentiment was widespread among the Filipino population, even among the men whose 
modus vivendi depended on the Spanish presence in the archipelago. Coercion might have 
also been a reason these troops joined the insurrection. As in Cuba, the native Filipinos 
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that stood loyal to Spain could expect no mercy from insurgents. Outright execution was 
the common fate of these men in cases of being captured in combat.210  
When the Republic of the Philippines was proclaimed by Emilio Aguinaldo on 12th 
June 1898, the Carabineros and the Pampanga Volunteers gathered in Manila rioted 
against the Spaniards, being followed by other native Volunteer units throughout the 
Philippines. This riot was aimed at provoking a popular uprising in favour of 
independence.211 Although the uprising was rapidly quelled by the peninsulares of the 
Loyal Volunteers, it had evidenced the weakness of the Spanish military position even 
within Manila, the seat of colonial power in the Philippines. After the siege began, the 
situation of the Spanish Volunteers alongside the regular forces was desperate: they were 
trapped between the besieging forces, unreliable native allies, and the US troops that 
landed near Manila between the 30th June and 25th July, commanded by General Wesley 
Merritt.212 
The 2,000 Volunteers left in Manila, mostly Spaniards, were ready to take part in 
the defence of a city that still had a 13,000-strong garrison and impressive 16th century 
fortresses.213 However, no relief force could be expected to arrive from far-flung Spain. 
Most of its Atlantic fleet had been destroyed at the battle of Santiago de Cuba, and the 
British closed the Suez Canal to the Spanish fleet sent to reinforce the Philippines.214 To 
carry on with the fight to the very end would have caused unnecessary bloodshed in 
Manila. A decree issued by Captain General Fermín Jáudenes on 5th August to the soldiers 
and Volunteers seems to indicate that he had already been negotiating the terms of 
surrender with the Americans.215  
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Historians, both in Spain and the United States, have tended to believe that what 
followed was a mock battle for Manila.216 The city surrendered to the US troops on 13th 
August, just a day after the armistice between Spain and the United States. In fact, the 
military actions during the siege consisted of small-scale skirmishes and the progressive 
withdrawal of the Spanish forces from their outer defensive lines. However, according to 
Trask, Jáudenes’ main concern was to avoid the occupation of Manila by the Filipino 
fighters of Emilio Aguinaldo. He not only feared the looting of property and retaliation 
against loyalists but also wanted to avoid the shame of having to surrender the city to the 
very people to whom Spain had claimed to be bringing a civilizing mission.217 Indeed, 
colonial prejudice shaped the way Spaniards and Americans handled the transfer of power. 
Rather than handing Manila, which had been the seat of Spanish power in the Philippines 
since 1561, to the Filipino insurgents, who they considered barbarous and uncivilized, 
Jáudenes surrendered the city to the US forces, representatives of a civilized nation, 
according to the standards of the day. 
Eventually, the US troops entered Manila on 13th August 1898, and on the 14th 
Captain General Jáudenes and General Wesley Merritt issued a joint decree by which all 
the Spanish forces, including the Volunteers, had to return to their barracks and be put 
under the direct command of US Army officers, whereas the civilians were allowed to leave 
Manila.218 Just as with the surrender of Santiago de Cuba on 16th July 1898, the occupation 
of the city by the US troops rather than by the insurgents was probably felt as a relief for 
the Spaniards in Manila, including the Volunteers. According to the capitulation agreed 
between the Spanish and American commissioners, the Volunteers could stay in Cuba if 
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they gave up their weapons to the US forces and promised not to fight against them during 
the war.219 With the presence of US troops, their lives and properties were secured. 
The surrender of Manila was nevertheless certainly a bitter experience for the men 
who had fought to keep the Philippines under the aegis of Spain.220 The Volunteer José 
Toral recalled that after seeing the US flag waving over the fort of Santiago, which had 
guarded the city since the 16th century, he thought ‘the sacrifice is consummated. The flag 
that the strong arm of Legazpi [the Spanish conquistador that took the city in 1561] nailed 
into this soil, has now fallen from the weak arms of our authorities’.221 More than three 
centuries and a half of Spanish history in the Philippines had come to an end. 
 
6. The Dissolution of the Volunteers 
The fate of the Volunteers was the fate of Spain in the Americas. After Spain’s military 
defeat by the United States, the Volunteers disappeared alongside the old Spanish Empire 
in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, as sanctioned by the Treaty of Paris (10th 
December 1898). Whilst the Spanish and US legations in Paris discussed the terms of the 
peace agreement between September and December 1898, hundreds of units of Volunteers 
were dismantled. 
In the Philippines, this process seems to have taken place in a disorderly fashion, 
as no evidence of a formal order of dissolution by the Spanish authorities was found. This 
was probably caused by the fact that neither the Spanish nor the Americans entirely 
controlled the archipelago after the surrender of Manila on 14th August 1898. In fact, vast 
areas of the country were controlled by the Filipino revolutionaries that had proclaimed 
the Republic of the Philippines, and who would soon begin to wage a long and cruel war 
against the United States for control of the archipelago. The Manila Volunteers probably 
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dissolved after the decree of 14th August, ordering all the Spanish forces to obey the new 
rulers. By then, most of the native Volunteers had already defected to the insurgency. 
In Puerto Rico, the order to dismantle the Volunteer units was issued by Captain 
General Ricardo Ortega y Díez on 5th September 1898, in the midst of a smooth transition 
between the Spanish and US authorities that began shortly after the armistice of 12th 
August. According to González Cuevas, most of the Volunteers returned to their homes, 
whereas a minority asked to ‘follow the fate of the [Spanish] Army’, and even settled in 
Spain after the United States took formal possession of Puerto Rico on 18th October 1898.222 
The dismantling of the Volunteers in Cuba proved more complicated than in 
Puerto Rico. At the time of the armistice, Spanish forces still controlled all the cities, 
whereas insurgents controlled most areas of the countryside and the US forces were firmly 
established in Santiago de Cuba and Guantánamo Bay (where they retain a military base 
at the time of writing). Beyond this logistical problem, the fear of retaliation by the mambís 
made an orderly dissolution of the Volunteer units practically impossible, especially in the 
areas where they had been the only Spanish force for a long time. After all, the Spanish 
regular soldiers would be repatriated to Spain, whereas the Volunteers were reluctant to 
leave their hometowns where they had family and often property. Perhaps trying to avoid 
the panic that a total disarmament would have caused among the Volunteers, Captain 
General Ramón Blanco ordered on 26th August 1898 that the casualties or defections in the 
Volunteers would not be replaced by new members.223 Thus, the Volunteers began a slow 
process of dissolution that only ended on 1st January 1899, when Adolfo Jiménez 
Castellanos, Cuba’s last captain general (1898-1899), handed the control of the island to 
the US Army General Leonard Wood after almost four centuries of Spanish rule. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The Volunteers were a key element in the defensive system of the Spanish Empire during 
the colonial wars that took place in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico between 
February 1895 and August 1898. They were the necessary link between the military 
authorities and the local communities in a context of guerrilla warfare. In all the warzones, 
the Volunteers often became the only Spanish force in areas where the army presence was 
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weak, if not nonexistent. In most of Cuba, they made up joint garrisons. In the Philippines, 
the native Volunteers were also conceived as a source of influence in areas where the local 
communities were largely alien to Spanish culture and control.  
The evidence presented here demonstrates that the military performance of the 
Volunteers in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines depended on the support received 
by the regular troops. The Volunteers were men who had to combine their jobs with 
unpaid military service, and generally had limited combat training. Thus, wherever the 
Spanish Army controlled the situation and fought efficiently, the Volunteers proved to be 
a reliable force. On the contrary, the collapse of the regular Spanish troops or the 
evacuation of entire areas often resulted in the surrender of the Volunteers to the mambís, 
the US troops or the Filipino rebels.  
The Volunteers attest to the relative strength of Spanish Loyalism in Cuba and 
Puerto Rico, and to a certain extent in the Spanish-controlled areas in the Philippines. In 
Cuba, despite decades of a growing anticolonial nationalist sentiment, and the erosion of 
the legitimacy of Spanish rule, the Volunteers still gathered an impressive force of ca. 
65,000 men at the beginning of the war, and wherever they enjoyed the support of the 
regular Army, fiercely opposed the advance of the mambís. Had support for independence 
been as widespread as some Cuban historiography sustains, the war would probably have 
ended much earlier. In Puerto Rico, where no serious attempt against Spain was made 
before the US invasion, thousands of Puerto Ricans joined the Volunteers during the 
preparations for the war against the United States. The collapse of their defences only 
came after the Spanish Army withdrew from most of the territory, and when the 
Volunteers’ lives and properties were threatened by bandits and fellow countrymen that 
threatened to retaliate only after the defeat of Spain was evident.  
The Volunteers remained a key element of the Spanish imperial culture to the very 
end in 1898. This is considered here to be symbolized by the creation of the Volunteers in 
1896 in the Philippines. Even though this archipelago was only weakly controlled by Spain, 
and the the concept of a Spanish Nation was generally culturally, politically and 
demographically alien to Filipino society, the community of peninsulares and Filipinos of 
Spanish descent imitated the practices of their Cuban and Puerto Rican colleagues with 




The end of the Volunteers was paradoxical. The prominent role they had played in Cuba 
and Puerto Rico for almost half a century, and for a short time in the Philippines, was only 
comparable to the swiftness with which they disappeared. As a militia, the Volunteers 
completely disappeared during the autumn of 1898. Their fate was signalled by the end of 
the Spanish Empire in the Caribbean and Asia. The Volunteer veterans did not create any 
association to recall their days of service, neither in Spain nor in Cuba, Puerto Rico, or the 
Philippines. The reason for this is unclear. The former Volunteers that settled in Spain 
after the war had in common a life in the Antilles or the Philippines, and an active service 
in the defence of the Spanish Empire. Perhaps the fact that most peninsulares remained in 
the lost empire after 1898 explains the absence of an association in Spain. In Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, and the Philippines, the absence is much more clearly understood. The Volunteers 
were associated with the most intransigent form of Spanish Loyalism, integrismo. At the 
very least, such a strong reminder of their ties with Spain’s power was unwelcome in 
territories that had just undergone an anti-colonial war (Cuba and the Philippines), or 
where a new ruler had replaced Spain manu militari (Puerto Rico).  
As individuals, the fate of the Volunteers after 1898 was as varied as the paths taken 
by these men. They did not act as a group but rather sought to protect their own personal 
interests. To track their lives after 1898 would require following the evolution of thousands 
of former Volunteers after the war. It is not known how many of them settled in Spain 
after 1898 or remained in the former colonies. Enrique San Miguel, who published detailed 
research on the repatriation of Army soldiers, considers that a good deal of the Volunteers, 
both peninsulares, and Creoles, left for Spain during the Autumn of 1898, but that most of 
them returned to the former colonies.1 However, he gives no figures. Thus, this represents 
a research study to be undertaken. 
Nevertheless, it is thought that most of the Volunteers, both Creoles, and 
peninsulares, remained in Cuba, Puerto Rico, or the Philippines. A Cuban nationalist that 
lived in Santiago de Cuba throughout the war, recalled that after the city’s capitulation to 
the US forces, the Spanish Government offered a free repatriation to all the Volunteers 
who wished to do so, but only ‘some of them took that opportunity’.2 Certainly, the 
Spanish newspapers show the arrival of Volunteers to the Peninsula between late-1898 and 
                                                 
1 De Miguel Fernández. “Las tropas españolas en la guerra de Cuba”, p. 257. 
2 This anecdote was recalled by José Joaquín Hernández y Mancebo on Memorias de un bloqueado, 
published on Emilio Bacardí y Moreau. Crónicas de Santiago de Cuba, vol. X, p. 369. 
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early-1899, but nothing indicates an exodus of thousands of men. Maya Jasanoff, in her 
study of British Loyalists during and after the war of American Independence, established 
that at least 60,000 loyalists and 15,000 slaves left the United States after 1783, representing 
around 2.40% of the Thirteen Colonies’ population.3 If the same percentage were applied, 
only in the case of Cuba (ca. 1,6 million inhabitants) and Puerto Rico (ca. 850,000), where 
there was a sizeable community of integristas and ca. 95,000 Volunteers by the end of 
1898, this would have meant an exodus of ca. 60,000 people. Nothing seems to indicate a 
relocation of such a magnitude in the case of the Spanish loyalists after the loss of the 
empire. 
How the Volunteers rebuilt their lives afterwards is also a research question to be 
addressed. Citing again the case of the British Loyalists in America, Jasanoff showed that 
a fifth of them settled in Britain, whereas the rest left for British colonies such as Canada, 
Australia, the Bahamas or India.4 An expanding British Empire offered such opportunities 
to the loyalists who left their native land. In 1898 Spain was an empire in retreat, if it could 
still be considered an empire at all. The only reminders of its past as a colonial power were 
the African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, a tiny presence in Spanish Sahara, and the island 
of Fernando Poo in the Gulf of Guinea. All these territories functioned as military outposts, 
not as places where civilians could rebuild their lives. Consequently, the options for the 
Volunteers after 1898 were rather simple: either settling in Spain or remaining in the land 
they were, whether this was Cuba, Puerto Rico, or the Philippines. 
A few examples can be offered showing the diverse ways in which the Volunteers 
reoriented their lives after the dissolution of the militia. Some of them decided to stay in 
the former colonies. The Catalan Narciso Maciá y Doménech, who had been a lieutenant 
in the Artillery Volunteer Battalion, remained in Havana with his Cuban wife and children, 
where he became a successful businessman and presided over the Casino Español in the 
1920s.5 The Puerto Rican Vicente Balbás Capó, San Juan’s Batallón de Tiradores de Altura’s 
former major, representative at the Congress, and journalist, devoted his life after 1898 to 
the cause of the Spanish language, the Catholic faith, Roman Law, and the independence 
of Puerto Rico from the United States as a way to preserve the Spanish identity of the 
island. Due to his campaigns in defence of the Spanish legacy on the island against the US 
cultural influence, he was awarded several civilian decorations by the Spanish Government 
                                                 
3 Maya Jasanoff. Liberty’s Exiles, pp. 357-358.  
4 Ibid., pp. 313-342.  
5 Maciá y Doménech. Vida y obra, pp. 28-61.  
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and even regained Spanish citizenship in 1923.6 It should be remembered that only the 
peninsulares kept their Spanish citizenship in the former colonies after 1898. Some others 
proudly highlighted their past as Volunteers. As late as May 1931, the peninsular Isidoro 
Yboleón signed a document in favour of the recently abdicated King Alphonse XIII issued 
by the most conservative elements of the Philippines’ Spanish colony, highlighting that he 
had been a Volunteer captain as a proof of his loyalty to Spain and the Bourbon dynasty.7 
There was no generalized retaliation against the Volunteers in the former colonies, 
but the coexistence of these men with those who had fought against them was not always 
easy, at least for a short period after the war. Their future in Ultramar after the end of 
Spanish sovereignty was certainly a concern for the Volunteers. In September 1898 the 
chiefs of the Volunteer units in Havana held a meeting to discuss this. They agreed, among 
other points, to ask the Spanish Government that all the Volunteers who wished so should 
be repatriated to Spain for free and advised the Volunteers to be cautious.8 It was sensible 
advice. In December 1899 the mayor of a small town near Santiago de Cuba reported that 
two former guerrilleros had been threatened by their neighbours for having hailed Spain, 
the Spanish guerrillas, and Weyler.9 Since the mayor could not secure these men’s lives, 
he asked the US governor to remove them from the town. There were no Volunteers 
involved in this episode, yet it illustrates the atmosphere in a rural community of eastern 
Cuba after 1898. A wave of reprisals against the Volunteers did take place in Puerto Rico, 
where no armed struggle against Spain had existed since the short-lived uprising of Lares 
(September 1868). In fact, between 1868 and 1898 the military participation of Puerto 
                                                 
6 In 1899 he created the Partido Oportunista with which to fight for the island’s independence, once 
reincorporating Puerto Rico into Spain was deemed unfeasible. He also opposed the US military 
occupation in the pages of the Heraldo de las Antillas, the renamed version of the Heraldo Español 
he had created before 1898. A staunch opponent of US cultural influence in Puerto Rico, he wrote 
Puerto Rico a los diez años de americanización (1910). Unión Ibero-Americana, February 1923, p. 24; 
Ana Isabel Benito Sánchez. “Determinantes instituciones de la reivindicación autonomista en 
Puerto Rico”. Revista de Humanidades Tecnológico de Monterrey, 2008, No. 24, p. 114.    
7 Voz española, 09-05-1931, p. 8. Isidoro Yboleón had been living in the Philippines at least since 
1883, when he was called on to perform military service in the archipelago. Diario oficial de avisos 
de Madrid, 23-04-1883, p. 1. The Spanish community in the Philippines was generally conservative, 
coming to support the Francoist side during the Spanish Civil War. For this aspect see Florentino 
Ridao. Franquistas sin Franco. Una historia alternativa de la guerra civil española desde Filipinas. 
Granada: Editorial Comares, 2012. 
8 El Correo Español, 24-09-1898, p. 2. 
9 The Cuban-born mayor of El Cristo Enrique Fournier reported this incident to the US military 
governor of Santiago de Cuba on 12th December 1899. Apparently, two former guerrilleros, “Chucho” 
Guerra and Higinio Pérez had stormed into the house of Josefa Suárez shouting “Long live Spain, 
the Spanish guerrilleros and Weyler!”. He asked the authorities to remove them from the town, since 
he could not secure their safety due to their neighbours’ threats. AHPSC, Gobierno Provincial, leg. 
514, exp. 17. 
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Ricans was always devoted to the defence of Spanish sovereignty. Between late-1898 and 
early-1899 groups of bandits from the rural areas assaulted the shops owned by 
peninsulares, many of whom were former Volunteers. The late Puerto Rican historian 
Fernando Picó considered these attacks a popular reaction against the unwanted result of 
the Spanish-American war by which Puerto Rico became a colony of the US, and against 
the previous social and economic system of Spanish dominance represented by the 
Volunteers. In fact, since the 1890s there had been a growing resentment among Puerto 
Rican autonomists against peninsulares for their dominant position in commerce, and 
against the Volunteers for their ferocious repression of the autonomists during the 
compontes of 1887. The crisis of 1898-1899 only provided the context that unleashed this 
accumulated tension. Thus, the US troops that had come to Puerto Rico to expel the 
Spaniards, ended up protecting their lives and properties. Tranquillity soon returned to 
the island.10 
Some Volunteers decided to start afresh in Spain for different reasons, either 
political, economic, or both. Enrique de Miguel considered that no less than 5,000 
Volunteers left Cuba after the Spanish defeat.11 Captain Melitón Castelló Anglada, who had 
served in Puerto Príncipe’s Volunteer Battalion for thirty years and owned a hardware 
store in that city, was well integrated into Cuban society through marriage to a local 
woman. Despite this, this Catalan left the island in December 1898 for he “would not stay 
in a country where the Spanish flag is not respected”. Shortly afterwards, in April 1900, 
Melitón Castelló died in Barcelona. His wife and children returned to Cuba, but she 
rejected an appointment as a teacher offered by the Cuban Ministry of Education for the 
sake of his husband’s memory.12 Some Cuban-born Volunteers also decided to settle in 
Spain. For instance, Sixto Bravo, from Santiago de Cuba, arrived in La Corunna in 
September 1898, after having taken part in the defence of his native city against the US 
and mambí troops in July of that very year. Since his hacienda had been destroyed by the 
insurgents and his Spanish sentiments were well known in an area dominated by 
                                                 
10 Picó. 1898, pp. 201-207. 
11 Enrique de Miguel Fernández. Azcárraga, Weyler y la conducción de la guerra de Cuba. Ph.D. 
Thesis. Castellón de La Plana: Universitat Jaume I, 2011, p. 221, footnote No. 372.    
12 I am indebted to Melitón Castelló’s Cuban great-grandson, Osvaldo Betancourt Sanz, for this 
information. Like his Volunteer forebear, Osvaldo also left Cuba for political reasons almost a 
century after his great-grandfather. 
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nationalist sentiment, he considered that staying in Cuba was not an option.13 A curious  
case was represented by the Macabebes, a group of Filipino Volunteers commanded by the 
mestizo Eugenio Blanco, who remained loyal to Spain to the very last. After the loss of the 
Philippines, the Macabebes were sent to the Marianas Islands, in the Pacific Ocean, 
because Blanco had been appointed governor by the Spanish Government. For a few 
months, these native Filipinos were the last representatives of the Spanish Empire in the 
Marianas, until the islands were handed over to Germany in November 1899.14 Once back 
in the Philippines, some Macabebes collaborated with the US Army during the Filipino-
American War (1899-1902).15 But some others rejected serving the country that had ousted 
Spain from the Philippines. Eugenio Blanco rejected a military appointment offered by the 
US colonial government and decided to sail to Spain with a few hundred of his former 
                                                 
13 His situation was so desperate upon arriving in Spain, that La Corunna’s military governor bought 
him a ticket for Madrid so that he could look for employment there. La Correspondencia de España, 
20-09-1898, p. 2. 
14 Spain sold the Marianas and Carolinas islands to Germany in the Spanish-German Treaty of 12th 
February 1899. La Ilustración Artística, 03-09-1900, pp. 571-573; Belén Pozuelo Mascaraque. “Los 
Estados Unidos, Alemania y el desmantelamiento colonial español en el Pacífico: el caso de las islas 
Marianas”. Anales de Historia Contemporánea, 1998, No. 14, pp. 147-168. 
15 The US Army maintained the basic structure of the Voluntarios Macabebes, creating the 
Macabebe Scouts which fought for the Americans throughout the war against the Filipino 
nationalists. Dennis Edward Flake. Loyal Macabebes. How the Americans Used the Macabebe Scouts 
in the Annexation of the Philippines. San Fernando: Holy Angel University Press, 2009, pp. 33-68. 
Image 12. The Macabebe Volunteers arriving to Barcelona in 8th June 1900. Photo: Laureano. La Ilustración 
Artística, 18-06-1900, p. 402. 
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Macabebe Volunteers, arriving in Barcelona in June 1900 hoping to rebuild their lives.16 A 
portrait of these men can be seen in image 12 (p. 218), taken aboard the steamphip Alicante 
shortly after their arrival to Spain. It is unclear whether they stayed in Spain or returned 
to the Philippines, but to this day they are remembered by a street name in Madrid: the 
calle de los Voluntarios Macabebes in the popular La Chopera neighbourhood. To this day, 
it is Spain’s only public space that remembers the Volunteers. 
As to the treatment received by the Volunteers from the Spanish State after 1898, 
it was generally marked by neglect, abandonment, and disdain. As to the men who 
remained in Cuba, Puerto Rico or the Philippines, both peninsulares and Creoles, they 
were not granted any compensation. The contempt suffered by the Volunteers born 
outside metropolitan Spain was even deeper, for they lost their Spanish citizenship in 
accordance with the Treaty of Paris (10th December 1898), by which the representatives of 
Spain and the United States negotiated the aftermath of the war.17 The peninsulares that 
remained in Cuba, Puerto Rico, or the Philippines, however, were given the option of 
keeping their citizenship. Thus, the peninsulares were denied any compensation, but the 
Creoles also lost the citizenship they had fought for. 
The situation of the Volunteers that decided to leave for Spain did not greatly vary 
from the fate suffered by the regular Spanish soldiers and sailors after 1898. The Spanish 
press reflected the miserable conditions of their repatriation which lasted from September 
1898 to February 1899.18 Back in Spain, due to their generally poor health conditions, many 
of the men that fought in Ultramar were compelled to beg on the streets or claim a pension 
that would never arrive.19 In this sense, the rank-and-file Volunteers were deprived of any 
financial aid or compensation by the State. Since they were not members of the regular 
army or navy, they were not included in the share of the budget devoted to giving meagre 
                                                 
16 La Ilustración Artística, 18-06-1900, pp. 402. 
17 Only in 1901, the Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos who had lost the citizenship in 1898, could 
regain it if they had been appointed in any administrative or military position by the Spanish 
Government before the Treaty of Paris. Gaceta de Madrid, 12-05-1901, Año CCXL, No. 132, T. II, p. 
563. 
18 María Antonia Fernández Jiménez. “La repatriación de los soldados españoles en la prensa del 
momento. Imágenes de una tragedia del 98”, in Mirta Núñez Díaz-Balart (dir.) & Antonio Rojas 
Friend (Coord.). El día después. España y sus excolonias tras el Desastre del 98. Madrid: Editorial 
Argés, 1998, pp. 153-169. 
19 In Córdoba, the veterans of the Cuban war often depended on charity from the population and 
the church to survive. This situation was extensive in the rest of Spain. Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera. 
“’Cuando pintan bastos’. De la derrota naval al drama de los repatriados en la Córdoba de 1898”, in 
Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera (coord.). Andalucía y la repatriación de los soldados en la guerra del 98. 
Seville: Fundación Pública Andaluza Centro de Estudios Andaluces, 2010, pp. 37-82.  
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allowances to the veterans of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. The only financial 
aid given by the State to the rank-and-file Volunteers was the right to a free ticket back to 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, or the Philippines, granted by a law in April 1900.20 However, those 
who joined the Volunteers to comply with their military service, and had not extinguished 
this, were relocated in army units until its completion. Thus, it may be inferred that the 
Spanish State would rather promote the migration of the young veterans than having to 
financially support thousands of men likely deemed a burden for a bankrupt nation.    
 Only the Volunteer chiefs and officers who settled in Spain after 1898 received 
some compensation. They were the only Volunteers that coordinated their efforts to 
defend their interests. On 19th March 1899, they created a committee in Madrid aimed at 
lobbying before the Ministry of War. It was supported by the former captains general 
Arsenio Martínez de Campos and Ramón Blanco.21 Due to their pressure, the Volunteer 
chiefs and officers were somehow equated to the regular army and navy officers and were 
recognised the right to a pension on 11th April 1900 more than a year and a half after the 
end of the war.22 Nonetheless, a series of requisites included in the law left many 
Volunteers ineligible for the pension. This caused hundreds of them to demand their 
pension from the Ministry of War, with uneven success, at least until 1910.23 In 1903 Elías 
Martínez Nubla, a magistrate and former Volunteer Cavalry major in Manila, denounced 
the fact that out of the ca. 15,000 Volunteer chief officers and officers that had served in 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines during 1895-1898, only 320 were eligible for a 
pension according to the law of 11th April 1900. Also, their pension represented 70% of the 
allowance given to their army and navy colleagues. In this respect, Martínez Nubla recalled 
that although the Volunteers did not join the militia for money, the bullets of the enemy 
did not distinguish regular soldiers from Volunteers either.24 It is known that Martínez 
Nubla met in 1903 with the war minister to negotiate better conditions for his comrades-
                                                 
20 Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra, 12-04-1900, p. 157-158.  
21 Martínez de Campos and Blanco were appointed honorary presidents. The members of the 
committee were Colonel Luis Ramos Izquierdo (president), Colonel Juan Malo Parra (vice-
president), Captain Juan Bravo (first secretary), 2nd Lieutenant Julio A. Domínguez (second 
secretary), Major Guillermo Castelví, captains Vicente Díez and Juan de Urquía (members of the 
board), and captain Juan Mateo (deputy member of the board). El Día, 20-03-1899, p. 2.  
22 The law that recognised the Volunteer chief officers and officers’ right to a pension was signed by 
the Regent Queen on 11th April 1900. The details in Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra, 12-04-
1900, pp. 157-158.  
23 The last demand found in this research was made by Antonio Asensio Pérez, who had served in 
Puerto Rico’s Volunteers between 1897 and 1898 after a long career in the Army Medical Corps. 
Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra, 09-07-1910, p. 121.  
24 Martínez Nubla. Los Voluntarios de Ultramar, p. 20.  
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at-arms to no avail.25 The compensation by the state remained unaltered after the law of 
April 1900. 
In another area, political participation proved to be a controversial activity for the 
Volunteers who remained in the former colonies. As a collectivity, they had no voice. More 
widely, the creation of political parties that might defend a return to Spanish sovereignty 
or that would represent the interest of the integristas was not even considered. The 
integration of the people that had supported Spanish rule into the new regimes, either in 
the form of new sovereign states (Cuba) or US colonies (Puerto Rico and the Philippines), 
came at the price of renouncing any form of collective political identity. The integration 
of those who wanted to actively participate in politics was thus made individually through 
the new political parties that represented the social and ideological divisions of any given 
society. The individual right of former Volunteers to participate in politics was nonetheless 
not accepted by all actors. In Puerto Rico, some elements of the Republican Party, mostly 
former radical autonomists who advocated for the island to become a new US state, 
considered that former integristas should not be allowed to participate in politics under 
the US regime, fortunately to no avail. Thus, former Volunteers and members of the 
Spanish Unconditional Party participated in the different political parties created after 
1898, although they tended to support options that fought for wide autonomy or outright 
independence from the United States.26  
 As a military concept, however, the Volunteers outlived 1898. The creation of a 
militia of civilians-at-arms might also have served the needs of the Republic of Cuba. For 
instance, during the uprising of Black mambí veterans known as Guerrita de los 
Independientes de Color that took place in eastern Cuba in 1912, the Government created a 
Volunteer Battalion in Guantánamo to fight the Black rebels, as well as a Voluntarios de 
Occidente battalion sent from Havana, and Volunteer units in several small towns of the 
area.27 It is significant that the Cuban Government chose the very name of Volunteers, 
                                                 
25 According to a Madrid-based newspaper, Elías Martínez Nubla met on 20th December 1903 with 
the Minister Vicente Martitegui (1903-1904) on behalf of a Comisión de Jefes y Oficiales movilizados. 
El Heraldo de Madrid, 21-09-1903, p. 2. 
26 Vicente Balbás Capó. Puerto Rico a los diez años de americanización. San Juan: Tip. Heraldo 
Español, 1910, pp. 397-400 & 415-419. 
27 The war (May-July 1912) was caused by the illegalization of the Partido de los Independientes de 
Color, which stood for the rights of the Cubans of African descent, as the Cuban electoral law of 
1910 prohibited the participation of racially-based political parties. The war caused between 2,000 
and 6,000 victims, mostly rebels. For an overview of this conflict, see Rolando Rodríguez. La 




profoundly identified with Spanish integrismo, to name these militias. The name was not 
the only resemblance. The members of the Volunteers created in 1912 were young men 
that had to combine their regular jobs with unpaid military service chasing the rebels.28 
The creation of this militia in 1912, during the first years of a Republic that was still forging 
its national identity, may indicate that the Volunteers were not considered an entirely 
alien Spanish concept, but a model deeply rooted in Cuban history. 
These Volunteers were dissolved in 1912 after having quashed the rebellion, but a 
new project to organize a Cuerpo de Voluntarios de la República de Cuba was presented to 
President Fulgencio Batista (1940-1944) in 1942. On this occasion, a group of army officers 
considered that Cuba’s defensive capacities ought to be strengthened in the context of the 
Second World War. Cuba’s position as an ally of the United States might make the island 
a target for the German U-Boats that patrolled the Atlantic.29 The project was not finally 
approved, but it is worth considering the persistence of the Volunteers as a concept for a 
militia in Cuba as an area worth studying. 
 In Puerto Rico, the legacy of the Volunteers as a militia also outlived 1898. In 1906 
a group of Puerto Ricans who favoured the Americanization of the island tried to create a 
militia made up of young volunteers who would have needed to afford their own uniforms 
and weapons and would combine their regular jobs with unpaid military service in a force 
meant to be the reserves for the US Army in Puerto Rico. This militia was not finally 
created because of the US military authorities’ dislike of the idea of arming Puerto Ricans. 
However, amidst the necessity of reinforcing the defences of its Caribbean colony in the 
context of the First World War, the Puerto Rican branch of the National Guard of the 
United States was created in 1917. This was only possible after the implementation of the 
Jones Act (1917), which granted Puerto Ricans US citizenship, thus allowing them to serve 
in the US armed forces, which included the National Guard, or to be conscripted if 
necessary.30 
Due to the politically charged background of the Volunteers, which had been 
considered the armed wing of Spanish integrismo, the US authorities wanted to consider 
                                                 
28 Carlos Forment Rovira. Crónicas de Santiago de Cuba, vol. II. Santiago de Cuba: Ediciones 
Alqueza, 2005, pp. 27-35; Aline Helg. Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886-
1912. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995, pp. 204-225.  
29 ANRC, Secretaría de la Presidencia, leg. 6, exp. 46. 
30 Rogers M. Smith. “The Bitter Roots of Puerto Rican Citizenship”, in Christina Duffy Burnett & 
Burke Marshall (eds.). Foreign in a Domestic Sense. Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the 
Constitution. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2001, pp. 373-388; Trías Monge. Puerto 
Rico, pp. 67-76.  
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Puerto Rico’s National Guard as heir of the Milicias Disciplinadas. Despite these militias 
having been dismantled in the 1870s, their historical association with Creoles was more 
convenient for the policy of erasing Puerto Rico’s Spanish identity conducted by the 
United States after the invasion of 1898.31 However, the Volunteers and the National Guard 
are similar in certain ways. Both were used by the regular army as a reserve force, and both 
play a political role. The Volunteers embodied the support for Spanish rule among a part 
of Puerto Rican society. The National Guard is an example of the support by part of the 
Puerto Rican people for ever closer ties between the island and the United States amidst a 
context where the status of Puerto Rico has been contested since the US military conquest 
of 1898. 
Thus, although the Spanish Volunteers vanished from history in 1898, the idea of 
a militia of civilians-at-arms to serve as the regular army reserve and to defend a political 
cause outlived in the Antilles after the end of Spanish sovereignty. In this regard, exploring 
the links between the men who donned the Volunteers uniform before 1898 and the 
creation of the new Volunteers in Cuba in 1912, and the US National Guard in Puerto Rico 
in 1917 might reveal new paths and suggest new interpretations of the history of the 
Antilles after the end of the Spanish Empire, through the persistence of some of its 
imperial legacies. The idea of the Volunteers as a militia might have survived the collapse 
of the Spanish Empire after all.
                                                 




This thesis aimed to demonstrate that the Volunteers were an expression of the ambivalent 
relationship between Nation and Empire in the Spanish context of the second half of the 
19th century. The boundaries between these two concepts were rather permeable. This was 
the consequence of the existence of a strong Spanish Loyalism, or integrismo, especially in 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, of which the Volunteers were the most militant form. In a way, the 
Volunteers were the embodiment of the ideal of a Spanish imperial nation, since their 
ranks were filled by men born both in the metropolitan as well as in the overseas 
territories. Study of this group, which has been ignored by many scholars, has allowed 
some key questions to be answered here regarding Spanish imperial history.  
First, the question of why there was a militia such as the Volunteers in the Spanish 
imperial context of the second half of the 19th century. The very existence of the Volunteers 
was linked to the survival of Spanish sovereignty in the territories that were left after losing 
the bulk of the empire, because of the wars for independence in Spanish America in the 
1820s: Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and briefly Santo Domingo. The creation of the 
Volunteers in Cuba in 1855 was aimed at strengthening the defensive capacities of the 
Spanish authorities, faced with a threat posed by a movement supported by some sectors 
both in Cuba and in the United States to annex the island manu militari to the American 
Union. Because of their effectiveness, the Volunteers became permanent elements of the 
Spanish defensive system in Cuba that were widely used by the Spanish authorities during 
the three wars for independence on this island between 1868 and 1898. The same scheme 
was repeated in the Philippines during the Filipino Revolution (1896-1898), where the 
Volunteers were created to strengthen Spanish sovereignty in the archipelago and fought, 
alongside the Spanish regular army, the forces that threatened to bring Spanish 
dominance in the Asian colony to an end. The Volunteers were created to defend the status 
quo and fight any attempt at altering the colonial relationship between Spain and her 
imperial possessions. This was the basic concept that also explains the expansion of the 
model of the Volunteers to Puerto Rico in 1864 and the Philippines in 1896. It is notable 
that the Volunteers opposed not just movements aimed at severing the ties between Spain 
and the colonies, but any political movement aimed at altering the status quo. For 
instance, whereas there were powerful pro-independence movements in Cuba and the 
Philippines, in Puerto Rico this was extremely insignificant. On this island, the continuity 
of the status quo was only questioned by the autonomist movement, which advocated for 
self-government for the Puerto Ricans yet within the wider framework of the Spanish 
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Nation. Despite this allegiance to Spain, the Volunteers in Puerto Rico were used by the 
local integristas to repress the autonomists, as seen during the compontes in 1887. 
It is also remarkable that the role of the Volunteers in relation to Spanish 
sovereignty in an imperial context was not only defensive but also offensive. That is, the 
Volunteers not only defended their lands from forces that wanted to alter them but also 
were used to impose Spanish sovereignty in places where it was long gone. An example of 
this is the creation of the Volunteers in Santo Domingo after the reincorporation of this 
former Spanish colony to the Monarchy in 1861. In this territory, where the Spanish had 
been absent for almost half a century since the independence of 1821, the Volunteers 
became an inherent element of the Spanish imperial administration almost from its very 
implementation. The Volunteers in Santo Domingo present a unique case, for it was 
conditioned by the short-lived Spanish administration (1861-1865), and the inexistence of 
a local community of integristas. Consequently, the Volunteers in this country had a weak 
relationship with local society, as their men were recruited almost exclusively from 
officials and merchants recently arrived from metropolitan Spain, Cuba, or Puerto Rico. 
The Dominican case is another expression of the inherent relationship between the 
Volunteers and defence of the Spanish sovereignty in the imperial context of the second 
half of the 19th century, and sheds light on the more celebrated examples elsewhere.      
Second, there is the question of the degree to which societies of Cuba, Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines participated in the creation and consolidation of the Volunteers as the 
armed wing of Spanish Loyalism. The Volunteers were a type of militia in which both 
peninsulares and men born in the overseas territories participated. Consequently, the 
Volunteers became the embodiment of the very idea of an imperial Spanish nation that 
embraced the metropolitan territory and the overseas possessions. This stemmed from the 
fact that one of the requisites for joining the Volunteers was to be Spanish citizen, a status 
granted to all the free inhabitants of the Spanish Antilles and the people of Spanish 
ancestry in the Philippines. Whereas the political relationship between Spain and her 
empire after 1820 had in many aspects an undeniably colonial nature, it is worth 
remembering that Cuba and Puerto Rico were de jure Spanish national overseas territories 
(their free inhabitants were Spanish citizens, had representation in the Spanish 
Parliament, they were considered provinces just like the rest of Spain and the metropolitan 
laws were applied although with some adaptations) , whereas the Philippines were always 
considered a colony until the end of the Spanish rule in 1898. This differentiation in terms 
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of citizenship between Cuba and Puerto Rico on the one hand and the Philippines on the 
other was also reflected in the local characteristics of the Volunteers. 
In Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Volunteers presented some common features. In 
quantitative terms, the men born in metropolitan Spain tended to dominate in the units 
created in the urban spaces, whereas the natives of the Antilles tended to be the majority 
in the companies and battalions located in the rural areas. This spatial distribution also 
affected the professional background of the Volunteers. Whereas in the cities the men 
employed in commerce became the bedrock of the Volunteers, in the rural areas most of 
their members were Cuban and Puerto Rican peasants employed in the agricultural 
industry or independent owners of small tracts of land. Grosso modo, it could be said that 
the dominant profile of the Volunteers in places like Havana or San Juan was a peninsular 
immigrant employed by a fellow peninsular in the commerce trade. In the countryside of 
Cuba or Puerto Rico, most of the Volunteers were peasants working either their own lands 
or employed in the sugar, tobacco, or coffee industries. 
In the Philippines, the situation was rather different. The Asian archipelago 
presented demographic characteristics radically different from the Spanish Antilles. 
Whereas a majority of the population in Cuba and Puerto Rico was of Spanish ancestry, 
and the Spanish culture (the basics of language and religion) was hegemonic even among 
the population of African descent that had adopted it through the centuries, though with 
a profound syncretism, the Philippines had a fragmented society with fewer links to the 
Spanish culture. The community of Spanish descent was rather small, and knowledge of 
the Spanish language was constrained to a minority of Filipinos related to the colonial 
administration. Spain’s deepest cultural penetration in the archipelago was the Catholic 
faith, followed by most Filipinos, though there were important pockets of Muslim 
communities in the southern islands. Consequently, the Volunteers in the Philippines 
were a segregated militia. The potential recruits were limited to the tiny community of 
Spaniards (including the members of Spanish families born in the archipelago) mostly 
concentrated in the capital, Manila, and a few other cities. The participation of the native 
Filipinos in the Volunteers came about through a separate avenue. Drawing on the same 
model of militia, units of native Filipino Volunteers were created in 1897, though all the 
new units were attached to regular army units to keep them under tighter control.  
From the participation of both peninsulares and Creoles in the Volunteers, two 
main inferences can be made. Firstly, the support for any form of Spanish Loyalism was 
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not constrained to the communities of peninsulares established in Cuba or Puerto Rico. 
On the contrary, thousands of Creoles joined the Volunteer efforts in repressing the 
movements that wanted to alter the relationship between Spain and the Antilles, either 
through reforms or outright independence. An example of this can be found in the 
repression of the Puerto Rican autonomists, or Cuban nationalists during the wars for 
independence. 
Secondly, the existence of thousands of Creoles in the Volunteers lead to the 
argument here that the struggles for independence in Cuba should be considered as much 
civil wars as wars for national emancipation. This is a consideration historically rejected 
by the historiography, but which has been supported by historians more recently in 
relation to the wars for independence in Spanish America in the 1820s. For instance, Pérez 
Vejo considers that the wars for independence in Spanish America (1810-1825) were true 
civil wars between Americans, not conflicts between pre-existing American nations and 
Spain or between Creoles and peninsulares.1 The wars in Cuba should be regarded as the 
last example of these Spanish American civil wars. However, the nationalist character of 
the wars in Cuba should not be rejected either. This is, for instance, the view of Tone: “The 
Cuban War of Independence was both a war of national liberation and a civil war about 
the meaning of Cubanidad”.2 Consideration of this idea also brings up the recent study on 
civil wars by the British historian David Armitage. He considers that “Without sovereignty 
and its external recognition, it seems, there can be no civitas, and hence no ‘civil’ war”.3 In 
the case that concerns us, the sovereignty was Spanish, and the civitas was Cuba. The 
question was whether Cuba should attain its own sovereignty, or should it remain under 
the Spanish one? The Volunteers were just one of the sides that contested the future of 
the community they belonged to. This was a question first and foremost debated within 
Cuban society, where the boundaries between Cubans and peninsulares were blurry rather 
than neat. Most of the island’s inhabitants were of Spanish ancestry, and the Cuban 
supporters of independence were often the sons of peninsulares who supported the union 
with Spain. For instance, the mastermind of Cuban independence, José Martí, was the son 
of a Spanish Army soldier from Valencia, in the Peninsula, and a woman from the Canary 
Islands.  
                                                 
1 Pérez Vejo. Elegía criolla, p. 111. 
2 Tone. War and Genocide, p. 145. 
3 David Armitage. Civil Wars. A History in Ideas. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017, p. 219. 
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The strong presence of Creoles in the Volunteers must not conceal the fact that 
the peninsulares played a prominent role in the creation, configuration, and evolution of 
the Volunteers. In fact, the creation of the Volunteers was linked to the emergence of the 
elite of peninsulares that came to dominate Cuban politics and its economy since the 
1840s. It should be remembered that the Spanish authorities in Cuba first created the 
Volunteers in 1855, aiming at establishing a militia of peninsulares that would marginalize 
the Creoles from the defence of the island. Thus, the unexpected participation of Creoles 
in the Volunteers was only allowed by the fact that White Cubans were legally Spanish 
citizens, and the authorities could not bar them from joining the new militia. Throughout 
their history, peninsulares were overrepresented in the Volunteers. This was a 
consequence of their dominant position in the economy of the Spanish Antilles, where 
they enjoyed a virtual monopoly over commerce. The affluent businessmen that first 
organized the Volunteers were mostly peninsulares, who also tended to recruit men for 
the militia from among their employees, also often born in metropolitan Spain. Although 
thousands of Creoles were members of the Volunteers, and they came to dominate in the 
countryside, the peninsulares played a leading role in the militia’s history as organizers 
and commanders. 
Third, the relationship between the Volunteers and the Spanish authorities was 
ambivalent. The Volunteers represented a double-edged reality for the colonial Spanish 
authorities. On the one hand, they were a militia absolutely identified with the defence of 
the status quo and the continuity of Spanish sovereignty. On the other, they were a force 
of citizens-at-arms that might be manipulated to impose the agenda of certain elements 
of integrismo which were not always collaborative with the authorities. 
The Volunteers often proved a reliable auxiliary force for the Spanish authorities. 
In the 1850s and 1860s, they played a coercive role against Cuban annexationists and 
supported the Spanish military effort in colonial campaigns in Morocco and Santo 
Domingo by means of financial and logistic aid. During the wars in Cuba and the 
Philippines they generally proved a loyal auxiliary force for the regular Spanish troops. In 
fact, a great deal of the upholding of public order in cities and fighting in rural areas was 
conducted by the Volunteers. Certainly, the military preparation of these men, who had 
to combine their regular job with unpaid military service, was improvable but was enough 
to perform as useful auxiliary forces to the army. However, their military capacity highly 
depended on the concordant performance by the regular army. This became particularly 
clear during the last war for Cuban independence (1895-1898). Wherever the regular 
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troopers stood their ground, the Volunteers were efficient fighters. When the Army’s 
performance was weak or even non-existent, the Volunteers tended to collapse, and even 
to join the insurgents in some cases. Thus, the Volunteers reflected the Spanish general 
military capacity at any given moment. 
The episodes of confrontation between the Volunteers and the authorities directly 
depended on the colonial policy dictated by the Spanish Governments and the internal 
tensions that existed within the Volunteer ranks. The best examples of this occasional 
confrontation were the pressure of the Havana Volunteers on the authorities to execute 
the plotter Ramón Pintó in 1855, the ousting of captain general Domingo Dulce in 1869, 
the pressure against the reformist policy dictated by the Spanish Government in Puerto 
Rico during the early 1870s, and the opposition to Cuban autonomy in 1898. The common 
denominator was the Spanish authorities’ intention to change the status quo via reforms. 
Thus, rather than exclusively defend Spanish soveringeignty, the Volunteers stood for the 
continuity of a status quo, in which Spanish sovereignty was a sine qua non element, of 
course. This status quo could be summed up as a situation in which the peninsulares 
dominated commerce and the colonial administration. Consequently, all the episodes of 
confrontation took place in the urban spaces, where the peninsulares predominated. In 
fact, opposition to the authorities’ reformism came from the Volunteers’ lower social 
strata. This is easily understandable, since the metropolitan immigrant employed in 
commerce, or occupying just a minor position in the administration, might have his 
position threatened should the Cubans or Puerto Ricans be given more participation in 
public affairs, or should changes in the economic relationship alter the quasi-monopolistic 
position of the peninsulares in commerce. Supporting the defence of these privileges, the 
development of the labour movement in Cuba also strengthened this use of the Volunteers 
as a tool to push forward the class agenda of the lower strata of the militia. An example of 
this is the presence of armed Volunteers in strikes taking place in Havana in the early 1870s 
and 1890s. By contrast, the absence of a labour movement in Puerto Rico explains the fact 
that the local Volunteers never carried out a confrontation with the authorities similar in 
scale to the events caused by their colleagues in Havana.  
 
To summarize, the main contributions of this thesis to historiography are, first, 
that the creation of the Volunteers must be understood in relation to the annexationist 
threat to Spanish sovereignty in Cuba, the weakness of the Spanish State on the island, 
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and the emergence of a powerful elite of peninsulares and some of their Creole allies. The 
Volunteers were intended to strengthen Spain’s grip over Cuba, and to replace the criollos 
from the Spanish military system. In relation to this, their open support for Spain’s colonial 
campaigns in Africa and the Caribbean during the 1860s, allowed the Volunteers to 
consolidate in Cuba and to expand their model to Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. 
Second, this thesis demonstrates that the Volunteers reflected the societies they were born 
in. This was a militia where peninsulares and criollos participated alike, though with a 
different spatial distribution. The former predominated in the urban spaces, whereas the 
latter were the majority in the countryside. Also, the Volunteers were a non-segregated 
militia. Most of the members were white, but there were also Volunteers of African 
descent. The Philippines was the exception, for Europeans and native Filipinos were 
organized into segregated units. Third, the relationship between the Volunteers and the 
Spanish authorities alternated between collaboration and defiance. When the Volunteers 
perceived that the authorities represented their interests (basically a firm commitment to 
maintaining the status quo), they behaved loyally. When the authorities were willing to 
introduce reforms that could alter the colonial relationship (such as more political rights, 
autonomy, of the abolition of slavery), the Volunteers in the urban areas tended to stand 
in open defiance of Spain’s authority. Fourth, ideologically, the Volunteers were only 
united by their commitment to the integridad nacional, which considered Spain and her 
colonies as members of the same nation. Beyond this point, they were a highly 
heterogeneous group in political terms. The internal ideological differences often resulted 
from social divisions. Volunteers from the highest echelons of society tended to be 
moderately conservative and monarchist. Volunteers that belonged to middle and lower 
strata of society, tended to be radically nationalist, often embracing liberal and republican 
ideals. These Volunteers represent a sound example of populist nationalism, committed 
to the idea of the Nation, but not always to the authorities that theoretically represented 
it. These divisions were particularly marked in the urban areas. In the countryside, the 
Volunteers were much less politically-driven and generally presented collaborative 
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